Raina Rivera v. Luis Antonio Rivera-Chong

FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2697
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R AINA R IVERA ,
Appellant,
v.
L UIS ANTONIO R IVERA-C HONG,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Robert K. Groeb, Judge.
February 18, 2026
NORDBY, J.
Former Wife Raina Rivera appeals the trial court’s order
disqualifying her trial counsel.* She contends that the trial court
erred in granting Former Husband Luis Antonio Rivera-Chong’s
motion to disqualify after a non-evidentiary hearing. Because the
* 	We 	have 	jurisdiction. 	See 	Art. 	V, 	§4(b)(1), 	Fla. 	Const.
(providing jurisdiction for district courts of appeal to “review
interlocutory orders . . . to the extent provided by rules adopted by
the supreme court”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(E) (authorizing
appeals to the district courts of appeal of nonfinal orders that
“grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel”).

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trial court granted broad relief based on speculation rather than
evidence, we reverse.
I.
Former Wife and Former Husband (who share two minor
children) 	have 	been 	engaged 	in 	post-dissolution 	of 	marriage
proceedings for several years. At some point, Former Wife married
her counsel. Upon learning of the marriage, Former Husband
moved to disqualify Former Wife’s counsel under Florida Rule of
Professional Conduct 4-3.7 on the grounds that counsel could not
be counsel of record as he was a material witness in the case. The
motion also asserted that the disqualification should be imputed
to counsel’s firm under Rule 4-1.10. At the time, several pleadings
were pending (raising issues related to time-sharing, parental
responsibility, and the children’s designated school).
At the hearing on the motion, the parties presented argument
as 	to 	whether 	counsel 	should 	be 	disqualified 	based 	on 	the
possibility that Former Husband would call counsel as a witness.
But no party submitted any evidence. And at that time, Former
Wife’s counsel/new husband had not been deposed by Former
Husband to explore what he might be called to testify about.
At the close of arguments, and in its written order, the trial
court explained that it was granting the disqualification request
out of an abundance of caution. In full candor, the trial court
explained it wanted to avoid “a train wreck of [having to disqualify
Former Wife’s counsel] in the middle of trial or right before trial.”
Without addressing Rule 4-3.7, the trial court reasoned that the
case 	involved 	the 	modification 	of 	a 	parenting 	plan 	and 	thus
required consideration of the statutory factors related to the best
interest of the children. In the trial court’s view, Former Wife’s
counsel may have unique information that bore on those factors
and might be called by Former Husband as a witness. And while it
was unclear to the trial court whether Former Wife’s counsel would
in fact be called, what he may be called to testify about, or whether
his 	testimony 	would 	be 	identical 	to 	that 	of 	Former 	Wife’s
testimony, 	the 	trial 	court 	concluded 	that 	the 	uncertainty
warranted disqualification of counsel from representing Former
Wife.

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II.
We review a trial court’s order on a motion to disqualify for an
abuse of discretion. ASI Holding Co. v. Royal Beach & Golf Resorts,
LLC, 163 So. 3d 668, 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Young v.
Achenbauch, 136 So. 3d 575, 580 (Fla. 2014)). On review, we test a
disqualification order “against the standards imposed by the Rules
of Professional Conduct.” Estright v. Bay Point Improvement Ass’n,
921 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Morse v. Clark, 890 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)).
We begin with Rule 4-3.7, which states:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness on behalf of the client unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality
and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence
will be offered in opposition to the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
(b) Other 	Members 	of 	Law 	Firm 	as 	Witnesses. A
lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another
lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness
unless precluded from doing so by rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9.
On 	the 	record 	before 	us, 	we 	cannot 	say 	that 	Rule 	4-3.7
requires disqualification. In plain language, the rule establishes
that a lawyer may not serve as an advocate and a necessary
witness at trial and on behalf of the client. Here, the trial court’s
disqualification ruling was not limited to counsel’s representation

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at trial and Former Wife maintained that she had no intention to
call counsel as a witness on her behalf.
The record also shows no certainty whether Former Husband
would call counsel as a witness. Former Husband offered no
evidence that counsel’s testimony would be contrary to his client,
let alone any evidence of the content of counsel’s likely testimony.
See Steinberg v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 121 So. 3d 622, 625 (Fla.
4th DCA 2013) (“[a] conflict requiring disqualification . . . could
arise if an opposing party called trial counsel as a witness and
counsel’s testimony was adverse to the client’s position.”). And the
record contains no evidence as to how Rule 4-3.7 would apply.
Rather, the trial court speculated about the substance of counsel’s
potential testimony and focused on the legal standard it would
need to apply in resolving the pending pleadings—the best interest
of the children. Nothing in Rule 4-3.7 contemplates that legal
standard being applied to a disqualification request.
Finally, we note that the disqualification order granted broad
relief: 	complete 	disqualification 	of 	counsel 	from 	representing
Former Wife. Nothing limited the scope of the disqualification to
specific matters or phases of litigation for which counsel would be
a witness. We are aware of the trial court’s concern that Former
Wife’s chosen counsel (her new spouse) would potentially cause a
“train wreck in the middle of trial or right before trial.” But
“[d]isqualification of counsel is an extraordinary remedy—one that
should be rare.” Phinney v. Phinney, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D207, D207
(Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 15, 2025). In our adversarial legal system, a
party’s choice of counsel is an important right. Given the lack of an
evidentiary 	record 	to 	support 	the 	trial 	court’s 	broad
disqualification order, we must reverse.
R EVERSED.
B ILBREY and K ELSEY, JJ., concur.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Brian 	North, 	Kenny 	Leigh 	& 	Associates, 	Huntersville, 	North
Carolina, for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.