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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 30 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4090
Matter of O-A-R-G-, et al., Respondents
Decided as amended April 16, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Where a particular social group is defined by “former” status, Immigration Judges must
ensure the persecutor’s conduct was based on a desire to overcome or animus toward
the respondent’s membership in a group defined specifically by that former status, not
retribution for conduct the respondent engaged in while a current member of the group.
(2) Acquiescence in the context of protection under the Convention Against Torture
requires a greater degree of governmental complicity than is required to establish a
government is unable or unwilling to protect a respondent in the asylum context.
FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Claudette M. Esparra Ramos, Esquire, Miami, Florida
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; GOODWIN
and PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judges.
PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondents2 have appealed the Immigration Judge’s denial of their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).3 	The
lead respondent previously worked as a police officer in Colombia, during
which time he was beaten and threatened by the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (“FARC”) because of his participation in operations against
1 	We amend the April 11, 2025, order in this case to correct citations to the regulations
and add additional legal authority.
2 	The respondents are the lead respondent, his unmarried partner, and their minor
daughter. They have each filed separate applications for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture. The
daughter is a derivative beneficiary on both of her parents’ asylum applications.
Section 208(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A)
(2018). All of the applications are based on the same facts set forth in the lead respondent’s
application. References to the respondent in the singular are to the lead respondent, unless
otherwise indicated.
3 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994)

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them. The respondent now seeks relief and protection from removal based
on that harm. We conclude that the respondent’s claim is based on his prior
status as a then-serving police officer, rather than his current status as a
former police officer. Thus, he has not shown a nexus between the harm he
experienced and fears and his particular social group composed of former
police officers. Accordingly, the respondents are ineligible for asylum and
withholding of removal. We further conclude that the respondents have not
established eligibility for CAT protection and will therefore dismiss the
appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are not in dispute. 	In 2016, the respondent, a native
and citizen of Colombia, became an officer of the National Police of
Colombia and was later assigned to the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad. 	In July
2022, he participated in an operation against the FARC. 	During the
operation, the National Police recovered military materials and cattle from
the FARC. The day after the operation ended, the respondent was on his way
home on a civilian bus when it was stopped by heavily armed men wearing
FARC armbands. 	Two of the men boarded the bus and directed the
passengers to exit. They were looking for police officers. 	The armed men
beat nine individuals, including the respondent, with rifle butts. 	The
respondent was hit in the chest, back, and mouth, resulting in a broken tooth.
The respondent escaped into the jungle and later boarded another bus home.
The respondent reported the incident to the police command 2 days later.
He was offered vacation time but no additional protection because the police
commander said he could not assign a policeman to guard another policeman.
While recuperating at home, the respondent received a threatening document
written with newspaper clippings that said he had a beautiful family, but it
was a pity that they were already dead. The document also included photos
from the respondent’s personal phone and indicated that it was from the
FARC. 	As a result of the threat, the respondent submitted his retirement
letter to the National Police on August 22, 2022.
After receiving the threatening letter, the respondents relocated to Bogotá
for 2 months while they applied for passports to leave Colombia. During that
time, the respondent received one threatening phone call but had no personal
encounters 	with 	the 	FARC. 	The 	respondents 	departed 	Colombia 	on
November 13, 2022. 	They seek asylum and withholding of removal on
account of the lead respondent’s membership in the proposed particular
social 	groups 	defined 	as 	“men 	in 	Colombia 	the 	government 	is
unwilling/unable to protect” and “former police officers of Colombia.” See

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sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018).
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. Particular Social Group Based on Former Status
The respondent’s first proposed particular social group of “former police
officers of Colombia” is based on a past experience. 	Past experiences, by
definition, cannot be changed. 	Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584
(BIA 	2008); 	see 	also 	Matter 	of 	M-E-V-G-, 	26 	I&N 	Dec. 	227, 	242
(BIA 2014); Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006); Matter of
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (recognizing that an immutable
characteristic 	“might 	be 	a 	shared 	past 	experience 	such 	as 	military
leadership”), overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi,
19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Thus, the respondent’s past experience as a
police officer meets the requirement that membership in a particular social
group be immutable (or fundamental to one’s identity or conscience). 	See,
e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 237–38, 242; Matter of Acosta,
19 I&N Dec. at 233. But even assuming the respondent could also establish
that “former police officers of Colombia” is both particular and socially
distinct, he has not established that he was or would be harmed on account
of his membership in the group. See INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 241(b)(3)(A),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).
With respect to past persecution, the Immigration Judge found that the
respondent was harmed and threatened while working as an active member
of the National Police because of his participation in operations against
the FARC. The respondent acknowledges on appeal that the FARC harmed
him because of his actions as a police officer. 	Except for the single
threatening phone call he received while awaiting passports in Bogotá, the
respondent was not yet a former police officer at the time of the past harm.
Because he was a current police officer at the time of the past harm, 	that
harm could not have been on account of his status as a former police officer.4
4 	To the extent the respondent was harmed on account of his then-current employment as
a police officer, the claim would fail. 	Employment is not immutable. 	See Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 231. The respondent has not suggested that his employment as
a police officer is fundamental to his identity or conscience. 	Moreover, we have held:
“[W]e do not afford protection based on social group membership to persons exposed to
risks normally associated with employment in occupations such as the police or the
military. . . . because persons accepting such employment are aware of the risks involved
and undertake the risks in return for compensation.” Matter of C-A- 23 I&N Dec. at 958

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See Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017) (limiting
consideration of whether the applicant was harmed on account of being a
former police officer to “evidence of persecution Sanjaa experienced after he
quit his job”).
With respect to the respondent’s claim that he has a well-founded fear of
future persecution, he has not established that any future harm would be on
account of his current status as a former police officer. 	To establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must prove
“that the persecutor’s motive for the harm is a desire to overcome the
protected characteristic” or otherwise based on “animus” against the group.
Matter of M-R-M-S-, 28 I&N Dec. 757, 760 (BIA 2023); see also Matter of
Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 222 (“[H]arm or suffering had to be inflicted upon
an individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic
a persecutor sought to overcome.”).
The respondent has not established that the FARC has any desire to
punish or overcome his status as a former police officer, or any animus
toward former police officers as a group. 	The respondent’s feared future
harm is based on the physical assault and subsequent threat he received by
the FARC when he was a then-serving police officer. The Immigration Judge
found, and the respondent admitted, that the FARC targeted him because of
his involvement in a law enforcement operation that confiscated military
materials and cattle held by the rebel group and compromised their criminal
enterprise—official actions that a former police officer would no longer be
authorized to conduct.
Reprisals against former police officers as a class (for example, after a
coup or revolution) may give rise to asylum eligibility.5 See Matter of C-A-,
23 I&N Dec. at 958–59; Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658, 662
(BIA 1988). However, the respondent here established only that the FARC
harmed him in the past and may harm him in the future to punish him because
of official acts he took as a then-current police officer. 	Harm inflicted on
(citation omitted). 	Therefore, any group relying on the respondent’s then-current
employment as a police officer would not be cognizable.
5 	Even if, in an appropriate case, there is evidence that some former police officers are
targeted based on their former status, a respondent would still need to establish that he or
she is similarly situated to those former police officers, such that there is a sufficient
likelihood that he or she would be persecuted based on his or her former status. Factors
such as the type of law enforcement position the respondent was in or the length of time
the respondent was in that position may be relevant to that analysis.

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account of specific conduct as a then-current police officer is distinct from
harm inflicted on account of membership in a group of former police officers.
See Sanjaa, 863 F.3d at 1165 (holding that personal retribution suffered by a
former police officer because of actions taken while a current police officer
is not persecution on account of a protected ground).
Here, the only harm the respondent experienced after he resigned from
the National Police in August 2022 was one threatening phone call while
temporarily in Bogotá. 	The Immigration Judge found, without clear error,
that none of the harm or threats received by the respondent—including this
phone call—were on account of his status as a former police officer. Rather,
the Immigration Judge found that the respondent “believes the FARC may
seek revenge because of the operations in which he participated as a police
officer against the criminal organization.” 	Reprisals against police officers
based on specific conduct or official acts are not on account of being a former
police officer. 	See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[I]f a former police officer [is] singled out for reprisal, not because of his
status as a former police officer, but because of his role in disrupting
particular criminal activity, he [is] not . . . considered, without more, to have
been targeted as a member of a particular social group.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 958–59)). The respondent
has conceded that the FARC’s motive is and was premised on his past
conduct as a police officer, not his current status as someone who has been a
police officer in the past.
Where 	a 	particular 	social 	group 	is 	defined 	by 	“former” 	status,
Immigration Judges must ensure the persecutor’s conduct was based on a
desire to overcome or animus toward the respondent’s membership in a
group defined specifically by that former status, not retribution for conduct
the respondent engaged in while a current member of the group. See Matter
of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658, 660–62 (differentiating between the two).
Here, the Immigration Judge properly concluded that the respondent had not
established a nexus between his past and feared future harm and his current
status as a former police officer in Colombia.
B. Particular Social Group Based on Risk of Harm
We agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent’s proposed
group of “men in Colombia the government is unwilling/unable to protect”
is impermissibly circular because it is defined by the members’ risk of harm.
A particular social group cannot be “circularly defined by the fact that [its
members] suffer[] persecution.” 	Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 584
(quoting Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005)). 	While

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harm may be evidence of the group’s existence, the group must exist
independently of the harm suffered. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 960.
Here, 	the 	proposed 	group 	of 	“men 	in 	Colombia 	the 	government 	is
unwilling/unable to protect” is defined by the risk of harm faced by members
of the group.
We have explained that “[w]here an applicant raises membership in a
particular social group as the enumerated ground that is the basis of her
claim, she has the burden to clearly indicate ‘the exact delineation of
any particular social group(s) to which she claims to belong.’” 	Matter of
W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018) (quoting Matter of
A-T-, 25 I&N Dec. 4, 10 (BIA 2009)), aff’d, Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr,
924 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2019). 	Thus, when evaluating whether a particular
social group is cognizable, Immigration Judges generally should consider the
entire group as it is defined by the respondent.6 The group as defined here is
impermissibly circular and is therefore not a cognizable particular social
group.
Based on the foregoing, the respondent has not established that any harm
he experienced or fears is on account of a statutorily protected ground. Thus,
because the respondent has not established a nexus between the claimed
harm 	and 	a 	protected 	ground, 	he 	is 	not 	eligible 	for 	asylum 	or
withholding of removal. 	INA §§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 	1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 	1231(b)(3)(A). 	Because 	the 	co-respondents’
applications are based on the lead respondent’s claim and they did not
identify any other proposed particular social groups, they are likewise
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.
6 	The respondent does not argue that this case is controlled by Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr,
968 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2020), but even if it had been properly raised, it would make no
difference. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction
this case arises, has held that the “the mere mention of harm does not categorically
disqualify an otherwise cognizable social group.” Id. at 1085. Here, however, the harm
included in the respondent’s proposed group definition does not merely describe the risk
common to all “men in Columbia,” but rather defines a different and narrower group of
“men in Colombia the government is unwilling/unable to protect.” Removing the language
concerning the risk of harm would change the membership of the group. The risk of harm
is therefore an intrinsic element of the group definition, and because it is intrinsic, it cannot
be disregarded as merely descriptive.

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C. Eligibility for CAT Protection
Finally, 	we 	affirm 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	conclusion 	that 	the
respondents 	did 	not 	establish 	eligibility 	for 	CAT 	protection. 	The
respondents’ reference to general country conditions evidence reflecting
human rights issues and the prevalence of crime in Colombia is insufficient
to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that they will be tortured in
Colombia by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 	See 8 C.F.R.
§ 	1208.16(c)(2) 	(2025); 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1208.18(a)(1) 	(2020); 	see 	also
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
generalized country conditions evidence of violence and crime that is not
particular to the applicant does not establish CAT eligibility).
Acquiescence 	in 	the 	CAT 	context 	requires 	a 	greater 	degree 	of
governmental complicity than is required to establish a government is unable
or unwilling to protect a respondent in the asylum context. 	See Azanor v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that “consent
or acquiescence” as required by the CAT involves more than showing “that
public officials would be merely unable or unwilling to prevent torture by
private parties”). Evidence that a government has been generally ineffective
in preventing or investigating criminal activities does not alone establish that
a public official will acquiesce to torture. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d
1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829,
836 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “general ineffectiveness . . . to
investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence and the
“inability to bring the criminals to justice is not evidence of acquiescence, as
defined by the applicable regulations”). 	Simply showing an inability of a
public official to prevent torture is insufficient. See Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d
at 1034 (“[A] government does not acquiesce to torture of its citizens merely
because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it.” (quoting Mouawad v.
Gonzales, 	485 	F.3d 	405, 	413 	(8th 	Cir. 	2007))); 	see 	also 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(7) (stating that acquiescence requires a public official “breach
his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity”). Here,
the respondents have not established that it is more likely than not that they
will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence—including willful
blindness—of a Colombian official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). 	Accordingly, we
will dismiss the respondents’ appeal.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland
Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper
the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. 	See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018);
8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).