Lantz v. Gibson

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2148
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J EANINE R OCHELLE LANTZ ,
Appellant,
v.
SHAWN JEREMY GIBSON ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
John J. Gontarek, Judge.
December 3, 2025
W INOKUR , J.
Jeanie Rochelle Lantz appeals the final judgment granting a
partition by sale and a subsequent order denying a motion for
rehearing. In her complaint, Lantz sought a partition by sale and
an accounting of the real property she owned as a tenant in
common with her former spouse. We reverse.
In October 2005, Lantz and her then-husband, Shawn Jeremy
Gibson, purchased a residence in Crestview (“the Home”), subject
to a mortgage. In May 2007, Lantz and Gibson divorced. The final
judgment 	dissolving 	their 	marriage 	incorporated 	a 	marital
settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Lantz and Gibson had drafted
themselves. With respect to disposing of the Home, the MSA
indicated that the parties “will split gains 60% wife 40% husband.”
The MSA further provided that “Wife shall pay as her own the
following and will not at any time ask Husband to pay these

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debts/bills: Mortgage on real estate: (Home) [monthly payment of]
$1,422.17 [and current amount owed] $172,476.04.”
In 2008, Lantz claims she attempted to sell the Home, but due
to 	the 	unfavorable 	market 	conditions, 	the 	market 	value 	was
significantly less than the mortgage on the Home. Lantz did not
sell the Home, instead renting it to third parties at some periods
throughout the next seventeen years. Gibson never contributed to
the Home’s expenses, and Lantz never paid Gibson any rent
proceeds.
In 2021, Lantz and Gibson contracted to sell the Home, but
when Lantz realized that Gibson was going to receive 40% of the
sale proceeds, Lantz refused to close. Lantz felt she was entitled to
Gibson’s share for having paid the expenses of the Home for
seventeen years. So, Lantz filed a partition action for the sale of
the 	Home. 	Lantz 	sought 	reimbursement 	from 	Gibson 	for 	the
mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, and maintenance
expenses she paid during the seventeen years she rented the
property. The trial court found that Lantz was not entitled to
reimbursement for the Home-related expenses because the MSA
did not provide for such expenses, and the trial court was “not
inclined 	to create 	terms of 	a contract that the parties 	never
anticipated and certainly never agreed upon.”
But the parties’ failure to agree on a division of expenses does
not mean that only one party must bear those costs. While an
agreement, such as an MSA, may modify certain aspects of real
property law, the absence of a specific term in the agreement does
not necessarily preclude application of real property law regarding
responsibilities of tenants in common.
When Lantz and Gibson were married, title to the home was
an estate by entirety. Pursuant to section 689.15, Florida Statutes,
property held as an estate by entirety becomes a tenancy in
common upon the dissolution of marriage. As tenants in common,
the parties are equally obligated to contribute to all costs necessary
to maintain their ownership of the property. Kelly v. Kelly, 583 So.
2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1991); Hosack v. Hosack, 679 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla.
1st DCA 1996). Further, when an agreement is silent regarding
liability for expenses, and no evidence shows that the non-paying

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tenant furnished consideration to be relieved of the obligation to
contribute, the paying tenant, upon partition, is entitled to “credit
from the proceeds of the sale for the other co-tenant’s proportionate
share of [] expenses[]” like “taxes, liens, and repairs[.]” Brandt v.
Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017, 1019–20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), approved,
Kelly, 583 So. 2d at 668; see also id. (noting that, “in the absence of
special circumstances the law imposes a duty on the nonpaying
tenant to reimburse the paying tenant for common expenses at the
time of and from the proceeds of a subsequent sale”). However, “the
right to a credit exists unless there is a basis in the record to relieve
the non-paying spouse of his duty to contribute.” D’Andrea v.
D’Andrea, 650 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); see also Levinas
v. Levinas, 410 So. 3d 124, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“A co-tenant
bearing 	a 	disproportionate 	share 	of 	such 	costs 	is 	entitled 	to
reimbursement 	upon 	sale, 	unless 	the 	parties 	arrive 	at 	an
agreement to the contrary.”).
The MSA stated that Lantz was responsible for the “mortgage
on 	real 	estate 	(Home)” 	and 	could 	not 	ask 	Gibson 	to 	pay 	it;
therefore, Gibson was relieved of his duty to contribute to the
mortgage and mortgage-related expenses. However, the MSA was
silent as to the Home’s other expenses. So, just as any other tenant
in common, Gibson is responsible for his portion of the Home’s
expenses, excluding the mortgage and mortgage-related expenses.
Cf. Potter v. Garrett, 52 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 1951) (explaining how
appellee was “entitled to reimbursement for one-half the money
she paid on the principal and interest of the mortgage, for taxes
and 	insurance 	and 	for 	other 	moneys 	she 	spent 	on 	essential
improvements to preserve the property[,]” but the appellant was
“entitled to have credited against this amount one-half of such sum
or sums as may be found to be a reasonable rental for the use of
the property during the time it was occupied by appellee after the
death of the last parent”). For these reasons, we reverse the trial
court’s decision to deny Lantz reimbursement for expenses related
to the Home and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.*
* Given the facts that the ownership of the property resulted
in rent proceeds to Lantz that were also subject to the tenancy in
common, and that the agreement assigned the mortgage and
mortgage-related expenses to Lantz, we express no opinion as to

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LEWIS and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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A. Richard Troell and Tara A. Hagan of Chesser & Barr, P.A.
Shalimar, for Appellant.
Shawn Jeremy Gibson, pro se, Appellee.
whether Lantz is ultimately entitled to any funds after accounting
for expenses and rental income.