Jackson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AARON JACKSON, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 170, 2025
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1901004729 (N)
§
Appellee. §
§

Submitted: July 7, 2025
Decided: August 18, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Aaron Jackson, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order denying his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State of Delaware

has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the grounds that it is manifest

on the face of Jackson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree

and affirm.

(2) In May 2019, a grand jury indicted Jackson for attempted first-degree

murder and weapon offenses. In November 2019, Jackson pleaded guilty to first-

degree assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) in exchange

for dismissal of the other charges. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed

not to request more than fifteen years of unsuspended Level V incarceration. The

Superior Court sentenced Jackson as follows: (i) for first-degree assault, fifteen years

of Level V incarceration, suspended after seven years for decreasing levels of

supervision; and (ii) for PFDCF, three years of Level V incarceration.

(3) In March 2025, Jackson filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence.

He argued that his sentence was illegal under Erlinger v. United States.1 The

Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Jackson’s sentence did not implicate

Erlinger. This appeal followed.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for

abuse of discretion.2 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the

claim de novo.3 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the

Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which

it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by

statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of

conviction did not authorize.4

1
602 U.S. 821 (2024).
2
Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014).
3
Id.
4
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998).
2
(5) In his opening brief, Jackson argues that the Superior Court erred in

finding Erlinger inapplicable. This argument is without merit. In Erlinger, the

United States Supreme Court held that a unanimous jury must determine beyond a

reasonable doubt whether a defendant’s prior offenses were committed on separate

occasions before his sentence can be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal

Act.5 As the Superior Court recognized, Erlinger did not apply in this case because

there was no enhancement of Jackson’s sentence based on his prior convictions.6

(6) To the extent Jackson claims that his sentence is illegal because it

exceeds the SENTAC Guidelines, he is mistaken.7 Jackson’s sentence—fifteen

years of Level V incarceration suspended after seven years for first-degree assault

and three years of Level V incarceration for PFDCF—falls within the statutory

guidelines and is not illegal.8 The Superior Court did not err in denying Jackson’s

motion for correction of illegal sentence.

5
602 U.S. and 835.
6
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 2025 WL 2048977, at *1 (Del. July 21, 2025) (holding Erlinger was
inapplicable to sentence that was not enhanced on the basis of the appellant’s prior criminal
conduct); Phillips v. State, 2025 WL 2025 1693652, at *2 (Del. June 16, 2025) (same).
7
See, e.g., White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 410 (Del. 2020) (describing the “voluntary and non-
binding” nature of the SENTAC Guidelines); Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Del. 2008)
(referring to the “voluntary and nonbinding character” of the SENTAC Guidelines).
8
11 Del. C. § 613(c) (defining first-degree assault as a class B felony); 11 Del. C. § 1447A(a), (b)
(defining PFDCF as a class B felony with a minimum Level V sentence of three years); 11 Del. C.
§ 4205(b)(2) (providing that the sentence for a class B felony is between two and twenty-five years
of Level V incarceration).
3
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

4