Brown v. Geico Choice Insurance Company

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AARON BROWN, NICOLE MILES- )
BERRY, Z.B. A MINOR, Z.B. A )
MINOR, Z.B. A MINOR, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No.: K25C-12-011 NEP
)
GEICO CHOICE INSURANCE )
COMPANY )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: December 8, 2025
Decided: January 28, 2026

ORDER 1 0F

Upon Plaintiffs’ Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
GRANTED

Upon Court’s Consideration of Complaint
DISMISSED

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ complaint and motion to proceed in forma

pauperis, the Court finds as follows:

1. On December 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an application to proceed in

forma pauperis. 2 1F According to the attached affidavit, Plaintiff Aaron Brown

1
Citations in the form of “D.I. ___” refer to docket items.
2 Although only Plaintiff Aaron Brown’s name and signature appear on the affidavit filed in

support of the application, Mr. Brown presumably filed the application on behalf of all of the
represents that he is presently unemployed, has no meaningful assets, and has no

regular source of income. The affidavit alleges facts sufficient to convince the Court

that Plaintiffs are unable to pay the filing costs, and Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in

forma pauperis is therefore GRANTED. Having made this determination, the Court

must next consider whether or not the complaint should be dismissed, as required by

10 Del. C. § 8803(b).

2. The Court views pro se in forma pauperis civil suits generously. 3 “All
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well-pled matters are accepted as true to determine whether . . . [a plaintiff] can

recover under any conceivable circumstances susceptible of proof under the

complaint.” 4 Nonetheless, the Court will not allow itself “to become the victim of
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frivolous or malicious claims” that are plainly “subject to a motion to dismiss under

Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) or subject to a defense of immunity or subject to

some other defect.” 5 After granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis,
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Delaware law requires that the Court dismiss the underlying complaint if it is legally

Plaintiffs, as no filing fee was submitted with the accompanying complaint. The Complaint bears
the signatures of both adult plaintiffs, Mr. Brown and Nicole Miles-Berry. (D.I. 1).
3
Parsons v. Dushuttle, 2019 WL 1131956, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 8, 2019) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
4
Fatir v. Records, 2023 WL 6622214, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 11, 2023) (quoting Johnson v.
Howard, 1999 WL 743902, at *1 (Del. Aug. 12, 1999)).
5
Lee v. Johnson, 1996 WL 944868, at *1 (Del. Super. June 4, 1996).
2
frivolous, factually frivolous, or malicious. 6 “If a complaint fails to state a claim
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upon which relief may be granted, then it is deemed legally frivolous.” 7 6F

3. Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Geico Choice Insurance

Company (“Defendant”) “acted in bad faith,” issued a policy that “failed to comply

with State of Delaware [sic],” and wrongfully refused to pay benefits arising from a

motor-vehicle accident that occurred in April 2018. 8 Among other relief, Plaintiffs
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have asserted claims for compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive

relief. 9 Although the pleading is sparse, it appears the gravamen of the Complaint
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is an insurance bad faith claim arising from Defendant’s alleged refusal to pay or

adequately resolve an insurance claim.

4. The Court first considers whether the injunctive relief sought by

Plaintiffs is available in Superior Court. It is not. Delaware is one of the few states

that preserve the distinction between law and equity, 10 and injunctive relief is an
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equitable remedy. 11 As such, the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
10F

6
Sanders v. Dep’t of Just., 2020 WL 1171045, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 11, 2020) (citing 10 Del.
C. § 8803(b)).
7
Fatir, 2023 WL 6622214, at *4 (quoting Johnson, 1999 WL 743902, at *1); Marvel v. State,
2014 WL 7009516, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 2014) (citing Cannon v. McCreanor, 2003 WL
943247, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 6, 2003)).
8
Compl. (D.I. 1).
9
Id.
10
Reylek v. Albence, 2023 WL 142522, at *3 (Del. Super. Jan. 10, 2023) (citing Wells Fargo
Bank, NA v. Strong, 2014 WL 6478788, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2014)).
11
Id. (citing Simon v. Pyrites Co., 128 A. 370, 371 (Del. Super. 1925) (“That the granting of an
injunction is a matter of equitable jurisdiction there can be no question.”)).
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claims for injunctive relief, which are more appropriately filed in the Court of

Chancery.

5. Having concluded that injunctive relief is unavailable, the Court turns

to the sole theory of relief reasonably discernable from the complaint: Plaintiffs’

insurance bad faith claim. Under Delaware law, a bad faith insurance claim sounds

in contract and arises from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 12 To 11F

state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the insurer refused to

honor its contractual obligations “clearly without any reasonable justification,” 13 12F

and, where punitive damages are sought, that the insurer acted with reckless

indifference or malice toward the insured. 14 13F

6. The Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy these elements.

The pleading fails to identify any specific contractual provision that Defendant

allegedly breached and does not plead facts showing the absence of a bona fide

dispute over coverage or damages. 15 14F

7. The Complaint also does not allege any facts which could plausibly

support an inference of bad faith—such as prolonged delay, intentional misconduct,

12
Enrique v. State Farm Mut. Auto-Mobile Ins. Co., 2015 WL 6330920, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct.
14, 2015) (citing Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 440 (Del. 2005)), aff'd
sub nom. Enrique v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 142 A.3d 506 (Del. 2016).
13
Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Green, 308 A.3d 132, 144 (Del. 2022) (quoting Casson v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 369 (Del. Super. 1982)).
14
Enrique, 142 A.3d at 512; Powell v. AmGuard Ins. Co., 2019 WL 4509165, at *3 (Del. Super.
Sept. 19, 2019).
15
See Compl. (D.I. 1).
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misrepresentation, or a suspicious pattern of claims-handling behavior—but only the

assertion that Plaintiffs feel Defendant was “being dishonest and deceitful.” 16 15F

8. Further, the Complaint leaves unresolved threshold issues necessary to

evaluate any purported bad faith theory, including what specific coverage was

allegedly implicated (e.g., personal injury protection), whether Plaintiffs proceed as

a first-party insured or a third-party claimant, and what contractual relationship, if

any, gives rise to the duties Plaintiffs claim were breached. 17 16F

9. Although the Court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it

is not required to accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts. 18 As 17F

such, conclusory allegations that an insurer acted in bad faith or failed to comply

with Delaware law, without factual allegations describing how the insurer’s conduct

lacked reasonable justification, are insufficient as a matter of law. Even a pro se

litigant must provide the Court with enough information to permit a meaningful

consideration of the merits. 1918F

10. Nor does the Complaint allege facts supporting a breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant cannot be used to

16
Id.
17
Id.
18
I Am Athlete, LLC v. IM EnMotive, LLC, 2024 WL 4904685, at *5 (Del. Super. Nov. 27, 2024)
(citing Vito v. Waterslide Prop. Owners Assoc., Inc., 2022 WL 4372755, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept.
21, 2022)).
19
Chrustowski v. Minuti, 2025 WL 2985737, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 22, 2025) (citing Brown v.
Delaware State Hous. Auth., 2024 WL 5245550, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 30, 2024)).
5
create a free-floating duty unattached to the insurance contract itself; 20 rather, it
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protects the insured’s reasonable expectations under the express terms of the

contract. 21 A plaintiff must therefore allege conduct that arbitrarily or unreasonably
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frustrated the fruits of the insurance bargain. The Complaint alleges no such conduct

and as such is legally insufficient.

11. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for

insurance bad faith or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Since the alleged bad faith theory is the sole plausible basis for relief apparent on

the face of the pleading, the Complaint is legally frivolous within the meaning of 10

Del. C. § 8803(b).

12. As an aside, the Court notes that the only date alleged in the Complaint

is April 2018, which strongly suggests that any contract or personal-injury-based

claims may be time-barred. 22 The Complaint also pleads no facts suggesting tolling,
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delayed accrual, or any other basis to avoid the limitations bar. However, because

the issue of legal frivolity is dispositive, the Court need not rely on the statute of

limitations as the ground for dismissal.

20
See Dunlap, 878 A.2d at 441 (“. . . implied good faith cannot be used to . . . create a free-
floating duty . . . unattached to the underlying legal document.”) (internal quotations omitted).
21
See id. at 444.
22
Claims sounding in contract are subject to a three-year limitations period. 10 Del. C. § 8106.
Claims alleging personal injury are subject to a two-year limitations period. 10 Del. C. § 8119.
6
13. For these reasons, the Complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby

GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

NEP/tls
Via File & ServeXpress & U.S. Mail
oc: Prothonotary
Aaron Brown and Nicole Miles-Berry, Pro Se – Via U.S. Mail

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