Star Casualty Insurance Company v. Jacksonville Chiropractic, Inc., a/a/o Marie St. Hilaire

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case Nos. 5D2024-1148
5D2024-2588
LT Case No. 2017-SC-004974
_____________________________
STAR C ASUALTY INSURANCE
C OMPANY,
Appellant,
v.
J ACKSONVILLE C HIROPRACTIC,
INC., a/a/o Marie St. Hilaire,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the County Court for Duval County.
Michelle L. Kalil, Judge.
Michael A. Rosenberg and Amanda H. Wasserman, of Cole, Scott
& Kissane, P.A., Plantation, V. Ashley Paxton, of Paxton Appeals
& Trials, Fort Lauderdale, and Thomas Hunker, of Hunker
Paxton Appeals & Trials, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Chad A. Barr and Dalton Gray, of Law Office of Chad A. Barr,
P.A., Altamonte Springs, and Robert Morris, Pamela Rakow-
Smith, and Crystal Eiffert, of Eiffert & Associates, P.A., Orlando,
for Appellee.
March 27, 2026
SOUD, J.

2
Appellant Star Casualty Insurance Company appeals the trial
court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and entry of
final judgment in favor of Appellee Jacksonville Chiropractic, Inc.
a/a/o Marie St. Hilaire pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.510(f). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla.
R. App. P. 9.030(b). We reverse the final judgment in favor of
Jacksonville Chiropractic and remand with instructions to grant
Star Casualty’s motion for summary judgment and enter judgment
in its favor, concluding the county judge erred in her interpretation
of the pertinent insurance policy exclusion provision. Further, in
light 	of 	our 	decision, 	we 	reverse 	the 	subsequent 	judgment
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Jacksonville Chiropractic.1
I.
In 2012, Marie and Fritzner St. Hilaire, who resided together
as husband and wife, obtained automobile insurance from Star
Casualty. As required by Florida law, the policy provided $10,000
in PIP coverage. A 2007 Ford Taurus owned by and legally titled
to Fritzner St. Hilaire individually was originally identified as an
insured motor vehicle on the policy’s Declarations Page.
Thereafter, more than 15 months later in July 2013, and after
two policy renewals with no changes, the St. Hilaires’ insurance
broker submitted a change request removing the Ford Taurus from
the Star Casualty auto insurance policy. When the policy again
renewed approximately three months later, the Ford Taurus was
not shown as an insured motor vehicle, having been replaced by a
Mercury Villager. This remained the case until Star Casualty
received a request to add the Ford Taurus to the policy in January
2014, after which a new Declarations Page was issued identifying
the Ford Taurus as an insured motor vehicle.
Just a month prior to the Taurus being added again to the
policy, in December 2013, Marie St. Hilaire was in a car accident
while a passenger in the Ford Taurus owned by her husband. She
1 We consolidated case no. 5D2024-1148 with case no. 5D2024-
2588, an appeal by Star Casualty from a subsequent judgment
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs.

3
sought treatment for injuries at Jacksonville Chiropractic. When
Jacksonville 	Chiropractic 	submitted 	its 	bill 	for 	services, 	Star
Casualty denied coverage and payment of PIP benefits, asserting
that the Ford Taurus was not listed as an insured motor vehicle at
the time of the accident and that Marie St. Hilaire’s resident
husband’s ownership of the Ford Taurus barred coverage.
At all material times, Star Casualty’s insurance policy issued
to the St. Hilaires expressly provided the following exclusion:
COVERAGE WILL NOT BE AFFORDED UNDER
THIS PART FOR ANY OF THE EXCLUSIONS
LISTED BELOW.
This insurance does not apply: 1. To you or a
relative 	while 	occupying 	a 	motor 	vehicle
owned by you and which is not an insured motor
vehicle under this policy;
The insurance policy also set forth certain definitions:
“Insured motor vehicle” means a:
a. motor vehicle:
i. which you own; and
ii. 	with 	respect 	for 	which 	security 	is
required to be maintained under the Florida
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law; and
iii. for which a premium is charged as
shown on the Declarations Page . . . .
. . . .
6. “Owner” means a person or organization who
holds the legal title to a motor vehicle . . . .
. . . .
10. “You” and “your” means the person named and
identified on the Declarations Page as the operator
insured. If an individual, “you” and “your” shall
include 	the 	spouse 	if 	a 	resident 	of 	the 	same
household.

4
As a result, Jacksonville Chiropractic, as assignee of Marie St.
Hilaire, 	filed 	suit 	against 	Star 	Casualty 	alleging 	breach 	of
contract. Ultimately, Star Casualty moved for summary judgment,
arguing that because Fritzner St. Hilaire was the title owner of the
unlisted Ford Taurus at the time of the subject accident, and Marie
St. Hilaire resided with him as spouse, the policy excluded the
Ford Taurus from coverage and PIP benefits were properly denied.
Jacksonville 	Chiropractic 	opposed 	the 	motion 	on 	numerous
grounds, including: (1) since Marie St. Hilaire did not legally own
the Taurus jointly with her husband, the exclusion provision did
not 	apply; 	and 	(2) 	there 	was 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	husband
intentionally removed the Ford Taurus from coverage.
Following hearing, the trial court denied Star Casualty’s
motion for summary judgment and concluded, consistent with
Jacksonville Chiropractic’s argument, that the coverage exclusion
did not apply because Marie St. Hilaire was not an owner of the
Ford Taurus, either individually or jointly with her husband. The
trial court also noted that Fritzner St. Hilaire disputed that he
ever 	requested 	that 	the 	Ford 	Taurus 	be 	removed 	from 	the
insurance policy and that Star Casualty “has failed to present any
evidence that Fritzner St. Hilaire removed the 2007 Ford Taurus
from the policy, let alone that he intentionally removed the 2007
Ford from the policy as asserted by [Star Casualty] in their
affirmative defense.”2
As a result of this ruling, Jacksonville Chiropractic then
moved for entry of final judgment under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.510(f). In reliance on its prior findings, the trial court
granted Jacksonville Chiropractic’s motion:
[I]t is undisputed that . . . Marie St. Hilaire was a
passenger in the 2007 Ford Taurus owned solely by
2 The trial judge’s order denying summary judgment also
denied 	Star 	Casualty’s 	motion 	for 	sanctions. 	Because 	Star
Casualty does not challenge that ruling in its initial brief, however,
any argument as to sanctions is waived. See Hurley v. Veon, 390
So. 3d 733, 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).

5
Fritzner 	St. 	Hilaire 	and 	she 	treated 	with
Jacksonville 	Chiropractic, 	Inc. 	for 	injuries
sustained 	in 	the 	accident. 	Based 	on 	[Star
Casualty’s] policy language, Marie St. Hilaire is not
excluded from coverage under the subject policy for
the December 5, 2013 motor vehicle accident.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, see Williams v. Weaver, 381 So. 3d 1260, 1264
(Fla. 5th DCA 2024), as we do its interpretation of a contract, see
Whitley v. Royal Trails Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 910 So. 2d 381, 383
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Of course, a party is entitled to summary
judgment if that party can demonstrate “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). “[A] genuine
dispute occurs when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for [the non-moving] party.” Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t
of Transp., 422 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted).
A.
Florida 	law 	requires 	that 	automobile 	insurance 	policies
provide personal injury protection coverage “to the named insured,
relatives residing in the same household . . . , persons operating
the insured motor vehicle, passengers in the motor vehicle, and
other persons struck by the motor vehicle and suffering bodily
injury 	while 	not 	an 	occupant 	of 	a 	self-propelled 	vehicle.” 	§
627.736(1), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	(2013). 	However, 	the 	law 	provides 	an
exception to this requirement for, inter alia, “injury sustained by
the named insured and relatives residing in the same household
while 	occupying 	another 	motor 	vehicle 	owned 	by 	the 	named
insured and not insured under the policy.” § 627.736(2)(a), Fla.
Stat.
Consistent 	with 	this 	statute, 	Star 	Casualty 	provided
automobile insurance to the St. Hilaires for the vehicles identified
in the Declarations Page. The policy covered automobiles “which

6
you own[] and . . . for which a premium is charged as shown on the
Declarations Page.” The policy also contained a coverage exclusion.
“This insurance does not apply: 1. To you or a relative while
occupying a motor vehicle owned by you and which is not an
insured motor vehicle under this policy.” “You” is defined in the
policy as “the person named and identified on the Declarations
Page as the operator insured. If an individual, ‘you’ and ‘your’ shall
include the spouse if a resident of the same household.
B.
Star 	Casualty 	argues 	the 	trial 	court 	misconstrued 	the
insurance policy’s exclusion provision by concluding that it did not
apply because Marie St. Hilaire was not the legal title owner of the
Taurus, 	either 	individually 	or 	jointly 	with 	her 	husband.
Jacksonville Chiropractic concedes the error—and rightly so.
Florida law defines both the scope of PIP coverage and the
permissible 	exclusions 	under 	section 	627.736(2). 	As 	a 	result,
Florida courts interpret automobile insurance policies against this
statutory 	backdrop. 	And 	here, 	the 	exclusion 	provision
substantially tracks the language of the exclusion permitted in
Florida Statutes. See § 627.736(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
As with any other contract or legal text, the language of the
insurance policy controls. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011). “When the language of
an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous it must be accorded
its natural meaning . . . [and] given full effect.” Dixie Ins. Co. v.
Beaudette, 474 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (citation
omitted).
Star Casualty’s insurance policy issued to the St. Hilaires
plainly provides that it will cover vehicles owned by Marie St.
Hilaire or Fritzner St. Hilaire and for which they paid for coverage,
as shown on the policy’s Declarations Page. However, the policy
also 	provides 	that 	coverage 	will 	not 	apply 	when 	they 	are
“occupying a motor vehicle owned by you and which is not an
insured motor vehicle under this policy.” And the term “you” is
expressly 	defined 	in 	the 	contract 	as 	“the 	person 	named 	and
identified on the Declarations Page as the operator insured[,] . . .
includ[ing] the spouse if a resident of the same household.”

7
The facts presented here fall squarely within the policy’s
exclusion provision. The Declarations Page shows both Fritzner
and Marie St. Hilaire as named insureds. Marie St. Hilaire alleges
she was injured in an accident while a passenger in the 2007 Ford
Taurus legally owned solely by her husband Fritzner St. Hilaire,
with whom she resided. Though this vehicle was listed as an
insured 	motor 	vehicle 	at 	the 	time 	the 	St. 	Hilaires 	originally
obtained the subject insurance from Star Casualty, at the time of
the 	accident, 	the 	Taurus 	was 	no 	longer 	included 	in 	the
Declarations Page as covered. As a result, because the Taurus was
owned by Fritzner, and Marie was his wife who resided with him,
she falls within the defined term “You” within the exclusion
provision, 	such 	that 	the 	exclusion 	is 	triggered. 	See 	id. 	(“The
automobile [the wife] was driving at the time of the accident was
not 	covered 	because 	it 	was 	neither 	a 	vehicle 	shown 	in 	the
declarations nor did it qualify as a temporary substitute vehicle
since it was owned by the insured’s spouse. Therefore, Dixie’s
policy did not provide coverage in the instant case.” (first citing
Boyd v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 256 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971); then citing
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Fonseca, 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1978)); see also Giarrusso
v. Amica Mut. Ins., 564 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
(“Appellant is the resident spouse of the named insured; he was
driving a vehicle owned by him but not listed as a covered auto in
the declarations of the policy. Therefore[,] the exclusion applies.”).
C.
Notwithstanding 	the 	conceded 	error, 	Jacksonville
Chiropractic argues that judgment in its favor should still be
affirmed 	because 	Star 	Casualty 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	that
Fritzner St. Hilaire intentionally removed the Ford Taurus from
his insurance policy. This argument fails.
Section 627.736(2)(a) permits exclusion of PIP benefits when
an insured or relatives residing in the same house sustain injuries
“while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the named
insured and not insured under the policy.” § 627.736(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. The functional purpose of an exclusion provision is to avoid
two or more vehicles within a household being covered by the
payment of a premium for a single automobile, thereby requiring

8
an insurance company to provide coverage for risks when no
premium was collected therefor. See Fonseca, 358 So. 2d at 575 (“If
inclusion of both spouses under the definition ‘named insured’
were not given its plain meaning, two or more vehicles could be
covered by payment of a single premium and the insurer would not
only assume risks for which it was uncompensated, but also lose
additional premiums it might otherwise receive.”).
To that end, all that is contemplated by the insurance policy
before us is that Star Casualty is bound to provide coverage for an
“insured motor vehicle” that is owned by a named insured and “for
which a premium is charged as shown on the Declarations Page.”
There simply is nothing within the insurance policy, or section
627.736(2)(a), that imposes a requirement that Star Casualty
demonstrate 	the 	St. 	Hilaires 	intentionally 	removed 	the 	Ford
Taurus from the policy before the policy’s exclusion provision is
triggered. It is enough that the Ford Taurus in which Marie St.
Hilaire was a passenger was owned by her husband with whom
she resided, was not listed on the Declarations Page, and that no
premium was charged for such coverage.
As 	a 	result, 	the 	final 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	Jacksonville
Chiropractic entered by the trial court pursuant to Rule 1.510(f)
was error. Further, denial of Star Casualty’s motion for summary
judgment, too, was error. There simply is no genuine dispute of a
material fact, and Star Casualty is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
III.
Accordingly, because the trial court erred in its interpretation
of 	the 	insurance 	policy’s 	exclusion 	provision 	and 	in 	its
determination that Star Casualty was required to prove the St.
Hilaires 	intentionally 	removed 	the 	Ford 	Taurus 	from 	the
insurance policy before the exclusion was triggered, we REVERSE
the final summary judgment in favor of Jacksonville Chiropractic,
Inc., and R EMAND the case to the Duval County Court with the
instruction to grant Star Casualty’s motion for summary judgment
and for further proceedings as may be required consistent with this
opinion.

9
Further, because of our decision here, we also R EVERSE the
subsequent 	judgment 	awarding 	attorneys’ 	fees 	and 	costs 	to
Jacksonville Chiropractic, Inc., which is the subject of the appeal
in case no. 5D2024-2588.3 See GEICO Gen. Ins. v. Tsao, 406 So. 3d
1121, 1122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“Because we reversed the final
judgment, 	we 	must 	reverse 	the 	trial 	court’s 	order 	awarding
attorney’s fees . . . .”); see also GEICO Indem. Co. v. Perez, 273 So.
3d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[T]his Court reversed the
underlying final judgment . . . . Therefore, the attorney’s fees and
costs 	judgments 	that 	were 	predicated 	on 	the 	reversed 	final
judgment cannot stand.”).
It is so ordered.
L AMBERT and H ARRIS, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
3 See n.1, supra.