State of Florida v. Milton

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2024-2856
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S TATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellant,
v.
JAKOBIE M ILTON ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Timothy Register, Judge.
December 3, 2025
PER C URIAM.
Jakobie 	Milton 	was 	arrested 	for, 	among 	other 	things,
trafficking 	in 	amphetamines 	and 	fentanyl. 	After 	Milton
successfully moved to suppress dispositive evidence, the State filed
this appeal. We reverse.
I
On or about April 18, 2023, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office
received information from a confidential informant (CI) that a man
named 	“RuRu” 	was 	traveling 	to 	the 	county 	to 	sell
methamphetamines and fentanyl. The CI was known to Deputy
Adams as a reliable informant who worked with the office to

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establish 	several 	drug-related 	cases. 	When 	the 	CI 	contacted
Adams and her office, he provided information that RuRu would
travel to Bay County to sell drugs and a phone number he knew
was associated with RuRu. Police determined that Milton was
associated 	with 	the 	phone 	number 	provided 	by 	the 	CI. 	A
photograph of Milton was also obtained, and the CI confirmed that
Milton was the man he knew as RuRu.
When 	Adams 	confirmed 	Milton 	as 	the 	suspect 	of 	the
investigation, the CI provided predictive details about when and
where Milton would conduct his sale. At first, the CI informed
Adams 	that 	the 	sale 	would 	occur 	at 	a 	given 	location, 	but 	a
subsequent phone call led to a real-time change of the location to
a Waffle House in Panama City Beach. Once there, Adams and
other officers confirmed that Milton was present at the Waffle
House and witnessed Milton entering a vehicle with a female
passenger.
The officers conducted a “vehicle pin,” which boxed Milton’s
vehicle in, not allowing him to leave. Milton began ramming two
of the officers’ vehicles, and after the female passenger exited the
vehicle, Milton tried to flee on foot. After a quick encounter with
Panama 	City 	Beach 	police, 	Milton 	was 	arrested, 	drugs 	were
recovered from his vehicle, and Milton was charged with, among
other things, trafficking in amphetamines and fentanyl.
Milton moved to suppress the seized drugs, arguing that the
CI’s information was unreliable, and so the officers lacked the
requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry* stop. The trial
court agreed and granted Milton’s motion. The State now appeals.
II
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under
a “mixed standard.” State v. Dennard, 385 So. 3d 1123, 1124 (Fla.
1st DCA 2024). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
competent, substantial evidence, and legal conclusions de novo. Id.
* Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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Given the facts are undisputed, the only question we must
answer 	today 	is 	whether 	law 	enforcement 	had 	reasonable
suspicion to justify a Terry stop and the subsequent search of
Milton’s vehicle. We answer that question in the affirmative.
“To justify a Terry stop, a law enforcement officer must have
a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the person detained has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Berry v.
State, 86 So. 3d 595, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citations omitted).
“Reasonable 	suspicion 	need 	not 	involve 	observation 	of 	illegal
conduct,” it “depends on probabilities, not hard certainties[,]” and
is based on “[a]n assessment of the whole picture[.]” United States
v. De La Rosa, No. 21-11923, 2022 WL 1559159, *1 (11th Cir. May
16, 2022) (citations omitted).
Analyzing a Terry stop that was conducted due to information
provided by an informant requires us to determine whether the
information provided was reliable enough to create reasonable
suspicion. See Berry, 86 So. 3d at 598 (“‘In analyzing whether
third-party 	information 	can 	provide 	the 	requisite 	reasonable
suspicion, courts have looked to the reliability of the informant as
well 	as 	the 	reliability 	of 	the 	information 	provided.’” 	(citation
omitted)). Even “an anonymous tip can provide the basis for
reasonable suspicion, provided that it can be established that the
tip is reliable.” J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1998). And
we measure “the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion . . . by
the information that the officers knew before conducting the stop-
and-frisk.” Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 294 (Fla. 2008).
We note, however, that it is unclear from the order granting
suppression whether the trial court considered the nature of the
type of information the CI provided. The type of information
provided 	matters 	because 	the 	task 	of 	determining 	whether
reasonable 	suspicion 	was 	present 	becomes 	harder 	when 	the
information provided is innocent in nature. See J.L., 727 So. 2d at
206 (“The more difficult case involves those tips which allege
criminal 	conduct, 	but 	only 	describe 	‘innocent 	details 	of
identification,’ for which the details in and of themselves are in no
way incriminating or indicative of criminal behavior.” (citation
omitted)).

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We hold that the CI’s information did not describe “innocent
details of identification.” Rather, the information provided was
specific 	enough 	for 	law 	enforcement 	to 	develop 	reasonable
suspicion that a crime would be conducted by a certain individual,
at a given location, and at a specific time. That information is not
what 	courts 	have 	deemed 	“innocent 	details 	of 	identification,”
rather, they are specific enough for law enforcement to act on—
especially when that information comes from a CI who provided
reliable information in the past. Still, even “innocent detail tips
can [ ] prove to be reliable and be the foundation for reasonable
suspicion.” J.L., 727 So. 2d at 207.
For instance, a tip can predict actions that will occur in the
future. Future predictions can establish that the tip is reliable if
the tip “contain[s] a range of details relating not just to easily
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to
future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.” Id.
(citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).
Here, the information Adams received was exactly that. The
CI provided Adams with Milton’s phone number, identified him,
and provided the exact location where the drug sale would occur.
The fact that the CI was able to inform Adams that Milton’s
location changed, in real time, and that Adams identified Milton
at 	the 	updated 	location 	is 	evidence 	that 	the 	CI 	had 	reliable
information that could not be easily predicted.
Thus, given that the CI (1) worked up numerous drug cases
for the department in the past, (2) provided identification of the
suspect, and (3) provided real-time updates about when the drug
sale was to occur, it cannot be said that the CI was in the same
category as the anonymous tipster. See cf. State v. DeLuca, 40 So.
3d 120, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“The spectrum of reliability
ranges from the relatively unknown veracity and reliability of an
anonymous, unknown tipster whose assertions of criminal activity
typically 	cannot 	be 	verified 	and 	thus 	require 	independent
corroboration, 	to 	the 	presumed 	high 	reliability 	of 	a 	citizen-
informer crime victim whose motivation in reporting illegality is
the promotion of justice and public safety rather than financial
gain, and who can be held accountable for the accuracy of the
information given.” (citations omitted)).

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III
Accordingly, because the CI here was far more reliable than
an anonymous tipster, and the information he provided predicted
future behavior, reasonable suspicion supporting the stop existed.
Thus, 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in 	granting 	Milton’s 	suppression
motion.
R EVERSED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and R OBERTS and W INOKUR , JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.