A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

A. A.-M. v. M. Z.*
(AC 46000)
Alvord, Cradle and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-
solved, appealed from the judgment of the trial court resolving several
postjudgment motions. Several years after the judgment of dissolution,
the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of the custody of the parties’
minor child, who was then seventeen years old, and two motions for
contempt. The court denied the defendants’ motions for contempt, which
had alleged that the plaintiff had violated the court’s orders with respect
to visitation, and it awarded the plaintiff sole legal custody of the child.
The defendant appealed to this court, and, shortly thereafter, the child
turned eighteen years old. Thereafter, the defendant filed additional
motions for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff violated the court’s
orders by not encouraging the parties’ child to see her and placing
obstacles in the way of visitation. In January, 2023, the court denied
the defendant’s motions for contempt with respect to visitation and the
defendant’s claim that the plaintiff improperly claimed the child on his
tax return. The defendant did not amend her appeal to challenge that
decision. This court dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the
trial court’s rulings related to custody and visitation, and the plaintiff
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the
defendant had failed to appeal from the January, 2023 decision. Held
that the defendant’s appeal was dismissed as moot: this court concluded,
after a review of the defendant’s appellate brief, that the appeal was
limited to challenges to the trial court’s rulings related to the defendant’s
rights to custody and visitation with the parties’ child and the relevant
portions of the defendant’s request for relief were entirely dedicated to
her access to the child, and, as to these issues, the appeal was rendered
moot when the child attained the age of eighteen; moreover; the fact
that the present case involved motions for contempt did not necessitate
a conclusion that the appeal was not moot because, even if this court
were to conclude that the plaintiff had violated orders of the trial court
related to access to the child, there was no practical relief that could

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.
be afforded to the defendant; accordingly, this court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.

Argued March 6—officially released April 23, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Britain, where the court, Prestley, J., ren-
dered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting
certain other relief in accordance with the parties’ sepa-
ration agreement; thereafter, the court, Caron, J.,
awarded the plaintiff temporary custody of the parties’
minor child and issued orders with respect to visitation;
subsequently, the court, Hon. Eric D. Coleman, judge
trial referee, awarded the plaintiff permanent custody
of the minor child, issued visitation orders, and denied
the defendant’s motions for contempt, and the defen-
dant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Allard,
J., denied the defendant’s motions for contempt; subse-
quently, this court, sua sponte, dismissed the appeal in
part. Appeal dismissed.
M. Z., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
A. A.-M., self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, M. Z.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court resolving
several postjudgment motions. Because we conclude
that the defendant’s appeal is moot, we dismiss the
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The following facts and procedural history are neces-
sary to our resolution of this appeal. The defendant and
the plaintiff, A. A.-M., were married in 2003, and have
one child, who was born in November, 2004. The parties’
marriage was dissolved by the court, Prestley, J., on
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

September 25, 2007. The judgment of dissolution incor-
porated by reference the parties’ separation agreement
dated September 25, 2007 (separation agreement). The
agreement provided that ‘‘[t]he parties shall share joint
legal and the [d]efendant shall have physical custody
of their minor child . . . subject to reasonable rights
of visitation to the [p]laintiff in accordance with a par-
enting schedule’’ set forth in the separation agreement.
The separation agreement also provided that ‘‘[t]he par-
ties shall exert every reasonable effort to maintain free
access and unhampered contact between the child and
each of the parties . . . .’’ On March 12, 2012, the court,
Adelman, J., issued a postjudgment order that, inter
alia, continued the award of joint legal custody and set
forth a parenting schedule that afforded the plaintiff
additional parenting time (March, 2012 decision).
In October, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for modi-
fication of custody, seeking sole custody of the parties’
child and alleging that the child had been abused by
the defendant. Following a hearing on November 4,
2021, the court, Caron, J., ordered, on a temporary
basis, that the child primarily reside with the plaintiff.
The court further ordered that the defendant be permit-
ted to video call the child twice weekly and that the
child be permitted to see the defendant ‘‘whenever he
wants’’ (November, 2021 decision).
Also on November 4, 2021, the defendant filed a
motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the
plaintiff had knowingly and wilfully violated orders con-
tained in the 2007 separation agreement and the court’s
March, 2012 decision. The defendant alleged, inter alia,
that the plaintiff had ‘‘gone out of his way to eliminate
any and all means of communication between the child
and the defendant . . . .’’ On December 28, 2021, the
defendant filed another motion for contempt, alleging
that the plaintiff had violated the court’s November,
2021 order that the plaintiff encourage visits between
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

the child and the defendant and not interfere with tele-
phone access. On January 21, 2022, the defendant filed
a motion for modification of visitation and decision-
making authority with respect to postsecondary educa-
tion, seeking, inter alia, ‘‘temporary visitation rights’’
for herself and visitation for the maternal grandparents.
A hearing was held on these motions on March 4, 2022.

On September 15, 2022, the court, Hon. Eric D. Cole-
man, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of deci-
sion resolving both parties’ motions for modification
and the defendant’s two motions for contempt (Septem-
ber, 2022 decision). First, the court awarded the plaintiff
sole legal custody. Next, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motions for contempt. With respect to the
November, 2021 motion for contempt, the court found
that the defendant had not ‘‘established by clear and
convincing evidence that [the child] was not responding
to her multiple phone calls of his own volition rather
than because of any interference by the plaintiff.’’ As
to the December, 2021 motion for contempt, the court
stated that ‘‘[t]he defendant presented no testimony,
evidence or argument regarding any of the issues raised
in this motion. Therefore, the defendant has not sus-
tained her burden with respect to the allegations con-
tained in the motion.’’ Finally, with respect to the defen-
dant’s motion for modification, the court ordered that
the child may see the defendant whenever the child
wants; the plaintiff shall encourage the child to see the
defendant, and he ‘‘shall place no obstacles in the way
of’’ visits; the plaintiff shall not ‘‘prevent, hamper, dis-
courage, or obstruct’’ the defendant’s access to their
child; the plaintiff shall transport the child to and from
any visits the child desires with the defendant unless
the defendant can make her own transportation
arrangements; and the plaintiff shall not interfere with
the defendant’s scheduled telephone, FaceTime, or
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

video chat contacts with the child on Tuesdays and
Thursdays at 7 p.m.
On October 5, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue the court’s September, 2022 decision, which
the court denied in an order dated October 21, 2022.
The defendant filed this appeal on November 10, 2022,
and, shortly thereafter, the parties’ child turned eigh-
teen.
On December 6, 2022, the defendant filed with the
trial court two additional motions for contempt. In the
first motion for contempt, the defendant alleged that
the plaintiff violated the court’s September, 2022 deci-
sion by not encouraging the parties’ child to see her
and placing obstacles in the way of their visits and
communications. In the second motion for contempt,
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff improperly had
claimed the child on his tax return for 2021, in violation
of the 2007 judgment of dissolution. On January 5, 2023,
following a hearing, the trial court, Allard, J., issued
an order denying the motions for contempt with respect
to visits and communication, finding that the defendant
had failed to sustain her burden of proof (January, 2023
decision).1 The court denied the motion for contempt
with respect to the plaintiff’s improperly claiming the
child on his tax return but entered remedial orders
requiring the plaintiff to pay $750 to the defendant’s
accountant. The defendant did not thereafter amend
her appeal to challenge the January, 2023 decision.
On February 10, 2023, this court ordered the parties
to file memoranda ‘‘addressing whether the portion of
the appeal challenging the trial court’s rulings related
1
In its January, 2023 decision, the court also denied an October 5, 2022
motion for contempt filed by the defendant, which alleged that the plaintiff
had violated the orders in the court’s September, 2022 decision because he
was not encouraging the child to see her, had placed obstacles in the way
of her visitation with the child, and had interfered with scheduled tele-
phone contacts.
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

to custody and visitation should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because it was rendered
moot when the parties’ minor [child] reached the age
of majority during the pendency of the appeal. See Ken-
nedy v. Kennedy, 109 Conn. App. 591, 592 n.2, [952
A.2d 115] (2008).’’ Neither party filed a memorandum
addressed to the order. On March 29, 2023, this court
dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the trial
court’s rulings related to custody and visitation.
On June 21, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to dis-
miss this appeal on the basis that the defendant had
failed to appeal from the court’s January, 2023 decision,
and the defendant filed an opposition. On September
6, 2023, this court denied the motion to dismiss but sua
sponte ordered the parties to ‘‘address in their briefs
on the merits whether this appeal is moot because the
defendant has not amended her appeal to include the
trial court’s January, 2023 decision . . . her appeal is
limited to the issues raised in her November 10, 2022
appeal that do not challenge the trial court’s rulings
related to custody and visitation.’’
In her appellate brief, the defendant raises a number
of claims.2 First, she claims that the court erred in
awarding temporary physical custody to the plaintiff in
its November, 2021 decision, and permanent physical
custody to the plaintiff in its September, 2022 decision.
Second, she claims that the court improperly limited her
presentation of evidence and cross-examination during
2
The issues identified in this opinion, which are set forth in a different
order than the defendant’s brief, are based on this court’s thorough review
of her brief. We note that, in addition to the absence of any standard
of review, much of the defendant’s brief lacks citation to authorities and
substantive discussion of the issues presented. ‘‘[When] a claim is asserted
in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the
brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed
to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGovern v. McGov-
ern, 217 Conn. App. 636, 637 n.1, 289 A.3d 1255, cert. denied, 346 Conn.
1018, 295 A.3d 111 (2023).
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

several hearings. Third, she claims that the court
improperly denied ‘‘ex parte motions, and several
caseflow requests, filed by the defendant . . . per-
taining to contempt actions, educational decisions, and
visitation requests.’’ Fourth, the defendant claims that
the court improperly ignored the plaintiff’s alleged con-
tempt. Fifth, she claims that the court’s September, 2022
decision with respect to custody was not timely issued.
In her request for relief, the defendant requests that
this court ‘‘(1) reconsider and rectify the trial courts’
past erroneous rulings, including the change of both
temporary [and] physical custody, the contempt motion
ruling, the denial of ex parte motions, and the refusal
of the court to accept documents into evidence, that
the defendant . . . requested to submit. As a result,
the trial court will be able to make appropriate future
decisions concerning the educational and financial
needs of the child. (2) The defendant . . . does not
wish to interact with the plaintiff . . . in any form.
However, she does need to have access to her child
and ensure that she and her child can reach each other
with no obstacles nor boundaries, and to resume the
counseling with her child, which the plaintiff . . . had
intentionally terminated. (3) The defendant . . . is also
respectfully asking the court and/or the plaintiff . . .
to reverse the contempt motion ruling, and vacate the
restraining order,3 which is currently in place until
December 1, 2023, to allow the relationship between
the defendant . . . and her child to be restored, which
. . . restraining order is now limiting her access to
her child, by extension.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote
The restraining order is not at issue in this appeal. On December 1,
3

2022, the Superior Court, Allard, J., in a separate action, issued a one year
restraining order, protecting the plaintiff from the defendant. See A. A.-M.
v. M. Z, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. FA-
XX-XXXXXXX-S. The restraining order subsequently was extended through
November 21, 2024. Id. On January 22, 2024, the defendant filed an appeal
in the action involving the restraining order.
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added.) The plaintiff responds in his appellate brief that
the appeal should be dismissed as moot.

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’’ Wendy V. v.
Santiago, 319 Conn. 540, 544, 125 A.3d 983 (2015). ‘‘It
is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an
actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts
to decide moot questions, disconnected from the grant-
ing of actual relief or from the determination of which
no practical relief can follow. . . . Mootness presents
a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has
been resolved or had lost its significance because of a
change in the condition or affairs between the parties.
. . . A case is moot when due to intervening circum-
stances a controversy between the parties no longer
exists.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M.
R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 661, 283 A.3d 520 (2022); see
also CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education,
346 Conn. 1, 12, 287 A.3d 557 (2023) (‘‘[a]n actual contro-
versy must exist not only at the time the appeal is
taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘In determining
mootness, the dispositive question is whether a success-
ful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in
any way.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendy
V. v. Santiago, supra, 545.

We carefully have reviewed the defendant’s appellate
briefing and conclude that her appeal is limited to chal-
lenges to the court’s rulings related to her rights to
custody and visitation with the parties’ child. Moreover,
the relevant portions of the defendant’s request for
relief are entirely dedicated to her access to the child.
As to these issues, however, the appeal was rendered
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A. A.-M. v. M. Z.

moot when the child attained the age of eighteen.4 See,
e.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy, supra, 109 Conn. App. 592
n.2; see also, e.g., Nowacki v. Nowacki, 144 Conn. App.
503, 508–509, 72 A.3d 1245 (noting that orders with
respect to parties’ older child were not at issue on
appeal because he reached age of majority while appeal
was pending), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 939, 79 A.3d 891
(2013). The fact that the present case involves motions
for contempt does not lead to the conclusion that this
appeal has not become moot because, even if this court
were to conclude that the plaintiff had violated orders
of the court related to access to the parties’ child, there
is no practical relief that can be afforded the defendant.
See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 38 Conn. App. 499, 503–504,
661 A.2d 1043 (1995) (dismissing as moot appeal from
denials of contempt motions where contempt motions
were addressed to issue relative to which court could
afford no practical relief).
The appeal is dismissed.

4
The defendant’s principal appellate briefing with respect to mootness is
limited to the following: ‘‘The [defendant’s] position is that this appeal is
not moot, and is challenging the trial court’s custody and visitation, and
contempt ruling because (a) the child is still not financially independent,
which affects his future financial needs, such as education, transportation,
health insurance . . . etc., [and] (b) the longevity, permanency, and preser-
vation of the defendant . . . and minor child’s relationship, which is cur-
rently [nonexistent], due to the trial court’s erroneous rulings.’’