State v. Stewart

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ, SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE
RESIDENT JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2
GEORGETOWN, DE 19947
TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263

April 14, 2025

Edward James Stewart
SBI# 00447666
Sussex Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 500
Georgetown, DE 19947

Re: State of Delaware v. Edward Stewart, Def. ID No. S2306010632 (R-1)

Dear Mr. Stewart:

On April 5, 2024, after a colloquy with me, you pled guilty to Possession of a

Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault in the Second Degree, and

Reckless Endangering in the Second Degree. Effective April 5, 2024, you were

sentenced to 25 years of Level 5 incarceration, suspended after 15 years for 18

months at Level 3 GPS monitoring.

On June 28, 2024, you filed a pro se Motion for Modification of Sentence,

which I denied on July 5, 2024.
On April 3, 2025, you filed your first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief

under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, dated March 30, 2025 (the

“Motion”). As I read the Motion, you state five somewhat interrelated grounds for

relief, all asserting in some way ineffective assistance of your defense counsel at

trial (“Trial Counsel”). The first ground asserts that Trial Counsel told you that you

would receive a mental evaluation, and you never received one. The second ground

asserts that, prior to your guilty plea, Trial Counsel told you that the Pre-Sentencing

Investigation (“PSI”) was for the purpose of investigating your mental health history,

rather than your prior criminal history, and that, based on the PSI, the State would

recommend mental health court, rather than incarceration. The third ground asserts

that a prior conviction, more than ten years old, was improperly used in the PSI to

influence the sentence,1 and that Trial Counsel never addressed your concerns about

that. The fourth ground asserts that Trial Counsel dismissed your concerns about

never having been given your Miranda rights.2 The fifth ground asserts that Trial

Counsel told you he would assist you with a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief

but failed to do so.

Your Motion did not request the appointment of postconviction counsel to

represent you in this Rule 61 proceeding, nor am I obligated to appoint one. For first

1
You cite Delaware Rule of Evidence 609 (Impeachment of Witness by Evidence of a Criminal
Conviction), which does not apply in this context.
2
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
postconviction motions in guilty plea cases, I may appoint counsel only if I

determine that: (i) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct

appellate review or direct appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the motion sets forth

a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of counsel in

relation to the plea of guilty; (iii) granting the motion would result in vacatur of the

judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and (iv) specific

exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.3 I determine that

none of these factors are met and I therefore do not appoint postconviction counsel.

I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.4 If a procedural bar exists,

as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.5 A Rule

61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise

claims below, or former adjudication.6

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed

more than one year after the conviction becomes final.7 In this case, your conviction

became final for purposes of Rule 61 30 days after I imposed sentence, i.e., May 5,

3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
4
Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.
1990).
5
Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super.
April 28, 2009).
6
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
7
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
3
2024.8 You filed the Motion on April 3, 2025, within the one-year period. Therefore,

consideration of the Motion is not barred by the one-year limitation.

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.9 Since this is your first motion for

postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the

judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.10 Your

grounds for relief are based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well-

settled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.11 Therefore,

consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.12 In the Motion, you

8
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).
9
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
11
State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State,
2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at
*2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective
assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).
12
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
4
do not seek to relitigate issues you have previously asserted in the case. Therefore,

consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Moreover, none of these four procedural bars apply either to (i) a claim that

there is new evidence of actual innocence in fact, or to (ii) a claim that a retroactively

applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.13 You make no such

claims here.

Since none of the procedural bars under Rule 61 apply, I will consider the

Motion on its merits.

With respect to your claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, I look to the

dual standards of Strickland v. Washington14 as applied in Delaware.15 Under

Strickland, you must show that (1) Trial Counsel’s representation “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance prong”); and (2) the

“deficient performance prejudiced [your] defense.” (the “prejudice prong”).16 In

considering the performance prong, the United States Supreme Court was mindful

that “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”17 Strickland requires an

objective analysis, making every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of

13
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
14
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988).
16
Strickland at 687.
17
Id. at 690.
5
hindsight” and to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”18 “[S]trategic choices about

which lines of defense to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the

reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they are based.”19

As to the prejudice prong, you must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable

probability that, but for Trial Counsel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have

been different.20 Even if Trial Counsel’s performance was professionally

unreasonable, it would not warrant setting aside the judgment of conviction if the

error had no effect on the judgment.21 A showing of prejudice “requires more than

a showing of theoretical possibility that the outcome was affected.”22

Strickland teaches that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective

assistance claim to approach the inquiry in a particular order, or even to address both

prongs of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. A court

need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the defendant because of the alleged deficiencies. If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

18
Id. at 689.
19
Id. at 681.
20
Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353,
1356 (Del. 1996).
21
Strickland at 691.
22
Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992).
6
prejudice, that course should be followed.23 In every case, the court should be

concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of

the proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that

our system counts on to produce just results.24

I find that none of your grounds for relief satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test, as discussed below, and I summarily dismiss them.

(1) The first ground asserts that Trial Counsel told you that you would

receive a mental evaluation, and you never received one. Even if you were entitled

to a mental evaluation, when you did not receive one you never raised this issue with

this Court – or anyone else – until now. In any event, you have in no way

demonstrated that you were prejudiced, or that the outcome of the case – my

acceptance of your guilty plea -- would have in any way been different.

(2) The second ground asserts that, prior to your guilty plea, Trial Counsel

told you that the Pre-Sentencing Investigation (“PSI”) was for the purpose of

investigating your mental health history, rather than your prior criminal history, and

that, based on the PSI, the State would recommend mental health court, rather than

incarceration. A PSI was ordered by me, not by Trial Counsel, and it customarily

and regularly encompasses a wide range of factors: your medical and mental health

23
Strickland at 697.
24
Id. at 696.
7
history, your criminal history, your socioeconomic and educational background, and

others. It is a comprehensive report which is prepared to assist me in imposing the

proper sentence. The PSI here was entirely appropriate, and its reference to your

prior criminal history in no way outweighed any other factor(s) so as to distort your

sentence. Moreover, the State had no power or authority on the serious facts of this

case to recommend mental health court in lieu of incarceration, and it did not do so

in your plea bargain. Had it done so, I would have ignored the request. Thus, the

outcome of this case would have been the same.

(3) The third ground asserts that a prior conviction, more than ten years

old, was improperly used in the PSI to influence the sentence, and that Trial Counsel

never addressed your concerns about that. Your citation of the Delaware Rules of

Evidence is misplaced. Those rules apply when evidence is presented in open court

during a trial. Here there was no trial, because you pled guilty. The PSI may address

any prior criminal convictions regardless of their age. In sentencing you, I give that

information the appropriate weight depending upon the circumstances of the case

and balancing it with other mitigating and aggravating factors. There was no

prejudice to you and the results of your guilty plea would have been the same.

(4) The fourth ground asserts that Trial Counsel dismissed your concerns

about never having been given your Miranda rights. Again, you conveniently raise

8
this issue only now, when it could have been raised much earlier in the proceedings,

including at your plea colloquy. This operates as a waiver of those rights.

(5) Finally, the fifth ground asserts that Trial Counsel told you he would

assist you with a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief but failed to do so. After

your conviction, Trial Counsel’s representation of you ended. He did not continue

to represent you in postconviction matters, although he has a lasting ethical duty to

you as a former client. Since your conviction, you have never requested the

appointment of postconviction counsel to represent you, including in connection

with your prior Motion for Modification of Sentence or in connection with this

Motion. Indeed, Rule 61 provides that a request for the appointment of

postconviction counsel shall be made contemporaneously with the filing of this

Motion, and your failure to so request is deemed a waiver of counsel.25

There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that, at that time, you had any

issue with your plea, or any disagreement with Trial Counsel about your plea or

other dissatisfaction with Trial Counsel. You engaged in a lengthy colloquy with me

wherein you acknowledged that you understood the consequences of the plea

agreement, that you knew what legal rights you were giving up under such an

agreement, and that you were satisfied with your representation by Trial Counsel.

You signed a Truth-in-Sentencing (“TIS”) form that clearly specified the terms of

25
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(1).
9
the plea agreement with the State and the terms of the sentence agreed upon by both

parties. After sentencing, you apparently have had a change of heart. It appears that

you are really asserting that the sentence is excessive, as you did in your prior Motion

for Modification of Sentence, which was denied, not that Trial Counsel was

ineffective. Hindsight is 20-20, but your attempt to abrogate your plea agreement

comes too late.

In your Petition, you give no supporting facts, evidence, or legal authority

whatsoever for your grounds. There is no evidence that Trial Counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or his deficient

performance prejudiced your defense. Self-serving assertions are no substitute for

facts, evidence, and legal authority.

I find that, based on your Motion and my thorough review of the record of the

prior proceedings in this case, you are not entitled to relief. I therefore am entering

an order for summary dismissal.26 For the reasons discussed above, there is no need

for me to expand the record to consider additional evidence27 or to hold an

evidentiary hearing.28 Your Rule 61 Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

26
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).
27
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g).
28
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h).
10
Very truly yours,

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary
Nichole D. Gannett, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
James Murray, Esquire

11