Priest v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-1577
_____________________________
M ARY PRIEST ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM FLORIDA
I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradford County.
George Micah Wright, Judge.
May 20, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellant 	Mary 	Priest, 	a 	homeowner 	in 	Starke, 	Florida,
entered into a homeowner’s insurance policy with Appellee State
Farm 	Florida 	Insurance 	Company 	(“State 	Farm”), 	which 	she
renewed on January 6, 2021. Her property sustained wind and
water damage a few months later, after which she filed a claim
with State Farm for property damage. A dispute arose between
Appellant and State Farm regarding coverage and the amount of
the loss. Appellant then filed suit for breach of contract and
declaratory relief. However, the trial court dismissed the case
because Appellant did not first file a pre-suit notice of intent to
initiate litigation. See § 627.70152(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021). Her
insurance policy had already existed before this statutory pre-suit

2
notice requirement had come into effect. Since there is no clear
legislative expression of retroactive intent, we conclude that the
statutory pre-suit notice requirement does not apply to Appellant’s
policy and reverse.
Section 627.70152 was added to Chapter 627 of the Florida
Statutes with an effective date of July 1, 2021. Chapter 2021-77, §
12, Laws of Fla. It reads as follows:
As a condition precedent to filing a suit under a property
insurance 	policy, 	a 	claimant 	must 	provide 	the
department 	with 	written 	notice 	of 	intent 	to 	initiate
litigation on a form provided by the department. Such
notice must be given at least 10 business days before
filing suit under the policy, but may not be given before
the insurer has made a determination of coverage under
s. 627.70131.
§ 627.70152(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
Subsection 	(1) 	of 	627.70152 	provides 	that 	it 	“applies
exclusively to all suits arising under a residential or commercial
property insurance policy . . . .” § 627.70152(1), Fla. Stat. State
Farm interprets this language as saying the provision applies to
all suits regardless of whether the policy was issued before or after
its enactment, which would mean the provision was intended to
apply retroactively. A conflict exists among the district courts of
appeal regarding whether this provision applies retroactively.
The 	Fourth 	District 	held 	that 	section 	627.70152 	clearly
expresses an intent of retroactive application. For the Fourth
District, “all suits” includes “those [insurance contracts] already in
existence 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	statute’s 	effective 	date.” 	Cole 	v.
Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 363 So. 3d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2023). Similarly, the Third District found that the phrase “all
suits” was a clear expression of intent of retroactivity, since the
phrase encompasses “all claims, regardless of when the policy was
incepted.” Cantens v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 388
So. 3d 242, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

3
On the contrary, the Sixth District concluded that section
627.70152 did not clearly express intent of retroactive application,
because “all suits” is not sufficiently conclusive to demonstrate
intent of retroactivity. Hughes v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
374 So. 3d 900, 906 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), review granted, No.
SC2024-0025, 2024 WL 1714497 (Fla. Apr. 22, 2024).∗ The phrase
“all suits” could just as well refer to the category or class of suit
governed by the provision rather than to the provision’s temporal
reach. Id.; see also Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So.
3d 738, 741-42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Smith v. Universal Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 396 So. 3d 860, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).
In 	addressing 	whether 	a 	statutory 	provision 	applies
retroactively 	to 	an 	insurance 	policy 	entered 	into 	before 	the
provision’s enactment, “we look at the date the insurance policy
was issued and not the date that the suit was filed or the accident
occurred[.]” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So. 3d
873, 	876 	(Fla. 	2010). 	A 	two-pronged 	test 	is 	utilized 	when
determining 	whether 	a 	statutory 	provision 	is 	to 	apply
retroactively: 	“First, 	the 	Court 	must 	ascertain 	whether 	the
Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second,
if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine
whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional
principles.” Id. at 877 (citing Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Chase Fed. Hous.
Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 499 (Fla. 1999)).
The first prong of the Menendez test requires us to determine
the intent behind the phrase “all suits” in section 627.70152(1),
which “may also include consideration of the language, structure,
purpose, and legislative history of the enactment.” Fla. Ins. Guar.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc., 67 So. 3d 187, 196-
97 (Fla. 2011). The provision states that it applies to all suits
“arising under a residential or commercial property insurance
policy[.]” § 627.70152(1), Fla. Stat. Isolated from the context of the
rest of the provision, “all suits” could appear to refer to any suit
regardless of when 	the corresponding 	insurance policies 	were
entered into. However, in its proper context, “all suits” works to
∗ This issue is currently pending before the Florida Supreme
Court under its conflict jurisdiction.

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highlight the category of suit governed by the provision, namely
those that involve a residential or commercial policy. This is made
even clearer from the word “exclusively” in the provision: “This
section applies exclusively to all suits arising under a residential
or commercial property insurance policy[.]” § 627.70152(1), Fla.
Stat. (emphasis added). “Exclusively” functions as a limitation on
what suits the provision governs. Buis, 394 So. 3d at 741 (“[A]n
interpretation of the phrase ‘all suits’ as an expansive temporal
indicator is one that disregards the contextual clue of use of the
term ‘exclusively’ in the phrase ‘exclusively to all suits.’”). When
read in context, “all suits” does not clearly refer to “an expansive
temporal 	indicator,” 	but 	simply 	highlights 	the 	class 	of 	suits
included under section 627.70152. Id.
The 	Legislature’s 	choice 	of 	the 	word 	“suits” 	rather 	than
“policies” as the operative noun further supports this reading. As
noted above, Menendez requires courts to look at the date the
policy was issued, not the date the suit was filed, when assessing
retroactivity in the insurance context. 35 So. 3d at 876. The
Legislature is presumed to know this rule. Potter v. Potter, 317 So.
3d 255, 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“[T]he Legislature is presumed to
be 	cognizant 	of 	relevant 	judicial 	decisions 	when 	enacting
statutes.”). If it had intended the statute to reach policies already
in existence at the time of enactment, the natural way to express
that intent would have been to reference “policies,” as it did in the
closely 	related 	section 	627.7152, 	which 	expressly 	limits 	its
application 	to 	policies 	“issued 	on 	or 	after” 	specified 	dates. 	§
627.7152(2)(a)1., 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2022); 	§ 	627.7152(13), 	Fla. 	Stat.
(2022). However, the Legislature did not choose this route.
Additionally, when a statutory provision has an effective date,
this 	would 	be 	“considered . . . 	evidence 	rebutting 	intent 	for
retroactive application of a law.” Devon, 67 So. 3d at 196. Here, the
provision at issue had an effective date of July 1, 2021. Without a
clear expression in favor of retroactivity, the effective date of a
statutory provision serves as more evidence against legislative
intent of retroactive application. Id.; see also Smith v. Universal
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 396 So. 3d 860, 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).
State Farm points to the legislative history, noting that an
earlier draft of the statute in House Bill 305 contained express

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prospectivity language limiting its application to policies “issued
or renewed on or after July 1, 2021,” which was not carried forward
into the enacted Senate Bill 76. However, the removal of draft
language during the legislative process does not supply the clear
expression of retroactive intent that the first prong demands. As
the Florida Supreme Court observed in Devon, the “absence of a
statement in the act that the amendments are inapplicable to
existing contracts does not constitute clear evidence of retroactive
intent.” 67 So. 3d at 197. Bills are revised for many reasons during
the legislative process, and treating the deletion of prospectivity
language as an affirmative expression of retroactive intent would
invert the presumption against retroactivity into a presumption
favoring it. Metro. Dade Cnty., 737 So. 2d at 500 (noting that the
presumption against retroactivity is the default rule of statutory
construction); 	Devon, 	67 	So. 	3d 	at 	195 	(stating 	that 	the
“presumption against retroactive application is a well-established
rule of statutory construction that is appropriate in the absence of
an express statement of legislative intent . . . .”).
Because of the structure of the provision in question here—
the context surrounding the phrase “all suits,” the existence of an
effective date, and the Legislature’s choice of “suits” rather than
“policies” 	as 	the 	operative 	noun—section 	627.70152 	does 	not
contain 	evidence 	clearly 	expressing 	any 	legislative 	intent 	of
retroactive application. Because this provision fails the first prong
of the retroactivity test, “we need not and should not determine
whether retroactive application of the statutory provision[] at
issue passes constitutional muster.” Hughes, 374 So. 3d at 913
(White, J., concurring). Consequently, section 627.70152 does not
govern Appellant’s insurance policy, and so we find that she was
not bound by the pre-suit notice requirement.
We certify conflict with Cantens v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s London, 388 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), and Cole v.
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla.
4th DCA 2023).
R EVERSED and REMANDED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
LEWIS and NEFF , JJ., concur; W INOKUR , J., specially concurs with
opinion.

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_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
W INOKUR , J., specially concurring.
I 	agree 	that 	section 	627.70152(1) 	contains 	no 	language
suggesting that its requirements apply retroactively, that is, to
actions involving policies executed prior to the effective date of the
statute. 	Accordingly, 	I 	agree 	that 	State 	Farm 	has 	failed 	to
overcome the “general rule . . . that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, a law affecting substantive rights, liabilities
and duties is presumed to apply prospectively,” Metro. Dade Cnty.
v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 499 (Fla. 1999).
But even if we conclude that section 627.70152(1) contains no
language 	indicating 	that 	the 	statute 	should 	be 	applied
retroactively, I do not find that we are precluded from considering
the constitutionality of retroactive application. This is particularly
the 	case 	when, 	as 	here, 	the 	party 	advocating 	retroactive
application makes plausible argument that the statute does in fact
state that it should be applied retroactively. In this respect, we
need to do nothing more than adopt the reasoning of the court in
Hughes v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 374
So.3d 900 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023).
In 	summary, 	while 	the 	statute 	contains 	no 	language
indicating that it should be applied retroactively, even if it did, I
would find that retroactive 	application is unconstitutional, in
accordance with the reasoning in Hughes.
_____________________________
Kevin George of Kuhn Raslavich, P.A., Tampa, and Gray Proctor
of Gray Proctor, Somerville, New Jersey, for Appellant.

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Kara 	Kennedy 	Byrnes 	of 	Kubicki 	Draper, 	Jacksonville,
Christopher Ryan 	Jones 	of Traub 	Lieberman, St. Petersburg,
Chris DelBene of Kubicki Draper, Jacksonville, Brandon Robert
Christian of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tampa, David Thayer Burr of
Traub Lieberman, St. Petersburg, and Matthew Alexander Taylor
of the Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.