Bruce Healy v. Walton County, Florida

FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Nos. 1D2024-0682
1D2024-0720
1D2024-0748
(Consolidated for disposition)
_____________________________
T. M ICHAEL G LENN T RUST ,
B RUCE HEALY, and L AKE
P ARTNERS , LLC,
Petitioners,
v.
WALTON C OUNTY, FL, et al.
Respondents.
_____________________________
Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Proceeding.
February 18, 2026
PER C URIAM.
Petitioners seek review of a final judgment that affirmed,
under 	section 	163.035, 	Florida 	Statutes, 	the 	existence 	of
recreational customary use on various Walton County beachfront
properties, including parcels owned by the Petitioners. For the
reasons discussed below, the petition is dismissed.
In 2017, Respondent Walton County adopted an ordinance
establishing and protecting the public’s “long-standing customary

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use of the dry sand areas of all of the beaches in the County for
recreational purposes.” W ALTON C OUNTY, F LA., C ODE § 23-2 (Mar.
28, 2017). In 2018, the legislature enacted section 163.035, Florida
Statutes, adopting the procedure a governmental entity must
follow when it seeks to establish the existence of recreational
customary use on private property. The County complied with the
statutory notice requirements and, in December 2018, initiated the
underlying proceeding by filing a complaint under section 163.035
and chapter 86, Florida Statutes, in the circuit court. A bench trial
was 	set, but every 	claim 	brought by 	represented 	intervening
parties at that point had been either dismissed or settled. The
County then filed nine motions for summary judgment, each
motion relating to a different beach area within the County. The
circuit court granted the motions.
In February 2024, the circuit court entered its final judgment
under section 163.035 declaring the County had established the
existence of customary use and affirming the public’s limited right
of customary use on the dry sand beach above the mean high-water
line with respect to the remaining parcels, which included those
owned by Petitioners. Petitioners timely sought review of the final
judgment. The case was initially filed as a direct appeal, which this
Court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. While the appeal
was pending, the legislature repealed section 163.035. See Ch.
2025-178, § 1, Laws of Fla. This Court directed the parties to
address the effect of the statutory repeal at oral argument.
At oral argument, the parties conceded the final judgment is
a nullity. We agree. With the enactment of chapter 2025-178,
section 1, the final judgment has no more legal effect, leaving no
harm to be remedied. Cf. State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 109 So. 2d
1, 3 (Fla. 1959) (“While no decision on this point has been made by
this court, it appears to be universally held in the courts of other
states and the federal courts that when the jurisdiction of a court
depends upon a statute which is repealed or otherwise nullified,
the 	jurisdiction 	falls 	even 	over 	pending 	causes, 	unless 	the
repealing statute contains a savings clause.”).
Yet, the parties continued to argue the merits. When asked
about the effect of the statutory repeal, the County posited the
statutory repeal brought the parties back to “square one.” The

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County could not say whether the 2017 ordinance was revived but
affirmed 	its 	previous 	posture 	that 	the 	2017 	ordinance 	was
invalidated by section 163.035 and no longer in effect. The County
believed it had discretion to adopt a new ordinance regulating
customary use under home rule power. When asked what harm
was left to be remedied, Petitioners claimed uncertainty if the final
judgment was not quashed. Petitioners hypothesized that the
Sheriff might not enforce trespass calls and argued the recorded
final judgment operated as a cloud on their title.
Certiorari is an extremely rare remedy that will be granted in
very few cases. See Swift Response, LLC v. Routt, 401 So. 3d 640,
642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). To invoke this Court’s extraordinary
jurisdiction, 	Petitioners 	must 	demonstrate 	substantial 	and
immediate harm flowing from the now nullified final judgment.
Petitioners have not done so. They have only asserted abstract,
hypothetical harm that cannot satisfy the jurisdictional harm
requirement. Id. at 643.
For these reasons, the petition is D ISMISSED.
R OBERTS, R AY, and K ELSEY,* JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
D. Kent Safriet and Valerie L. Charter-Hogancamp of Holtzman
Vogel 	Baran 	Torchinsky 	& 	Josefiak 	PLLC, 	Tallahassee, 	for
Petitioners T. Michael Glen Trust and Lake Partners, LLC.
* Judge Kelsey was substituted for an original panel member
after oral argument. She has reviewed the parties' briefs, the
record, and the recording of the oral argument.

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Chance Lyman of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Tampa; Kyle
Brandon Teal, Miami, for Petitioner Bruce Healy.
Benjamin Clayton Iseman of Maynard Nexsen PC, Winter Park,
for Petitioner Lake Partners, LLC.
David Allen Theriaque, Steven Brent Spain, and Benjamin R.
Kelley 	of 	Theriaque 	& 	Spain, 	Tallahassee; 	Glenn 	Thomas
Burhans, 	Jr., 	Reginald 	Luc 	Bouthillier, 	Jr., 	Bridget 	Kellogg
Smitha, Douglas Lamar Kilby, and Christopher Roy Clark of
Stearns 	Weaver 	Miller 	Weissler 	Alhadeff 	& 	Sitterson, 	P.A.,
Tallahassee; Michael J. Harwin of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler
Alhadeff 	& 	Sitterson, 	P.A., 	Fort 	Lauderdale, 	for 	Respondent
Walton County, FL.
William James Dunaway, Pensacola; Mary Grace Gatewood of
Clark Partington, LLP, Destin, for Respondents 79 Lupine Road,
LLC, 	Charles 	and 	Adrian 	Cowan, 	Walter 	Edwin 	Lydick, 	Jr.,
Christopher Curran Lydick, Barbara B. Middleton, Twin Dunes
Estates, LLC, Bella Waves I, LLC, and Bella Waves II, LLC.
David 	Smolker 	and 	Robert 	Clayton 	Mathews 	of 	Smolker
Matthews, LLP, Tampa, for Respondents Julie Ann Belcher; Craig
Fleming, as owner of units A & B in the Crosswinds Condominium
with an undivided ownership interest in the Crosswinds common
area beachfront parcel; Crosswinds Condominium Association of
Panama City Beach, Inc.; David F. Radlmann as Trustee of the 457
W. Park Place Revocable Trust Agreement dated May 25, 2019;
George Sertl, Jr.; Alayne Sertl; and Joseph and Jan Delozier.
Dana Carl Matthews and C. Stephen Tatum of Matthews &
Matthews, LLP, Destin, for Respondents 8028 Escape LLC; Blue
Mountain Retreat, LLC; Elton B. Stephens, Jr. 2012 Child's Trust;
Investment Partners IV, LLC; Kenneth R. Goulet; Tatjana Keller
Hagen; Joan C. Henderson Irrevocable Trust; John A. Drillot
Irrevocable 	Grantor 	Trust, 	dated 	January 	1, 	2008; 	Lloyd
Investment Company; Zachary Mayer and Lindsay Mayer; Myron
and Teresa Palmer; Andrea D. Rockefeller; Ruth, LLC; Seagrove
Beach Investment Property, LLC; Toscana 41, LLC; Valentina
Aldrete Revocable Trust; and WG Development LLC.

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David Brand Pleat, Destin, for Respondents Gretchen A. Bodin;
Elizabeth H. Benton, et al.; William R. and Tracee F. Hodges;
Michael 	D. 	Martin; 	MD 	Miramar 	Properties, 	LLC; 	and 	MD
Miramar Properties II, LLC.
Darryl Steve Traylor, Jr., and Tadeusz Augusta Borowski, of
Borowski & Traylor, P.A., Pensacola for Respondent Julie Wise
Oreck.