R-P-L-

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4238
Matter of R-P-L-, Respondent
Decided August 28, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Department of Homeland Security properly imposed a civil monetary penalty after
the respondent failed to depart the United States in compliance with his voluntary departure
order.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Aamna Aziz, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	VOLKERT and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges;
TERRIEN, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of India, has appealed from a
Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”) 	immigration 	officer’s
September 29, 2025, decision imposing a civil monetary penalty in the
amount of $3,000 for failure to depart the United States before expiration of
a voluntary departure period. 	See section 240B(d) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d) (2024). We will dismiss the
appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In a December 2, 2003, decision, an Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s application for asylum and withholding of removal and granted
voluntary departure. See INA §§ 208(b)(1), 240B(b)(1), 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(1), 1229c(b)(1), 1231(b)(3) (2000). 	The Immigration Judge’s
order advised the respondent that if he did not depart the United States by
January 2, 2004, he “will be subject to civil penalties of not less than $1,000
nor more than $5,000.” The respondent appealed the decision to the Board.
On December 20, 2004, the Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s
decision and reinstated the grant of voluntary departure for a period of
30 days from the date of the Board’s order. 	The Board’s decision further
advised the respondent that if he “fail[ed] to depart the United States within
the time period specified, or any extensions granted by the DHS, [he] shall
be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000,
and shall be ineligible for a period of 10 years for any further relief under

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section 	240B 	and 	sections 	240A, 	245, 	248, 	and 	249 	of 	the 	[INA].”
Nevertheless, 	the 	respondent 	did 	not 	depart 	the 	United 	States. 	On
April 23, 2025, DHS served him with a Notice of Intention to Fine, Form
I-79. 	The respondent challenged the fine and has appealed the decision
imposing the fine.1
II. DISCUSSION
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over
the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012). “Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of
relief that allows certain favored aliens . . . to leave the country willingly.”
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 8 (2008). 	“The existence of voluntary
departure enables aliens identified by the government as being illegally
present in the United States to leave the country of their own accord without
being forcibly removed by the government.” 	Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d
323, 327 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Barker v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 313, 317
(3d Cir. 2003).
Voluntary departure benefits both the government and the alien. 	The
government need not expend resources removing the alien from the United
States, and the alien is likely to leave the country more quickly than if the
government were to execute an order of removal. See, e.g., Rife v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2004). For the alien, voluntary departure allows
them to sidestep some of the penalties associated with removal. Dada, 554
U.S. at 11. Aliens who are granted voluntary departure must “either follow
the rules [and] depart voluntarily . . . or break the rules by failing to leave
[and] accept the penalties associated with that failure.” 	Thapa, 460 F.3d at
328 (quoting Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 651).
It is undisputed that the respondent was statutorily eligible for and was
granted the discretionary relief of voluntary departure at the conclusion of
his removal proceedings. See INA § 240B(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (setting
forth the statutory requirements for post-conclusion voluntary departure);
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c). 	Further, the voluntary departure order included the
mandatory notice of the civil penalties for failing to depart in accordance
with the order. See INA § 240B(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(3) (2024).
1 	The Board has appellate authority to review DHS decisions involving fines and civil
monetary penalties imposed under 8 C.F.R. § 280 prior to June 27, 2025. 	8 C.F.R.
§§ 281.1(h), 1003.1(b)(4), 1280.1(b) (2026). For fines imposed on or after June 27, 2025,
appellate review is now solely within the jurisdiction of DHS. 8 C.F.R. § 281.1 (2026).

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The INA has long authorized the imposition of numerous civil monetary
penalties for various immigration-related violations by entities or persons
who fail to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements designed to
prevent aliens’ unlawful entry and presence in the United States. 	In 1996,
Congress substantially amended the INA through the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-208,
Div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597, to also authorize civil monetary
penalties 	against 	aliens 	to 	deter 	noncompliance 	with 	removal 	orders.
Specifically, Congress added three provisions to the INA that authorize the
Attorney General to impose civil monetary penalties against aliens, including
for those who are granted voluntary departure but fail to depart the United
States within the allotted time period, as codified in section 240B(d) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d).2
Congress’ decision to include an amendment to the INA that authorizes
the imposition of civil monetary fines against aliens who fail to depart after
being issued a final order of removal or being granted voluntary departure
reflects Congress’ intent that voluntary departure and removal orders be
enforced.3 	See Dada, 554 U.S. at 19–20 (observing that “[v]oluntary
departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement
agreement,” and that allowing an alien to stay past the departure date negates
“the benefit to the Government—a prompt and costless departure— . . . [and]
would invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country”). Further, the
imposition of civil monetary fines is a longstanding method designed by
Congress for the government to employ in order to encourage adherence to
laws 	established 	by 	Congress, 	and 	such 	penalties 	have 	withstood
constitutional scrutiny. 	See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 46–47
(1914) (upholding the enforcement of a civil penalty for a violation of the
Alien Immigration Act); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 109 (1909)
(allowing a civil suit by the United States to recover a monetary penalty for
violation of an immigration statute). 	The standard of proof required to
impose an immigration civil penalty fine is a preponderance of the evidence.
Regan, 232 U.S. at 46–50.
2 	This authority was transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security as part of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002.
3 	The present case involves a civil penalty of $1,000 to $5,000, for overstaying a
voluntary departure order. A civil penalty of up to $998 per day may be imposed on an
alien who willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to a final order
of removal. INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026).

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We review all questions arising in appeals from decisions of DHS officers
de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iii) (2026). Section 240B(d)(1) of the INA
provides, subject to an exception for domestic violence victims that is not
relevant here, that:
if an alien is permitted to depart voluntarily under this section and voluntarily fails
to depart the United States within the time period specified, the alien—
(A) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than
$5,000; and
(B) shall be ineligible, for a period of 10 years, to receive any further relief under
this section and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249.
Section 240B(d)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(3), specifies that “[t]he
order permitting an alien to depart voluntarily shall inform the alien of the
penalties under this section.”
The respondent does not dispute that the Immigration Judge granted him
the privilege of voluntary departure in the December 2, 2003, decision, and
that he never departed the United States. 	He also does not assert that the
Board did not reinstate the period of voluntary departure in its December 20,
2004, decision. Although the respondent argues that he did not receive the
mandatory notice of the penalties for violating the voluntary departure order,
both the Immigration Judge and the Board explicitly included notice of the
penalties for failing to depart the United States at the end of their respective
orders 	in 	accordance 	with 	section 	240B(d)(3) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229c(d)(3). Further, there is no requirement that notice of the voluntary
departure fines be included in an alien’s notice to appear.
The respondent also argues that notice of the fine may not be imputed to
him because he was not provided the requisite statutory notice by his counsel
in a language that he understands. However, it is well-established that “there
is no requirement that an alien in immigration proceedings be provided with
a notice to appear or any other document in their native language.” 	Matter
of J.J. Rodriguez, 27 I&N Dec. 762, 765 (BIA 2020); see also Urquia-Yanez
v. Blanche, 176 F.4th 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2026) (“English-language notices of
an alien’s obligations generally are reasonably calculated to reach and to
inform aliens of their obligations, and thus [are] sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process.” (citation omitted)); Platero-Rosales v. Garland,
55 F.4th 974, 977–78 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that a notice to appear does
not need to be provided to an alien in any language other than English); Lopez
v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1000, 1003 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e have held time and
again that the INA does not require that the Notice to Appear be explained
or written in an alien’s native language.” (citation omitted)); Singh v. Holder,
749 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that “[i]n the immigration

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context, personal service in English to a non-English-speaker typically
satisfies due process”); Lopes v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“The relevant statute does not require that notice [of the consequences of
failing to appear] be provided in any particular language”).
Moreover, notice sent to an alien’s attorney of record is deemed proper
notice to the alien, and the respondent has not established that his attorney
did not notify him of the voluntary departure order or the penalties for failing
to comply with that order in the course of his representation.4 See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1292.5(a) (2026); Matter of Barocio, 19 I&N Dec. 255, 259 (1985); cf.
Matter of Zmijewska, 24 I&N Dec. 87, 94 (2007) (holding that where an
alien, through no fault of his or her own, is unaware of the voluntary
departure order, the consequences do not apply). 	Consequently, we are
satisfied that DHS met its burden to show that the respondent was fully
informed of the penalties associated with a failure to comply with the
voluntary departure order and that the requirements of due process have been
satisfied.
Although the respondent argues on appeal that he was never directed to
depart, the decisions of both the Immigration Judge and the Board ordered
the respondent to voluntarily depart. Further, the statute does not require the
failure to depart to be willful. The plain language of section 240B(d)(1) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1), states that if an alien is permitted to depart
voluntarily under this section and voluntarily fails to depart the United States
within the time period specified, then the penalties shall be applied. 	See
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that
“where the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms.” (citation omitted)). The term “willful” is
not contained in the statute.
Additionally, the statute does not contain any provision allowing an alien
to remain in the United States indefinitely after a voluntary departure order
is issued while applying for any other form of relief from removal. An alien
subject to a failure-to-depart penalty has typically already availed himself of
the immigration process, has had the opportunity to request relief or
protection from removal, and was ordered removed or granted voluntary
departure. In fact, the respondent’s violation of the voluntary departure order
rendered him subject to further penalty in that he is, among other things,
ineligible to adjust his status pursuant to section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
4 	The respondent has not raised a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel or
otherwise complied with the procedural requirements for such a claim as set forth in Matter
of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).

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§ 1255 (2024), for a period of 10 years even with an approved visa petition.
See INA § 240B(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B). Hence, his appellate
argument that he continued to seek lawful ways to legalize his status such
that he did not willfully violate the voluntary departure order is unavailing.
The respondent’s assertion that he lacked the necessary resources to
return to his home country is also unavailing. 	His request for voluntary
departure was approved by the Immigration Judge because the respondent
demonstrated that he had the means to depart the United States promptly in
accordance with the statutory requirements. 	See INA § 240B(b)(1)(D),
8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D). 	The voluntary departure order was an explicit
order directing him to depart the United States within 30 days.
Although the respondent argues that the amount of the fine is excessive,
the imposition of a fine in the amount of $3000 is consistent with both the
statute and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(l) (2026). 	See BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (due process is satisfied where
a person receives “fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty”); Stop Ill. Health Care
Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed, 100 F.4th 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2024) (“To violate the
[Eighth Amendment’s] Excessive Fines Clause, a penalty must be grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the . . . offense.” (citation omitted)).
In sum, the record reflects that DHS has established that the respondent
failed to depart the United States prior to the expiration of his voluntary
departure period and that he was appropriately notified of the penalties for
doing so. DHS properly imposed a civil monetary penalty in the amount of
$3,000 after the respondent failed to depart in compliance with his voluntary
departure order. 	To the extent the respondent seeks equitable relief, the
Board has limited jurisdiction and no power to grant equitable remedies or
confer general humanitarian relief beyond its delegated authority. See Matter
of Medina, 19 I&N Dec. 734, 746 (BIA 1988).
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.