Angela Okafor Carlisle v. Rone Everett

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
KATHALEEN ST. JUDE MCCORMICK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

August 14, 2024

Kathleen DeLacy Jason C. Powell
Martin D. Page Thomas J. Reichert
Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP Laurel A. LaLone
1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305 The Powell Firm, LLC
Wilmington, DE 19803 1813 N. Franklin Street
Wilmington, DE 19802

Re: Angela Okafor Carlisle v. Rone Everett,
C.A. No. 2023-0077-LM

Dear Counsel:

This letter resolves the exceptions filed to Magistrate Mitchell’s Final Report

(the “Final Report”) dated January 31, 2024.1 For the reasons discussed below, the

exceptions are granted, and I will preside over all further proceedings in this action.

I. Factual And Procedural Background

This case concerns the Estate of Sharif Kihill Green, who died on June 18,

2022. Weeks prior to his death, on June 1, the Philadelphia Orphan’s Court provided

Green and Everett with a marriage license. The license authorized Green and

Respondent Rone Everett to marry on or after June 4. The license also stated that it

was “valid only in Pennsylvania.”2 On June 3, Everett was admitted to a hospital in

1 Carlisle v. Everett, 2024 WL 368379 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2024); see also C.A. No. 2022-

0077-LM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 34.
2 Dkt. 39 (“Pet.’s Opening Br.”), Ex. D (Marriage License).
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
August 14, 2024
Page 2 of 7

New Jersey.3 He was incapacitated and confined to bed from June 3 until he died.4

The marriage certificate was executed on June 6 and witnessed by Everett’s

stepfather.5 The marriage certificate states that Green and Everett were married in

Philadelphia.6

Everett opened Green’s estate as Green’s wife with the Delaware Register of

Wills on August 26, 2022, and was appointed the estate’s personal representative.7

Green’s mother, Petitioner Angela Carlisle, does not recognize Green’s

marriage to Everett and wishes to serve as personal representative of Green’s estate.

On December 14, 2022, Carlisle filed a letter with the Register of Wills contesting

Everett’s appointment.8 She claimed that Everett’s marriage to Green was

impossible due to his location on the date of their marriage.9 The same day, the Chief

Deputy of the Register of Wills contacted several persons to investigate Carlisle’s

claims, including the Philadelphia County Clerk of the Orphans’ Court, Tiffany

Gordon.10 Gordon confirmed on December 15 that the Orphans’ Court had the actual

marriage certificate on file.

3 Dkt. 1 (“Pet. for Removal”) ¶ 7.
4 Id. ¶ 8.

5 Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. E (Marriage Certificate).

6 Id.

7 Dkt. 30, Ex. F.

8 New Castle County Register of Wills Case No. ROW 181736 Dkt. (“ROW Dkt.”) 5.

9 Id.

10 ROW Dkts. 6–8; Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. I.
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
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The Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Division further responded by a letter dated

December 22, received on December 28, and uploaded to the docket on January 3,

2023. The letter stated:

A Marriage Licensing application as completed and
approved by our office for [Green and Everett] on June 1,
2022, during a Zoom meeting. The applicants indicated
that Mr. Green was hospitalized at the time and provided
proper documentation for the Marriage License Clerk to
conduct a Zoom Sick Call.

Proper documentation would have included a completed
application and a Doctor’s Note from the attending
physician indicating the hospitalized applicant is of sound
mind and body to make their own decision and has a
diagnosis of a terminal illness. The Doctor’s Note must be
on the physician’s letterhead and signed by the physician.

We are searching for our paper file on this matter so that
we may confirm the exact documentation that was
provided.11

A Philadelphia Assistant Solicitor confirmed by email, a week later, that the

Orphans’ Court received the fully executed marriage certificate. 12

Carlisle filed this action to remove Everett as personal representative on

January 24, 2023, alleging that the marriage was fraudulent because Green was

hospitalized in New Jersey on the day of the marriage ceremony and thus could not

have married Everett in Philadelphia, as the certificate stated.13

11 ROW Dkt. 11.

12 ROW Dkt. 12.

13 Pet. for Removal ¶ 10.
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
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Everett moved to dismiss the petition, and the Magistrate Judge heard

argument on October 2, 2023. During argument, the parties requested leave to

submit supplemental briefing on an issue raised by the Magistrate concerning the

implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction.14 Supplemental briefing concluded on November 20.

II. Legal Analysis

In her Final Report dated January 31, 2024, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that the motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) be

granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.15 Carlisle filed exceptions, which the

parties argued on May 17.16

This court applies de novo review to the factual and legal findings of a

Magistrate.17 The narrow question presented on exceptions is whether this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action to remove Everett as a personal

representative of the estate.18

This court acquires subject matter jurisdiction “in only three ways: (1) the

invocation of an equitable right; (2) the request for an equitable remedy when there

is no adequate remedy at law; or (3) a statutory delegation of subject matter

14 Dkt. 38 at 45.

15 Dkt. 34.

16 Dkt. 44.

17 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. 1999).

18 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 7–13; see Dkt. 41(“Resp.’s Answering Br.”) at 14–17.
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
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jurisdiction.”19 At base, Petitioner seeks the removal of a representative of an

estate.20 This relief is equitable in nature and is thus within the court’s equitable

jurisdiction.21 This court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction. The exceptions

are sustained.

This conclusion, however, stops far short of resolving the thorny issues raised

by the parties. Magistrate Judge Mitchell was rightly concerned that Carlisle’s

petition sought to collaterally attack Green’s marriage to Everett. Although she

framed this as a question of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), I view it

as an issue of standing under Rule 12(b)(6). That is, the question, to my mind, is

whether Carlisle has standing to challenge Green’s marriage to Everett in this court

or elsewhere on the basis of fraud. The parties did not directly address this issue,

and they are granted leave to do so. They may also raise any other legal argument

that has been preserved or that is prompted by the reframing of the issue.

19 Quarum v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 2019 WL 158153, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2019)

(quoting Hillsboro Energy, LLC v. Secure Energy, Inc., 2008 WL 4561227, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 3, 2008)).
20 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 14–15.

21 Matter of Est. of Gusoff, 2024 WL 1903744, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2024) (removing

an estate representative under this court’s “equitable power”); Nelson v. Russo, 844
A.2d 301, 303 (Del. 2004) (commenting that “[t]he only way a court could order
removal . . . would be through mandatory injunction”); see also Davis v. Browne, 1859
WL 2010, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 1859) (noting that removal of a trustee requires
an injunction); Ct. Ch. R. 207 (stating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction
over “petitions for review of proof of will, petitions for partition, caveats against
allowance of instrument as will, petitions for removal of personal representatives, and
other similar petitions concerning the estates of decedents that require judicial action
by the Court of Chancery” (emphasis added)).
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
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There are strong competing arguments that point in opposite directions. On

the one hand, 13 Del. C. § 1506 (which governs efforts to challenge Green’s marriage

to Everett)22 grants very few persons who are not parties to a marriage standing to

challenge its validity “after the death of either party to the marriage” for estate

administration purposes or otherwise.23 Everett does not fall into any of the

categories of persons recognized by this statute. One might argue that the express

inclusion of a list of persons with standing to challenge a marriage for estate

administration purposes, along with the exclusion of parents of the deceased from

that list, means that the General Assembly did not intend to allow parents of a

deceased person to challenge the decedent’s marriage for estate administration

purposes.

On the other hand, “the public policy against fraud is a strong and venerable

one that is largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is wrong.” 24 Carlisle

claims that Everett fraudulently secured the marriage so as to foreclose Carlisle from

22 The parties married in Pennsylvania, but Delaware law governs efforts to annul

that marriage because Green and Everett lived in Delaware. See 23 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3104(b); 13 Del. C. § 1504(a).
23 See 13 Del. C. § 1506(b)(4) (“A decree of annulment for the reason set forth in

paragraph (a)(7) of this section may be sought by either party, by the legal spouse in
case of bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages, by the appropriate state
official, or by a child of either party at any time prior to the death of either party or
prior to the final settlement of the estate of either party and the discharge of the
personal representative, executor or administrator of the estate, or prior to 6 months
after an order of distribution is made under Chapter 23 of Title 12.”).
24 Abry P’rs V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2006).
C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM
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administering her son’s estate. The question is whether Delaware law impliedly

grants Carlisle standing to pursue that cause of action.25

The parties are ordered to confer to determine whether they can agree on an

orderly way to take this action to its conclusion, including by addressing the standing

issue I have raised in this letter. If agreement is reached, the parties are ordered to

submit a form of scheduling order for my review. If not, the parties are ordered to

submit competing scheduling orders and schedule a telephonic hearing to resolve the

issue.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick

Chancellor

cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)

25 As a second basis for recommending dismissal, the Magistrate Judge concluded

that the Orphans’ Court’s letters prompted by the Register in Chancery’s
investigation deserved respect under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To this,
Carlisle responds that the marriage certificate is not entitled to deference if it was
procured by fraud as Carlisle alleges. The Magistrate Judge further reasoned that
Carlisle had not adequately alleged fraud with particularity as required by Court of
Chancery Rule 9. The Magistrate Judge made excellent points, but I read the record
and the rule slightly differently and believe that Carlisle met the heightened pleading
standard in this action.