Ling Chai Maginn v. Robert Maginn, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LING CHAI MAGINN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2023-0805-LWW
)
ROBERT MAGINN, JR., and D. )
QUINN MILLS, )
)
Defendant, )
)
and )
)
JENZABAR, INC., a Delaware )
corporation, )
)
Nominal Party. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: October 13, 2023
Date Decided: October 16, 2023

Neil R. Lapinski, Phillip A. Giordano, & Madeline R. Silverman, GORDON,
FOURNARIS & MAMMARELLA, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for
Plaintiff Ling Chai Maginn

Garrett B. Moritz, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Counsel for Defendant Robert Maginn, Jr.

Thad J. Bracegirdle, BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for
Defendant D. Quinn Mills

Albert H. Manwaring, IV & Kirsten A. Zeberkiewicz, MORRIS JAMES LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Nominal Defendant Jenzabar, Inc.

WILL, Vice Chancellor
Ling Chai Maginn and Robert Maginn, Jr. are engaged in divorce proceedings

in Massachusetts to divide their joint assets. They are both founders, stockholders,

and directors of Jenzabar, Inc. Their divorce prompted the board of Jenzabar to form

a special committee to prevent negative effects on the company.

In July 2023, one of the two members of the special committee died. On

August 3, the plaintiff filed an emergency ex parte motion in Massachusetts and

obtained an order temporarily “equalizing” the parties’ Jenzabar shares. Later that

day, Chai Maginn delivered a written consent purporting to remove D. Quinn

Mills—the remaining special committee member—from Jenzabar’s board. When

Maginn and Mills refused to recognize the consent, Chai Maginn filed this action

under 8 Del. C. § 225.

This case turns on whether the August 3 written consent is valid. As discussed

below, it is not. Chai Maginn lacked the unilateral authority to sign on behalf of a

limited partnership in which she and Maginn are the two general partners. Maginn’s

partnership interests have not been transferred and Maginn (at present) remains a

general partner of the entity. Without the limited partnership, Chai Maginn lacked

sufficient shares to remove Mills from the board.

The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. The plaintiff’s

cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

1
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the factual background is drawn from the undisputed

facts in the parties’ pleadings and documentary exhibits submitted by the parties.

A. Jenzabar and Its Stockholders

Plaintiff Ling Chai Maginn is a founder and Chief Executive Officer of

nominal defendant Jenzabar, Inc.1 Jenzabar, a Delaware corporation, provides

software and services for the education sector.2

Approximately 90% of Jenzabar’s shares are controlled directly or indirectly

by Chai Maginn and defendant Robert A. Maginn, Jr. as married spouses.3 New

Media Investors II-C, LLC (“New Media II-C”)—an entity formed and managed

exclusively by Maginn—holds 19.09% of Jenzabar’s stock.4 The Chai-Maginn

Family LLC (the “Delaware LLC”)—a Delaware limited liability company managed

1
Aff. of Ling Chai Maginn in Supp. of Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in
Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 35) (“Chai Maginn Aff.”) ¶¶ 1, 3; Verified Compl.
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dkt. 1) (“Compl.”) ¶ 11.
2
Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11.
3
Id. ¶ 14. For clarity, this decision refers to Ling Chai Maginn as “Chai Maginn” and to
Robert Maginn, Jr. as “Maginn.”
4
Aff. of Def. Robert Maginn, Jr. in Supp. of His (i) Resp. to Mot. to Expedite, (ii) Opp’n
to Mot. for TRO, and (iii) Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 8) (“Maginn Aff.”) Ex. 1 (Jenzabar
capitalization table). The ownership percentages reflected in the capitalization table may
have changed slightly due to dilution, but any differences are immaterial to the resolution
of the present motions. See Maginn Aff. ¶ 2.

2
by Chai Maginn and her sister, Dr. Li Chai—holds another 29.37%.5 Maginn and

Chai Maginn each personally hold about 0.06% of Jenzabar’s stock.6

Jenzabar’s largest stockholder is the Chai-Maginn Family LP (the “Family

LP”), which holds a 42.08% stake.7 The Family LP is a Nevada limited partnership.8

The Limited Partnership Agreement of the Chai-Maginn Family Limited Partnership

(the “Family LP Agreement”) states that the Family LP’s “General Partners” are

Maginn and Chai Maginn.9 Section 7.1 of the Family LP Agreement provides that

“[t]he business and affairs of the Partnership shall be under the exclusive control of

the General Partners who shall act by a majority vote in all business affairs.” 10 For

such purposes, the General Partners (i.e., Maginn and Chai Maginn) “each have one

vote.”11

B. The Divorce Litigation

On January 23, 2019, Chai Maginn initiated divorce proceedings in the

Probate and Family Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.12 On January 4,

5
Maginn Aff. Ex. 1.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Maginn Aff. Ex. 2 (“Family LP Agreement”) at 1. As discussed below, another version
of the Family LP Agreement has been introduced into the record. See infra Section I.G.
9
Id. at 1.
10
Id. § 7.1.
11
Id.
12
Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 17; Compl. ¶ 15.

3
2023, Special Master Robert J. Rivers, Jr. issued an Amended Master’s Report (the

“Master’s Report”) detailing the proposed division of the parties’ joint assets.13

Paragraph 8(a) of the Master’s Report addresses the division of Jenzabar stock

held collectively by Maginn and Chai Maginn, totaling 62.39% of Jenzabar’s issued

and outstanding shares.14 It states that Maginn would retain the shares of Jenzabar

stock he held individually and those held by New Media II-C.15 It also contemplates

that Chai Maginn would transfer 12.04% of the Jenzabar shares held by the Family

LP to Maginn and “retain the balance of shares held by the [Family LP] after the

transfer (29.67% of the total [Jenzabar] shares).”16

Paragraph 8(e) of the Master’s Report addresses the parties’ interests in the

Family LP.17 It observes that Maginn and Chai Maginn are “general partners” of the

entity and own a combined 99.115%. The assets of the Family LP were “41.71% of

the total stock in Jenzabar, Inc.”18 Paragraph 8(e) further states:

The parties’ Jenzabar, Inc. stock ownership interest held by th[e]
[Family] LP has been assigned between the parties pursuant to the terms
set forth in Paragraph 8(a)(iii) of this Report. Following the transfer of
Jenzabar, Inc. shares to [Maginn] as provided therein, [Chai Maginn]

Pl.’s Combined Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. and Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s
13

Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opening Br.”) Ex. 2 (“Master’s Report”).
14
Id. ¶ 8(a).
15
Id. ¶¶ 8(a)(i)-(ii).
16
Id. ¶ 8(a)(iii).
17
Id. ¶ 8(e).
18
Id.

4
shall solely retain the parties’ interest in th[e] [Family] LP. The parties
shall cooperate in taking all steps necessary to transfer the parties’
interests in th[e] [Family] LP solely to [Chai Maginn] and remove
[Maginn] therefrom (said documents to be prepared at [Chai Maginn’s]
sole expense).19
Chai Maginn has moved for the Massachusetts court to adopt the Master’s

Report. That motion remains pending.20

C. The Special Committee

When the divorce proceedings began, Jenzabar’s Board of Directors consisted

of Chai Maginn, Maginn, defendant D. Quinn Mills, and Joseph San Miguel.21 In

2019, the Board formed a Special Committee of Mills and San Miguel to settle any

matters between Chai Maginn and Maginn that could affect Jenzabar amid their

divorce.22

On August 2, 2023, following the death of San Miguel, Maginn and Mills

noticed a meeting of Jenzabar’s Board to be held on August 4.23 The agenda

circulated by Maginn included a discussion of “authorizing” or “re-authorizing” the

Special Committee.24 It also listed a proposal that no officer or employee of Jenzabar

19
Id.
20
See Compl. ¶ 19; see also Tr. of Sept. 20, 2023 Oral Arg. on Cross-Mots. for Summ. J.
(Dkt. 58) (“Hr’g Tr.”) 9.
21
Compl. ¶ 17; Chai Maginn Aff. ¶¶ 10-12.
22
Compl. ¶¶ 16-17; Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 21.
23
Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 3.
24
Id.

5
could “retain any counsel to represent [Jenzabar] without Board approval.”25 Chai

Maginn believes that the proposed prohibition against unilaterally hiring counsel

was directed at her.26

D. The August Ex Parte Order

In response to the notice, on August 3, Chai Maginn filed an emergency

motion for an ex parte hearing in the divorce action.27 Her motion explained that the

parties were awaiting a decision on the adoption of the Master’s Report and that, due

to San Miguel’s death, emergency relief was needed to “stabilize [Jenzabar].”28 The

motion asked that the “marital shares” of Jenzabar be “equally divid[ed] . . . without

prejudice[] while the court consider[ed] and ma[de] a ruling on the Special Master’s

[R]eport.”29

The same day, the Massachusetts court entered an order granting Chai

Maginn’s emergency motion (the “August Ex Parte Order”).30 The August Ex Parte

Order states:

Effective immediately, any Jenzabar Inc. stock shares held by, or for
the benefit of either plaintiff or defendant, shall be divided equally
between plaintiff and defendant, pursuant to paragraph 8a of the

25
Id.
26
Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 25.
27
Id. ¶ 26; Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 4.
28
Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 4.
29
Id.
30
Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 5 (“Aug. Ex Parte Order”).

6
Master’s Report, as Amended, dated January 4, 2023, without
prejudice, until such time as th[e] Court makes a ruling on the Motion
to Adopt Special Master Robert Rivers’ Report (as amended).31

E. The Written Consent

Upon receipt of the August Ex Parte Order, Chai Maginn executed a written

consent putatively on behalf of a “majority” of Jenzabar’s stockholders (the “Written

Consent”).32 The Written Consent was signed by Chai Maginn on behalf of

Jenzabar, by Chai Maginn and Li Chai as managers of the Delaware LLC, by Chai

Maginn as a “[s]tockholder” of New Media II-C, and by Chai Maginn as “General

Partner” of the Family LP.33 The Written Consent purported to remove Mills from

the Jenzabar Board, effectively eliminating the Special Committee.34 Maginn did

not sign or approve the Written Consent.35

Maginn and Mills went forward with the August 4 Board meeting as noticed.36

During the meeting, Maginn told Chai Maginn that the Written Consent was

“flawed.”37 Maginn also expressed his belief that the August Ex Parte Order did not

31
Id. ¶ 1.
32
Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 6.
33
Id.
34
Compl. ¶ 26; Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 29.
35
Maginn Aff. ¶ 4. He asserts that he also did not authorize Chai Maginn to act on behalf
of New Media II-C. See Def. Robert Maginn, Jr.’s (i) Resp. to Mot. to Expedite, (ii) Opp’n
to Mot. for TRO, and (iii) Mot. for Summ J. (Dkt. 8) ¶ 7 n.2.
36
Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 30.
37
Id.

7
remove him as a General Partner of the Family LP.38 By a vote of two to one (Mills

and Maginn for; Chai Maginn against), the Board purported to reaffirm the Special

Committee’s authority and reappoint Mills as the Special Committee’s sole

member.39

F. The Litigation

On August 8, 2023, Chai Maginn filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory

and Injunctive Relief in this court.40 Among other things, she asks the court to

declare that the Written Consent was valid and that Mills was removed as a

director.41 She also sought expedited proceedings and a temporary restraining order

enjoining Maginn, Mills, and Jenzabar “from refusing to acknowledge the proper

exercise of [Chai Maginn’s] rights as majority shareholder” of Jenzabar.42 After a

hearing, the proceedings were expedited and the parties stipulated to a status quo

order.43

38
Id.
39
Id. ¶ 31.
40
Dkt. 1.
41
Id.
42
Mot. for TRO (Dkt. 1) 1.
43
Dkt. 21; see Dkt. 37.

8
On August 15, Maginn moved for summary judgment in his favor on Chai

Maginn’s claims.44 Mills joined in the motion.45 On August 25, Chai Maginn filed

a cross-motion for summary judgment.46 Maginn and Mills answered Chai

Maginn’s complaint and Maginn filed counterclaims on August 31.47 After briefing

was complete, the summary judgment motions were argued on September 20.48

G. The Competing LP Agreements

On August 14, Chai Maginn located a PDF file containing an executed version

of the Family LP Agreement.49 This version of the Family LP Agreement is different

from the one submitted as an uncontested exhibit in the divorce proceedings and

addressed in the Master’s Report and August Ex Parte Order.50 Although the two

documents have a number of differences, several features relevant to these motions

are the same.51

44
Dkt. 8.
45
Dkt. 42.
46
Dkt. 26.
47
Dkts. 36, 38.
48
Dkts. 35, 41, 47, 53; see Dkt. 58.
49
Chai Maginn Aff. ¶ 33; id. Ex. 10 (“Alternate LP Agreement”).
50
Aff. of Michael P. Judge in Supp. of Def. Robert Maginn, Jr.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt.
41) (“Judge Aff.”) ¶¶ 2-3; id. Ex. A.
51
Compare Alternate LP Agreement, with Family LP Agreement; see also infra
Section II.B.

9
H. The October Ex Parte Order

On October 12, Chai Maginn filed another ex parte emergency motion in

Massachusetts, requesting that another temporary order be entered pending a

decision on the adoption of the Master’s Report.52 The Massachusetts probate court

granted Chai Maginn’s emergency motion in a same-day ex parte order (the

“October Ex Parte Order”).53 The October Ex Parte Order states:

Paragraph 8(e) and Paragraph 8(f) of Special Master Robert Rivers’
Report (as amended) dated January 4, 2023 . . . are hereby adopted and
incorporated as an Order of this Court . . . The parties shall immediately
sign all documents necessary to effectuate their obligations referenced
in Paragraphs 8(a), (e), and (f) . . . . This Court’s Order of August 3,
2023 shall continue to remain in full force and effect.54

Chai Maginn’s counsel submitted a copy of the October Ex Parte Order to me

shortly after it was granted. I subsequently asked that counsel for each party file a

supplemental submission addressing whether the October Ex Parte Order affected

my resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment.55 Counsel for Chai

Maginn, Maginn, and Mills filed letters in response on October 13.56

52
Letter from Neil R. Lapinski (Dkt. 63) Ex. A (“Oct. Ex Parte Order”). The version of
the October 12 motion filed in this court is missing pages, leaving me unable to consider
the full extent of relief requested.
53
Id.
54
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
55
Dkt. 64.
56
Letter from G. Moritz Regarding Mass. Prob. Ct. Order (Dkt. 68) (“Def.’s Oct. 13
Letter”); Letter from Neil R. Lapinski Regarding Mass. Prob. Ct. Order (Dkt. 70) (“Pl.’s
Oct. 13 Letter”); see also Dkt. 69.

10
II. ANALYSIS

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment center on whether the

Written Consent validly represented a majority of Jenzabar’s voting shares. In Chai

Maginn’s view, the August Ex Parte Order operated to remove Maginn as a General

Partner of the Family LP, allowing her to sign the Written Consent on the Family

LP’s behalf.57 Maginn, for his part, asserts that the August Ex Parte Order addressed

a division of assets but did not remove him as a General Partner of the Family LP.58

Summary judgment is appropriate under Court of Chancery Rule 56 when

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.”59 “[T]he facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of

demonstrating that there is no material question of fact.”60 “Where the parties have

filed cross motions for summary judgment and have not presented argument to the

Court that there is an issue of fact material to the disposition of either motion, the

57
Pl.’s Opening Br. 12-14.
58
Def.’s Answering Br. 11-13.
59
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
60
Alchemy LTD LLC v. Franchise League Co., LLC, 2023 WL 4670954, at *4 (Del. Ch.
July 20, 2023) (quoting Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Hldgs. Co.,
853 A.2d 124, 126 (Del. Ch. 2004)).

11
Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the

merits based on the record submitted with the motions.”61

As discussed below, Maginn is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.

The Written Consent is invalid as a matter of law because Maginn was a General

Partner of the Family LP when Chai Maginn signed it.62 Maginn has yet to transfer

his interests in the Family LP and remains a General Partner. Thus, Chai Maginn

presently lacks the authority to unilaterally bind the Family LP and—by extension—

a majority of Jenzabar’s voting shares. The only factual dispute concerns the

competing LP Agreements, which does not affect my conclusions.

A. The Written Consent’s Invalidity

Jenzabar’s bylaws permit stockholders to remove directors by written consent

where the consent is signed by holders of a majority of Jenzabar’s outstanding stock

entitled to vote.63 If Chai Maginn lacked the authority to unilaterally act on behalf

of the Family LP, she could not control a majority of Jenzabar’s voting shares. But

Chai Maginn was not the Family LP’s sole General Partner at the time of the Written

Consent and is not at the time of this decision.

61
Ct. Ch. R. 56(h).
62
Because this issue is dispositive, I need not consider other arguments raised by the
parties.
63
Pl.’s Opening Br. Ex. 8 §§ 2.6, 2.7, 3.2.

12
As of August 3, Maginn remained a General Partner of the Family LP. The

Master’s Report was then unadopted by the Massachusetts probate court.64 And the

August Ex Parte Order provided “without prejudice” that the Jenzabar shares held

by the Family LP would be divided between Maginn and Chai Maginn pursuant to

paragraph 8(a) of the Master’s Report.65 That is, the August Ex Parte Order

addressed the division of the Family LP’s assets—not interests in the Family LP

itself.66 Maginn’s status as a General Partner of the Family LP was unaffected by

the division of Jenzabar shares held by the Family LP; he contributed cash for his

General Partner interest.67

Chai Maginn contends that the August Ex Parte Order should be read more

broadly to include paragraph 8(e) of the Master’s Report, which concerns the

64
See Dawson v. Rogers, 387 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (“[A] master’s
report . . . has no effect until it is confirmed[.]”) (citations omitted); Hardiman v. Hardiman,
418 N.E.2d 347, 348 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“To give the master’s disposition any weight
beyond that of a recommendation would be an abdication of the judicial function.”).
Although Chai Maginn contends that the probate court was “fully cognizant” of the full
extent of the Master’s Report when rendering its decision on her August 3 emergency
motion, she only attached paragraph 8(a) of the Master’s Report to her motion. See Maginn
Aff. Ex. 6 at Attachment.
65
See Aug. Ex Parte Order ¶ 1.
66
See Nev. Rev. Stat. 87.4321 (1) (“A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.”);
Rosemore v. Burns, 2021 WL 183325, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2021) (observing that a
member of a Nevada LLC should be treated as separate and distinct from the company for
purposes of personal jurisdiction).
67
See Family LP Agreement at Sched. A; Alternate LP Agreement at Sched. A.

13
ownership of Family LP interests.68 The very text of the August Ex Parte Order

negates Chai Maginn’s argument since it only mentions paragraph 8(a). Chai

Maginn insists that paragraph 8(e) must be read into the August Ex Parte Order since

paragraph 8(e) references paragraph 8(a), but that is a backward approach to

incorporation by reference.69

To the extent that it is fairly before me, the October Ex Parte Order merits

further analysis. It expressly and “without prejudice” “adopted and incorporated”

paragraph 8(e) of the Master’s Report as an order of the probate court.70 It also states

that Maginn and Chai Maginn were to “immediately sign all documents necessary”

to effect the transfer of Family LP interests contemplated by paragraph 8(e) of the

Master’s Report.71

Still, the October Ex Parte Order does not retroactively validate the Written

Consent. Nor does it (or the August Ex Parte Order) automatically remove Maginn

as a General Partner of the Family LP. Even if these were final orders, Maginn

would need to transfer his interests in the Family LP to Chai Maginn to effectuate

68
Pl.’s Opening Br. 11-13.
69
Id. at 12-13; see also Hr’g Tr. 27-28 (asking the court to read paragraph 8(e) into the
August Ex Parte Order, even though it only discusses paragraph 8(a), because “8(e) directly
references 8(a)”).
70
Oct. Ex Parte Order ¶ 1. Based on my reading of the October Ex Parte Order, the court’s
order was temporary and subject to a further hearing on October 17, 2023.
71
Id. ¶ 2.

14
the change in status. It is undisputed that he has taken no steps to do so.72 Rather,

Maginn insists that if he is required by a final order to transfer his interests, he will

appeal.73

Maginn remains a General Partner of the Family LP. The Family LP

Agreement grants each General Partner one vote.74 Thus, without Maginn’s

approval, Chai Maginn lacked the authority to direct the Family LP through the

Written Consent.

B. The Absence of a Genuine Fact Dispute

The two versions of the Family LP Agreement do not create a genuine dispute

of material fact that renders summary judgment unavailable.

Regardless of the version of Family LP Agreement considered, Chai Maginn

(presently) lacks the authority to unilaterally act on behalf of the Family LP. Both

versions of the Family LP Agreement state on the first page that the “General

72
See Def.’s Oct. 13 Letter; Pl.’s Oct. 13 Letter. I am not opining on whether Maginn has
been required to transfer (or should not transfer) his Family LP interests. That is the
province of the Massachusetts court. I am also not addressing whether the Massachusetts
court has the jurisdiction to change the governance of a Nevada entity. I am observing, for
purposes of the limited dispute before me regarding the governance of Jenzabar, that
Maginn has not yet transferred his Family LP interests to Chai Maginn.
73
Def.’s Answering Br. 16 (asserting that under Massachusetts law, the transfer will likely
be stayed pending appeal); Def.’s Oct. 13 Letter at 2 (noting that Maginn has advised “he
does not intend to sign” any transfer documents while litigating in Massachusetts, has filed
an interlocutory appeal of the October Ex Parte Order, and “is prepared to exercise his full
appellate rights”).
74
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

15
Partners” of the Family LP are “Robert A. Maginn, Jr. and Ling Chai.”75 Both

versions of the Family LP Agreement also provide that “[t]he business of the

Partnership shall be under the exclusive control of the General Partners who shall

act by a majority vote in all business affairs.”76 And both versions contemplate that

for purposes of voting on such business affairs, each General Partner “shall . . . have

one vote.”77

* * *

My conclusion that the Written Consent was not signed on behalf of a majority

of Jenzabar’s voting shares is dispositive. The Written Consent is invalid.78 Mills

is a member of the Jenzabar Board and the Special Committee.79 There are no

genuine disputes of material fact indicating otherwise.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Maginn’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Chai Maginn’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

75
Family LP Agreement at 1; Alternate LP Agreement at 1. Both versions also reflect that,
at the inception of the Family LP, Maginn contributed cash as a General Partner and
Jenzabar shares as a Limited Partner. Family LP Agreement at Sched. A; Alternate LP
Agreement at Sched. A.
76
Family LP Agreement § 7.1; Alternate LP Agreement § 6.1.
77
Family LP Agreement § 7.1; Alternate LP Agreement § 6.1.
78
See 8 Del. C. § 228(a).
79
See 8 Del. C. § 225(a).

16