Dunham Trust Company v. Ruth Surrey

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DUNHAM TRUST COMPANY,
Appellant,
v.
RUTH SURREY,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-1889
[April 29, 2026]
Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michele Towbin Singer, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 062025CA002470AXXXCE.
Jon Scuderi of Goldman Felcoski & Stone, P.A., Naples, for appellant.
Michael J. Labbee, Tyler A. Hayden, and Natalie P. Thomas of Phillips,
Hayden & Labbee, LLP, St. Petersburg, for appellee.
CIKLIN, J.
Dunham Trust Company (“DTC”) appeals an order denying its motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 	DTC, a Nevada corporation,
argues that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to allow the
state’s courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over it consistent with due
process requirements. We agree and reverse and remand with instructions
to dismiss the complaint.
Background
The litigation concerns a trust created by Mildred Surrey in 2001 for
the benefit of her two children, Lewis and Ruth, prior to her death in 2005.
Mildred was a Florida resident when the trust was created, and the trust
instrument states that its “validity and interpretation” shall be governed
by Florida law.
In 2014, DTC was appointed as a successor co-trustee of Mildred’s
trust. 	Lewis was the other co-trustee. 	When DTC was appointed, Lewis

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was a California resident and Ruth was a Nevada resident. 	Lewis later
moved to Florida.
Ruth filed a complaint against DTC in Broward County circuit court
stating causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
and accounting. She alleges that Lewis misappropriated millions of dollars
in trust assets, and DTC breached its fiduciary duties by either facilitating
or failing to prevent Lewis’s misconduct.
DTC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
DTC 	conceded 	that 	the 	complaint 	sufficiently 	alleged 	a 	basis 	for
jurisdiction 	under 	section 	736.0202(2)(a)3., 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2024),
because Mildred was a Florida resident when the trust was created. 	But
DTC argued that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to allow
the 	court 	to 	exercise 	jurisdiction 	consistent 	with 	due 	process
requirements.
To support its motion, DTC submitted an affidavit executed by its
President and Chief Trust Officer, Ann Rosevear. 	Rosevear attested that:
DTC is incorporated in Nevada and is licensed as a trust company in
Nevada, Wyoming, and Colorado; its only offices are in Nevada; it does not
maintain an office in Florida or conduct any business there; and all of
DTC’s duties in administering Mildred’s trust are handled in Nevada and
are governed by Nevada law.
Ruth responded with an affidavit in which she attested that DTC had
purposefully availed itself of conducting business in Florida by agreeing to
serve as co-trustee of a trust created by a Florida resident and governed
by Florida law. Ruth also attested that DTC had “connected its trusteeship
to Florida” by sending trust-related communications, such as account
statements, invoices, and wire transfer confirmations, to Lewis after he
moved to Florida.
The trial court denied DTC’s motion to dismiss. 	The court agreed with
Ruth’s argument that DTC had established a sufficient connection with
Florida by acting as co-trustee of Mildred’s trust.
DTC filed a timely notice of appeal.
Analysis
We review the trial court’s order denying DTC’s motion to dismiss de
novo. 	Karisma Hotels & Resorts Corp. Ltd. v. Hoffman, 400 So. 3d 10, 14
(Fla. 4th DCA 2025).

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Determining whether a Florida court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant involves a two-step analysis: (1) whether the
complaint 	sufficiently 	alleges 	a 	statutory 	basis 	for 	the 	exercise 	of
jurisdiction, 	and 	(2) 	whether 	the 	defendant 	has 	sufficient 	minimum
contacts with the state to allow the court to exercise jurisdiction consistent
with 	due 	process 	requirements. 	Id. 	(citing 	Venetian 	Salami 	Co. 	v.
Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)).
Here, DTC concedes that the complaint sufficiently alleges a statutory
basis for jurisdiction. 	The issue on appeal is whether DTC has sufficient
minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements.
The minimum contacts test asks whether the defendant’s “suit-related
conduct” created a “substantial connection” with the forum state. Walden
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). 	The defendant, by his own conduct,
must have “purposefully avail[ed]” himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws. 	Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985)
(citation omitted); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (stating that the defendant’s conduct and connection
with the forum state must be such that “he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there”).
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. 	Ruth maintains that
DTC established sufficient minimum contacts with Florida by: (1) agreeing
to 	serve 	as 	co-trustee 	of 	a 	trust 	created 	by 	a 	Florida 	resident 	and
containing a Florida choice-of-law provision, and (2) sending trust-related
communications to Lewis after he moved to Florida.
The United States Supreme Court considered this issue under similar
facts 	in 	Hanson 	v. 	Denckla, 	357 	U.S. 	235 	(1958). 	In 	that 	case, 	a
Pennsylvania 	resident 	executed 	a 	trust 	instrument 	in 	Delaware 	and
appointed a Delaware company as trustee. 	Id. at 238. 	The settlor later
moved to Florida, where she executed a power of appointment in which
she appointed a portion of the trust assets to two other trusts. Id. at 239.
After the settlor’s death, two beneficiaries of a residuary clause in her will
filed suit in Florida, alleging that the original trust instrument was invalid.
See id. at 239-43. 	The suit named the Delaware trustee among other
defendants. 	Id. at 240-41. 	The case travelled to the Supreme Court on
several issues, including whether the Delaware trustee had a “sufficient
affiliation” with the state of Florida to allow the state’s courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over it. 	See id. at 250-51.

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The Supreme Court held that the trustee’s actions were insufficient to
sustain the Florida court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction because the
trustee had not purposefully availed itself of conducting business in
Florida. 	Id. at 253-54. 	The Court noted that the trustee did not have an
office in Florida or conduct any business there, had not solicited any
business there, and had not administered any of the trust assets there.
Id. at 251. 	The Court explained that the cause of action did not arise out
of an “act done or transaction consummated” in Florida, and the trust was
connected to Florida only by the settlor’s “unilateral activity” in moving to
the state and executing the power of appointment there. 	Id. at 251-53.
The Court concluded that the trustee’s remitting of trust income to the
settlor after she moved to Florida was insufficient to create the necessary
relationship with the state. 	Id. at 252. 	The Court also acknowledged the
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that Florida law applied to determine the
validity of the trust and the power of appointment, but it held that ruling
did not confer personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee even if it was
correct for choice-of-law purposes. 	Id. at 253.
Like the nonresident trustee in Hanson, DTC is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Florida because it did not purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of conducting business in Florida. Although DTC agreed to serve
as co-trustee of a trust created by a Florida resident, DTC was not a party
to the trust instrument when it was executed in Florida, and no evidence
indicates that DTC solicited the appointment as co-trustee or otherwise
intentionally sought to create a relationship with Florida. 	DTC merely
accepted the appointment and assumed its predecessor’s duties. 	See
Hoag v. French, 357 P.3d 153, 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a
Bahamian 	corporation 	did 	not 	purposefully 	avail 	itself 	of 	conducting
business in Arizona by accepting an appointment as successor trustee of
a trust created by an Arizona resident); see also Phillips Exeter Acad. v.
Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 292 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that,
to 	establish 	purposeful 	availment, 	“it 	is 	not 	enough 	to 	prove 	that 	a
defendant agreed to act as the trustee of a trust that benefitted a resident
of the forum state”; instead, the defendant must have “actually reached
out to the [forum state] to create a relationship”) (emphasis in original).
The trust’s choice-of-law provision is immaterial because a choice-of-
law provision alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. 	See Burke Prods., Inc. v. Access Elecs., LLC, 311
So. 3d 145, 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). 	See also Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.1
1 We also note that the choice-of-law provision would not have caused DTC to
reasonably foresee being sued in Florida for claims related to its administration
of the trust, which Ruth did not dispute occurred in Nevada. The choice-of-law

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We also reject the argument that DTC created a sufficient connection
with Florida by sending routine trust-related communications to Lewis
while Lewis resided in Florida. 	The minimum contacts analysis “looks to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.” 	Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. 	DTC
did not create any significant relationship with Florida by sending account
statements, invoices, and wire transfer confirmations to Lewis after he
moved here. 	See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252 (holding that the Delaware
trustee did not establish a sufficient connection with Florida by remitting
trust income to the settlor after she moved to Florida); Rose v. Firstar Bank,
819 A.2d 1247, 1252 (R.I. 2003) (holding that an Ohio trustee did not
establish minimum contacts with Rhode Island by sending statements and
checks to beneficiaries who lived in Rhode Island); Hoag, 357 P.3d at 158-
59 	(holding 	that 	the 	Bahamian 	trustee 	did 	not 	establish 	minimum
contacts with Arizona by sending trust payments and documents to the
settlor in Arizona).
Further, Ruth did not show that the communications which DTC sent
to Lewis in Florida were related to her causes of action. 	See Walden, 571
U.S. at 284 (stating that the defendant’s “suit-related conduct” must create
a substantial connection with the forum state); Corporacion Aero Angeles,
S.A. v. Fernandez, 69 So. 3d 295, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (stating that
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state “must be related to the
plaintiff’s cause of action or have given rise to it”).
Ruth’s causes of action arise from DTC’s administration of the trust,
which she did not dispute occurred solely in Nevada. Any decisions which
DTC made in connection with the trust, including decisions related to its
alleged 	facilitation 	of 	or 	failure 	to 	prevent 	Lewis’s 	misconduct, 	were
necessarily made in Nevada and were connected to Florida only by Lewis’s
unilateral activity in moving here after DTC accepted the appointment as
co-trustee. 	See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-54; Rose, 819 A.2d at 1254
(holding that claims related to the Ohio trustee’s alleged mismanagement
of the trust arose from decisions that were necessarily made in Ohio, where
provision applies only to the “validity and interpretation” of the trust instrument;
the provision does not specify where the trust must be administered nor require
the administration to be governed by any particular law. 	See generally Silver v.
Horneck, 216 N.E.3d 970, 979-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021) (holding that a provision in
a trust document stating that the “validity and effect” of the trust would be
governed by Illinois law did not constitute a designation of Illinois as the principal
place of administration for the purpose of applying the Illinois long-arm statute).

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the 	trust 	was 	administered, 	not 	from 	the 	trustee’s 	periodic
communications with the beneficiaries in Rhode Island).
In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying DTC’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because the undisputed
facts 	do 	not 	establish 	that 	DTC 	purposefully 	created 	a 	sufficient
connection 	with 	Florida 	to 	allow 	our 	courts 	to 	exercise 	personal
jurisdiction over DTC consistent with due process requirements. 	To hold
otherwise would subject any nonresident trustee to personal jurisdiction
in Florida based on the residence of a settlor or beneficiary, which would
be inconsistent with well-established constitutional principles.
We 	therefore 	reverse 	the 	trial 	court’s 	order 	and 	remand 	with
instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
GERBER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.