Dale Dixon, Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Alfonso T. Glover, Jr. v. Michael J. Green, Rosa Wright, Ruth Randal, Deloris Kidd, Arlean Brookins, and Andrea Troutman

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-2410
LT Case No. 2017-CP-001731
_____________________________
DALE D IXON , A DMINISTRATOR AD
L ITEM of THE E STATE of ALFONSO
T. G LOVER, J R.,
Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. G REEN , R OSA
W RIGHT , R UTH R ANDAL , D ELORIS
K IDD, A RLEAN B ROOKINS, and
A NDREA TROUTMAN ,
Appellees.
_____________________________
Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Thomas M. Beverly, Judge.
Rosemary Shackelford, Clearwater, and Grayling Emanuel
Brannon, of Law Offices of Grayling E. Brannon, P.A., for
Appellant.
Edward P. Jackson, of Edward P. Jackson, P.A., Jacksonville,
for Appellee, Michael J. Green.
No Appearance for Remaining Appellees.
December 5, 2025

2
E DWARDS, J.
The primary issue in the underlying case is who will inherit a
million dollars from a relative’s intestate estate. 	However, this
appeal is about the probate court’s order disqualifying attorney
Grayling E. Brannon1 from further participation in the underlying
case, based upon a conflict of interest. 	Attorney Brannon initially
represented a client claiming to be the nephew and sole heir of the
decedent. 	However, after being unable to initially prove that
relationship, Attorney Brannon began representing other relatives
of the decedent and directly fought to defeat the claim of his first
client, 	the 	nephew. 	We 	affirm 	the 	trial 	court’s 	detailed 	order
granting the nephew’s motion to disqualify.
Inheriting From a Rich Uncle
Uncle Alfonso Glover, Jr. (“the Decedent”) died intestate; he
never married, had no children, and was predeceased by both his
parents and Charles Glover—his brother and only sibling. Charles
Glover married Sandra Glover in 1975 and remained wedded to her
up until his death. In 1977, Charles Glover fathered a son, Michael
Green (“Green”) out of wedlock.
In the first phase of the probate case, Attorney Brannon
represented Green, asserting that Green is the Decedent’s nephew
and sole heir to inherit his uncle’s intestate estate.2 	Some of the
Decedent’s cousins, Deloris Kidd, Ruth Randal, Rosa Wright, and
Arlean 	Brookins 	(“the 	Cousins”), 	claimed 	that 	Green 	was 	not
Charles Glover’s biological son and therefore not the Decedent’s
1 Florida Bar Number 882100 of Jacksonville, Florida
2 Attorney Brannon also represented Arneka Green, Green’s
wife, and had her appointed personal representative (“PR”) in lieu
of Green, who is a convicted felon and thus prohibited by law from
serving as PR. See § 733.303(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017).

3
nephew.3 	Thus, the positions of Green and the Cousins were
directly and completely adverse to each other, as only one side
would be entitled to inherit the Decedent’s intestate estate. As the
probate court put it, the battle lines were thus drawn: Green vs. the
Cousins. Attorney Brannon changed sides in the same case by first
representing and then opposing Green’s claim.
First Phase of Probate Litigation
Because Green had been born out of wedlock and Charles
Glover never formally acknowledged Green as his son, proving that
Green was the Decedent’s nephew was challenging. 	Attorney
Brannon sought an order from the probate court to designate Green
as an heir and to exhume the body of Charles Glover in order to
obtain DNA samples. 	Glover’s widow and the Cousins opposed
exhumation. 	The probate court denied the motion, observing that
no order would be needed if the widow later agreed to exhumation.
Attorney Brannon took an appeal of that order to the First District
Court of Appeal, where it was per curiam affirmed without a
written opinion.4
Later Phases of Probate Litigation
Later 	in 	this 	same 	probate 	case, 	Attorney 	Brannon
represented one of the Decedent’s second cousins, James Glover,
and another cousin, Andrea Troutman. 	Meanwhile, Green hired
new counsel, Attorney Jackson, who convinced Glover’s widow to
permit the exhumation of her late husband’s body. 	The DNA test
results established a 99.99% probability that Green was Charles
Glover’s son and thus was the Decedent’s nephew and sole heir.
Attorney 	Jackson, 	on 	behalf 	of 	Green, 	filed 	a 	motion 	for
summary 	judgment 	asserting 	that 	he 	should 	be 	declared 	the
3 The Cousins were initially represented only by Attorney
Tassone.
4 Green v. Kidd, 280 So. 3d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

4
Decedent’s sole heir and that the claims of the other potential heirs
should be denied.
Summary Judgment Hearing
The 	court 	held 	a 	hearing 	on 	Green’s 	summary 	judgment
motion. Attorney Jackson on behalf of Green argued that the recent
DNA results established that Charles Glover was Green’s father,
making Green the sole heir of the Decedent’s estate.
Although Attorney Tassone filed the sole written response in
opposition to Green’s summary judgment motion, he deferred to
Attorney Brannon to orally argue against Green’s position during
the 	hearing. 	Attorney 	Brannon 	began 	his 	presentation 	with
something 	of 	an 	understatement, 	“[a]nd 	it’s 	kind 	of 	awkward
because I was on the other side back during that period of time.”
This was an obvious reference to the fact that Attorney Brannon
originally asserted in this same case that Green was the Decedent’s
nephew and sole beneficiary, a position Attorney Brannon now
opposed. 	Attorney Brannon then proceeded in that hearing to
advocate against Green’s entitlement to inherit from the Decedent’s
estate.
The court orally granted the motion for summary judgment
and found Green to be the Decedent’s sole beneficiary.5
Attorney Brannon’s Motion for Rehearing
Before 	a 	written 	order 	granting 	summary 	judgment 	was
prepared, Attorney Brannon filed a motion for rehearing on behalf
of Appellant, Dale Dixon, Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of
Alfonso Green. 	Attorney Brannon’s rehearing motion argued that
Green was barred for multiple reasons from asserting his claim to
be the sole heir.
Motion to Disqualify Attorney Brannon
5 Neither side included a written order granting summary
judgment in its appendix.

5
In response to Attorney Brannon’s motion for rehearing, Green
moved to disqualify Attorney Brannon from representing any party
opposed to him in the estate contest. 	The motion to disqualify
stated that Attorney Brannon represented Michael and Arneka
Green initially, but then changed sides during the estate litigation
by representing opposing clients, thereby creating a conflict of
interest warranting disqualification. 	Attorney Brannon filed a
written response asserting that Green lacked standing to challenge
Attorney Brannon’s representation of others in this probate matter.
In that response, Attorney Brannon also denied that an attorney-
client relationship ever existed between him and Green. 	Attorney
Brannon argued that he was not precluded from representing
Green’s opponents under The Florida Bar’s conflict of interest rules,
a position Appellant maintains on appeal.
Hearing on Motion to Disqualify and Motion for Rehearing
A 	hearing 	was 	held 	on 	Green’s 	motion 	to 	disqualify 	and
Attorney Brannon’s motion for rehearing. 	Green argued that
Attorney Brannon’s representation of the Administrator Ad Litem
and various cousins was adverse to Green’s interests and, based on
the 	conflict, 	Attorney 	Brannon 	should 	be 	disqualified. 	Green
further asserted that Attorney Brannon’s initial representation of
him and his wife was based upon the claim of Green being the
Decedent’s 	nephew 	and 	sole 	heir, 	and 	after 	switching 	sides,
Attorney Brannon was now arguing directly in opposition to that
premise without the Greens’ consent.
Attorney 	Brannon 	argued 	that 	Green 	lacked 	standing,
claiming Brannon never had a direct attorney-client relationship
with Green. Attorney Brannon asserted that his withdrawal would
cause 	irreparable 	damage 	to 	his 	current 	clients 	who 	opposed
Green’s status as sole heir.
The Disqualification Order
The 	probate 	court 	granted 	Green’s 	motion 	to 	disqualify
Attorney Brannon. 	In its detailed order, now being appealed, the
probate court found that Arneka Green was still a party to the case
because she had never been discharged as the PR, and Attorney
Brannon never terminated his appearance for her. 	The court

6
considered 	Attorney 	Brannon’s 	representation 	of 	Ms. 	Green,
additional 	evidence 	of 	Attorney 	Brannon’s 	coextensive
representation of Green and his wife, and analyzed both under the
conflict of interest rules found in the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar and relevant case law. 	The probate court found there was an
adverse interest between the Greens and the Cousins and entered
a written order granting Green’s motion to disqualify Attorney
Brannon from representing those adverse to Green. 	A timely
appeal was taken by Appellant.
Issues On Appeal
1. 	Standing to Seek Attorney Brannon’s Disqualification
Appellant asserts that Michael Green lacked standing to seek
Attorney Brannon’s disqualification. 	“To have standing, a would-
be litigant must show ‘a direct and articulable interest in the
controversy, which will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.’”
Bivins v. Douglas, 335 So. 3d 1214, 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
(quoting Cruz v. Cmty. Bank & Tr. of Fla., 277 So. 3d 1095, 1097
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019)). Whether a party has standing is reviewed de
novo. 	See Fox v. Pro. Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d
175, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing Putnam Cnty. Env’t Council,
Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Putnam Cnty., 757 So. 2d 590, 594
(Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). Appellant claims Green is not an “interested
person,” citing to 	section 731.201(23), Florida Statutes (2024),
which 	defines 	an 	interested 	person 	as 	“any 	person 	who 	may
reasonably 	be 	expected 	to 	be 	affected 	by 	the 	outcome 	of 	the
particular proceeding . . . .” 	Given Green’s claim and the probate
court’s ruling that he is the sole heir of the Decedent’s estate, he
certainly qualifies as an “interested person.” 	It is difficult to
conceive of anybody having a stronger claim of standing than a
former client seeking to prevent his attorney from representing
other clients, whose interests are directly adverse to his, in the
same proceeding.
2. Was Disqualification an Abuse of Discretion?
“The standard of review for orders entered on motions to
disqualify counsel is that of an abuse of discretion.” Kemp Invs. N.,
LLC v. Englert, 314 So. 3d 734, 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (quoting

7
Applied Digit. Sols., Inc. v. Vasa, 941 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006) (citation omitted)).
Appellant argues that there was no evidence to support any
finding that Attorney Brannon represented Green. 	To say that
Appellant is badly mistaken is charitable. 	The following evidence
was adduced below. 	First, during the initial hearing in the estate
contest, 	Attorney 	Brannon 	announced 	on 	the 	record 	that 	he
represented both Michael and Arneka Green. 	Second, during the
first phase of the probate litigation, Attorney Brannon billed the
Greens for services rendered on different dates including: (1) “an
office consultation with clients,” (2) “advise clients” that he spoke
with opposing counsel, (3) “phone conference with clients,” and (4)
“office conference with clients.” The probate court found Brannon’s
use of “clients,” plural, in those bills, indicated that “Attorney
Brannon considered both Arneka Green and Michael Green to be
his clients.” Third, Attorney Brannon’s cover letter forwarding the
invoice 	for 	services 	rendered 	was 	addressed 	solely 	to 	Michael
Green. 	Fourth, 	Attorney 	Brannon 	acknowledged 	during 	the
summary judgment hearing that he was in an awkward position as
he previously was on the other side.
Legal Basis of Disqualification: Conflict of Interest
The probate court here carefully considered the two-part test
established in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991), before it disqualified
Attorney 	Brannon. 	K.A.W. 	requires 	that 	a 	party 	seeking 	to
disqualify opposing counsel based on a conflict of interest must
demonstrate that:
(1) 	an 	attorney-client 	relationship 	existed, 	thereby
giving 	rise 	to 	an 	irrefutable 	presumption 	that
confidences were disclosed during the relationship, and
(2) the matter in which the law firm subsequently
represented the interest adverse to the former client
was the same or substantially related to the matter in
which it represented the former client.

8
Kaplan v. Divosta Homes, L.P., 20 So. 3d 459, 462 (Fla. 2d DCA
2009) (quoting K.A.W., 575 So. 2d at 633). Here, the probate court
found that the first factor, the attorney-client relationship, had
been 	established. 	Its 	decision 	is 	supported 	by 	competent
substantial evidence. The probate court concluded that the second
factor, subsequent representation of an interest adverse to the
former client in the same or similar proceeding, had likewise been
established as it all occurred in the very same estate contest. That
finding is likewise supported by competent substantial evidence. It
is difficult to imagine more completely adverse interests being
represented by a single attorney, in a single case, than to begin
advocating for Green being the sole heir only to change sides,
arguing against Green inheriting a single penny. 	As the probate
court aptly noted in the order of disqualification, “the battle lines
are drawn: Michael Green vs. the Cousins” because “[t]he primary
dispute in this adversary proceeding has always been the identity
of the [D]ecedent’s beneficiaries.” 	Attorney Brannon over time
represented first one side and then the other in the same case.
The 	Rules 	Regulating 	The 	Florida 	Bar 	prohibit 	such
representation of adverse interests. 	To the extent that Appellant
argues that Attorney Brannon quit representing Arneka Green and
Michael 	Green 	before 	switching 	sides 	and 	clients, 	Rule 	of
Professional Conduct 4-1.9 provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter must not afterwards:
(a) 	represent 	another 	person 	in 	the 	same 	or 	a
substantially related matter in which that person’s
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client gives informed
consent[.]
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.9(a) (2024); see also R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 4-1.9 cmt. (“The underlying question is whether the lawyer was
so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can
be 	justly 	regarded 	as 	a 	changing 	of 	sides 	in 	the 	matter 	in
question.”).

9
Similarly, 	Rule 	of 	Professional 	Conduct 	4-1.7, 	Conflict 	of
Interest; Current Clients, must be considered. The disqualification
order noted that Attorney Brannon never formally terminated his
representation of Arneka Green, nor did Brannon have the court
enter an order satisfactorily discharging her as the PR. 	Thus, the
probate court concluded that she was still a party. 	As such, this
rule governs because Attorney Brannon represented some of the
Cousins and the Administrator Ad Litem against the Greens. That
rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. Except as provided
in subdivision (b), a lawyer must not represent a client
if:
(1) the representation of 1 client will be directly adverse
to another client; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the representation of
1 or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a) (2024).
The adverse nature of the sequential representations is clear.
There is no argument that the clients, Michael or Arneka Green,
gave informed consent for Brannon to change sides and oppose
them. A conflict of interest existed sufficient to disqualify Attorney
Brannon. Accordingly, we affirm the disqualification order.6
Order Striking All Pleadings Filed by Brannon Against Green
In addition to disqualifying Attorney Brannon from further
participation, the probate court’s order also struck all “pleadings,
motions, 	and 	other 	matters 	filed 	by 	Grayling 	Brannon 	in
opposition to Michael Green’s interest in this case.” 	Appellant
6 Appellant raised several other arguments in support of its
position, which we considered but found do not merit discussion.

10
asserts that this was an abuse of discretion. 	However, Appellant
provides no case law in support of his position and offers only
conclusory 	statements 	that 	striking 	Attorney 	Brannon-filed
pleadings adverse to Green during the past five years would create
a 	“devastating 	burden” 	on 	his 	newer 	clients. 	Conclusory
arguments are insufficient for purposes of appeal and should be
deemed waived. 	See State v. Town of Sweetwater, 112 So. 2d 852,
854 (Fla. 1959); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So.
2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). 	Thus, Appellant waived this
issue.
Referral to The Florida Bar
Canon 3D of Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct states, in part:
(2) A judge who receives information or has actual
knowledge that substantial likelihood exists that a
lawyer 	has 	committed 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar shall take appropriate
action.
Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3D.
Based on the probate court’s finding that Attorney Brannon
changed sides, “has abandoned his client and taken up the cause
of his client’s adversaries, the Cousins,” and our review of the
entire record, we conclude that there is a substantial likelihood
that Attorney Brannon violated one or more Florida Bar rules
regarding conflicts of interest. This Court finds that the action
appropriate to take here is to make a referral of Attorney Grayling
Brannon to The Florida Bar.
Accordingly, we order our Clerk of the Court to forward a copy
of: this opinion, the probate court’s disqualification order, and the
parties’ briefs to The Florida Bar for its consideration and such
action as it deems appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
L AMBERT , J., concurs.
KILBANE, J., concurs in result only.

11
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________