Patella v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-1783
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M ICHAEL TERRANCE PATELLA ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
Leandra G. Johnson, Judge.
March 11, 2026
W INOKUR , J.
In the lower tribunal, Appellant Michael Patella filed an 81-
page Motion for Leave to File Untimely Post-Conviction Relief
Under Rule 3.850(b). The motion was not merely a request for
leave to file, but a detailed request for postconviction relief that
raises numerous claims. Focusing on the substance of the motion
rather than its label, we construe the motion as a motion for
postconviction 	relief 	pursuant 	to 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Criminal
Procedure 3.850. See Indus. Affiliates, Ltd. v. Testa, 770 So. 2d 202,
204 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“[I]f the motion is mislabeled, the court
will look to the substance of the motion, not the label.”).

2
The 	postconviction 	court 	dismissed 	the 	motion 	for
postconviction relief as moot due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction.
In its Order dismissing the motion, the court indicated that it held
a hearing on Patella’s separate motion for early termination of
probation. At the hearing, the court “advised [Patella] that if his
probation was terminated, the court would lose jurisdiction to rule
on his post-conviction motion[.]” Based on this contention, the
court “inquired of [Patella] as to whether he wished to proceed on
his request to have his probation terminated, or if he wished to
proceed on the post-conviction motion.” When Patella indicated
that he wished to proceed on his motion for early termination of
probation, the court dismissed the postconviction motion as moot.
Because we construe the order as one denying a postconviction
motion, and because the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing,
the order is “a final appealable order summarily denying the
motion with prejudice.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(1); see also In re
Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. 3.850 & 3.853, 419 So. 3d 629,
631 	(Fla. 	2025) 	(moving 	previous 	subdivision 	(f) 	to 	(h)).
Accordingly, 	we 	consider 	this 	case 	as 	an 	appeal 	of 	an 	order
summarily denying 	relief. 	See 	Fla. R. 	App. P. 	9.141(b)(2); 	cf.
Duncan v. State, 232 So. 3d 450, 451 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA. 2017)
(treating a dismissal of a motion for postconviction relief as a
summary denial for appellate purposes).
Unlike most appeals, we do not presume an order summarily
denying a postconviction motion to be correct. We are required to
reverse the order “unless the record shows conclusively that the
appellant is entitled to no relief,” even if the appellant does not file
a brief showing entitlement to relief. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D).
In 	this 	Court, 	Patella 	has 	filed 	a 	Motion 	to 	Compel
Transmission of Complete Record. Because the special appellate
rules applicable to summary-denial appeals require that the record
on appeal be specifically limited, we deny this motion. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A); Levin v. State, 298 So. 3d 681, 682 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2020) (denying a motion to supplement the record on appeal
of a summarily-denied postconviction motion because it “fails to
demonstrate that the items sought fall within the scope of the
record 	as 	defined 	by 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure
9.141(b)(2)(A)”).

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Turning 	to 	Patella’s 	appeal 	of 	the 	order 	below, 	the
postconviction 	court’s 	decision 	to 	dismiss 	was 	erroneous, 	as
termination of probation, by itself, did not limit Patella’s ability to
challenge his conviction—nor did it limit the court’s jurisdiction to
hear that challenge. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a) (specifying that
a motion under this rule is for “relief from judgment,” not just
“release from custody”). The Florida Supreme Court has ruled
explicitly that a movant need not be “in custody” to file a rule 3.850
motion. See Amend. to Fla. Rule of Crim. Proc. 3.850, 779 So. 2d
1290 (Fla. 2000) (amending rule 3.850 to delete “the ‘in custody’
requirement of the former rule”); Wood v. State, 750 So. 2d 592,
595 (Fla. 1999) (holding that “both custodial and noncustodial
movants” may seek relief under rule 3.850). See also Turner v.
State, 	120 	So. 	3d 	187 	(Fla. 	2d 	DCA 	2013) 	(holding 	that 	a
postconviction motion was not rendered moot on the basis that
probation had been terminated). Accordingly, the termination of
Patella’s 	probation 	did 	not 	require 	the 	dismissal 	of 	his
postconviction motion.
We state no opinion on whether Patella was permitted to file
an untimely postconviction motion pursuant to rule 3.850(b), or
whether he was otherwise entitled to any relief. However, we
REVERSE and R EMAND for the postconviction court to reconsider
Patella’s 	motion 	for 	postconviction 	relief 	under 	the 	procedure
outlined in rule 3.850(h).
R AY and TREADWELL , JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Michael Terrance Patella, pro se, Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.