Alachua County Housing Authority v. Graham

2024-1385Fladistctapp1

Testo completo

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-1385
_____________________________
A LACHUA C OUNTY HOUSING
A UTHORITY ,
Appellant,
v.
ERICA GRAHAM,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the County Court for Alachua County.
Meshon T. Rawls, Judge.
December 23, 2025
W INOKUR , J.
Alachua County Housing Authority (ACHA) appeals a final
order dismissing its complaint for eviction. In its complaint, the
ACHA sought to evict Erica Graham after Graham failed to comply
with the lease’s recertification requirement. The county court
dismissed ACHA’s complaint. We reverse.
In 	December 	2017, 	ACHA 	and 	Graham 	entered 	into 	a
residential lease agreement, for a term of one year with an option
to renew. To renew, Graham and all adults living in the home were
required to attend a recertification appointment and submit a
redetermination packet with information to determine eligibility
and rent. Under the lease, “failure to supply such information
when requested is a serious violation of the terms of the lease and
ACHA must terminate the lease.”
2
From 	2017 	to 	2021, 	Graham 	attended 	the 	recertification
appointments and submitted the redetermination packets. But on
July 26, 2022, Graham was found guilty of felony petit theft and
resisting detention after theft, resulting in a 180-day sentence in
the county jail. On August 5, while Graham was in jail, ACHA sent
Graham 	the 	first 	letter 	regarding 	the 	annual 	reclassification
appointment 	and 	redetermination 	packet, 	scheduled 	for
September 6, 2022. On August 10, Graham’s adult son, James
Covert, was given power of attorney to act on behalf of Graham,
but 	neither 	Graham 	nor 	Covert 	attended 	the 	recertification
appointment scheduled for September 6. On September 8, ACHA
sent 	Graham 	a 	second 	letter 	rescheduling 	the 	certification
appointment to September 22. Again, neither Graham nor Covert
attended 	the 	recertification 	meeting 	or 	submitted 	the
redetermination packet. On November 4, ACHA sent Graham a
third letter titled “30 Day Notice – Curable Noncompliance with
Lease, Notice of Proposed Adverse Action, Notice of Termination
of 	Tenancy.” 	This 	document 	provided 	a 	new 	date 	for 	the
recertification 	appointment: 	November 	17. 	This 	letter 	also
provided 	conflicting 	dates 	for 	the 	termination 	of 	the 	Lease,
December 1 and December 12. For the third time, Graham and
Covert 	failed 	to 	attend 	the 	scheduled 	meeting. 	However, 	on
November 29, Covert attempted to submit the redetermination
packet, but was told it was incomplete and given until the end of
business on November 30 to submit the complete packet. Covert
failed to submit the redetermination packet.
Graham was released from jail on December 5 and contacted
ACHA 	about 	the 	redetermination 	packet 	the 	following 	day.
Graham requested ACHA re-mail the three previous letters so she
could accurately complete the redetermination packet. Graham
claims she never received these three letters. On December 16, as
a result 	of Graham’s failure to 	complete the redetermination
packet and recertification appointment, ACHA filed an action to
evict Graham. The county court found that eviction would be
inequitable and unconscionable and dismissed ACHA’s complaint.
ACHA appealed.
A fundamental principle of contract construction is that clear,
unambiguous 	language 	must 	be 	given 	its 	plain 	and 	ordinary
meaning. Columbia Bank v. Columbia Developers, LLC, 127 So. 3d
3
670, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). It is not the role of a court to rewrite
the terms of a contract to make it more favorable for one of the
parties. Ferreira v. Home Depot/Sedgwick CMS, 12 So. 3d 866, 868
(Fla. 1st DCA 2009). And while forfeitures are not favored, “[t]he
law permits a man to make a contract which will result in a
forfeiture; and when it is clear from the terms of the contract that
the parties have so agreed, a court of law as well as the court of
equity, will enforce the forfeiture.” Nelson v. Hansard, 197 So. 513,
513–14 (Fla. 1940). But given the severity of forfeitures, a court
will seek to mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without
altering the terms of the contract. Stoltz v. Truitt, 940 So. 2d 521,
523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Nevertheless, “[a] court of equity . . . will
not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect,
gross 	negligence, 	or 	willful 	and 	persistent 	violations 	of 	the
contract.” Id. (citing Nelson, 197 So. at 514 and Rader v. Prather,
130 So. 15, 18 (1930)).
The 	lease 	agreement 	between 	Graham 	and 	ACHA
unambiguously 	states 	that 	“failure 	to 	supply 	such
[redetermination] 	information 	when 	requested 	is 	a 	serious
violation of the terms of the lease and ACHA must terminate the
lease.” Although Graham was incarcerated, she had submitted the
redetermination packet in years prior, was aware the packet was
due while she was incarcerated, and had given her son power of
attorney so he could complete the packet in her absence. Covert
failed to complete the packet, and when Graham was released, she
also 	failed 	to 	complete 	the 	redetermination 	packet 	and
recertification 	appointment. 	While 	the 	third 	letter 	included
conflicting dates as to whether the lease would terminate on
December 1 or 12, by the 16th, Graham had still not completed her
redetermination packet or recertification appointment.
When the trial court refused to honor the terms of the lease to
which Graham and ACHA had agreed, it essentially rewrote the
terms of the contract to favor Graham. See Med. Inv. Corp. v. Mike
Rollison Fence, LLC, 331 So. 3d 242, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“‘A
party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and
unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract. . . . It is not the role of
the courts to make an otherwise valid contract more reasonable
from the standpoint of one contracting party.’” (citation omitted)).
4
For these reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions
to enter judgment in favor of ACHA.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Rhonda E. Stringer of Saxon Gilmore & Carraway P.A., Tampa, for
Appellant.
Kevin 	Skyler 	Rabin 	of 	Three 	Rivers 	Legal 	Services, 	Inc.,
Gainesville, for Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-1385

ALACHUA COUNTY HOUSING
AUTHORITY,

Appellant,
Vv.
ERICA GRAHAM,

Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court for Alachua County.
Meshon T. Rawls, Judge.

December 23, 2025
WINOKUR, J.

Alachua County Housing Authority (ACHA) appeals a final
order dismissing its complaint for eviction. In its complaint, the
ACHA sought to evict Erica Graham after Graham failed to comply
with the lease’s recertification requirement. The county court
dismissed ACHA’s complaint. We reverse.

In December 2017, ACHA and Graham entered into a
residential lease agreement, for a term of one year with an option
to renew. To renew, Graham and all adults living in the home were
required to attend a recertification appointment and submit a
redetermination packet with information to determine eligibility
and rent. Under the lease, “failure to supply such information
when requested is a serious violation of the terms of the lease and
ACHA must terminate the lease.”

From 2017 to 2021, Graham attended the recertification
appointments and submitted the redetermination packets. But on
July 26, 2022, Graham was found guilty of felony petit theft and
resisting detention after theft, resulting in a 180-day sentence in
the county jail. On August 5, while Graham was in jail, ACHA sent
Graham the first letter regarding the annual reclassification
appointment and _ redetermination packet, scheduled for
September 6, 2022. On August 10, Graham’s adult son, James
Covert, was given power of attorney to act on behalf of Graham,
but neither Graham nor Covert attended the recertification
appointment scheduled for September 6. On September 8, ACHA
sent Graham a second letter rescheduling the certification
appointment to September 22. Again, neither Graham nor Covert
attended the _ recertification meeting or submitted the
redetermination packet. On November 4, ACHA sent Graham a
third letter titled “830 Day Notice — Curable Noncompliance with
Lease, Notice of Proposed Adverse Action, Notice of Termination
of Tenancy.” This document provided a new date for the
recertification appointment: November 17. This letter also
provided conflicting dates for the termination of the Lease,
December 1 and December 12. For the third time, Graham and
Covert failed to attend the scheduled meeting. However, on
November 29, Covert attempted to submit the redetermination
packet, but was told it was incomplete and given until the end of
business on November 30 to submit the complete packet. Covert
failed to submit the redetermination packet.

Graham was released from jail on December 5 and contacted
ACHA about the redetermination packet the following day.
Graham requested ACHA re-mail the three previous letters so she
could accurately complete the redetermination packet. Graham
claims she never received these three letters. On December 16, as
a result of Graham’s failure to complete the redetermination
packet and recertification appointment, ACHA filed an action to
evict Graham. The county court found that eviction would be
inequitable and unconscionable and dismissed ACHA’s complaint.
ACHA appealed.

A fundamental principle of contract construction is that clear,
unambiguous language must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Columbia Bank v. Columbia Developers, LLC, 127 So. 3d

670, 673 (Fla. Ist DCA 2018). It is not the role of a court to rewrite
the terms of a contract to make it more favorable for one of the
parties. Ferreira v. Home Depot /Sedgwick CMS, 12 So. 3d 866, 868
(Fla. 1st DCA 2009). And while forfeitures are not favored, “[t]he
law permits a man to make a contract which will result in a
forfeiture; and when it is clear from the terms of the contract that
the parties have so agreed, a court of law as well as the court of
equity, will enforce the forfeiture.” Nelson v. Hansard, 197 So. 513,
513-14 (Fla. 1940). But given the severity of forfeitures, a court
will seek to mitigate forfeitures when it can be done without
altering the terms of the contract. Stoltz v. Truitt, 940 So. 2d 521,
523 (Fla. lst DCA 2006). Nevertheless, “[a] court of equity... will
not grant relief from a situation traceable to a party’s own neglect,
gross negligence, or willful and persistent violations of the
contract.” Id. (citing Nelson, 197 So. at 514 and Rader v. Prather,
130 So. 15, 18 (1930)).

The lease agreement between Graham and ACHA
unambiguously states that “failure to supply = such
[redetermination] information when requested is a_ serious
violation of the terms of the lease and ACHA must terminate the
lease.” Although Graham was incarcerated, she had submitted the
redetermination packet in years prior, was aware the packet was
due while she was incarcerated, and had given her son power of
attorney so he could complete the packet in her absence. Covert
failed to complete the packet, and when Graham was released, she
also failed to complete the redetermination packet and
recertification appointment. While the third letter included
conflicting dates as to whether the lease would terminate on
December 1 or 12, by the 16th, Graham had still not completed her
redetermination packet or recertification appointment.

When the trial court refused to honor the terms of the lease to
which Graham and ACHA had agreed, it essentially rewrote the
terms of the contract to favor Graham. See Med. Inv. Corp. v. Mike
Rollison Fence, LLC, 331 So. 3d 242, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“A
party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and
unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract. ... It is not the role of
the courts to make an otherwise valid contract more reasonable
from the standpoint of one contracting party.” (citation omitted)).

For these reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions
to enter judgment in favor of ACHA.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

Rhonda E. Stringer of Saxon Gilmore & Carraway P.A., Tampa, for
Appellant.

Kevin Skyler Rabin of Three Rivers Legal Services, Inc.,
Gainesville, for Appellee.

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