Fred Jay Campbell v. Erica Schulze Ising

2024-1698Fladistctapp1

Testo completo

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-1698
_____________________________
F RED JAY C AMPBELL ,
Appellant,
v.
ERICA SCHULZE I SING,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
John Miller, Judge.
December 23, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
A FFIRMED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur; W INOKUR , J., dissents with
opinion.
2
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
W INOKUR , J., dissenting.
The evidence in this case was not sufficient to show that
Campbell willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harassed Ising to
support an injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to
section 784.0485, Florida Statutes. 	“Harass” means “to engage in
a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial 	emotional 	distress 	to 	that 	person 	and 	serves 	no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Even if we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ising, the evidence did not
support a finding that Campbell’s conduct was sufficient to cause
“substantial 	emotional 	distress” 	under 	the 	reasonable-person
standard we must apply. See Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238
(Fla. 1995) (holding that an objective, reasonable-person standard
applies to the phrase “substantial emotional distress”). For this
reason, we should reverse.
_____________________________
Jason Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Erica Schulze Ising, pro se, Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-1698

FRED JAY CAMPBELL,
Appellant,
Vv.

ERICA SCHULZE ISING,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
John Miller, Judge.

December 23, 2025

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and LONG, J., concur; WINOKUR, J., dissents with
opinion.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

WINOKUR, J., dissenting.

The evidence in this case was not sufficient to show that
Campbell willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harassed Ising to
support an injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to
section 784.0485, Florida Statutes. “Harass” means “to engage in
a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Even if we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ising, the evidence did not
support a finding that Campbell’s conduct was sufficient to cause
“substantial emotional distress” under the reasonable-person
standard we must apply. See Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238
(Fla. 1995) (holding that an objective, reasonable-person standard
applies to the phrase “substantial emotional distress”). For this
reason, we should reverse.

Jason Cromey of Cromey Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.

Erica Schulze Ising, pro se, Appellee.

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