Branden Bailey v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2025-1317
LT Case No. 2016-CF-005817-A
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BRANDEN BAILEY,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
London Mahogany Kite, Judge.
Branden Bailey, Milton, pro se.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
April 10, 2026
EISNAUGLE, J.
Branden Bailey appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion alleging that his Prison
Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences
violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Erlinger
v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). While the postconviction
court’s reasons for denying the motion were erroneous, we affirm
based on the tipsy coachman doctrine.

2
In denying the motion, the postconviction court reasoned that
(1) the alleged error relates to the sentencing process, not the
sentence itself, and (2) Erlinger is not retroactive because it is not
a “development of fundamental significance.”
We have already considered and rejected both of these reasons
for denying Bailey’s motion in Brown v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly
D1191a (Fla. 5th DCA May 30, 2025). First, while we still agree
that rule 3.800(a) is an odd fit for an Apprendi claim, it is also still
true that our supreme court’s decision in Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d
90, 95 (Fla. 2014), makes such a claim cognizable in a rule 3.800(a)
motion. “We are, of course, bound by Plott, as is the postconviction
court.” Brown, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at D1191a.
Second, “the postconviction court’s unelaborated statement
that Erlinger is not retroactive misses the mark because, for one,
[Bailey] did not rely on Erlinger alone. He relied on Apprendi and
its progeny.” Id. In fact, in this case, the motion relies almost
exclusively on Apprendi—which was decided long before the
convictions at issue.1 As a result, retroactivity is not relevant to
our analysis. Id.
1 We do not suggest that relying on Erlinger alone would
foreclose Bailey’s claim because we do not decide whether Erlinger
announced a new rule or if it merely applied Apprendi. See Witt v.
State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). Of course, we are aware of our
supreme court’s decision in Wainwright v. State, 411 So. 3d 392,
399 (Fla. 2025), but Wainwright did not hold that Erlinger
announced a new rule. Instead, Wainwright concluded that “even
if Erlinger constitutes a change of law, it does not apply
retroactively.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, unlike the
appellant in Wainwright, Bailey does not argue that Erlinger
created a new rule apart from the rule announced in Apprendi. In
short, given the differing nature and procedural posture of the
appellant’s successive claim in Wainwright, that decision would
not necessarily foreclose Bailey’s argument in this case. Id. at 401
(“And even if Erlinger announced a new rule that might serve as a
vehicle for Wainwright to overcome this procedural bar, Erlinger
does not apply retroactively.” (emphasis added)).

3
Although the postconviction court’s reasons for denying
Bailey’s motion were in error, we affirm under the tipsy coachman
doctrine.2 This court has already rejected these claims. See Denson
v. State, 401 So. 3d 633, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025); Simmons v.
State, 332 So. 3d 1129, 1131–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); Frumenti v.
State, 885 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Wright v. State,
780 So. 2d 216, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).3
AFFIRMED.
WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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2 See Home Depot U.S.A. Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 479,
480 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“The trial judge made the right decision,
albeit for the wrong reason . . . .”).
3 While our holding in Simmons is currently under review in
the supreme court, it remains binding to date. Maye v. State, No.
SC2023-1184, 2024 WL 1796831, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2024).