Todd M. Janosky v. Jillian E. Janosky

FIFTH D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
________________________________
Case No. 5D2025-1404
LT Case No. 18-2022-DR-1041
________________________________
T ODD M. JANOSKY,
Appellant,
v.
JILLIAN E. JANOSKY,
Appellee.
_______________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Flagler County.
Christopher A. France, Judge.
Andrew T. Windle, of The Windle Family Law Firm P.A., Orlando,
for Appellant.
David P. Krupski, of Ivy Law, Ponte Vedra, for Appellee.
October 9, 2026
MACIVER, J.
Former Husband, Todd Janosky, raises three issues on appeal
in which he claims the trial court erred in entering its Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage in the highly contentious
divorce proceedings between him and Former Wife, Jillian
Janosky. Because only a partial trial transcript was provided in
the appellate record, and the answer brief raises the omission, our
review “is limited to the pleadings, judgment dissolving the
marriage and other matters contained in the record.” Mayfield v.

2
Mayfield, 929 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Lane v.
Lane, 107 So. 3d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“In the absence
of a trial transcript, we are obligated to affirm the trial court
unless clear error appears on the face of the final judgment.”).
On our limited review, two of Former Husband’s claims have
merit.
I.
First, Former Husband claims that the trial court entered
inconsistent timesharing, exchange schedule, and communication
provisions in the Final Judgment. In the Final Judgment, the trial
court awarded timesharing with the minor children to Former
Wife every Wednesday and Thursday, to Former Husband every
Monday 	and 	Tuesday, 	and 	rotated 	the 	weekends. 	Non-school
exchanges were to be at the Flagler County Library. The trial court
designated the parties as “equal timesharing parents” of the minor
children, with their duties, responsibilities, and other related
matters set out in the separate Parenting Plan attached as Exhibit
“A”.
But the Parenting Plan arguably awards care of the children
to Former Wife on Monday and Tuesday and to Former Husband
on Wednesday and Thursday—opposite to that ordered in the
Final Judgment. The Parenting Plan also references a timesharing
schedule that was previously in existence but is not attached.
The 	Final 	Judgment 	also 	ordered 	that 	communication
between the parents was limited to an online co-parenting app and
that they “shall thereafter not e-mail, text, or telephone, but shall
post 	all 	communication 	exclusively 	on 	the 	website 	with 	the
exception that the parties may communicate by telephone or text
messaging regarding matters of an emergency nature regarding
the children that must be acted upon in less than forty-eight (48)
hours.”
But 	the 	Parenting 	Plan 	provides 	that 	the 	“parents 	shall
communicate with each other by telephone, text, e-mail or other
electronic means as long as both parties agree to the type of
electronic communication.”

3
In Murnane v. Murnane, 411 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025),
this Court remanded a summer break timesharing schedule for
clarification 	because 	the 	trial 	court’s 	instructions 	“can 	be
interpreted in multiple ways, thus leading to confusion,” where the
plan simultaneously allowed two consecutive vacation weeks while
permitting 	those 	weeks 	to 	be 	scheduled 	consecutively 	or
separately—a conflict that could result in one parent obtaining up
to five consecutive weeks of timesharing. Id. at 545; see also Justice
v. Justice, 80 So. 3d 405, 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing and
remanding 	final 	judgment 	that 	awarded 	former 	husband
timesharing pursuant to a temporary order, but then stated that
timesharing was controlled by an attached exhibit with different
schedule, making it “unclear from this order whether appellant is
entitled to timesharing every other Monday”).
Similarly, in Dowers v. Johnson, 392 So. 3d 140, 142–43 (Fla.
4th DCA 2024), the Fourth District reversed and remanded where
the final judgment, among other things, required the parents to
communicate solely by one method, yet the incorporated parenting
plan 	allowed 	for 	multiple 	means 	of 	communication—a 	direct
internal 	inconsistency 	that 	rendered 	the 	final 	judgment
ambiguous and unenforceable as written.
Here, 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in 	entering 	an 	ambiguous 	or
inconsistent judgment regarding timesharing and communication.
II.
Next, the Final Judgment provided that Former Wife could
purchase Former Husband’s interest in the marital home within
ninety days, or the home would be listed for sale. It outlined
certain offsets to which Former Wife was entitled, valued the
home, and found the sum due to Former Husband for his equity to
be $31,571.00. It ordered Former Wife to pay that sum to Former
Husband within ninety days from the date of the Final Judgment,
or to list the home immediately for sale, with extensive directions
governing the sale of the marital home.
In Patel v. Patel, 162 So. 3d 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), this
Court reversed the portion of a final judgment that awarded the
marital home to the husband and directed the wife to execute a

4
quitclaim 	deed 	but 	made 	no 	provision 	to 	relieve 	the 	wife 	of
mortgage liability. This Court remanded with instructions that the
husband attempt to refinance the home to place the mortgage
solely in his name within a reasonable time, and that the amended
judgment include a hold harmless provision if refinancing could
not be obtained. Id. at 166; see also Jones v. Jones, 184 So. 3d 1238,
1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (reversing and remanding where “the
trial court’s final judgment should have specifically addressed each
party’s financial responsibilities prior to sale of the home and the
consequences should Former Wife fail to sell or refinance the home
within the allotted time frame”).
Here, 	the 	Final 	Judgment 	that 	permits 	Former 	Wife 	to
purchase the marital home but is silent about Former Husband’s
mortgage liability is legally deficient.
The Final Judgment is otherwise affirmed.
A FFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
JAY , C.J., and E ISNAUGLE , J., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________