Rushikesh Manche v. MVMT Labs, Inc.

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
CHRISTIAN DOUGLAS WRIGHT LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3734

Date Submitted: December 5, 2025
Date Decided: December 11, 2025

David J. Margules, Esquire
Emily C. Friedman, Esquire
Ballard Spahr LLP
919 N. Market Street, 11th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801-3034

Re: Rushikesh Manche v. MVMT Labs, Inc.,
C.A. No. 2025-1407-CDW
Dear Counsel:
Petitioner filed this advancement proceeding on December 3, 2025.1

Two days later, without any apparent change in the circumstances that led to

petitioner filing the petition and before the Chancellor had assigned this action,

petitioner filed a “Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief of Interim

Advancement.”2 The motion, succinctly stated, asks the court to award

advancement before the court has determined petitioner is entitled to

advancement. I deny the motion for three reasons.

First, the Motion has little to recommend it in the context of an

advancement proceeding. Advancement cases are summary in nature. Under
1 Verified Pet. for Advancement (“Pet.”), Dkt. 1.

2 Dkt. 5 (“Motion”).
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the court’s current framework, where advancement cases are assigned to

magistrates, the court strives to decide a plaintiff’s entitlement to advancement

within 60 days. This is explained to every advancement plaintiff in the

Chancellor’s standard assignment letter, including petitioner here.3 The point is

to get to a final resolution on the merits of entitlement promptly—so if a

plaintiff needs to have entitlement determined more quickly than 60 days, the

answer is not to seek preliminary injunctive relief ordering “interim

advancement,”4 it is to ask the court to put a faster schedule in place and

explain why. Indeed, the court’s Guidelines for Persons Litigating in the Court

of Chancery convey this idea: “Summary proceedings generally can be

completed in 45-90 days. A faster or slower schedule may be warranted based

on external events or the complexity of the case.”5

Second, the Motion fails because the irreparable harm of which petitioner

complains6 is present in every case where a company is alleged to have

3 Dkt. 6.

4 The incongruity of this Motion within an advancement proceeding is evident from

the term “interim advancement” itself. Advancement is already something our
Supreme Court has described as “immediate interim relief.” Homestore, Inc. v.
Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005). So a request for “interim advancement” is,
algebraically, a request for “interim immediate interim relief.”
5 See Guidelines for Persons Litigating in the Court of Chancery § 5.c.i. (Oct. 15,

2024), https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/guidelines.aspx.
6 Motion ¶ 13; Aff. of Rushikesh Manche ¶ 9, Dkt. 5.
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improperly denied an advancement demand: the inability to hire the counsel or

pursue the legal strategy of one’s choosing due to cost concerns.7 There is

nothing said in the Motion or in petitioner’s affidavit that cannot be said by

virtually every advancement plaintiff appearing in our court. It is absolutely

true, as the Supreme Court and this court have noted, that the denial of

advancement can cause irreparable harm.8 But that irreparable harm is why

advancement cases are treated as summary proceedings; it is not a reason, by

itself, to also add a layer of preliminary injunction motion practice on top of an

already expedited schedule.

Third, the Motion seeks the same mandatory (and final) relief petitioner

seeks via the petition.9 A preliminary injunction that grants mandatory relief is

rare.10 This shows, once again, that the solution for an advancement plaintiff is

7 Gandhi-Kapoor v. Hone Cap. LLC, 305 A.3d 707, 718–19 (Del. Ch. 2023) (quoting

Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., 2005 WL 1314782, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2005), aff’d,
886 A.2d 502 (Del. 2005)).
8 See, e.g., Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502, 505 (Del. 2005) (“[T]o be of any

value to the executive or director, advancement must be made promptly, otherwise its
benefit is forever lost[.]”); Gandhi-Kapoor, 305 A.3d at 719 (explaining that a
covered person denied advancement “faces a threat of irreparable harm”).
9 Compare Pet. (Prayer for Relief) ¶ iii (requesting entry of order directing
“Respondent to advance Petitioner’s fees and expenses incurred in pursuing his right
to advancement”), with Motion ¶ 19 (requesting “this Court order interim
advancement of Petitioner Manche’s expenses incurred pursuing his advancement
claim”).
10 See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation

Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1071 (Del. 2014) (“To issue a mandatory injunction
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to get to a final merits hearing on entitlement on an appropriately prompt

schedule, not to add a layer of preliminary injunction motion practice on top of

this summary proceeding.

The primary authority on which petitioner relies to say the Motion and

the relief sought are proper, a transcript ruling from Perryman v. Stimwave

Technologies, Inc.,11 does not compel a different result. Contrary to petitioner’s

suggestion, the court in Perryman did not grant interim advancement pending a

final merits hearing on the plaintiffs’ entitlement to advancement. Rather, the

court granted advancement “pending a determination of the validity” of the

indemnification agreements containing the advancement right.12 Perryman did

requiring a party to take affirmative action . . . the Court of Chancery must either hold
a trial and make findings of fact, or base an injunction solely on undisputed facts.”);
In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 449–51 (Del. Ch. 2012) (stating
mandatory injunctive relief is “not a traditional negative injunction that can be done
without an evidentiary hearing or undisputed facts”).
11 C.A. No. 2020-0079-SG, Dkt. 45 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2020) (TRANSCRIPT).

12 Id. at 35 (“I am prepared to enter an order that . . . provides for advancement rights

pending a determination of the validity of the contract.”); see also Perryman v.
Stimwave Techs., Inc., 2020 WL 2465720, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2020) (“Here, I
ordered Stimwave to provide advancement while the parties resolve the issue of the
validity of the underlying indemnification agreements.”). I acknowledge there are
references elsewhere in the court’s May 13, 2020 letter opinion in Perryman
characterizing the bench ruling as requiring the company to “advance fees pending a
final determination of the Petitioners’ entitlement to advancement” (id. at *1), but I
believe it is clear from the context that what the court meant there was the validity of
the underlying indemnification agreements from which the advancement right arose.
In other words, if the indemnification agreements were ultimately determined to be
invalid, there would be no entitlement to advancement and any funds previously
advanced would have to be returned. See id. at *4 (“I note that the Petitioners’
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not grant the right to interim advancement prior to a full advancement hearing,

and it does not stand for that proposition now.13

For all of these reasons, the Motion is denied.

Very truly yours,
/s/ Christian Douglas Wright
Magistrate in Chancery

undertakings to repay give the Respondent a legal right to recovery, if the
Indemnification Agreements prove unenforceable.”).
13 The court is aware of two other recent cases in which the plaintiff requested interim

advancement and relied on Perryman. The court denied the request in both cases.
See, e.g., Leiske v. Kidd, C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW, Dkt. 28 (Nov. 17, 2025); Yudin
v. FrontPorch AI LLC, C.A. No. 2025-0954-DH, Dkt. 21 (Sept. 18, 2025).