Mamadou Ouedraogo v. Walmart Stores East, LP d/b/a Walmart Supercenter Store #1408

2023-1238Fladistctapp1

Testo completo

FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1238
_____________________________
MAMADOU OUEDRAOGO,
Appellant,
v.
WALMART S TORES EAST , LP d/b/a
W ALMART S UPERCENTER S TORE
#1408,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
J. Lee Marsh, Judge.
February 18, 2026
PER C URIAM.
Appellant, Mamadou Ouedraogo, appeals the trial court’s
order granting final summary judgment in favor of Appellee,
Walmart Stores East, LP, following an incident where Appellant
slipped and fell on a banana peel inside the entrance of a Walmart
store. 	Appellant argues, and we agree, that summary judgment
was improper. For the following reasons, we reverse.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion filed below,
Appellant 	submitted 	surveillance 	footage 	and 	photographs
showing the banana peel on Walmart’s floor for almost eight
minutes before his fall, with several employees nearby during that
time and with at least one employee walking directly past the
2
banana peel. 	Appellant also submitted the deposition transcript
of a Walmart employee who had been working as a customer host
at the entrance of the store the day he fell. The employee testified
that both she and another employee had been working as hosts
that day and that she was in the vicinity to witness the aftermath
of the fall. Despite this evidence, the trial court granted Appellee’s
summary judgment motion. In doing so, the court found:
Though employees were arguably near the banana
peel, it would be unreasonable to assume the employees
would be able to observe and notice the banana peel, as
doing so would have required them to turn their heads at
least 90 degrees. The fact that the banana peel was on the
floor for just under 8 minutes, is irrelevant.
This appeal followed.
We review the trial court’s order de novo. 	Gessner v. S. Co.,
396 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). 	The federal summary
judgment standard, which Florida has adopted, requires that a
trial court grant summary judgment if the movant “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Id. (quoting
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1510). 	A court must enter summary judgment
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element necessary to that party’s case and upon
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 	Id. (citing
In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.150, 309 So. 3d 192, 193
(Fla. 2020). 	Pursuant to the federal standard, “[I]nferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. 	Co. 	v. 	Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	587 	(1986)
(internal quotation omitted); Markowitz v. Helen Homes of Kendall
Corp., 826 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 2002) (“When reviewing the entry
of summary judgment, an appellate court must examine the record
and any supporting affidavits in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Here, Appellant was an invitee at the Walmart store. Florida
law makes clear that a premises owner owes a duty to its invitees
to exercise reasonable care to maintain its premises in a safe
condition. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330
3
(Fla. 2001). 	The existence of a transitory foreign object such as a
banana peel on the floor is not a safe condition. Id. An invitee who
is injured by such an object must prove at trial that the business
had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition
and should have remedied it. 	See § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. Under
section 	768.0755(1)(a)–(b), 	“Constructive 	knowledge 	may 	be
proven 	by 	circumstantial 	evidence 	showing 	that: 	(a) 	[t]he
dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the
exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have
known 	of 	the 	condition; 	or 	(b) 	[t]he 	condition 	occurred 	with
regularity and was therefore foreseeable.” Appellant relies on
subsection (1)(a) to demonstrate that he sufficiently proved there
was a question of fact as to Appellee’s constructive knowledge of
the banana peel.
We agree with Appellant that he made a sufficient showing to
support the element of constructive knowledge. He provided direct
evidence that there were several employees in the area where the
banana peel was located and that one employee walked right past
it. 	See Markowitz, 826 So. 2d at 261 (holding that it was error to
grant summary judgment where a question was sufficiently raised
as to whether the business had constructive knowledge of the
“unsafe condition” as there was evidence of employees in the
vicinity where the invitee’s fall occurred). Moreover, a trial judge
cannot conclude as a matter of law whether the duration of which
an object was on the floor is sufficient to create an issue of fact
because 	that 	is 	a 	question 	within 	the 	jury’s 	province. 	See
Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 306
(Fla. 1973) (explaining that where there was evidence that a
“foreign substance had been on the floor for a sufficient length of
time to charge the store owner with constructive knowledge of its
presence[,] . . . the trial court [] properly submit[ted] the question
of defendant’s negligence to the jury”). Because Appellee failed to
show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
it had constructive knowledge of the banana peel on its premises,
we reverse.
REVERSED.
4
L EWIS, R OBERTS, and R AY,* JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Brian J. Lee of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Daniel Weinger and Tabitha Gail Jackson of Luks, Santaniello,
Petrillo, Cohen & Peterfriend, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
* Judge Ray was substituted for an original panel member in
this proceeding after oral argument. She has reviewed the briefs,
the record, and the recording of the oral argument.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2023-1238

MAMADOU OUEDRAOGO,
Appellant,
Vv.
WALMART STORES EAST, LP d/b/a
WALMART SUPERCENTER STORE

#1408,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
J. Lee Marsh, Judge.

February 18, 2026

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Mamadou Ouedraogo, appeals the trial court’s
order granting final summary judgment in favor of Appellee,
Walmart Stores East, LP, following an incident where Appellant
slipped and fell on a banana peel inside the entrance of a Walmart
store. Appellant argues, and we agree, that summary judgment
was improper. For the following reasons, we reverse.

In opposition to the summary judgment motion filed below,
Appellant submitted surveillance footage and photographs
showing the banana peel on Walmart’s floor for almost eight
minutes before his fall, with several employees nearby during that
time and with at least one employee walking directly past the

banana peel. Appellant also submitted the deposition transcript
of a Walmart employee who had been working as a customer host
at the entrance of the store the day he fell. The employee testified
that both she and another employee had been working as hosts
that day and that she was in the vicinity to witness the aftermath
of the fall. Despite this evidence, the trial court granted Appellee’s
summary judgment motion. In doing so, the court found:

Though employees were arguably near the banana
peel, it would be unreasonable to assume the employees
would be able to observe and notice the banana peel, as
doing so would have required them to turn their heads at
least 90 degrees. The fact that the banana peel was on the
floor for just under 8 minutes, 1s irrelevant.

This appeal followed.

We review the trial court’s order de novo. Gessner v. S. Co.,
396 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). The federal summary
judgment standard, which Florida has adopted, requires that a
trial court grant summary judgment if the movant “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jd. (quoting
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1510). A court must enter summary judgment
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element necessary to that party’s case and upon
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Jd. (citing
In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.150, 309 So. 3d 192, 198
(Fla. 2020). Pursuant to the federal standard, “[I]nferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(internal quotation omitted); Markowitz v. Helen Homes of Kendall
Corp., 826 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 2002) (“When reviewing the entry
of summary judgment, an appellate court must examine the record
and any supporting affidavits in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Here, Appellant was an invitee at the Walmart store. Florida
law makes clear that a premises owner owes a duty to its invitees
to exercise reasonable care to maintain its premises in a safe

condition. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330

(Fla. 2001). The existence of a transitory foreign object such as a
banana peel on the floor is not a safe condition. Jd. An invitee who
is injured by such an object must prove at trial that the business
had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition
and should have remedied it. See § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. Under
section 768.0755(1)(a)-(b), “Constructive knowledge may be
proven by circumstantial evidence showing that: (a) [t]he
dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the
exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have
known of the condition; or (b) [t]he condition occurred with
regularity and was therefore foreseeable.” Appellant relies on
subsection (1)(a) to demonstrate that he sufficiently proved there
was a question of fact as to Appellee’s constructive knowledge of
the banana peel.

We agree with Appellant that he made a sufficient showing to
support the element of constructive knowledge. He provided direct
evidence that there were several employees in the area where the
banana peel was located and that one employee walked right past
it. See Markowitz, 826 So. 2d at 261 (holding that it was error to
erant summary judgment where a question was sufficiently raised
as to whether the business had constructive knowledge of the
“unsafe condition” as there was evidence of employees in the
vicinity where the invitee’s fall occurred). Moreover, a trial judge
cannot conclude as a matter of law whether the duration of which
an object was on the floor is sufficient to create an issue of fact
because that is a question within the jury’ province. See
Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 306
(Fla. 1973) (explaining that where there was evidence that a
“foreign substance had been on the floor for a sufficient length of
time to charge the store owner with constructive knowledge of its
presence[,] .. . the trial court [] properly submit[ted] the question
of defendant’s negligence to the jury”). Because Appellee failed to
show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
it had constructive knowledge of the banana peel on its premises,
we reverse.

REVERSED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and RAY,* JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

Brian J. Lee of Morgan & Morgan, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Daniel Weinger and Tabitha Gail Jackson of Luks, Santaniello,
Petrillo, Cohen & Peterfriend, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

* Judge Ray was substituted for an original panel member in
this proceeding after oral argument. She has reviewed the briefs,
the record, and the recording of the oral argument.

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