Russell, etc. v. Florida Department of Corrections

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2730
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SHAWN R USSELL ,
Appellant,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
C ORRECTIONS,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.
November 26, 2025
O STERHAUS, C.J.
Shawn Russell appeals a circuit court order reinstating his
disciplinary 	dismissal 	after 	an 	arbitrator 	had 	overturned 	the
Department of Correction’s decision to terminate his employment.
Russell argues that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority
under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and Florida law
by overturning the Department’s decision. We affirm, however,
because the arbitrator imposed a timeliness requirement in ruling
against 	the 	Department 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	CBA 	and 	the
limitations period expressly provided for disciplinary dismissals of
correctional 	officers 	in 	Florida 	law, 	§ 112.532(6)(a), 	Florida
Statutes.

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I.
On December 13, 2022, Russell fell asleep twice on the job,
where 	he 	was 	assigned 	to 	do 	roving 	perimeter 	patrol 	in
maintaining security at the Marion Correctional Institution. The
Department notified Russell on February 21, 2023, of its intent to
take disciplinary action against him and dismiss him. The parties
subsequently met at a predetermination conference in March 2023
(see 	§ 	110.227(5), 	Florida 	Statutes), 	before 	the 	Department
ultimately terminated Appellant’s employment on June 14, 2023
(just over six months after the employment misconduct). In the
wake 	of 	this 	decision, 	Russell 	filed 	a 	collective 	bargaining
grievance 	against 	the 	Department 	pursuant 	to 	§ 447.401 	and
proceeded to arbitration.
At the arbitration hearing, Russell sought mitigation of the
penalty, 	arguing that his 	sleeping 	on the job 	was caused by
prescribed 	medication. 	But 	the 	arbitrator 	found 	that 	Russell
hadn’t 	mentioned 	medical 	issues 	to 	his 	supervisor 	before 	or
immediately after the December sleeping incident. The arbitrator
concluded that Russell’s claim lacked credibility and that “any
mitigation for a lesser penalty would not be warranted.”
But the arbitrator did not end his mitigation analysis there.
Instead, the arbitrator faulted the Department for taking more
than two months to initiate the disciplinary process with Russell
and another three months to finalize the discipline. By taking this
amount of time, the arbitrator concluded that the Department had
failed to provide due process and that its “action of waiting and
taking 6 months after the incident to terminate the Grievant was
clearly capricious, unreasonable and absent of undue delay.” For
this reason, the arbitrator mitigated Russell’s discipline down to a
two-month unpaid suspension.
Following the arbitrator’s decision, the Department sought
judicial review in circuit court. The Department argued that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers by taking up the due process issue
and using it to mitigate the Department’s lawful disciplinary
action. The trial court agreed and vacated the arbitration award.
It 	concluded 	that 	once 	the 	arbitrator 	confirmed 	that 	the
Department possessed legal cause to terminate Russell, it lacked
authority to alter the Department-decided discipline. The court

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also 	found 	the 	arbitrator 	to 	have 	exceeded 	his 	authority 	by
injecting due process concerns into the case and penalizing the
Department for its compliance with law. Russell then filed his
appeal.
II.
“A trial court’s authority to vacate an arbitration decision is
limited 	to 	the 	grounds 	set 	forth 	in section 	682.13(1), 	Florida
Statutes.” Lake City Fire & Rescue Ass’n, Local 2288 v. City of Lake
City, 240 So. 3d 128, 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Relevant here, the
arbitration order shall be vacated where “[a]n arbitrator exceeded
the arbitrator’s powers.” § 682.13(1)(d), Fla. Stat. “[T]he award of
arbitrators 	in 	statutory arbitration proceedings 	cannot 	be 	set
aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the
facts; if the award is within the scope of the submission, and
the arbitrators are not guilty of the acts of misconduct set forth in
the 	statute, 	the 	award 	operates 	as 	a 	final 	and 	conclusive
judgment.” AFSCME Fla. Council 79, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. &
Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 23 So. 3d 748, 755
(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2009) 	(quoting 	Schnurmacher 	Holding, 	Inc. 	v.
Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 1989)). “The question of
whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers is a question of law
that [this Court] review[s] de novo.” Lake City Fire & Rescue, 240
So. 3d at 130.
We interpret collective bargaining agreements, like the one at
issue here, under the rules of contract law. Id. “The cardinal rule
of 	contractual 	construction 	is 	that 	when 	the 	language 	of 	the
contract 	is 	clear 	and 	unambiguous, 	the 	contract 	must 	be
interpreted and enforced in accordance with its plain meaning.” Id.
(quoting Columbia Bank v. Columbia Developers, LLC, 127 So. 3d
670, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)). The central issue in this case
involves an arbitrator’s authority to mitigate an otherwise lawful
dismissal if the arbitrator thinks the Department acted too slowly
in meting out discipline.
The CBA here restricted the arbitrator’s authority under law:
“The arbitrator shall be without power or authority to make any
decisions that are . . . [c]ontrary to or inconsistent with, adding to,
subtracting from, or modifying, altering or ignoring in any way,
the terms of this Agreement, or of applicable law or rules or

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regulations having the force and effect of law.” In turn, Florida law
sets forth specific parameters governing the timing of disciplinary
procedures 	when 	a 	corrections 	officer 	is 	under 	investigation.
Specifically, the statute requires the Department to provide notice
of intent to proceed with disciplinary action within 180 days: “If
the agency determines that disciplinary action is appropriate, it
shall complete its investigation and give notice in writing to the
law enforcement officer or correctional officer of its intent to
proceed with disciplinary action. . . . Notice to the officer must be
provided within 180 days after the date the agency received notice
of the alleged misconduct.” § 112.532(6)(a), Fla. Stat. In this case,
as found by arbitrator, the Department provided Russell notice of
its intent to dismiss him within a few months after the incident,
which easily met the 180-day statutory deadline. After receiving
this 	notice, 	Russell 	sought 	and 	received 	a 	predetermination
conference 	under 	§ 	110.227(5), 	after 	which 	the 	Department
finalized its decision to dismiss Russell about three months later.
All told, it took the Department just over six months, total, to
effectuate Russell’s dismissal here, whereas Florida law gave the
Department roughly this same amount of time to simply notice its
intent to dismiss Russell. Under these circumstances, given the
CBA’s language, we see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that
the 	arbitrator 	exceeded 	his 	authority 	because 	he 	enforced 	a
limitations period requirement inconsistent with § 112.532(6).
In 	reaching 	this 	conclusion, 	we 	acknowledge 	Appellant’s
reliance upon Raynor v. Florida State Lodge, 987 So. 2d 152 (Fla.
1st DCA 2008). But that case does not counsel a different result.
There, we found that the arbitrator had authority to consider a due
process argument where different CBA language arguably allowed
for it. Id. at 154. But here, the CBA constrains the arbitrator from
ruling 	inconsistent 	with 	applicable 	law. 	And 	the 	timeliness
restriction enforced by the arbitrator against the Department here
was 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	limitations 	period 	provided 	in 	the
statute for such disciplinary actions.
We thus AFFIRM the order vacating the arbitration award.
R OBERTS and W INOKUR , JJ., concur.

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_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Maria 	S. 	Hossain, 	Chief 	Legal 	Counsel, 	Department 	of
Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.