Weaver v. Hatfield

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2423
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K IP ANTHONY W EAVER ,
Appellant,
v.
RUFUS E UGENE H ATFIELD,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
William Francis Stone, Judge.
November 19, 2025
O STERHAUS, C.J.
Kip Anthony Weaver appeals the denial of his petition to
determine 	homestead 	status 	of 	real 	property. 	The 	trial 	court
concluded that Mr. Weaver waived his homestead rights when he
executed a warranty deed assigning his rights and interests to his
decedent wife, Carolyn Sue Weaver. Seeing no error in the trial
court’s decision, we affirm.
I.

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Mr. and Ms. Weaver executed an Agreement for Deed on a
property in Okaloosa County in December 2013. In July 2019, the
Weavers executed a warranty deed wherein Mr. Weaver assigned
to Ms. Weaver “any marital and homestead interest” and “all
rights, duties, and obligations” in the subject property. Then, in
2022, Ms. Weaver executed another warranty deed conveying the
Property to herself and to her brother, Appellee Rufus Eugene
Hatfield, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Upon Ms. Weaver’s death in 2023, Mr. Weaver filed a petition
to 	determine 	homestead 	status 	of 	real 	property. 	Mr. 	Weaver
argued that upon Ms. Weaver’s death, the homestead Property
vested in him as the surviving spouse. In response, Mr. Hatfield
argued that Mr. 	Weaver waived his 	homestead rights 	in the
Property in 2019, and that a subsequent 2022 conveyance vested
the Property in Mr. Hatfield.
The 	trial 	court 	agreed 	with 	Mr. 	Hatfield. 	It 	denied 	Mr.
Weaver’s attempt to regain a stake in the Property due to his
earlier assignment of his homestead rights. Mr. Weaver timely
filed a notice of appeal and challenges the denial of his petition.
II.
The trial court’s order denying Mr. Weaver’s petition involves
the interpretation of statutory language and is reviewed de novo.
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 380 So. 3d 541, 544
(Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
The 	Florida 	Constitution 	protects 	homestead 	property 	by
providing tax exemptions, protecting against its forced sale by
creditors, and restricting its alienation or devise. Art. X, § 4, Fla.
Const. These protections, however, may be alienated or encumbered.
Id. 	at 	§ 	4(c). 	Section 	732.702(1), 	Florida 	Statutes, 	provides 	in
relevant 	part 	that 	“[t]he 	rights 	of 	a 	surviving 	spouse 	to 	. 	. 	.
homestead . . . may be waived . . . before or after marriage, by written
contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses.” Subsection (1) states further
that “a waiver of ‘all rights’ or equivalent language, in the property
or estate of a present or prospective spouse . . . is a waiver of all

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rights 	to 	elective 	share, 	intestate 	share, 	pretermitted 	share,
homestead, exempt property, family allowance. . . .”
This 	case 	involves 	a 	homestead 	rights 	waiver 	dispute. 	In
deciding whether a waiver occurred under applicable law, we look,
first, to the operative language of the subject waiver. The waiver
signed by Mr. Weaver expresses an explicit intent to waive marital
and homestead rights. Specifically, Mr. Weaver released “all his
interest, of whatever kind including any marital or homestead
interest, in this real property to Carolyn Sue Weaver.” The waiver
expressly mentions not only Mr. Weaver’s homestead rights, but
marital 	rights 	and 	“[a]ll 	the 	tenements, 	hereditaments 	and
appurtenances. . . .” This language is sufficiently specific to waive
homestead rights under § 732.702(1) and leaves Mr. Weaver in a
position vis-a-vis the Property that equates to having pre-deceased
his spouse. Webb v. Blue, 243 So. 3d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
And so, the waiver left Ms. Weaver free unilaterally to convey the
Property during her life without restriction, which she did to Mr.
Hatfield.
We acknowledge Mr. Weaver’s § 732.7025 argument regarding
supposed non-compliance with statutory waiver requirements. But
§ 732.7025 isn’t applicable here as it restricts “devises” of the
homestead. Section 731.201(10), Florida Statutes, defines a “devise”
as a testamentary disposition of personal property by will or trust.
The deeds executed here, however, involved conveyances during Ms.
Weaver’s life. The conveyance to Mr. Hatfield was not a “devise.” By
the time of the 2022 conveyance to Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Weaver had
already executed a clear waiver of his homestead and spousal rights
in the Property. And unlike in Thayer, the case on which Mr. Weaver
relies, the language of his warranty deed explicitly indicated a
waiver 	of 	his 	homestead 	interests 	in 	the 	property 	and 	all
hereditaments of the homestead. Thayer v. Hawthorn, 363 So. 3d
170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As such, Ms. Weaver was free to
convey the Property to Mr. Hatfield during her life without regard
to § 732.7025.

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III.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	judgment 	of 	the 	circuit 	court 	is
A FFIRMED.
ROWE and LONG, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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John 	R. 	Dowd 	Jr. 	of 	the 	Dowd 	Law 	Firm, 	P.A., 	Destin, 	for
Appellant.
Cristine M. 	Russell, of Rogers Towers, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellee.