Steven McBride v. Courtney Keller and Savannah Young

2025-1397Fladistctapp5

Testo completo

FIFTH D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
________________________________
Case No. 5D2025-1397
LT Case No. 16-2025-CC-1701
________________________________
S TEVEN MC B RIDE ,
Appellant,
v.
COURTNEY KELLER and
SAVANNAH YOUNG,
Appellees.
_______________________________
On appeal from the County Court for Duval County.
Kelly E. Eckley-Moulder, Judge.
Steven McBride, Jacksonville, pro se.
Joshua C. Webb and Jacob Z. Coates, of Hill, Ward & Henderson,
P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
February 13, 2026
M AC IVER , J.
Appellant, Steven McBride, appeals an order dismissing with
prejudice his complaint against Appellees, Courtney Keller and
Savannah Young, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
dismiss his complaint while an interlocutory appeal was pending.
We agree.
2
McBride 	filed 	a 	complaint 	below 	against 	Appellees, 	and
during the litigation McBride appealed two interlocutory non-final
orders. While said appeal was pending, Appellees filed a motion to
dismiss McBride’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
cause of action in the trial court. Then, McBride filed a motion to
dismiss his appeal with this Court, with a copy to the trial court.
This Court entered an order dismissing the then-pending appeal
on May 7, 2025. The same day, the trial court entered a final order
dismissing McBride’s complaint with prejudice.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) governs the trial
court’s authority during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal.
Under the rule, “[i]n the absence of a stay, during the pendency of
a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with
all matters, including trial or final hearings; provided that the
lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause
pending such review.” Fla. R. App. P. Rule 9.130(f).
The 	restoration 	of 	full 	jurisdiction 	to 	the 	lower 	tribunal
requires 	issuance 	of 	the 	appellate 	mandate. 	Florida 	Rule 	of
Appellate 	Procedure 	9.340(a) 	provides 	that 	unless 	otherwise
ordered by the court, the clerk must issue the mandate after the
expiration of fifteen days from the date of an order or decision.
Thus, a lower tribunal generally lacks jurisdiction to enter an
order dismissing a complaint with prejudice on the same day an
appellate court dismisses an appeal because the lower tribunal’s
jurisdiction 	is 	not 	automatically 	restored 	until 	the 	appellate
mandate issues. Hersey v. Batchelor, 433 So. 2d 558, 559 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1983) (the filing of the appellate court’s opinion and mandate
in the trial court constitutes record activity that restores the lower
tribunal’s 	jurisdiction); 	see 	also 	Mandrachia 	v. 	Ravenswood
Marine, Inc., 118 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (when a
plaintiff 	took 	an 	interlocutory 	appeal 	and 	the 	lower 	court
subsequently entered a final judgment dismissing the complaint
with prejudice, the authority of the lower court terminated on
taking 	of 	the 	appeal 	and 	the 	dismissal 	with 	prejudice 	was
unauthorized).
Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final order
dismissing the complaint with prejudice while the interlocutory
appeal was pending in this court. “[A]n order entered without
3
jurisdiction is a nullity, and cannot be considered harmless error.”
Llanso v. Gomez de Cordova, 263 So. 3d 137, 140 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018) (quoting Dragomirecky v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 891 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 	5th 	DCA 	2005) 	(holding 	that 	“the 	trial 	court 	lacked
jurisdiction 	to 	enter 	the 	final 	order 	dismissing 	the 	certiorari
petition with prejudice while the interlocutory appeal was pending
in this court.” 891 So. 2d at 634)).
Accordingly, 	the 	trial 	court’s 	order 	dismissing 	McBride’s
complaint with prejudice is vacated, and the case remanded. We
note that, on remand, the trial court is authorized to enter another
dismissal order since McBride’s interlocutory appeal has now been
disposed of with finality by this court. See id. at 635; Esposito v.
Horning, 416 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that
although it may sound like “legal gobbledegook” to require a trial
court to re-enter a final judgment after a non-final appeal is
concluded, jurisdiction is not a question a court can take or leave,
and a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void). However, we
do not address the issue whether the trial court applied the correct
law in dismissing the complaint, as such an analysis would be
premature. See Dragomirecky, 891 So. 2d at 635.
Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice V ACATED and
case R EMANDED.
JAY , C.J., and LAMBERT , J., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 5D2025-1397
LT Case No. 16-2025-CC-1701

STEVEN MCBRIDE,
Appellant,
v.

COURTNEY KELLER and
SAVANNAH YOUNG,

Appellees.

On appeal from the County Court for Duval County.
Kelly E. Eckley-Moulder, Judge.

Steven McBride, Jacksonville, pro se.

Joshua C. Webb and Jacob Z. Coates, of Hill, Ward & Henderson,
P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.

February 13, 2026
MACIVER, J.

Appellant, Steven McBride, appeals an order dismissing with
prejudice his complaint against Appellees, Courtney Keller and
Savannah Young, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
dismiss his complaint while an interlocutory appeal was pending.
We agree.

McBride filed a complaint below against Appellees, and
during the litigation McBride appealed two interlocutory non-final
orders. While said appeal was pending, Appellees filed a motion to
dismiss McBride’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a
cause of action in the trial court. Then, McBride filed a motion to
dismiss his appeal with this Court, with a copy to the trial court.
This Court entered an order dismissing the then-pending appeal
on May 7, 2025. The same day, the trial court entered a final order
dismissing McBride’s complaint with prejudice.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f) governs the trial
court’s authority during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal.
Under the rule, “[i]n the absence of a stay, during the pendency of
a review of a non-final order, the lower tribunal may proceed with
all matters, including trial or final hearings; provided that the
lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the cause

pending such review.” Fla. R. App. P. Rule 9.130(f).

The restoration of full jurisdiction to the lower tribunal
requires issuance of the appellate mandate. Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.340(a) provides that unless otherwise
ordered by the court, the clerk must issue the mandate after the
expiration of fifteen days from the date of an order or decision.
Thus, a lower tribunal generally lacks jurisdiction to enter an
order dismissing a complaint with prejudice on the same day an
appellate court dismisses an appeal because the lower tribunal’s
jurisdiction is not automatically restored until the appellate
mandate issues. Hersey v. Batchelor, 433 So. 2d 558, 559 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1983) (the filing of the appellate court’s opinion and mandate
in the trial court constitutes record activity that restores the lower
tribunal’s jurisdiction); see also Mandrachia v. Ravenswood
Marine, Inc., 118 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) (when a
plaintiff took an interlocutory appeal and the lower court
subsequently entered a final judgment dismissing the complaint
with prejudice, the authority of the lower court terminated on
taking of the appeal and the dismissal with prejudice was
unauthorized).

Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final order
dismissing the complaint with prejudice while the interlocutory
appeal was pending in this court. “[A]n order entered without

jurisdiction is a nullity, and cannot be considered harmless error.”
Llanso v. Gomez de Cordova, 263 So. 3d 137, 140 (Fla. 8d DCA
2018) (quoting Dragomirecky v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 891 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (holding that “the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the final order dismissing the certiorari
petition with prejudice while the interlocutory appeal was pending
in this court.” 891 So. 2d at 634)).

Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing McBride’s
complaint with prejudice is vacated, and the case remanded. We
note that, on remand, the trial court is authorized to enter another
dismissal order since McBride’s interlocutory appeal has now been
disposed of with finality by this court. See id. at 635; Esposito v.
Horning, 416 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that
although it may sound like “legal gobbledegook” to require a trial
court to re-enter a final judgment after a non-final appeal is
concluded, jurisdiction is not a question a court can take or leave,
and a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void). However, we
do not address the issue whether the trial court applied the correct
law in dismissing the complaint, as such an analysis would be
premature. See Dragomirecky, 891 So. 2d at 635.

Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice VACATED and
case REMANDED.

JAY, C.J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.