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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 343 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4146
Matter of L-A-G-B-, Respondent
Decided by Board November 5, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge’s predictive factual findings based on a series of suppositions
regarding the harm the respondent would likely suffer in Panama are clearly erroneous and
do not support a grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Misael Cornelio, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Julie A. Werdt, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	HUNSUCKER, GOODWIN, and GEMOETS, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals the Immigration
Judge’s February 7, 2025, decision granting the respondent’s request for
protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).2 The respondent, a native and citizen of Panama, opposes
the appeal. The appeal will be sustained, and the respondent will be ordered
removed to Panama.
The Immigration Judge found, and the parties do not dispute, that the
respondent’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute
5 kilograms or more of cocaine constitutes an aggravated felony and a
particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for asylum, statutory
withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the CAT. 	See
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6526-2025, dated December 8, 2025, the Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of L-A-G-B- (BIA Nov. 5, 2025), as precedent
in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2025).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2025); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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sections 	208(b)(2)(A)(ii) 	and 	241(b)(3)(B)(ii) 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)
(2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2025). 	In granting the respondent’s
application for deferral of removal under the CAT, the Immigration Judge
found that the respondent established a likelihood of future torture from
private actors in Panama with the acquiescence, including willful blindness,
of Panamanian public officials. 	DHS challenges this determination on
appeal.
To 	establish 	eligibility 	for 	CAT 	protection, 	a 	respondent 	must
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured in his home
country by or with the consent or acquiescence, to include willful blindness,
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2020). 	To determine whether a
respondent has established a clear probability of future torture in the country
of removal, the Immigration Judge must first make factual findings on what
is likely to happen to the respondent if he is removed and then determine
whether what is likely to happen meets the legal definition of torture. 	See
Myrie v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017). 	The Board
reviews for clear error the factual findings of the Immigration Judge as to
what is likely to happen to the respondent in the future but reviews de novo
whether the harm the respondent may experience rises to the legal definition
of torture. See Matter of R-A-F-, 27 I&N Dec. 778, 779–80 (A.G. 2020). An
Immigration Judge should consider all evidence relevant to the possibility of
future torture, including but not limited to: 	(1) evidence of past torture;
(2) evidence that the respondent could relocate to a part of the country where
he or she is not likely to be tortured; (3) evidence of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human 	rights; and (4) other 	relevant country conditions
information. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Eligibility for CAT protection cannot
be established by stringing together a series of suppositions if the evidence
does not establish that each step in the hypothetical chain of events is more
likely than not to occur. 	See Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917–18,
918 n.4 (A.G. 2006).
We 	will 	reverse 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	determination 	that 	the
respondent 	has 	established 	a 	likelihood 	of 	torture 	in 	Panama. 	We
acknowledge the respondent’s history of gang affiliation in the United States
and his asserted past conflicts with other gangs while living in the United
States. However, on this record, the respondent has not established that he
will more likely than not be tortured in Panama. 	In determining that the
respondent would likely face future harm rising to the level of torture, the
Immigration Judge found based on the circumstances of the respondent’s
arrest and imprisonment on the cocaine charge that his former associates,

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Franklyn Sterling and the King Ariano family, believe the respondent stole
cocaine from them and cooperated with law enforcement. The Immigration
Judge found that the respondent would be perceived as having cooperated
with law enforcement by the King Ariano family and would be targeted for
harm rising to the level of torture by the King Ariano family, despite finding
that the King Ariano family is no longer functioning as a drug-trafficking
organization. The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent would
be targeted by other gangs in Panama either at the direction of Franklyn
Sterling or as retaliation for his past stealing from other gangs in the United
States under Franklyn’s command.
The Immigration Judge’s predictive factual findings draw unsupported
inferences from the record and are clearly erroneous. See Matter of Z-Z-O-,
26 I&N Dec. 586, 590 (BIA 2015) (holding an Immigration Judge’s
predictive factual findings regarding future harm are reviewed for clear
error). For example, the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondent’s
“proffers and cooperation” against Franklyn Sterling and another former
associate named Xavier will lead Franklyn and the King Ariano family to
target the respondent for harm is unsupported by the record. The record does
not 	include 	any 	objective 	evidence 	that 	the 	respondent 	provided 	any
assistance to law enforcement or proffered any information about Xavier or
Franklyn as part of his plea. 	Beyond the respondent’s own suspicion, the
record does not indicate that anyone believes he cooperated with law
enforcement. 	Moreover, the record does not support the Immigration
Judge’s inference that Franklyn and the King Ariano family believe the
respondent stole cocaine from them because he was only caught with
15 kilograms of cocaine, rather than 20. The publicly available press releases
submitted by the respondent into evidence indicate that the respondent and a
member of the King Ariano family were arrested because they were caught
trafficking cocaine by undercover law enforcement in a controlled operation,
that the respondent had traveled specifically to receive 15 kilograms of
cocaine, and that a coconspirator cooperating with the government handed
the respondent 15 kilograms of cocaine, which was seized shortly thereafter
in its entirety.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent may be targeted by
other gangs including Banda Norte based on the respondent’s allegation that
he stole heroin from Banda Norte at Franklyn’s direction in 2008 and was
seriously harmed in retaliation. 	However, the record does not contain
evidence that the respondent was harmed by Banda Norte at all or that the
respondent has had any contact with Banda Norte since 2008. Furthermore,
the respondent testified that he has never had any contact with any gangs
currently operating in Panama, that Xavier is deceased, and that Franklyn is

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currently incarcerated in the United States in connection with other drug
charges. 	Given the lack of evidence that anyone was or remains interested
in the respondent such that they would have the willingness and ability to
seek him out and harm him in Panama, the Immigration Judge’s finding that
the respondent would likely suffer severe harm as a target of Franklyn or a
Panamanian gang is clearly erroneous.
The Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent is more likely
than not to suffer harm rising to the level of torture in Panama is based on a
series of suppositions not supported by the record. 	See Matter of J-F-F-,
23 I&N Dec. at 917–19 (holding that it is the applicant’s legal burden to
demonstrate eligibility for protection under the CAT, and an applicant cannot
do so by stringing together a series of suppositions to form a hypothetical
chain of events resulting in the applicant’s torture without demonstrating that
each step in that chain of events is more likely than not to occur).
Accordingly, the respondent has not met his burden of showing that he would
suffer torture from his former associates or other gangs in Panama.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s grant of
protection under the CAT for the respondent. 	We need not remand for
additional factfinding or legal analysis because the record is insufficient to
establish that it is more likely than not that the respondent will be tortured
anywhere in Panama by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: 	The Immigration Judge’s grant of deferral of
removal under the Convention Against Torture is vacated.
FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is ordered removed to Panama.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).