Odom v. Cole

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-2646
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E RICA LYNN ODOM,
Appellant,
v.
JAMES C ALAS C OLE ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla County.
J. Layne Smith, Judge.
April 8, 2026
B ILBREY , J.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for
injunction for protection against stalking. 	Appellant argues the
trial court was incorrect in finding that her petition was legally
insufficient to allow for an evidentiary hearing. 	We agree that
Appellant’s verified petition stated a cause of action for stalking by
Respondent/Appellee harassing and cyberstalking Appellant. 	We
therefore 	reverse 	and 	remand 	for 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on
Appellant’s petition.
Appellant’s petition alleged that she and Appellee had been in
an on-again, off-again relationship and had lived together. 	She
also alleged that after an argument with Appellee, he called the
police to their residence resulting in Appellant being charged with

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domestic violence battery. Appellant alleged that she was released
from jail with the condition that she have no contact with Appellee.
She 	alleged 	that 	the 	Appellee 	“keeps 	harassing 	me 	and
cyberstalking me by sending a multitude of text messages and
calling my cell phone which I do not answer.” 	She alleged that
“[s]ome of his messages are menacing” and that the persistent
contact has caused her emotional distress during her pregnancy.
In the petition, Appellant alleged that the assistant state
attorney assigned to her criminal case contacted Appellee to have
him cease all contact “to no avail.” 	She alleged that Appellee was
“unhinged and escalating” and that he had threatened to come to
the hospital when she delivers, without her permission. Appellant
attached text messages and receipts from an app where Appellee
had sent her money unsolicited and against her wishes. 	The text
messages also showed Appellee contacting other people asking
them to have Appellant contact Appellee. 	Appellant sought the
entry of an ex parte injunction and for the court to conduct an
evidentiary 	final 	hearing 	and 	enter 	a 	permanent 	injunction.
Appellant swore that the facts in the petition were true under
penalty of perjury.
The trial court denied the petition without conducting an
evidentiary hearing,* stating in the order denying
Petitioner 	has 	failed 	to 	allege 	facts 	sufficient 	to
support the entry of an injunction for protection against
stalking because the Petition lacks factual and legal
sufficiency to support a Petition for Stalking. The parties
may want to file a paternity action once the child is born.
* From the record it is unclear if the trial court denied the
petition after conducting an ex parte hearing or solely based on the
pleadings. 	Appellant does not mention attending an ex parte
hearing, and we have no record that an ex parte hearing occurred.
But even if an ex parte hearing had been conducted, the sole issue
there would be whether the verified petition stated a cause of
action since “evidence other than verified pleadings or affidavits
may 	not 	be 	used 	as 	evidence” 	in 	an 	ex 	parte 	hearing.
§ 784.0485(5)(b), Fla. Stat.

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The Petitioner may want to file a Petition for Domestic
Violence Injunction.
Appellant moved for rehearing noting that the trial court “did
not 	specify 	which 	element 	of 	the 	statute 	was 	insufficiently
alleged.” The motion argued that the text messages from Appellee
not only did not serve a legitimate purpose, instead they were sent
for 	the 	“illegitimate 	purpose 	of 	convincing 	the 	Petitioner 	to
unlawfully 	violate 	their 	no-contact 	order.” 	The 	motion 	for
rehearing was denied with the trial court stating that, “If she
wants relief, she should file a petition for a domestic violence
injunction. She qualifies for that.” This appeal followed.
Stalking 	injunctions 	are 	governed 	by 	section 	784.0485,
Florida Statutes (2025) and rule 12.610, Florida Family Law Rules
of Procedure. 	Section 784.0485(1) creates a cause of action for a
stalking injunction. 	Stalking is committed when the perpetrator
“willfully, 	maliciously, 	and 	repeatedly 	follows, 	harasses, 	or
cyberstalks another person.” 	§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. 	“‘Harass’
means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and
serves no legitimate purpose.” 	§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 	While
“cyberstalk” is defined in part as meaning
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to
cause to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words,
images, or language by or through the use of electronic
mail 	or 	electronic 	communication, 	directed 	at 	or
pertaining to a specific person . . . causing substantial
emotional 	distress 	to 	that 	person 	and 	serving 	no
legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(d)1., Fla. Stat.
Whether an initial pleading states a cause of action is a
question 	of 	law 	subject 	to 	de 	novo 	review. 	W.R. 	Townsend
Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civ. Const., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 300
(Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 	Likewise, we apply a de novo standard of
review in interpreting statutes. 	Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So.2d 1217,
1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Our cases provide guidance on how the
statutory terms in section 784.048 are interpreted. 	“Thus, by its
statutory definition, stalking requires proof of repeated acts.” 	Id.

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at 	1219. 	“Substantial 	emotional 	distress 	is 	evaluated 	by 	an
objective standard, based on the totality of all circumstances, and
is not easily suffered.” Kendrick v. Glover, 315 So. 3d 159, 161 (Fla.
1st DCA 2021).
“A denial of a petition for an ex parte injunction shall be by
written 	order 	noting 	the 	legal 	grounds 	for 	denial.”
§ 784.0485(5)(b), Fla. Stat; Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.610(b)(3)(A). The
denial here was a tautology lacking in explanation, denying the
petitioner for failing to “allege facts sufficient to support the entry
of 	an 	injunction 	for 	protection 	against 	stalking 	because 	the
Petition lacks factual and legal sufficiency.” 	That alone would be
grounds to reverse and remand. 	See Reilly v. Reilly, 325 So. 3d
1048, 	1048 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2021) 	(citing 	Fla. 	Fam. 	L. 	R. 	P.
12.610(b)(3)(A)) (“A denial of a petition for an ex parte injunction
shall be by written order noting the legal grounds for denial.”).
Moreover, the petition stated a cause of action for stalking.
Multiple instances of harassment and cyberstalking were alleged.
The allegation that Appellant was on pretrial release, subject to
violating that release and committing a new crime if she had
contact 	with 	Appellee, 	was 	sufficient 	to 	allege 	substantial
emotional 	distress 	in 	an 	objectively 	reasonable 	person. 	See
§ 741.29(7), Fla. Stat. (making willful violation of pretrial release
in a domestic violence case a first degree misdemeanor). 	The
allegation that Appellee planned to show up during Appellant’s
labor and delivery against her wishes likewise alleged conduct that
would 	cause 	a 	reasonable 	person 	in 	Appellant’s 	situation
substantial emotional distress. 	Lastly, that Appellant may have
also qualified for an injunction for protection against domestic
violence 	did 	not 	provide 	a 	basis 	to 	deny 	the 	injunction 	that
Appellant sought here. 	See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 	12.610(c)(4)(B)
(“Such relief may be granted in addition to other civil or criminal
remedies.”).
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s
petition for injunction for protection against stalking without a
hearing as required by section 784.0485(4), Florida Statutes. 	See
Doe v. Days, 365 So. 3d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). Appellant
did not seek an ex parte injunction in her initial brief, so we do not
order that one be entered. 	However, we REVERSE and REMAND for

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an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	Appellant’s 	verified 	petition 	for
injunction for protection against stalking.
KELSEY and M.K. T HOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Donald A. Pumphrey, Jr., of Pumphrey Law Firm, Tallahassee, for
Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.