Jean Joseph v. State of Florida

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

JEAN JOSEPH,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-1337
[November 12, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Samantha Schosberg Feuer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2025-
MH-001054-XXXA-NB.

Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jacqueline I.
Kurland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Jean Joseph appeals an involuntary inpatient placement order! issued
pursuant to the Baker Act.2, Joseph contends the state’s evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate a finding of “mental illness” under the Baker
Act. The state has conceded error. We agree the trial court erred.

To qualify as a “mental illness” under section 394.455(29), Florida
Statutes (2025), an “impairment of |] mental or emotional processes” must
affect a person’s “exercise [of] conscious control of one’s actions or of the
ability to perceive or understand reality” and that impairment must also

1 Appellant’s release has not rendered this case moot. See Godwin v. State, 593
So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992).

2 Part 1 of chapter 394 is referred to as “The Florida Mental Health Act” or “The
Baker Act.” § 394.451, Fla. Stat. (2025).

“substantially interfere[] with the person’s ability to meet the ordinary
demands of living.” In addition, “there must [|] be clear and convincing
evidence that without treatment, the patient would pose a real and present
threat of substantial harm to h[im]self, or a substantial likelihood that in
the near future [|he will inflict serious bodily harm on h[im|self or another,
as evidenced by recent behavior.” Boller v. State, 775 So. 2d 408, 409-10
(Fla. lst DCA 2000) (citing § 394.467(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (1999)) (other
citation omitted).

Upon our review of the record, we find no evidence that Joseph was
affected by an impaired mental or emotional process as required by
sections 394.455(29) and 394.467(1)(a)2. Rather, the evidence, at most,
suggests a lack of self-care and a desire to not speak with hospital staff or
otherwise submit to treatment. The state did not present any evidence to
show that Joseph was delusional, thinking irrationally, or caused any
concern that he would be likely to inflict serious bodily harm either to
himself or someone else. As a result, we reverse the order imposing
involuntary inpatient placement.

Reversed.
KUNTZ, C.J., GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.