William Vincent Vernon, III v. Jackqulyn Young, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Doris Wright Shaw

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2025-1922
LT Case No. 2025-CC-0000679
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WILLIAM VINCENT VERNON, III,
Appellant,
v.
JACKQULYN YOUNG, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Doris Wright Shaw,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the County Court for Marion County.
Leann Mackey-Barnes, Judge.
William Vincent Vernon, III, Silver Springs, pro se.
No Appearance for Appellee.
November 14, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Young sued Vernon for unlawful detainer. Vernon maintained
that he is the rightful owner of the house in question thanks to a
will codicil, which he accused Young of concealing. He argued that
the county court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case since
ownership of the house was still in dispute in the probate court.
Ultimately, the county court entered judgment for Young and
issued a writ of possession.

2
As he did below, Vernon argues that the county court had no
jurisdiction to hear this case. Our review is de novo. See Estevill v.
Estevill, 399 So. 3d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Unless altered
by the amount in controversy, county courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over unlawful detainer actions. See § 34.011(2), Fla.
Stat. (2025). But if the defendant asserts an equitable interest in
the property, “the matter sounds in ejectment, not unlawful
detainer.” Babcock v. Golden Acres S., LLC, 361 So. 3d 406, 407
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023). In other words, ejectment becomes the proper
cause of action. See id. at 408. And circuit courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over actions of ejectment. § 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat.; see
also Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d
1244, 1250 (Fla. 2008) (holding that “county courts lack subject-
matter jurisdiction to entertain ejectment actions”).
Here, after Vernon “asserted an equitable interest in the
property, ejectment became the proper cause of action because the
trial court had to consider [his] equitable claims.” See Babcock, 361
So. 3d at 408. Therefore, the county court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to rule on this matter, and its judgment is void. See
Estevill, 399 So. 3d at 1172; Babcock, 361 So. 3d at 408; Thompson
v. Thompson, 342 So. 3d 818, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); see generally
State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Roof Pros Storm Div., Inc., 346 So. 3d
163, 165 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
renders a judgment void.”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand
with instructions to transfer this case to the circuit court.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
JAY, C.J., and EDWARDS and MACIVER, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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