State v. Mayfield

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 1504011040A
)
ATIBA MAYFIELD, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: April 4, 2025
Decided: April 25, 2025

Upon Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief
DENIED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Chief of Appeals, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820
North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Herbert W. Mondros. Esquire, RIDGROSKY & LONG, P.A., 300 Delaware
Avenue, Suite 210, Wilmington, DE 19801; Stephanie M. McArdle, Esquire, (pro
hac vice) 220 North Jackson Street, Media, PA 19063, Attorneys for Defendant
Atiba Mayfield.

WHARTON, J.
I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the Court on Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s (“Mayfield”)

Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (“AMPCR”). Mayfield was convicted

at trial of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the

Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy First Degree, Reckless

Endangering First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. In a

separate trial, his codefendant Michael Broomer (“Boomer”) was convicted of

Murder Second Degree, two counts of PFDCF, and one count of Reckless

Endangering First Degree. Mayfield appealed his convictions to the Delaware

Supreme Court. That Court affirmed the judgment of this Court.

Through counsel, Mayfield presents five claims: (1) Fraudulent Ballistics

Examiner Carl Rone; (2) Failure to Perform Exculpatory GSR Testing; (3) Failure

to Timely Disclose Immunity Agreement; (4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

(“IAC”) both at trial and on direct appeal; and (5) Mandatory Life without Probation

or Parole Sentence. His IAC claim against trial counsel is subdivided into 11 alleged

deficiencies. His IAC claim against appellate counsel, who was one of his trial

attorneys also, has two allegations of ineffectiveness. The Court has carefully

considered each claim. All are without merit. Accordingly, the AMPCR is

DENIED.

2
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mayfield and his co-defendant Broomer were both charged with Murder First

Degree and various other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Raekwan

Mangrum (“Mangrum”) on April 4, 2015 in Wilmington. The homicide was

witnessed, at least in part, by Wilmington Police Officer Matthew Begany. Officer

Begany heard what he thought were multiple gunshots while on patrol in the 800

block of West 4th Street.1 He turned southbound onto Monroe Street and heard

another round of multiple shots.2 As he turned southbound, he observed a blue Ford

Focus at the end of an alleyway between 2nd and 3rd Streets. 3 He also saw a man

standing outside of the Focus firing a handgun.4 Officer Begany wrote in his report

that the man jumped inside the Focus, but when he testified at trial he acknowledged

the man may have retreated down the alleyway.5 He called for backup and drove

down the alleyway toward the Focus and the man firing the gun. 6 The Focus began

to head northbound towards his car and then turned suddenly onto a pedestrian

alleyway, narrowly avoiding a collision. 7 At that point, Officer Begany saw two

black males in the vehicle and broadcast the Focus’ license plate over the radio.8 He

1
Trial Tr. at 59:20-23 (Jun. 21, 2016)
2
Id. at 63:6-7; 64:3-11.
3
Id. at 65:16-17; 66:20-23
4
Id. at 66:23-67:4.
5
Id. at 67:5-15.
6
Id. at 8-10.
7
Id. at 73:1-16.
8
Id. at 74:3-75:21.
3
continued down the alleyway and observed Mangrum, who had been shot multiple

times, a woman who had also been shot once in the leg, and her young child, who

was not injured. 9 The woman survived, but Mangrum died hours later at the

hospital. 10

After several Wilmington Police Officers spotted the Focus, a high-speed

vehicle chase involving multiple police officers ensued.11 During the chase

northbound on I-95, one of the officers observed a handgun being thrown from the

passenger side of the Focus.12 A CZ .40 caliber semi-automatic firearm was

recovered in the area where the officer saw a weapon being thrown.13 Ultimately,

the chase ended in Pennsylvania where Broomer, the driver, and Mayfield, the

passenger, fled on foot, but quickly were taken into custody.14 A .380 Cobra FS 380,

with one spent casing and five live rounds of ammunition was also found along the

path of the chase.15 Subsequent DNA testing established that Mayfield was the

“major contributor” to DNA located on the grip of the .380 firearm. 16 The police

also recovered a box of .380 ammunition from under the driver’s seat of the Focus

and a spent shell casing under the passenger side floor mat.17

9
Id. at 77:20-78:5.
10
Id. at 85:15-86:6.
11
Trial Tr. at 59:1-6; 61:23; 10-16 (Jun. 14, 2016).
12
Id. at 73:18-74:4.
13
Id. at 90:7-91:19; 163:8-165:20.
14
Id. at 83:20-84:15; 85:20-87:2; 90:2-6.
15
Id. at 171:18-172:2; 179:21-180:14.
16
Trial Tr. at 52:17-54:1 (Jun. 15, 2026, AM).
17
Id. at 72:3-17; 71:2-6.
4
At Mayfield’s request, Wilmington Detective Robert Fox, the chief

investigating officer, went to Ridley Township about nine hours after the shooting

to speak with Mayfield.18 There, Det. Fox conducted an audiotaped interview.19

Mayfield confirmed that he requested to speak to Det. Fox, was read his Miranda

rights and agreed to waive them. 20 At trial, the State played the audiotape for the

jury.21 Mayfield spoke to Det. Fox on two other occasions. The first was when he

was taken to the Delaware County, Pennsylvania jail to await extradition to

Delaware.22 The second was in Delaware on April 16th at the Wilmington Police

station after Mayfield had been returned to Delaware.23 The State did not seek to

introduce either of these two statements into evidence at trial.

Wilmington Police processed the scene in the 200 block of Monroe Street and

collected ballistic evidence. Det. Hugh Stephy photographed and collected six .40

caliber shell casings from north of a manhole cover in the pedestrian walkway. 24 He

also recovered two .40 caliber projectiles – one in the walkway and the other inside

220 Monroe Street. 25 Det. Stephy collected five 9mm shell casings as well. 26 The

.40 caliber and 9mm shell casings were found in two separate clusters with all of the

18
Trial Tr. at 191:13-192:7; 198:111-16. (Jun. 21, 2016).
19
Id. at 197:16-20. App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278-351, D.I. 110.
20
App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278, D.I.110.
21
Trial Tr. at 201:21-22 (Jun. 21, 2016).
22
AMPCR at 13, D.I. 100.
23
Id. at 14.
24
Trial Tr. at 101:18-108:19 (Jun. 15, 2016 PM).
25
Id. at 111:19-23; 105:4-13.
26
Id. at 118:9-10.
5
.40 caliber casings north of a manhole and all of the 9mm casings south of it.27

Because the calibers are not interchangeable, all of the casings could not have come

from the same firearm. 28

Carl Rone (“Rone”), a forensic firearms examiner for the Delaware State

Police testified for the State as a ballistics expert.29 He examined both firearms that

were recovered, and all of the .40 caliber and 9mm shell casings and projectiles.30

He concluded that the .40 caliber handgun functioned properly and that it fired all of

the .40 caliber shell casings found on Monroe Street.31 He also concluded that the

five 9mm casings were fired from the same firearm.32 Finally, the Cobra .380

handgun did not properly feed cartridges into the chamber which required him to

manually manipulate the weapon to seat a cartridge to fire.33

Since his testimony at trial, Rone has become a controversial figure. In May

2018, he was indicted on charges of Theft by False Pretense and Falsifying Business

Records. 34 He later pled guilty to those charges. 35 The allegations involved Rone

27
Id. at 118:4-17.
28
Id.
29
Trial Tr. at 121:14-23 (June 21, 2016).
30
Id. at 130:8-131:23.
31
Id. at 131:20-132:8.
32
Id. at 132:9-16. The 9mm handgun was never recovered.
33
Id. at 132:17-133:16.
34
AMPCR, at 22, D.I. 100.
35
Id.; State’s Resp., at 26, D.I. 109.
6
falsifying payroll records and receiving pay for time when he was not working from

2016-2017.36 The falsified records were not ballistics reports.37

Clothing was seized from both Mayfield and Broomer. Wilmington Police

Master Corporal William Gearhart seized two sweatshirts and a pair of jeans from

Mayfield.38 He also took samples from Mayfield’s hands to test for gunshot residue

(“GSR”). 39 He followed the same procedure with Broomer.40

Michael Gorski of the RJ Lee Group presented the results of his tests for GSR.

Broomer’s left palm sample yielded a single particle GSR characteristic while

Mayfield had at least one particle of GSR on the fronts and backs of his left and right

hands. 41 Additionally, he found significantly more GSR particles on Mayfield’s

sweatshirt than Broomer’s.42 No GSR particles were found on Broomer’s glove.43

Until shortly before the homicide it appears Mayfield, Broomer, Mangrum,

and Nicodemus Morris (“Morris”) all had been on good terms.44 But two incidents

soured relationships among them. The first occurred on March 21, 2015. On that

date, all four individuals were together riding around Wilmington in a car jointly

36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Trial Tr. at 198:12-21 (June 14, 2016).
39
Id. at 201:9-203:8.
40
Id. at 205:5-8.
41
Trial Tr. at 27:15-28:12 (Jun. 16, 2016 PM).
42
Id. at 32:4-6.
43
Id. at 20-23.
44
Trial Tr. at 96:14-22; 156:18-21 (Jun. 16, 2016).
7
owned by Mangrum and Broomer.45 When they stopped for gas, an argument over

who was going to drive started between Mangrum and Mayfield. 46 The argument

ended after Mangrum told Morris to drive to Mangrum’s house where he retrieved

a .380 handgun, and then to Windsor Street where Mangrum shot Mayfield in the

leg.47 The second incident involved bad blood between Mangrum and Broomer.

Prior to both the shooting and the homicide, Broomer and Mangrum were arrested

on felony drug charges. 48 At their joint trial, days before the homicide, Broomer

testified that the drugs were Mangrum’s, angering Mangrum and ending their

relationship.49 Mangrum began telling people, including on Facebook, what

Broomer had done causing Broomer to be angry in return. 50

Such was the state of things between Mayfield and Mangrum and Broomer

and Mangrum on April 4, 2015. That afternoon, about an hour before the homicide,

Mangrum, Morris and Tyezghaire Stevens (“Stevens”), and her young son met at the

Fresh Grocer supermarket in Wilmington.51 Mangrum and Morris were helping

Stevens shop for groceries with her grandmother and sister.52 After grocery

shopping, Morris, Stevens, and her son walked to McDonald’s on 4th Street, while

45
Id. at 96:23-97:23.
46
Id. at 98:3-14.
47
Id. at 101:2-104:9.
48
Id. at 108:6-18.
49
Id. at 108:20-109:13; 155:19-156:2.
50
Id. at 156:3-17.
51
Trial Tr. at 6:19-7:4; 7:22-8:1 (Jun. 21, 2016).
52
Id.
8
Mangrum went to his grandmother’s house.53 While headed to McDonald’s, Morris

saw Broomer at the drive-through.54 Morris left McDonald’s to tell Mangrum he

had seen Broomer because he knew that there must be a reason Broomer was in the

city and because he knew of the history between the two.55

Later, Stevens, her son, Morris and Mangrum all met in the alleyway on

Monroe Street, a block from McDonald’s.56 Morris stood on the sidewalk and

busied himself on his cell phone while Mangrum and Stevens flirted as Stevens’ son

played a short distance away.57 Morris looked up from his phone and saw an arm

with a gun come out of a car window.58 He immediately ran to where he had secreted

a 9mm Glock handgun. 59 As he was running, he heard 6-7 gunshots. 60 While Morris

was returning, he saw Mangrum fall after being shot.61 Morris stood next to

Mangrum and fired what he thought were five rounds at the blue car. 62 He then

noticed a police car at the end of the alley and fled because he was not legally

permitted to possess a firearm. 63

53
Id. at 8:4-9; Trial Tr. at 86:21-89:16 (Jun. 20, 2016).
54
Trial Tr. at 89:17-90:3 (Jun. 20, 2016).
55
Id. at 94:6-95:5.
56
Id. 65:9-12; 66:3-6; Trial Tr. at 11:23-12:7; 13:19-14:18 (Jun. 21, 2016).
57
Trial Tr. at 68:3-20 (Jun. 20, 2016); Trial Tr. at 16:22-18:8 (Jun. 21, 2016).
58
Trial Tr. at 69:14-18 (Jun. 20, 2016).
59
Id.; 144:12-145:1.
60
Trial Tr. at 73:17-74:9 (Jun. 20, 2016).
61
Id. at 77:20-78:11.
62
Id. at 78:17-21; 79:5-6.
63
Id. at 79:2-5; 81:4-23.
9
Stevens had been talking to Mangrum when she heard shots and felt her leg.64

She tried to get up but could not.65 She was able to locate her son who appeared

uninjured. 66 At first, she could not tell if Mangrum had been shot, but then she

realized he had been hit. 67 After the shooting started, she saw the blue car that she

had seen earlier at McDonald’s.68

After a nine day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as charged on all but

the severed PDWBPP charge, which the State declined to pursue.69 Mayfield was

sentenced on November 4, 2016 to a term of life imprisonment without probation

or parole on the murder charge, plus an additional five years at Level V on each of

the other charges.70

Mayfield appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, raising two issues both

involving this Court’s denial of certain jury instructions he requested.71 One was

based on various justification defenses.72 The other was for lesser included

offenses.73 The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of this Court’s reasons stated

in its rulings at the Prayer Conference.74

64
Trial Tr. at 18:6-10 (Jun. 21, 2016).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 21:8-10.
67
Id. at 21:11-23:20.
68
Id. at 23:21-24:12.
69
D.I. 35; Trial Tr. at 7:10-14 (June 24, 2016).
70
D.I. 42.
71
State’s Resp. at Ex. A (Appellant’s Opening Brief), D.I. 109.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Mayfield v. State, 2017 WL 6015762 (Del. Dec. 4, 2017).
10
On October 4, 2018, Mayfield filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction

Relief75 and Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 76 Benjamin S. Gifford, IV,

Esquire was appointed postconviction counsel. 77 On August 28, 2020, current

postconviction counsel Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire substituted his appearance for

Mr. Gifford. 78 Stefanie M. McArdle, Esquire was admitted pro hac vice as co-

counsel with Mr. Mondros on October 12, 2020.79 Both Mr. Mondros and Ms.

McArdle were privately retained.80 However, private funding eventually dried up

and counsel applied to represent Mayfield as appointed counsel.81 After a hearing

at which the Court determined that Mayfield was indigent, Mr. Mondros and Ms.

McArdle were appointed as counsel for Mayfield.82 Appointed counsel ultimately

filed this AMPCR motion on May 6, 2024. 83 The AMPCR included a number of

IAC allegations. John S. Malik, Esquire, who was both trial counsel and appellate

counsel, and Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, who was trial co-counsel submitted

separate affidavits in response to the IAC allegations.84 The State answered on

75
Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 59.
76
Pro Se Motion for Appointment of Counsel, D.I. 60.
77
D.I. 66.
78
D.I. 82.
79
D.I. 75.
80
D.I. 83. Two copies of this motion have different docket item numbers. The copy
incorrectly marked D.I. 81 is a complete copy. The copy correctly marked D.I. 83
is incomplete because only the odd numbered pages are copied.
81
Id.
82
D.I. 88.
83
AMPCR, D.I. 100..
84
Affidavit of John S. Malick, Esquire, D.I. 107; Affidavit of Andrew J. Witherell,
Esquire, D.I. 106.
11
October 31, 2024.85 Postconviction counsel submitted a Reply to the State’s Answer

on April 4, 2025. 86

III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

The AMPCR raises five claims, one of which is an IAC claim. That claim is

subdivided into 11 allegations of ineffectiveness against trial counsel and two

against appellate counsel. Three claims relate to the prosecution function and the

last claim to Mayfield’s sentencing.

A. Mayfield’s Claims Related to the Prosecution Function

Mayfield’s first claim is that the verdict was tainted by the fact that within

five months of the Delaware Supreme Court affirming his convictions, Rone was

charged with Theft by False Pretense and Falsifying Business Records. 87 He notes

the importance of Rone expert ballistics testimony at trial and contends that

testimony is tainted by Rone’s criminal misconduct.88

Mayfield’s second claim is that the State failed to perform exculpatory GSR

testing. 89 Specifically, despite Det. Fox testifying at Mayfield’s preliminary hearing

that the State intended to send the bags that covered Mangrum’s hands out for GSR

testing, it never did.90 He claims the State had a fundamental discovery obligation

85
State’s Ans., D.I. 110.
86
Def.’s Resp., D.I. 112.
87
AMPCR, at 22, D.I. 100.
88
Id. at 24.
89
Id. at 26.
90
Id.
12
to inform Mangrum’s trial counsel of its decision to reverse course and not test the

bags.91

The third claim Mayfield brings is an allegation that the State failed to timely

disclose an immunity agreement it entered into with Morris on May 1, 2015. 92 The

State did not disclose the agreement until Morris took the stand at trial, nearly 13

months later. 93 He argues that timely disclosure “would have changed the course of

[defense counsels’] preparation of this case in many ways.”94

B. Mayfield’s IAC Claims Against Trial Counsel

Mayfield’s IAC claims represent the bulk of the AMPCR. He alleges that trial

counsel: (1) failed to adequately investigate and prepare for trial, particularly in the

areas of crime scene reconstruction and ballistics evidence; 95 (2) failed to move to

suppress Mayfield’s statements to police; 96 (3) failed to move to suppress evidence

recovered from a search of Mayfield’s room at his grandmother’s house; 97 (4) failed

to prepare and use expert witness Jeffrey Miller, who apparently did a crime scene

reconstruction; 98 (5) failed to interview witnesses Tyrie Burton (“Burton”), who

claimed to be an eyewitness, and Mayfield’s younger brother Jowan Whitley

91
Id.
92
Id. at 28.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 29-31.
96
Id. 31-32.
97
Id. at 33-35.
98
Id. at 35-36.
13
(“Whitley”), both of whom Mayfield claims would have provided exculpatory

information, Mayfield’s grandmother, and trial witnesses Brittany Mangrum and

Dorothy Mangrum, who Mayfield claims counsel never interviewed before their

testimony;99 (6) failed to investigate the relationship between Broomer and

Mangrum; 100 (7) failed to conduct independent GSR forensic testing which “would

have likely produced exculpatory evidence;” 101 (8) failed to seek a favorable pre-

trial resolution;102 (9) failed to object to Det. Fox testifying as an expert regarding

cell phone extractions;103 (10) failed to prepare to use cell phone records of

communications between Mangrum and Broomer leading up to the homicide; 104 and

(11) failed to humanize Mayfield before the jury.105

C. Mayfield’s IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.

Mayfield makes two claims of IAC on direct appeal. He contends appellate

counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the trial court’s denial of lesser included

offense instructions and Det. Fox improperly testifying as an expert on cell phone

extractions.106

D. Mayfield’s Sentencing Claim

99
Id. at 36-37.
100
Id. at 37-39.
101
Id. at 39.
102
Id. at 40.
103
Id. at 40-41.
104
Id. at 41-42.
105
Id. at 42-42
106
Id. at 44.
14
Mayfield argues that his mandatory life without parole sentence for his first

degree murder conviction violate he 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States

Constitution and the Delaware Constitution because he was a 21-year old with no

prior violent history.

E. State’s Response to Mayfield’s Claims Related to the Prosecution
Function

In response, the State contends that a number of Mayfield’s claims are barred

by Rule 61(i). Specifically, it relies upon Rule 61(i)(3) to argue all but his IAC

claims are barred and not subject to Rule 61(i)(5)’s exception.107 Rule 61(i)(3) bars

claims not raised in the proceedings leading up to the judgment of conviction unless

Mayfield can show cause for the default and actual prejudice. The State contends

Mayfield is unable to show either.

The State first addresses the Carl Rone issue. It downplays the importance of

Rone’s testimony and points out that Rone’s crimes did not involve the mishandling

of evidence or the falsification of documents related to his examination of evidence

or his reports.108

As to Mayfield’s claim that the State’s failure to conduct GSR testing violated

his due process rights, the State argues that Mayfield has no such right requiring the

State to inform him that it would not be testing the bags on Mangrum’s hands for

107
State’s Resp. at 20, D.I. 109.
108
Id. at 26-32.
15
GSR.109 It also disputes Mayfield’s conclusory allegation that the results of such

testing would have been exculpatory.110

The State acknowledges that it did not disclose Morris’ immunity agreement

to the defense prior to trial.111 But, it maintains that Mayfield’s trial counsel made

effective use of it in attacking Morris’ credibility on cross-examination and in

argument.112

F. State’s Response to Mayfield’s Claims Related to Ineffective
Assistance of Trial Counsel

The State addresses Mayfield’s IAC claims in sequence. It contends where

Mayfield does not establish IAC, his claims are barred by Rule 61(i)(3). Further, in

each instance, Mayfield failed to meet both the performance and prejudice prongs of

Strickland v. Washington. 113

First, the State addresses Mayfield’s claim that trial counsel failed to

“investigate the physical evidence and forensics in the case” because the three

different caliber guns in the case warranted crime scene reconstruction and ballistics

analysis.114 State maintains that the record refutes this claim – trial counsel visited

and examined the scene and engaged a crime scene analyst, Jeffrey Miller, to review

109
Id. at 32-34.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 35.
112
Id.
113
466 U.S. 668 (1994).
114
State’s Resp. at 36, D.I. 109.
16
the evidence.115 Miller determined that the physical evidence did not support

Mayfield’s version of what happened. 116 Thus, Counsel was not ineffective for not

utilizing him as a witness, and further, Mayfield has failed to state with particularity

any prejudice. 117

Mayfield next claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to

suppress his statements. The State argues that Mayfield has failed to “develop the

claim beyond reciting the facts attendant to each statement and offers no legal basis

upon which a motion to suppress would have rested.”118

Mayfield claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to

suppress a laser-sight for a handgun seized from his room at his grandmother’s house

and/or to move in limine to exclude it from evidence on other bad acts grounds. The

State does not address the argument that a motion to suppress should have been filed,

but does argue that the laser-sight was relevant and that there was no basis for a

motion in limine because possession of the laser sight did not rise to the level of a

bad act under DRE 404(b).119

115
Id.
116
Id. at 37.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 39.
119
Id. at 42.
17
Mayfield’s next IAC claim is that trial counsel failed to prepare and use expert

witness Jeffrey Miller. The State points out again that the witness’ testimony would

not have helped Mayfield.120

Mayfield claims that trial counsel failed to speak to Burton and Whitley, who

he contends would have provided exculpatory information about the homicide, and

failed to meet with trial witnesses Dorothy Mangrum and Brittany Mangrum before

they testified. The State contends that Mayfield has failed to proffer the exculpatory

evidence that Burton and Whitley would have provided.121 While it is true proffered

exculpatory evidence was not set out in the body of the AMPCR, investigators’

summaries of interviews of them are found in the Appendix to the AMPCR.122 As

to Dorothy and Brittany Mangrum, the State maintains that trial counsel did talk to

them. 123

The State next turns to Mayfield’s claim that trial counsel failed to investigate

the relationship between Broomer and Mangrum, their joint trial, and to present

evidence of Mangrum’s propensity for violence. But, according to the State, trial

counsel were well aware of the relationship between Mangrum and Broomer and

their joint trial.124 Mayfield fails to specify what evidence in addition to what was

120
Id. at 44.
121
Id. at 47.
122
AMPCR at Exs. 6 (Whitley) and 7 (Burton), D.I. 100.
123
State’s Resp. at 46, D.I. 109.
124
Id. at 48.
18
presented at trial further investigation would have unearthed. 125 Regarding

Mangrum’s propensity, the State argues Mayfield has failed to identify that evidence

with particularity and also failed to offer a theory for its admissibility. 126

Mayfield’s next claim is that trial counsel failed to conduct forensic testing.

The State points out that, beyond the statement that additional forensic testing

“would have likely produced exculpatory evidence” Mayfield offers nothing. The

claim is conclusory and unsubstantiated and can be denied for that reason.127

Mayfield next alleges the trial counsel failed in their duty to seek a resolution

of the case prior to trial. The State responds that Mayfield’s postconviction

counsel’s “good faith belief” that plea negotiations did not occur has no basis in

fact.128 Further the State was not obliged to offer a plea and Mayfield has not stated

he would have accepted one.129

Mayfield’s next claim is that trial counsel failed to object to Det. Fox

testifying as an expert regarding Cellebrite phone records extractions. The State

notes trial counsel’s strategic decision not to object to the extractions due the

exculpatory nature of some of the records.130 To the extent Mayfield argues that

admission of the records violated his confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment

125
Id. at 49.
126
Id. at 49-50.
127
Id. at 51.
128
Id at 52.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 54.
19
and Crawford v. Washington,131 the State argues that Mayfield did not develop that

argument, and in any event, Det. Fox’s testimony did not violate Crawford because

he did not recount the statement of any non-appearing witness.132

Mayfield contends that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to use phone

records provided in discovery to show a constant back and forth between Broomer

and Mangrum and looked unprepared to address the cell phone evidence offered by

the State to Mayfield’s detriment. The State responds that trial counsel did introduce

cell phone evidence in Mayfield’s defense. It also argues that Mayfield has failed

to make a concrete claim of prejudice and to substantiate it.133

Mayfield’s final claim of ineffectiveness against trial counsel is that they

failed to humanize him before the jury. He faults trial counsel for calling Mayfield

by Mangrum’s name four times in closing argument. The State responds by pointing

out that Mayfield offers no authority for his contention that trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective in mistakenly confusing the names of Mayfield and

Mangrum. 134

C. IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.

Mayfield’s first IAC claim against appellate counsel is that he failed to raise

a meritorious issue on appeal by failing to appeal this Court’s denial of his request

131
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
132
State’s Resp. at 54, D.I. 109.
133
Id. at 58.
134
Id. at 57.
20
for lesser included offenses. The State notes that appellate counsel did in fact raise

that issue on appeal.135

His second claim of IAC against appellate counsel is that trial counsel failed

to object to Det. Fox testifying as an expert witness on cell phone extraction

evidence. In the State’s view, the allegation is conclusory, and because he fails to

identify the legal basis for his argument, he cannot demonstrate that it is clearly

stronger than the issues appellate counsel raised.136

D. Sentencing Claim

Mayfield argues that his mandatory life without parole sentence on his first

degree murder conviction violate he 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States

Constitution and the Delaware Constitution because he was a 21-year old with no

prior violent history. The State argues that Mayfield’s sentencing claim is

conclusory.137 It should be dismissed on that basis alone. 138

G. Mayfield’s Reply

Mayfield’s reply comes in six subsections: (1) the State is incorrect that

certain of his claims are barred; (2) Rone’s crimes require a new trial; (3) Trial

Counsel’s prejudicial IAC requires a new trial; (4) the legal standards governing

effective assistance of counsel support a new trial; (5) trial counsel’s affidavits raise

135
Id. at 58.
136
Id. at 59.
137
Id. at 60.
138
Id.
21
more questions than they answer; and (6) an evidentiary hearing is necessary to

demonstrate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, the resulting prejudice, and to allow

Mayfield to introduce evidence to support his claims.139

Mayfield challenges the State’s contention that all but his IAC claims are

barred under Rule 61(i). He suggests that it is inappropriate to apply the exceptions

related to successive postconviction relief motions found in Rules 61(d)(i) or (ii) to

his first such motion. 140 He points out that his first claim of error concerning Rone

could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. 141 He claims that the failure

to raise his second and third claims of error – the State’s failure to conduct GSR

testing of the bags on Mangrum’s hands or to inform him of its decision not to do

that testing and its untimely production of Morriss’ immunity agreement – are

attributable to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and excuse any default.142 He also

ascribes the failure to raise his sentencing claim to ineffective assistance of

counsel. 143

He insists Rone’s testimony was critical to the State’s case. He cites Rone’s

testimony regarding the inoperability of the .380 handgun, the fact that there were

three guns at the scene with conflicting theories of “who shot who with what gun

and from where,” and the medical examiner’s inability to identify the gun

139
Def.’s Reply at 1-2, D. I. 112.
140
Id. at 3.
141
Id. at 4.
142
Id. at 5.
143
Id.
22
responsible for Mangrum’s fatal injury to establish how critical Rone’s testimony

was. 144

Turning to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, Mayfield

substantially repeats the allegations in the AMPCR. He emphasizes trial counsel’s

failure to file any motions to suppress: (1) Mayfield’s original statement; (2) other

bad acts relating to the firearm accessory found at his grandmother’s house; and (3)

pictures from Broomer’s cell phone which Mayfield used.145 He makes a new claim

that had trial counsel had the bullet removed from Mayfield’s leg when he was shot

by Mangrum ballistically analyzed they “likely would have discovered that the same

weapon Mangrum possessed on March 21, 2015 was the same weapon that he still

had at the time of this shootout two [2] weeks later.”146 He makes another new claim

that trial counsel should have conducted tests on the car which “likely would have

had exculpatory evidence to prove their defense theory – this was a person-to-person

fight when shots rang out and gunfire was exchanged across a parking lot and

alleyway.”147 He reiterates claims he made in his AMPCR regarding what he

considers the inadequacy of trial counsel’s investigation and trial preparation, but

does not address with any specificity the State’s response to those allegations. 148

144
Id. at 7.
145
Id. at 10-12.
146
Id. at 12-13.
147
Id. at 13.
148
Id. at 13-19.
23
Mayfield’s Reply contains 2 ½ pages discussing what constitutes effective

assistance of counsel in criminal cases. 149 But, that terrain is well worn and the Court

has travelled it many times.

Mayfield is unsatisfied with trial counsel’s affidavits, insisting they raise more

questions than they answer. He claims they do little to shed light on what strategy,

if any, trial counsel employed in defending him.150 He insists an evidentiary hearing

is necessary to explore certain “discrepancies” in the affidavits. 151

Mayfield requests an evidentiary hearing for other reasons as well. An

evidentiary hearing is necessary to “resolve disputes over material facts, including

the amount of time counsel spent with their client, their reasons for not filing

motions, the investigation they did or did not do, to answer questions about their

invoices in this case, and other things relevant to their performance in this matter.”152

It is also necessary to resolve the “dispute” over plea negotiations, and whether such

negotiations were communicated to Mayfield, to present testimony from Burton,

unnamed “police experts,” investigators from True Blue Detective Agency, Morris,

and Stevens to explore her bias and the “intricate contours of her relationship with

the participants.”153

149
Id. at 19-22.
150
Id. at 22.
151
Id. at 23.
152
Id. at 24.
153
Id. at 24-27.
24
IV. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction relief,

the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule

61(i).154 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the

postconviction claim. 155 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal

Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations,

repetitive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds

time limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final

or if it asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year

after it was first recognized.156 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and

therefore barred.157 The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was

convicted at trial and the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual

innocence; 158 or (2) the application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule

of constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid.159 Grounds for relief “not

asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as

procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice

from [the] violation.” 160 Grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case,

154
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
155
Id.
156
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
157
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
158
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
159
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).
160
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
25
including “proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-

conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred. 161 The

above bars to relief do not apply either to a claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to

one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the application of a newly recognized,

retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid. 162

To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a claimant

must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the

deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with reliable

results.163 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.164 Moreover, a

defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them

or risk summary dismissal. 165 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” 166 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.”167 An inmate must satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to

161
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
162
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
163
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
164
Id. at 667-68.
165
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
166
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689.
167
Id. at 694.
26
succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Failure to do so on either prong

will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168

In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel

was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is,

that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits

brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every

nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the

likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a

Strickland claim based on counsel’s failure to raise a particular claim, but it is

difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent.” 171 A defendant faces a

tougher burden of “showing that a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger

than issues that counsel did present” where appellate counsel filed a merits brief,

than in the case where appellate counsel filed a no merit brief.172 Further, Mayfield

must still show prejudice, “That is, [the defendant] must show a reasonable

probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure [to raise a clearly stronger

issue], he would have prevailed on his appeal.”173

168
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013)
(“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an
attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”).
169
Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259, 285 (2000)).
170
Id. (citing Smith, 528 U.S. at 288).
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285).
27
V. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of Mayfield’s AMPCR, the Court applies the

procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).174 If a procedural bar exists,

then the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim. 175 Grounds

for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are

barred as procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief” and

“prejudice from [the] violation.”176 None of the bars to relief apply either to a claim

the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the

application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law

rendering the conviction invalid. 177

In his Reply, Mayfield now couches his claims regarding Rone, GSR, the late

production of Morris’ immunity agreement, and his sentencing claim in IAC terms

in order to show cause for his failure to raise them previously since IAC claims are

not subject to the procedural default of Rule 61(i)(3). As this Court has observed in

State v. Gattis: “However, this path creates confusion if the defendant does not

understand that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel and the test for cause

and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”178 For example the United

States Supreme Court has held that:

174
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
175
Id.
176
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
177
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
178
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995).
28
[i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires
that the responsibility for the default be imputed to the
State, which may not “conduc[t] trials at which persons
who face incarceration must defend themselves without
adequate legal assistance;” Ineffective assistance of
counsel then is cause for a procedural default. 179

But:

A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted
passage to mean that he can simply assert ineffectiveness
and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss the
mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two-
part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington and
adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v.
State. 180

Accordingly, the Court discusses those four claims bearing in mind the “cause and

prejudice” necessary to overcome 61(i)(3)’s bar to relief and Strickland’s

performance deficiency and prejudice requirements.

A. Claim I – Fraudulent Ballistics Examiner Carl Rone

Rone’s transgressions first came to light in 2018 in Fowler v. State 181 while

Fowler’s appeal from this Court’s denial of his postconviction relief motion was

before the Delaware Supreme Court. 182 They were unknown at the time of

179
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466
U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
180
Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *4 (internal citations omitted).
181
194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018).
182
Id. at 17.
29
Mayfield’s trial and direct appeal. 183 Since this issue was not raised before, Mayfield

must show cause for relief from the procedural default bar of Rule 61(i)(3) and actual

prejudice. Mayfield does not address the bar until his Reply, but the timing of the

revelation of Rone’s crimes is a sufficient cause for not raising the issue at trial or

on appeal. Whether he is entitled to relief and was prejudiced requires the Court to

examine the claim.

At trial in this case Rone offered expert ballistics testimony about the two

handguns that were recovered – the .40 caliber and the .380 and multiple shell

casings. 184 He matched all of the .40 caliber shell casings found on Monroe Street

to the .40 caliber handgun thrown from the Focus during the police chase. 185 He

concluded that all of the 9mm casings were fired from the same weapon. 186 Lastly,

he testified that the Cobra .380 also recovered after the chase, did not properly feed

cartridges into the chamber requiring him to manually manipulate it to seat a

cartridge to fire.187 The calibers of the shell casings recovered at the Monroe Street

scene had been determined earlier by Det. Stephy. 188

183
Mayfield’s trial was in 2016 and his convictions were affirmed in 2017. See
Mayfield v. State, 2017 WL 6015762 (Del. Dec. 4, 2017).
184
Trial Tr. at 121:14-23 (Jun. 21, 2016).
185
Id. at 131:20-132:8.
186
Id. at 132:9-16.
187
Id. at 132:17- 33:16.
188
Trial Tr. at 101:18-108:19, 111:19-23 (Jun. 15, 2016).
30
In Fowler, Rone testified that a single gun was used in two separate shooting

incidents for which Fowler was charged. 189 This testimony was significant because

“[T]he fact that ballistic evidence linked the same weapon to both incidents makes

the evidence of Fowler’s guilt in each separate incident mutually reinforcing” and

supported the Court’s finding that the State’s failure to provide Jencks material for

four witnesses to the defense was harmless. 190 After the Rone revelations, the State

reversed field.

Having argued below that its four Jencks violations were
harmless in substantial part because of the ballistics
evidence it presented, on appeal it did a 180. Now, it tells
us that we need not worry that its ballistics expert has
serious credibility issues because he claimed pay for work
he did not do. Why? Because its witness testimony,
including that of the four witnesses for whom it had failed
to provide Jencks statements was so strong. 191

In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “Rone’s testimony was vital to

both the State’s trial case and the Superior Court’s opinion because if one accepted

the expert’s testimony, that the same weapon was present at each incident, it gave

the jury and the Superior Court a basis other than eye witness testimony to conclude

that Fowler was the shooter.” 192 In combination, the State’s multiple Jencks

189
State v. Fowler, 2017 WL 4381384, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017)
190
Id., at 6-7.
191
Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d at 17-18.
192
Id. at 23.
31
violations and Rone’s crimes were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and

entitled Fowler to a new trial. 193

Cases after Fowler have delt with Rone’s trial testimony and subsequent

criminal conduct. In Thompson v. State,194 the Supreme Court observed:

This is not the first case dealing with the fallout from
Rone's arrest and conviction. A number of defendants
have tried to use Rone's falsification of time sheets to upset
convictions. But “every court” to consider the issue has
concluded that “evidence that tends to impeach Rone's
character is not a ground for invalidating a conviction
unless Rone was ‘vital’ to proving the defendant's
guilt.” General character impeachment of Rone in this
case was neither vital to Thompson's conviction nor does
it suggest that Rone crossed the line from falsifying time
sheets to providing a compromised expert report and
testimony. 195

Similarly, here the Court finds that Rone’s testimony was not “vital” to proving

Mayfield’s guilt. It mostly either confirmed what was obvious – that the .40 caliber

casings were fired from the .40 caliber handgun discarded by the Defendants as they

fled police, or confirmed other testimony - that the 9mm casings came from the 9mm

handgun Morris said he fired, 196 and that the .380 was inoperable as described by

Det. Henry Law 197 and Mayfield himself in his first statement to Det. Fox.198 His

193
Id. at 27.
194
Thompson v. State, 296 A.2d 872 (Del. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
195
Id. at 879-80
196
Trial Tr., at 78:17-21; 79:5-6; 144:12-145:1.
197
Trial Tr. at 81:11-12 (Jun. 15, 2016 AM) (“Yes – no, I’m sorry, I’m sorry, the
.380 did not function.”).
198
AMPCR, at Ex. 9 at 15, D.I. 100 (“AM: I shot the .380 three times. DF: Three
times. AM: And after that it didn’t shoot anymore.”).
32
one uncorroborated finding was favorable to Mayfield – that a 9mm casing found at

the scene of the shooting at Mayfield’s grandmother’s house was fired by Morris’

gun.

In Fowler, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the unusual issues the case

presented:

Because of these new developments [Rone’s arrest and the
Jencks violation] Fowler sought leave to argue that he
should receive a new trial during which Rone’s credibility
and reliability could be tested in light of this new
information. That leave was granted and the key issues
before us therefore are whether Fowler is entitled to a new
trial because of (i) the confidence-undermining nature of
the State’s decision to indict its own expert, and (ii) the
prejudice caused by the four Jencks violations. 199

But, in reality, Fowler would never have gotten the chance to test Rone’s credibility

and reliability at a new trial. After all, why would the State call as its expert someone

it had prosecuted for crimes involving dishonesty? It would not. Rone was not an

eyewitness whose observations could not be replicated by a substitute witness. He

conducted examinations of physical objects that remained in the State’s custody and

were available for re-examination. The State would do what it did in every other

Rone case with which the Court is aware that went to trial. It would have the

evidence re-examined by a different expert unburdened by Rone’s baggage.200

199
Fowler v. State, 194 A.2d at 22-23.
200
Just as Mayfield proposed to have the ballistics evidence re-examined.
33
The Court assumes the State would submit the ballistics evidence to a different

examiner in this case if the Court were to grant Mayfield’s motion based on Rone’s

post-trial arrest and guilty plea. Rone would never testify at a re-trial of this case.

All of the foregoing begs the obvious question – “Was Rone wrong?” The answer

is that Mayfield has not given the Court any forensically based reason to conclude

he was.

The Court concludes that this claim fails for two equal and independent

reasons. First, Rone’s testimony was not vital to proving Mayfield’s guilt. Second,

he has failed to challenge forensically the accuracy of Rone’s testimony. As a result,

he has failed to show he is entitled to relief and was prejudiced. At best, he has

shown he would be able to impeach the character of a witness whose convictions

occurred after his trial and will never testify at a retrial.

B. GSR Testing.

The State did not perform GSR testing on the bags that covered Mangrum’s

hands during his autopsy despite Det. Fox testifying at Mayfield’s preliminary

hearing that it would do so.201 Mayfield contends he had a right to “rely upon the

preservation and testing of this evidence” and that he should have been notified prior

to trial that the State was not going to have the testing performed. 202 He claims this

201
AMPCR at 26, D.I. 100.
202
Id. at 27.
34
evidence was exculpatory and he was prejudiced by the State’s violation of its

“constitutional obligation to inform the defense of this change in course.” 203

Mayfield did not raise this claim either at trial or on direct appeal. Thus, it is

procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3) unless he can show cause for relief from

the default and actual prejudice. He has done neither. His assertion that a GSR

analysis of the bags on Mangrum’s hands would have produced exculpatory

evidence is speculative at best. His argument that the State had a constitutional

obligation to inform him that it did not intend to have the bags tested is unsupported

by any citation to authority. This claim is procedurally defaulted under Rule

61(i)(3). To the extent he recasts it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in

order to avert procedural default, he is unpersuasive for the reasons set out in section

V.D.7, infra.

C. Morris’ Immunity Agreement.

The State entered into an immunity agreement with Morris on May 1, 2015,

but did not inform Mayfield’s defense counsel of it until Morris took the stand, an

obvious discovery violation.204 He alleges that “diligent defense counsel operating

with adequate notice that one of the shooters had been given transactional immunity

203
Id.
204
Id. 28.
35
would have changed the course of their preparation in many ways.” 205 He does not

say how.206

Mayfield did not raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal. Thus, it is subject

to procedural default under Rule61(i)(i)(3) unless he can show cause for the default

and actual prejudice from it. He has failed to do so. Simply incanting ineffective

assistance of counsel is insufficient to remove the procedural default bar. Strickland

requires that he demonstrate trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there

was a reasonable likelihood of a different result. He must do more than allege that

earlier production would have caused a change in trial strategy. He must identify

that change and how that changed strategy would have been effective. Again,

Mayfield has done neither. Accordingly, he has shown no reason why the bar should

not apply, and so, this claim is barred by Rule 61(i)(3) as well.

D. IAC Claims Against Trial Counsel

Mayfield makes 11 IAC claims against trial counsel. Rule 61 requires that a

motion for postconviction relief “set forth in summary form the facts each of the

grounds thus specified [in the motion].”207 A predicate for a successful IAC claim

is that a defendant “must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and

205
Id.
206
Interestingly, Mayfield does not allege that trial counsel failed to make effective
use of the agreement in cross-examining Morris and in closing argument.
207
Super. Ct Crim. R. 61(b)(2).
36
substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”208 All of Mayfield’s IAC claims fail

to clear that hurdle. In the IAC context, Mayfield must show both that his trial

counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.

Mayfield’s IAC allegations are conclusory and lack substantial factual or legal

support to establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or he suffered

actual prejudice.

1. Claim 1 – Failure to Prepare and Investigate

Mayfield identifies two critical factors in the case – crime scene

reconstruction and ballistics evidence.209 He asserts that it was critical for trial

counsel to investigate the forensics in the case and provide the jury with a credible

self-defense case. 210 The first part of that sentence undoubtedly is true. The second

part depends on what the forensic evidence establishes. Mayfield acknowledges that

trial counsel hired a crime scene and law enforcement investigations expert, Jeffrey

Miller, M.S. (“Miller”), but fault them for not calling him as a witness at trial.211 But

Mayfield never makes any concrete allegation that he was prejudiced by Miller’s

absence from the witness stand. He never informs the Court of the helpful testimony

Miller was prepared to offer.

208
Wright v. State, 671 A.2d at 1356.
209
AMPCR at 29, D.I. 100.
210
Id.
211
AMPCR at 30, D.I. 100.
37
On the other hand, trial counsel, John S. Malik, Esquire did discuss Miller’s

report in his affidavit. Mr. Malik quoted Miller as writing:

The victim, Rae’Kwon Mangrum, has no evidence he was
in a fight. He has no abrasions or contusions to his face,
elbows, knees, or the knuckles of his hands. No witness
describes two subjects fighting. In addition, Mangrum has
numerous perforating bullet wounds. If he and Mayfield
were in a fighting embrace when Mayfield was fired on by
Nicodemus “Nick” Morris then Mayfield would have
likely either been struck directly or by bullets exiting
Mangrum’s body. This forensic and pathological
evidence is contrary to Mayfield’s statement to Det. Fox
during his interview.212

Mr. Malik concluded that Miller’s opinion that the physical evidence did not support

Mayfield’s version of events “would not have been helpful for the defense at

trial,”213 certainly a reasonable conclusion. Not only has Mayfield has failed to

substantiate this claim of actual prejudice, but he has failed to show that trial

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

2. No Motions to Suppress Mayfield’s Statement Were Filed

Mayfield gave three statements to the police, but only one was introduced into

evidence. That statement was the one he gave to Det. Fox in Pennsylvania on the

night he was arrested. 214 Mayfield does not specify any ground for suppression of

that statement, nor does he cite any authority in support of suppression. Rather, he

leaves the Court to infer one based on his claim that he gave the statement “after he

212
Aff. John S. Malik, Esquire at 4 (June 18, 2024), D.I. 107.
213
Id.
214
Trial Tr. at 201:21-22 (Jun. 21, 2016).
38
sat for hours and while he was under the influence of benzodiazepines, and other

drugs.”215 Leaving aside the question of whether he was still under the influence of

drugs “after sitting for hours,” Mayfield provides not basis to believe he was under

the influence. Certainly, a review his statement does not. The only evidence

Mayfield cites is the fact that benzodiazepines were found in the vehicle in which he

was a passenger. 216 But, being in a car that had drugs in it is insufficient to raise an

inference Mayfield was under the influence of those drugs hours later when he gave

his statement.

Mayfield has cited neither facts nor law that would support a suppression

motion. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for performance deficiency for not moving

to suppress Mayfield’s statement if postconviction counsel fails to supply any factual

or legal basis for such a motion. Certainly he has given the Court no reason to

believe a suppression motion would have had a reasonable likelihood of success.

Further, Mayfield has not alleged that there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome

of the case would have been difference had a suppression motion been filed. This

claim fails both prongs of Strickland.

3. No Motions to Suppress Evidence from Search

During a search of Mayfield’s room at his grandmother’s house, the

Wilmington Police recovered what appeared to be a laser sight for a handgun.217

215
AMPCR at 31, D.I. 100.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 33.
39
Mayfield contends that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the laser sight

because there was no evidence a laser sight was used in this case. 218 Alternatively,

trial counsel should have moved in limine to exclude it as evidence of other bad

acts. 219 He also argues that trial counsel should have filed motions to preclude the

State from admitting other bad acts, “including photographs from a phone that

depicted guns and an alleged plan to buy guns, as well as a scope to a firearm that

was located on a search of Mayfield’s grandmother’s house.” 220 Finally, he claims

pre-trial motion practice would have put Mayfield in a better position to bargain for

a more favorable resolution of the case. 221

Mayfield’s claims are entirely conclusory and lack any real legal analysis.

The laser sight, which is a handgun accessory, was properly admitted as evidence

that Mayfield had access to a handgun. Failure to object, therefore, was not

performance deficiency. Further, Mayfield has not demonstrated how moving to

exclude the laser sight from evidence would have resulted in a reasonable probability

that the result of the trial would have been different. Moreover, his argument that

pretrial motion practice would have put him in a better plea negotiating position is

pure speculation. On this issue, Mayfield has failed to satisfy either of Strickland’s

prongs.

218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id. 34.
221
Id.
40
4. Failure to Prepare and Use Expert Witness at Trial

Postconviction counsel represents that they have reviewed potential defense

expert Miller’s files, diagrams, and reports and attached them to the AMPCR as

Exhibit 13.222 The documents are not attached. There is nothing behind tab 13.223

They state that they have reviewed billing records and e-mail correspondence

between Miller and the Office of Conflict Counsel and attached those documents as

Exhibit 14. 224 But, Exhibit 14 is Miller’s curriculum vitae, not billing records and

e-mail correspondence. 225

As discussed in Section V. D. 1., supra, Mr. Malik stated in his affidavit that

Miller’s assessment that the forensic and pathological evidence contradicted

Mayfield’s version of events as set out in his statement to Det. Fox. Declining to

call an expert witness with that unhelpful opinion was a prudent decision and not

performance deficiency. Although Mayfield states that Miller’s work and diagrams

would have supported Mayfield’s defense, he offers no evidence of that conclusion.

Mayfield fails to meet either Strickland prong on this issue.

5. Failure to Interview Witnesses

Mayfield alleges trial counsel failed to interview five witnesses – two who

testified at trial and three who did not. 226 The two who testified were Mangrum’s

222
Id. at 35.
223
Id. at Ex. 13. Similarly, there is nothing behind tabs 4, 11, and 13.
224
Id. at 35.
225
Id. at Ex. 14.
226
Id. at 36-37.
41
aunt, Brittany Mangrum, who was examined by Mr. Witherell, and his grandmother

Dorothy Mangrum, examined by Mr. Malik.227 The three who did not were

Mayfield’s younger brother Whitley; purported eyewitness Burton, and Mayfield’s

grandmother. 228 In the case of the testifying witnesses, Mayfield says, it is “clear”

from the questioning that neither attorney had ever met their respective witness

before the witness testified. 229 With respect to Mr. Witherell, what made it “clear”

he had not spoken to the witness before was his apology for meeting her under the

circumstances.230 Beyond that, Mayfield offers nothing.

Both trial attorneys deny the allegation that they did not meet with the witness

they examined before trial. Although, their recollections differ about the

circumstances of the meetings. In his affidavit, Mr. Witherell states:

Counsel did meet with the witness(es) in the office prior
to being identified as witnesses to confirm their present
recollection and testimony would be consistent with the
prior statement provided to the police. Both witnesses
were very consistent with the prior statements. Both were
very credible in identifying Broomer as the shooter.
Counsel had ‘met’ Brittany before and the use of the word
‘meet’ is being taken out of context.231

Mr. Malik states in his affidavit:

Counsel recalls Mr. Monahan [a private investigator
retained by the defense] accompanying both trial counsel
to the scene of the shooting to photograph the area and to

227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Aff. Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire at 4-5 (July __, 2024), D.I. 106.
42
conduct witness interviews. Counsel believes that
Dorothy Mangrum was interviewed by Mr. Monahan
during this visit to the crime scene with both counsel.
Counsel believes that it was during this interview that it
was confirmed that Dorothy Mangrum advised that she
witnessed Co-Defendant Michael Broomer shoot her
grandson Raekwon Mangrum. Counsel also believes that
Mr. Monahan interviewed Brittany Mangrum who related
that immediately after the shooting, she went to her
nephew, Raekwon Mangrum, to help him at which time he
declared that Co-Defendant Michael Broomer had shot
him.232

Mayfield’s subjective conclusion based on his interpretation of transcript is

insufficient to outweigh the attestations of trial counsel. The Court finds no

performance deficiency on either trial counsel’s part. Importantly, Mayfield does

not take issue with the substance of either witness’ examination. Rather, he

speculates that speaking to them earlier would have enabled trial counsel to help

negotiate a settlement of the case. But, such speculation does not constitute actual

prejudice under Strickland.

The Court now considers the three witnesses who were not interviewed.

Mayfield does not inform the Court what testimony or information his grandmother

would have provided. Accordingly, the allegation that trial counsel were ineffective

in not interviewing her is without merit.

Whitley is Mayfield’s brother. According to a summary of his interview with

investigators Fontello and Workman of True Blue Detective Agency on March 11,

232
Aff. John S. Malik, Esquire at 7-8 (June 18, 2024), D.I. 107.
43
2024, he is also Broomer’s cousin because “Jowan’s aunt adopted Broomer.”233

Mayfield claims his brother would have provided exculpatory information.234

Whitley did not see the shooting, but was with Broomer earlier when they

encountered Mangrum and Morris near McDonald’s.235 He provided some

information about the “beef” between Mayfield and Mangrum as well as what

appears to be hearsay information about a Glock .40 caliber handgun that Mayfield

sold. 236 Mayfield does not explain why Whitley, his brother, did not volunteer this

information to trial counsel. The Court finds Whitley had little if anything to say

that was exculpatory, but the information about a .40 caliber Glock that Mayfield

had possessed was potentially harmful. Further, it is not clear how trial counsel

would have known Whitley had any information at all to provide. Under these

circumstances, the Court finds no performance deficiency and no actual prejudice

because Whitley was not interviewed by trial counsel.

Burton also was interviewed by investigators from True Blue Detective

Agency. A summary of his interview is attached to the AMPCR at Exhibit 7. It

appears that Burton first spoke to Mayfield while they were both incarcerated at

Sussex Correctional Institution.237 Burton claimed to have witnessed the shooting.

In his telling, he was about 14 or 15 years old and was with his uncle (who is

233
AMPCR at Ex 6, D.I. 100.
234
Id. at 36.
235
Id. at Ex. 6.
236
Id.
237
Id. at Ex. 7.
44
currently incarcerated out of state in federal prison) in a parking lot near where the

shooting occurred.238 He saw a man standing outside a black car parked in the alley

pull a gun. 239 That man started shooting at the car, then ran through an alleyway and

disappeared. 240 There was return gunfire from the car. 241 The man that started

shooting was with the man who got shot. 242 He and his uncle ran to his

grandmother’s house in the 700 block of W. 2nd Street. 243 He has never spoken to

the Wilmington Police or any investigators (presumably including any investigators

for Broomer).244

It is difficult to ascribe performance deficiency to Mayfield’s trial counsel for

failing to locate Burton. He did not remain at the scene. He did not come forward

later. The Wilmington Police did not know of him. Broomer’s attorneys were

unaware of him as well. Mayfield does not provide an answer as to how his attorneys

were supposed to find him. Mayfield himself only became aware of Burton through

a chance prison encounter. Further, while the substance of Burton’s statement

indeed is exculpatory, he is unlikely to be an unimpeachable witness, having

remained silent for years and only telling his story after being incarcerated with

Mayfield. His contention that the man with Mangrum (Morris) initiated the shooting

238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
211
Id.
45
by shooting at a car does not mesh seamlessly with the testimony of Brittany and

Dorothy Mangrum that Boomer shot Mangrum, or Mayfield’s own version that he

was “tussling” with Mangrum when the shooting began.245 Burton does not describe

a fight occurring outside of the car, nor, in fact, does he describe any of the car’s

occupants being outside of it.246 On balance, the Court does not find it a reasonable

probability that Burton’s testimony would have resulted in a different result.

Accordingly, the Court finds Mayfield has failed to establish either Strickland prong

regarding Burton.

6. Failure to Investigate Relationship Between Broomer and
Mangrum

Mayfield states in his AMPCR that trial counsel were ineffective for failing

to investigate the trial in which Mangrum and Broomer were co-defendants. 247 Had

counsel investigated the trial, they “likely would have learned important information

about the history and behavior of co-defendant Broomer and Raekwon Mangrum

and the relationship between them.” 248 He claims that had such an investigation

been undertaken, it “would have provided important information towards preparing

Petitioner’s defense at trial, and would likely have put [him] in a better place in terms

of negotiation. Unfortunately, Mayfield does not tell the Court just what “important

information” trial counsel would have learned from the trial of Broomer and

245
Id. at Ex. 9 at 2.
246
Id. at Ex. 7.
247
Id. at 37
248
Id.
46
Mangrum, nor does he explain how this “important information” would have

assisted in preparing his defense. It is impossible to give any weight to this portion

of Mayfield’s claim.

Mayfield also argues that trial counsel should have attacked Broomer’s

character in front of the jury. He does not explain what admissible bad character

traits Broomer possessed, nor how attacking him would have benefited Mayfield.

Again, this argument carries no weight.

Next Mayfield characterizes Mangrum as a “young man with a very long

violent criminal history and faults trial counsel for not putting Mangrum’s

propensity for violence in front of the jury.249 Mayfield apparently finds it

unnecessary to share the details of that “very long violent criminal history” with the

Court beyond the fact that the jury was already aware that Mangrum had shot

Mayfield not long before the homicide. Nor he does provide a theory of

admissibility in light of the fact that a victim’s character is generally not an essential

element of a self-defense claim and DRE 405(b)’s general prohibition against the

admission of specific instances of conduct to show that a victim had a general

propensity for violence.250 Accordingly, Mayfield has not moved the ball towards

either performance deficiency of actual prejudice with this argument.

249
Id., at 38.
250
Wright v. State, 25 A.3d 747, 755 (Del. 2011).
47
Finally, Mayfield reviews the time records of both trial counsel. He makes

no argument based on this review, however.

7. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective for Failing to Conduct
Forensic Testing

Here, Mayfield notes evidence was produced at trial showing that Mayfield

had the greatest concentration of GSR on him. 251 He argues that trial counsel should

have requested independent forensic testing prior to trial, including unspecified

testing of the Defendants’ car and “bullets and shell casings”.252 He notes that were

multiple guns and multiple people involved in this shooting incident, and then claims

without any evidentiary support, “it [sic] who would have likely provided

exculpatory evidence if the defense had in a timely manner requested defense

testing.”253 This contention is nothing more than surmise

There were only three people from whom possible GSR samples could have

been obtained for possible testing – Mayfield, Broomer, and Mangrum. Of those

three, GSR testing was done on Broomer and Mayfield. Retesting those samples

would have been pointless, as Mayfield admitted firing a gun in his initial statement

to Det. Fox. Only the bags covering Mangrum’s hands were not tested. His new

contentions regarding testing the car and the “bullets and shell casings” raised for

the first time in his Reply are to undeveloped and speculative to credit.

251
AMPCR at 39, D.I. 100.
252
Id.; Def’s Reply at 12-13, D.I. 112.
253
Id.
48
Curiously, postconviction counsel criticizes trial counsel for not conducting

GSR and ballistics testing while failing to have it done themselves despite seeking

delays in the case to have it done. On June 15, 2020, prior postconviction counsel,

Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire, moved to stay the proceedings “based on the need

to test bags that had been placed on the hands of Raekwon Mangrum to preserve

forensic evidence after he had been fatally shot for the existence of gunshot

residue.”254 Mr. Gifford retained McCrone Associates, Inc., a laboratory in Chicago,

to conduct the tests, but was uncertain when the testing could be done.255 On

November 12, 2023, current postconviction counsel also requested a delay in order

to retain forensic experts to conduct GSR testing prior to filing this AMPCR – “This

extension request is based upon Petitioner’s need to retain necessary forensic experts

prior to filing his Amended Rule 61 Petition, so that claims are pled with sufficient

particularity to demonstrate prejudice and the need for further fact development, or

the granting of relief in this case.”256 Current post conviction counsel were

communicating with potential expert witnesses requesting quotes for their services

and with the Office of Conflicts Counsel to secure funding as of June 17, 2022.257

On November 27, 2023, the Court granted Mayfield’s Motion for 90 Day Stay to

File Amended Rule 61 Petition so he could retain a ballistics expert. 258 Finally, on

254
Def.’s Mot. to Stay Proceedings, D.I. 76.
255
Id., at 140.
256
D.I. 83 at 1-2.
257
D.I. 91.
258
Motion, D.I. 94; Order, D.I. 95.
49
February 6, 2024, the Court signed an Order granting Mayfield’s motion to transport

two autopsy bags and one set of fingernail clippings to Microtrace Laboratories in

Elgin, Illinois for the purpose of GSR testing.259 In the end, the AMPCR contained

no reference to these efforts, nor to any post-trial GSR or ballistics test results. Two

reasons come to mind for this absence. Either no testing was done, or if tests were

done, the results were unfavorable to Mayfield. If no testing was done, the AMPCR

fails it explain how trial counsel were ineffective for not having independent forensic

testing done but postconviction counsel are not. If testing was done and the results

were unfavorable, postconviction counsel would be in no position to accuse trial

counsel of ineffectiveness. The Court assumes the former to be the case.

Even if the bags were tested, the value of testing for GSR is uncertain. The

GSR testing of the hands of both Mayfield and Broomer was done by “tabbing” their

hands with sticky strips.260 If there were GSR on Mangrum’s hands, it is unclear

how much, if any, would have been transferred to the bags. It is similarly unclear

whether any potential GSR on his hands had been transferred to any other objects

between when Mangrum was shot and his autopsy. It makes more sense for the

police to have put the bags on Mangrum’s hands to preserve his hands for future

“tabbing,” perhaps at autopsy, than to preserve the bags for future testing for GSR

259
Motion, D.I. 96; Order, D.I. 97.
260
Trial Tr. at 200:19-21; 202:17-23 (Jun. 14, 2026).
50
transferred to them from his hands. In other words, the utility of GSR testing of the

bags on Mangrum’s hands has not been established.

The Court concludes that this claim is conclusory as to both trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness and any actual prejudice Mayfield may have suffered.

8. Duty to Resolve Case Prior to Trial

Postconviction counsel represent that they have a “good faith belief that there

was no pretrial negotiation to resolve this case.” 261 Mayfield states that had trial

counsel engaged in pleas negotiations, “they likely would have been able to resolve

this case for a reasonable term of years. 262 Two problems with this claim are

immediately apparent. First, postconviction counsel’s “good faith belief” is not

evidence of the claim, and second, Mayfield fails to inform the Court what plea to

“a reasonable term of years,” he would have accepted. There is no reason the believe

the State would have agreed to what Mayfield deemed “reasonable.” The Court

finds this claim insufficient to allege both performance deficiency and actual

prejudice.

9. Failure to Object to Det. Fox Testifying as An Expert

This claim consists of a mere three sentences. The first relates that in one of

his many trips to the witness stand, Det. Fox discussed phone records extracted using

Cellebrite.263 The second states that Det. Fox testified that he had been trained in

261
AMPCR at 40, D.I. 100.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 40.
51
extracting and properly preserving cell phone records. 264 The third states that Det.

Fox testified he did not extract the information from the phone himself “although

there was no defense objection based on Crawford and the 6th Amendment right to

confront witnesses against him.”.265

Det. Fox testified that in order to extract information from a cell phone:

Basically what happens is you connect a power chord from
the phone to the little computer, and a storage device, like
a pen drive or a terabyte drive, to the other end of the
computer. The computer reads the phone, tells you what
kind of phone it is, and prompts you for a series of actions
that you need to take in order to download the phone.

After you perform these actions that you’re prompted to
perform by the computer, it extracts all the information on
the – on the – from the phone onto your external drive. It
includes pictures, text messages, SMS messages,
Instagram, social media accounts, e-mail accounts,
anything that’s stored on the phone.266

This claim does not develop any argument that Det. Fox testified as an expert and

the Court finds he did not. Despite being trained on extracting cell phone information

from the phone using the Cellebrite computer, mechanically connecting the phone

to the computer and following its prompts does not Make Det. Fox and expert.

The confrontation claim similarly is undeveloped. The Court finds Mayfield’s

confrontation rights were not violated. Det. Fox’s testimony did not violate

264
Id. at 40-41.
265
Id.
266
Trial Tr. 122:5-19 (Jun. 16, 2016).
52
Crawford v. Washington’s 267 ban on the admission of testimonial statements of non-

appearing witnesses because Det. Fox offered no such testimony. Moreover,

according to trial counsel:

[w]hether Detective Fox or another detective connected
the cell phones in question to the Cellebrite program, the
contents of the cell phones were produced in discovery and
some of the cell phone records were introduced as
exculpatory evidence during the course of the trial
including text message exchanges involving Raekwon
Mangrum shortly before the shooting transpired.268

Trial counsel made a strategic decision not to oppose the admission of the

information.269

Neither allegation establishes performance deficiency by trial counsel.

Neither allegation even attempts to demonstrate actual prejudice.

10. Failure to Prepare: Phone Records

Mayfield claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use certain phone

records provided in discovery showing “a constant back and forth between Broomer

and Mangrum in the hours and minutes leading up to the incident.” 270 He claims

that trial counsel was “woefully unprepared to deal with the cell phone records” to

his prejudice. 271 The defense wished to introduce a summary of certain phone

267
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
268
Affidavit of John S. Malik, Esquire at ⁋ 4i, D.I. 107
269
Affidavit of Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire at ⁋ 4h, D.I. 106.
270
AMPCR at 41, D.I. 100.
271
Id.
53
records. 272 Ultimately, the Court did not allow the introduction of the summary of

the phone calls and text messages in the format proposed by the defense, but

suggested that the parties reach a stipulation overnight. 273 The parties did reach a

stipulation which included a chart of cell phone transmissions and some additional

testimony from Det. Fox.274 Mayfield contends that trial counsel were ineffective

for failing to retain an expert to educate them on the cell phone records and possibly

present testimony.275 But, Mayfield fails take into account that all of the

conversation regarding a summary of the cell transmissions occurred outside the

presence of the jury.

Again, Mayfield is unable to state the alleged performance deficiency with

any particularity. And, his allegation of actual prejudice is speculative.

12. Failure to Humanize Petitioner Before Jury

During his summation, Mr. Malik misspoke and called Mayfield by

Mangrum’s name four times (although the AMPCR only cites to three times.)276

According to Mayfield, these slips of the tongue “disrespect[ed] both the deceased

young man and his own client.” 277 He claims that “This fatal error by Malik should

stand on its own as ineffective assistance at closing argument. This abject failure by

272
Trial Tr. at 153:10-17 (Jun. 22, 2016).
273
Id. at 158:15-160:23.
274
Trial Tr. at 3:4-49 (Jun. 23, 2016).
275
AMPCR at 42, D.I. 100.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 42.
54
Malik also speaks to lack of a relationship between trial counsel and their of counsel

and their client.”278

Mayfield is engaging in hyperbole. Three (or four) slips of the tongue in a

closing argument that lasted approximately 80 minutes 279 and spanned some 70

pages of transcript 280 in a 9-day trial hardly constitutes a “fatal error” or an “abject

failure.” 281 More importantly, Mayfield does not take issue with the substantive

arguments Mr. Malik presented in his summation. Mayfield has failed to

demonstrate either performance deficiency or actual prejudice in this IAC claim.

E. IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.

Mayfield alleges two claims of IAC against appellate counsel. Both have no

merit. The first alleges that appellate counsel failed to raise an argument regarding

the trial court’s denial of his request for lesser included offenses. 282 This claim fails

because it simply is wrong factually. Appellate counsel did raise that issue. 283

The second claim alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

the issue of “Detective Fox improperly testifying as an expert on cellular phone

extraction evidence.”284 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every

nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the

278
Id.
279
Trial Tr. 57:23-58:1; 59:20 (Jun. 23, 2016).
280
Id. at 59:20-129:5.
281
How many parents have called one of their children by another child’s name?
282
AMPCR at 44, D.I. 100.
283
State’s Resp. Ex. A (Appellant’s Amended Opening Brief), D.I. 109.
284
AMPCR at 44, D.I. 100.
55
likelihood of success on appeal.”285 A defendant faces a tougher burden of “showing

that a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than issues that counsel did

present” where appellate counsel filed a merits brief, than in the case where appellate

counsel filed a no merit brief.286 Further, Mayfield must still show prejudice, “That

is, [the defendant] must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s

unreasonable failure [to raise a clearly stronger issue], he would have prevailed on

his appeal.” 287 In Section V.D.9., supra, the Court found no merit to this claim.

Mayfield has failed in his burden to show performance deficiency or prejudice in

this IAC claim as well.

F. Mayfield’s Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentence

This entire claim as stated in th AMPCR consists of a single sentence:

“Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentences violate the 8th and 14th Amendments to

the U.S. Constitution and the Delaware Constitution when imposed upon a 21-year

old with no prior violent history.”288 Because this claim presents no argument or

authority to support it, the Court declines to consider it. Even with the Reply’s

somewhat expanded argument, this claim is nothing more than wishcasting on

Mayfield’s part. He does not cites to a single example of his contention being

accepted anywhere. Were it to consider it, it would find it barred by Rule 61(i)(3).

285
Id. (citing Smith, 528 U.S. at 288).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285).
288
AMPCR at 45, D.I. 100.
56
G. Mayfield’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing.

The Court has carefully considered all of Mayfield’s claims and his arguments

in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing. The Court is not convinced such

a hearing is necessary. The Court finds no utility in flyspecking trial counsel’s

billing records, or cross-examining them about their investigation and trial strategy,

including their decision not to file pre-trial motions. None of that would change the

fact that Mayfield has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance, which

the Court witnessed firsthand, would have fallen below an objective standard of

reasonableness or that there was a reasonable likelihood that a different result would

have occurred at trial. Nor would the testimony of investigators from True Blue

Detective Agency or Burton. Presumably, Mayfield identified any significant issues

discovered by his investigators and presented them in his AMPCR. The Court is not

persuaded that any of the are significant enough to warrant granting Mayfield relief.

As for Burton, hearing from him would not remove the significant impeachment

baggage his testimony would carry. Mayfield has presented no persuasive reason to

re-litigate the testimony of Morris and Stevens. Finally, the Court finds claims

raised by Mayfield for the first time in his Reply to be untimely and speculative.

57
VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s Amended

Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton
Ferris W. Wharton, J.

58