Wynne Building Corporation v. Spanish Lakes Country Club Village Homeowner's Association, Inc. and Spanish Lakes-Golf Village Homeowners Association, Inc.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WYNNE BUILDING CORPORATION,
Appellant,
v.
SPANISH LAKES COUNTRY CLUB VILLAGE HOMEOWNER’S
ASSOCIATION, INC., and SPANISH LAKES-GOLF VILLAGE
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-2169
[February 11, 2026]
Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562022CA001626AXXXHC.
J. Allen Bobo and Daniel C. Guarnieri of Lutz, Bobo & Telfair, P.A.,
Sarasota, for appellant.
Jacob E. Ensor of Ross Earle Bonan Ensor & Carrigan, P.A., Stuart, for
appellees.
L OTT , J.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 allows “[a] mobile homeowners’
association” 	to 	bring 	a 	class 	action 	“in 	its 	name 	on 	behalf 	of 	all
homeowners concerning matters of common interest,” not subject to Rule
1.220’s normal class-action strictures. 	This appeal concerns whether
multiple mobile homeowners’ associations may bring a single class action
under the rule. We hold that they may not; the rule allows one association
to bring a given claim as a class action on behalf of its own members. But
we 	also 	note 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	has 	broad 	discretion 	to 	join 	and
consolidate related claims, including distinct Rule 1.222 class actions.
Appellees, Plaintiffs below, are two mobile homeowners’ associations.
They are distinct homeowners’ associations representing distinct sets of
member-homeowners, 	but 	they 	sit 	on 	geographically 	proximate 	land
owned by the same owner, Appellant, Defendant below, Wynne Building
Corporation.

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As it concerns this appeal, Plaintiffs brought a six-count amended
complaint 	against 	Wynne.1 	Each 	association 	brought 	three 	counts
seeking, 	respectively, 	declaratory 	relief 	related 	to 	an 	allegedly
unreasonable rent increase in 2021-22; declaratory relief related to an
allegedly unreasonable rent increase in 2022-23; and damages related to
those increases. 	In allegations common to all counts, Plaintiffs alleged
that “[t]he affected homeowners have a right to be represented as a Class
pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.222 and Florida Statute
§ 723.037.”
In considering whether to certify the claims as a Rule 1.222 class, the
trial court found that “the allegations pertaining to the lot rental increases
concern matters of common interest to all mobile park homeowners and,
as such, the Amended Complaint properly alleges a class action pursuant
to Rule 1.222.”
We hold the trial court erred by certifying the six claims “concern[ing]
matters of common interest to all mobile park homeowners [of both
associations]” as “a class action.” 	The trial court should have considered
whether each association was permitted under the rule to bring its claims
on behalf of its own membership.2
Rule 1.222 states:
A mobile homeowners’ association may institute, maintain,
settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf of
all 	homeowners 	concerning 	matters 	of 	common 	interest,
including, but not limited to: the common property; structural
components of a building or other improvements; mechanical,
electrical, and plumbing elements serving the park property;
and protests of ad valorem taxes on commonly used facilities.
If the association has the authority to maintain a class action
under this rule, the association may be joined in an action as
representative of that class with reference to litigation and
1 The proceedings prior to the filing of the amended complaint, as well as the
settlement of the third homeowners’ association that was originally part of the
proceedings, are irrelevant to this appeal.
2 “The standard of review for the trial court’s interpretation of the rules of civil
procedure [] is de novo.” 	Carl Domino, Inc. v. Dixon, 358 So. 3d 29, 32 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2023) (citing Donado v. PennyMac Corp., 174 So. 3d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2015)).

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disputes involving the matters for which the association could
bring a class action under this rule. Nothing herein limits any
statutory or common-law right of any individual homeowner
or 	class 	of 	homeowners 	to 	bring 	any 	action 	which 	may
otherwise be available. An action under this rule shall not be
subject to the requirements of rule 1.220.
The plain language and context of the rule, including the language “[a]
mobile 	homeowners’ 	association,” 	“in 	its 	name 	on 	behalf 	of 	all 	[its]
homeowners,” 	and 	“the 	association,” 	contemplates 	a 	single 	mobile
homeowners’ 	association 	bringing 	a 	class 	action 	on 	behalf 	of 	all
homeowners of that association. 	Allowing multiple associations to band
together to bring a single action that is common to all members across
multiple 	associations 	is 	an 	interpretation 	the 	text 	will 	not 	bear.
The second sentence, for example, would be nonsensical in such a case.
See Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020)
(textual interpretation “requires a methodical and consistent approach
involving faithful reliance upon the natural or reasonable meanings of
language and choosing always a meaning that the text will sensibly bear
by 	the 	fair 	use 	of 	language”) 	(cleaned 	up). 	How 	could 	multiple
homeowners’ associations be joined as defendant representative(s) of a
single class? 	To the contrary, the switch from the indefinite article “a” in
the first sentence to the definite article “the” in the second sentence
(especially in the second clause) contemplates a particular association
bringing a class action contemplated by the rule on behalf of its own
membership. 	The “use of ‘the’ rather than ‘a’ . . . presupposes that these
are particular and definable actors who must be involved for the statute to
apply.” 	Brito v. Salas, 2025 WL 3765686, *6 (Fla. Dec. 30, 2025). 	“The
definite article, the, usually introduces a particular thing or individual
group, one that was mentioned before or whose existence is known or
presumed to be known.” 	Id. at *7 (cleaned up).
This reading also accords with our interpretations of rule 1.221, an
analogous rule providing for class actions by condominium and non-
mobile homeowners’ associations. 	See, e.g., Brazilian Court Hotel Condo.
Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Walker, 584 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
(“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.221 provides the procedural means by
which the Association may represent unit owners as a class and requires
that the action involve matters of common interest.”); Kesl, Inc. v. Racquet
Club of Deer Creek II Condo., Inc., 574 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
(contemplating “an association plaintiff . . . acting under rule 1.221 on
behalf of all unit owners to enforce their rights under the agreement”); id.
at 256 (Gunther, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Rule

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1.221] is the procedural vehicle which allows a condominium association
to sue and be sued as representative of the class of condominium unit
owners.”); Four Jay’s Constr., Inc. v. Marina at Bluffs Condo. Ass’n, Inc.,
846 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“This rule allows class actions
to 	be 	brought 	or 	defended 	by 	a 	condominium 	association 	in 	its
representative capacity.”); see also Homeowner’s Ass’n of Overlook, Inc. v.
Seabrooke Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 62 So. 3d 667, 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
(“The sole requirement for the bundling of a [Rule 1.221] class is that the
members of the association have a common interest regarding the common
elements of the property.” (citation omitted)).
And 	we 	reached 	a 	similar 	conclusion 	in 	Condominium 	Owners
Organization of Century Village East, Inc. v. Century Village East, Inc., 428
So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). 	There, 251 condo buildings, each
represented by their own association, sought to bring an action under Rule
1.221. 	We 	noted 	it 	was 	“undisputed 	that 	each 	of 	the 	individual
condominium associations is a representative of the units and owners of
a particular building, and, as such, is entitled to bring a class action
pursuant to [rule] 1.221.” 	Id. at 386 (emphasis added). 	But we held
“without 	difficulty” 	that 	an 	umbrella 	organization 	for 	the 	condo
associations could not bring a single rule 1.221 action for all buildings and
rejected “the concept of class action of class actions.” Id. We so hold here
as well.
We also note that in Century Village East, in affirming the trial court’s
dismissal of the class action, we emphasized that trial courts should have
“maximum 	discretion” 	in 	managing 	their 	dockets. 	Id. 	at 	386. 	We
explained that individual cases could still be consolidated, or the plaintiffs
might amend their complaint and persuade the trial court that all or at
least some of them could be joined in a single complaint and possibly
severed later. 	Id. at 386–87.
So too, here. 	The trial court may well find on remand that all of the
counts ought to proceed in one case and be heard in a single consolidated
trial.
But in determining whether “an association” is permitted to bring a
given claim as a class action on behalf of its members using the procedural
mechanism of Rule 1.222, the trial court must undertake the commonality
inquiry 	as 	to 	each 	claim 	brought 	by 	each 	association 	vis-à-vis 	that
association’s membership.
If the court finds, after conducting this inquiry, that multiple factually-
related Rule 1.222 class actions are properly before it, then it may exercise

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its considerable discretion to address those actions in a consolidated
proceeding, within the normal bounds of the rules.
* 	* 	*
In sum, we remand so that the trial court may assess in the first
instance whether each association may maintain each of their respective
counts as a Rule 1.222 class action.3 From there, the court may exercise
3 We offer only a few short points in response to the dissent.
First, the relationship between the class action procedure in Rule 1.222 and
the discretion to join and consolidate claims embodied in Rule 1.270 explains the
dissent’s misapprehension.
The claims here ultimately belong to a number of individual homeowners, each
of whom is a member of a single association. 	The class action mechanism
generally allows the “class” to bring as one claim the summated claims of all of
the class members. 	Rule 1.222 allows a procedural shortcut for a mobile
homeowner’s association to (relatively) easily bring as a class claim the summated
claims of its homeowner-members. 	Once a court certifies that the summated
individual claims meet Rule 1.222’s commonality requirement, then that class
claim may be treated as any other single claim in the litigation. That class claim
may be joined and consolidated for litigation and trial with other claims (which
may or may not also be certified class claims) within the broad discretion afforded
to the trial judge.
What Rule 1.222 does not allow is a shortcut for multiple associations to bring
summated claims that may be common to all homeowners across the multiple
associational memberships as a single class claim—a “class action of class
actions.” That was what we rejected in Century Village East. We do not and need
not pass on whether other mechanisms, including Rule 1.220, might be available
for multiple HOAs to proceed in a single class claim.
Second, while in ordinary interpretation the singular should generally be
construed as the plural, we only so construe “where the context will permit.”
§ 1.01, Fla. Stat.; accord Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 130 (Thomson/West
2012) (“The rule is simply a matter of common sense and everyday linguistic
expression.”). Here, as explained, the context and the text considered as a whole
do not allow for one action by multiple associations made up of households
belonging to multiple associations.
Third, we cannot say the error is harmless. Rather, we have no idea if the error
is harmless, because the trial court conducted the wrong commonality inquiry.
We remand to the trial court so that it can conduct the correct inquiry, which
may or may not leave the parties in a functionally similar position to where they
are now.

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its discretion as to whether any or all of the claims it certifies as a class
action should or should not be consolidated going forward.
Reversed and remanded.
LEVINE , J., concurs.
CIKLIN, J., dissents with opinion.
CIKLIN, J., dissenting.
This appeal turns on a narrow question: 	Whether Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.222 prohibits more than one mobile homeowners’ association
from proceeding together in a single action raising matters of common
interest.
I dissent for three primary reasons: rule 1.222 does not forbid multiple
associations from proceeding together, an interpretation to the contrary is
not supported by the plain language of rule 1.222, precedent, or the rules
of construction, and any error here is harmless. Respectfully, the majority
misses the mark because the rule does not contain any such prohibition,
and the majority reaches a contrary result only by supplying words the
Florida Supreme Court never adopted.
I. 	The Text of Rule 1.222
Rule 1.222 provides that “[a] mobile homeowners’ association may
institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on
behalf of all homeowners concerning matters of common interest . . . .”
The operative language authorizes an association to act; it does not restrict
how many associations may do so in a single proceeding. 	The rule
contains no express limitation barring joint actions, collective pleadings,
or coordinated prosecution by multiple associations where the claims raise
“matters of common interest.”
In effect, the majority converts silence into prohibition. 	The majority
does 	not 	identify 	any 	language 	in 	rule 	1.222 	stating 	that 	multiple
associations may not proceed together. 	Instead, it reasons that because
the rule contemplates an association acting on behalf of its own members,
joint proceedings must be forbidden. 	The majority’s conclusion rests
almost entirely on the rule’s use of the singular—“a mobile homeowners’
association”—from 	which 	it 	infers 	an 	exclusivity 	requirement: 	one
association per class action. But Florida law has long recognized that the
singular includes the plural unless a contrary intent is clear, and nothing
in rule 1.222 suggests an intent to impose a numerical restriction on

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plaintiffs. 	See § 1.01(1), Fla. Stat. (“In construing these statutes . . . ,
where the context will permit . . . [t]he singular includes the plural and
vice versa.”); Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla.
2006) (noting that when interpreting procedural rules, courts apply the
same principles of construction applicable to statutes, beginning with the
rule’s plain language).
Had the Supreme Court intended to impose a “one association only”
limitation, it could have done so explicitly. 	It is not within the province of
our court to modify a rule of the Florida Supreme Court. 	Courts are not
at liberty to add limitations merely because they might have been sensible
or administratively neat.
II. 	Reliance on Rule 1.221 and Century Village
The 	majority’s 	reliance 	on 	cases 	interpreting 	rule 	1.221 	and 	on
Condominium Owners Organization of Century Village East, Inc. v. Century
Village East, Inc., 428 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), is misplaced.
First, the cases addressing rule 1.221 cited by the majority provide no
guidance on the issue raised here. 	The cases do not involve or address
multiple condominium or homeowners’ associations. 	Thus, it is unclear
how the majority concludes that its interpretation of rule 1.222 “accords
with the way our [c]ourt has construed rule 1.221.”
Second, I will assume, arguendo, that majority properly employs its
tortured “a”/“the” analysis in lieu of applying the general rule that the
singular includes the plural where context permits. Both rules 1.221 and
1.222 begin with “A” (“A homeowners’ or condominium association” and
“A mobile homeowners’ association”). 	But the second sentence of rule
1.221 says, “If an association has the authority . . . ,” whereas the second
sentence of rule 1.222 says, “If the association has the authority . . . .” 	If
this a/the analysis is taken to its logical extreme, does this mean we must
construe rules 1.221 and 1.222 differently? 	With respect to rule 1.221,
does the failure to switch to a definite article initially in the second
sentence 	mean 	we 	must 	construe 	rule 	1.221 	to 	not 	contemplate 	a
particular association? 	(In reality, of course not. 	I merely point this out
to demonstrate that, when one strays from the plain meaning to such
tortured analyses, the consequences include inconsistency.)
Third, Century Village, 428 So. 2d 384, is distinguishable. 	It involved
a class action brought by 251 condominium associations, each for a
separate building, with separate damages requiring separate jury verdicts,

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and the suit included an improper party - an umbrella organization that
had suffered no damages. 	Id. at 385-86.
III. 	An Unnecessary Procedural Detour & Trial Court Discretion
Reversing under these circumstances elevates form over substance and
takes the parties through an unnecessary procedural detour, given the
harmless nature of any error. 	Decisions concerning joinder, coordination
of related actions, and the orderly administration of overlapping litigation
are traditionally committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Even
assuming ambiguity in rule 1.222’s phrasing, that ambiguity does not
eliminate the trial 	court’s broad discretion to manage related claims
raising common issues. 	Where no prejudice is shown and the outcome is
unchanged, appellate courts must be cautious about imposing procedural
hurdles the rule itself does not mandate--particularly when our appellate
court edict does nothing more than further complicate a trial judge’s job.
Where, as here, the same defendant, the same alleged conduct, and the
same legal issues are presented, and no prejudice is shown, an appellate
court should be reluctant to reverse a trial judge’s discretionary case-
management decision merely to require a different and strained procedural
sequence leading to the same result. As we emphasized in Century Village,
trial courts retain “maximum discretion” in managing related actions,
including consolidation and joinder. 	428 So. 2d at 386. 	The majority
invokes that principle only after first stripping the trial court of discretion
by imposing a prohibition not found in the rule.
Reversal on a purely procedural sequencing issue—where the same
claims will proceed before the same court through consolidation—does not
advance 	the 	resolution 	of 	the 	dispute. 	The 	majority 	nevertheless
intervenes to correct a procedural formality that causes no prejudice while
predictably increasing litigation costs and attorney’s fees that, under the
governing statutory framework, will ultimately be borne by the losing
party.
VII. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.