Robert C. Dart v. Ariane Dart

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
ROBERT C. DART,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
ARIANE DART,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 4D2024-1525
[January 7, 2026]
Appeal 	and 	cross-appeal 	from 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	for 	the 	Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Darren D. Shull, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 50-2019-DR-007552-XXXX-MB.
Nancy W. Gregoire Stamper of Birnbaum, Lippman & Gregoire, PLLC,
Fort Lauderdale, and Joel M. Weissman and Ashley Bolender of Joel M.
Weissman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Zachary R. Potter, Lawrence J. Hamilton II, and Fabiola M. Delgado
Cruz of Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas, LLP, West
Palm Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant.
C ONNER , J.
Husband appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage. 	He
asserts three grounds for reversal. 	Wife cross-appeals the trial court’s
denial of her claim for retroactive child support. 	We affirm without
discussion the trial court’s rulings as to Husband’s appeal. On the cross-
appeal, we reverse the trial court’s denial of retroactive child support.
Background
Our background discussion of Wife’s cross-appeal is limited to the
history pertinent to the trial court’s denial of retroactive child support.
Husband had considerable wealth when he met Wife, and the parties
entered into a prenuptial agreement. During the marriage, the parties had
two children.

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Subsequently, Husband petitioned to dissolve the marriage and Wife
counter-petitioned. 	One month after the case was filed, Wife moved for
temporary relief, including child support. The next day, Husband objected
to mandatory financial disclosure, arguing “finances [were] not an issue
for the children in this lawsuit.” 	Significantly, Husband’s dissolution
petition admitted he was obligated to pay the guideline amount of child
support and did not request a downward deviation in the guideline amount
of support he was obligated to pay.
The parties filed motions regarding the prenuptial agreement’s validity
and effect. 	Thereafter, the parties submitted an agreed order regarding
the prenuptial agreement’s choice of law. 	The agreed order provided:
“Pennsylvania law shall govern interpretation and application of the terms
and conditions of the parties’ valid and enforceable Prenuptial Agreement
excluding the issues of child support which shall be governed by Florida
law.” The same day, the trial court entered an agreed order regarding child
support issues in response to Wife’s motion for temporary child support.
The agreed child support order stated:
ORDERED:
1. 	The Court shall address the Wife’s application for child
support (as contained in her Motion for Temporary Relief, DE
34) at the time of trial.
2. 	Any monthly child support amount determined by the
Court, 	should 	the 	amount 	not 	have 	been 	paid 	(direct 	or
indirect) by the Husband to the Wife, said amount shall be
subject 	to 	the 	Court’s 	requirement 	to 	provide 	amount(s)
retroactively.
During the pendency of the dissolution proceeding, the parties’ oldest
child became an adult.
In orally ruling at the end of trial on the matter of child support, the
trial 	court 	first 	addressed 	Wife’s 	claim 	for 	retroactive 	child 	support
(including retroactive support for the time the oldest child was a minor).
The trial court denied any retroactive support. 	For reasons that are
unclear from the record, the trial court stated:
The Court does not award retroactive child support in this
case. 	There was an agreement that was in the—that was in
the prenuptial agreement. 	She agreed to—the mother agreed
to it. 	It was already agreed to. 	The law states—Florida law

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states that unless it adversely affects the child, basically, and
in no shape or form was there any evidence regarding the
adverse effect on either of the children.
The trial court’s final judgment likewise denied retroactive child support.
After the final dissolution judgment was entered and both parties’
motions for rehearing were denied, both parties gave notice of appeal.
Appellate Analysis
Wife 	contends 	the 	trial 	court 	applied 	the 	wrong 	law 	by 	denying
retroactive 	child 	support 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	agreed 	orders. 	More
specifically, she argues that trial court’s denial of retroactive child support
essentially found that Wife had voluntarily paid Husband’s child support
obligation by waiting until the final hearing to address temporary support,
and the children suffered no detriment. 	Wife further argues retroactive
child support was mandatory and the trial court erred in determining the
prenuptial agreement controlled retroactive child support.
Husband argues that the trial court did not base its denial of retroactive
child support on the prenuptial agreement, but rather ruled that the
children had no need for the retroactive support. 	Thus, Husband argues,
as a matter of discretion, the trial court properly denied an award of
retroactive child support.
The parties agree our review of the denial of retroactive child support,
based on the interpretation of a prenuptial agreement, stipulation, or
agreed pretrial order, is de novo. 	See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Rodriguez,
256 So. 3d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“A trial court’s interpretation of
a contract [memorialized by an agreed order] is reviewed de novo.” (citation
omitted)); Wiener v. The Country Club at Woodfield, Inc., 254 So. 3d 488,
491–92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (same); Jones v. Blue Ridge Mfg., LLC, 353 So.
3d 69, 72–73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“Pretrial stipulations are interpreted
using the same principles for interpreting written contracts. . . . When
construing stipulations, a court should attempt to interpret it in line with
the apparent intent of the parties.” (quoting Wiener, 254 So. 3d at 491–
92)). 	Absent consideration of a prenuptial agreement, stipulation, or
agreed pretrial order, child support awards are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Coe v. Rautenberg, 358 So. 3d 24, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“The
standard of review regarding equitable distribution, timesharing, and child
support is abuse of discretion.”).

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We first observe that below and on appeal, both parties agree that the
prenuptial agreement did not control or affect the parties’ obligation as to
child support. 	Thus, we need not apply contract interpretation principles
to resolve the retroactive child support matter. 	We again point out that
the cross-appeal is limited to the issue of retroactive child support. Thus,
the issue we address on cross-appeal is the effect of pretrial orders
regarding how retroactive child support would be handled at trial.
On the same day in February 2022, almost two years before the final
hearing, the trial court entered two agreed pretrial orders. The first agreed
pretrial order ruled that child support was to be determined under Florida
law, rather than Pennsylvania law. 	The second agreed order ruled that
Wife’s application for temporary child support would be addressed at trial
and, most significantly, “[a]ny monthly child support amount determined
by the [c]ourt, should the amount not have been paid (direct or indirect)
by the Husband to the Wife, said amount shall be subject to the [c]ourt’s
requirement to provide amount(s) retroactively.” 	More importantly, no
subsequent nonfinal orders or stipulations modified the February 2022
agreed orders.
As we said in Jones, “[a] Pretrial Stipulation is a powerful blueprint that
enables a well-run and fair trial[] . . . [that is] binding upon the parties and
the court, and should be strictly enforced.” 353 So. 3d at 74 (emphasis
added) (quoting Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Broward Marine, Inc.,
174 So. 3d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)). 	We further said: “It is
axiomatic, 	however, 	that 	any 	such 	stipulations 	be 	clear, 	positive,
definitive, and unambiguous.” 	Id. 	Because the February 2022 orders
discussed above were “agreed,” we deem the legal principles regarding
pretrial stipulations discussed in Jones and Palm Beach Polo Holdings
applicable to those orders. 	We also conclude the February 2022 agreed
orders were “clear, positive, definitive, and unambiguous.”
Additionally, we agree with Wife that the legislature has made clear that
child support is the parents’ dual obligation, which is shared according to
the parents’ relative incomes. § 61.30(17), Fla. Stat. (2024). We also agree
with the Second District that “the mother’s ability to provide the child with
[] basic needs [does not] excuse the father from supporting the child.”
T.T.L. v. F.A.L., 367 So. 3d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); see also
Johnson v. Johnson, 297 So. 3d 700, 704–05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“The
trial court erred in failing to fully consider retroactive child support, which
is a dual obligation by both parents owed to the children.”). As Wife points
out, we have said: “Although the award of retroactive child support is
discretionary, appellate courts routinely find it error to not award it.”
Nierenberg v. Nierenberg, 758 So. 2d, 1179, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)

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(citation omitted). 	That is particularly true when one considers that child
support is the child’s right, not the parent’s right. 	See Coffy v. Coffy, 321
So. 3d 230, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“It is well-established under Florida
law that parents cannot contract away their children’s right to support.”).
Because the parties agreed that retroactive child support would be
considered at the final hearing and Husband’s unpaid support during the
pendency 	of 	the 	proceedings 	would 	be 	awarded 	as 	retroactive 	child
support once Husband’s ongoing child support obligation was determined,
we hold the trial court erred in denying retroactive child support.
Conclusion
As discussed above, we affirm without discussion all the trial court’s
rulings in the final judgment dissolving the marriage, except for the denial
of retroactive child support. 	We reverse the denial of retroactive child
support and remand for further proceedings to determine and award the
appropriate 	amount 	of 	retroactive 	child 	support 	and 	the 	manner 	of
payment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
MAY and GERBER , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.