U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey

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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. v. GREGG P. HEALEY ET AL.
(AC 45761)
Elgo, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff bank sought, by way of a summary process action, to recover
possession of certain real property from the defendants. The property
had been subject to a strict foreclosure action, and ownership became
absolute in the plaintiff after the law day had passed. The defendant
parents, the former owners of the property, the defendant C, their adult
daughter, and their son, D, continued to reside at the property after the
law day had passed. A notice to quit was served on the parents and C.
D was not served with notice because he was a minor at the time of
service and service of a notice to quit possession on a minor was not
required under the applicable statute (§ 47a-23 (c)). After this court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of possession for the plaintiff, the
defendants moved to open and dismiss the judgment for mootness and
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants claimed that, because
D, who continued to reside at the property, had turned eighteen years
old, the plaintiff was required to have served a notice to quit on him.
Because the notice to quit could not be retroactively amended to include
D, the defendants claimed that the judgment of possession became
invalid, as all adults presently residing at the property had not been
properly served pursuant to § 47a-23 (c) before the judgment of posses-
sion had been executed. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion,
finding that the notice to quit had been properly served on all adult
occupants and the fact that D reached the age of majority after the
judgment had been rendered did not cause the notice to quit to become
defective. On the defendants’ appeal to this court, held that this court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal as the
defendants were not aggrieved by the denial of their motion to open and
dismiss the judgment of possession: the defendants were not classically
aggrieved by the trial court’s decision denying their motion to open and
dismiss the judgment as that motion was premised on their claim that
D had not been served with a notice to quit as required by § 47a-23 (c),
a claim that was based on a right or interest that allegedly belonged to
a third party, D, who was a nonparty to the present action; moreover,
even if the defendants arguably have a specific, personal, and legal
interest in the subject matter of the judgment of possession to remain
residing in the property, the defendants failed to identify a special,
personal interest belonging to them that has been specifically and injuri-
ously affected by the trial court’s decision denying the motion to open
and dismiss; furthermore, the defendants failed to demonstrate that they
were statutorily aggrieved under § 47a-23 (c), as the defendants did not
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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey
claim that they were not properly served with the notice to quit, rather,
they claimed that D, a nonparty, was not properly served with notice,
and there was no judicial relief that the defendants could seek under
§ 47a-23 (c), as the defendants’ claim related to the plaintiff’s alleged
failure to comply with service under § 47a-23 as to D, a nonparty; accord-
ingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Argued January 8—officially released April 23, 2024

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
Housing Session, where the court, Spader, J., rendered
judgment of possession for the plaintiff, from which
the defendants appealed to the this court, Alvord, Cra-
dle and Palmer, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment; thereafter, the court, Baio, J., denied the
defendants’ motion to open and dismiss the judgment
of possession; subsequently, the court denied the defen-
dants’ motion to reargue, and the defendants appealed
to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Gregg P. Healey, self-represented, with whom, on the
brief, were Bridgette G. Healey, self-represented, and
Claire A. Healey, self-represented, the appellants
(named defendant et al.).
Vincent J. Averaimo, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendants Gregg P. Healey,
Bridgette G. Healey, and Claire A. Healey appeal, chal-
lenging the trial court’s denial of their motion to open
and dismiss the judgment of possession rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as trustee
for LSF9 Master Participation Trust.1 On appeal, the
1
The complaint also named several individuals: John Doe I, Jane Doe II,
John Doe II, Jane Doe III and John Doe III. Those parties have been removed
and are not participating in this appeal. We refer herein to Gregg P. Healey,
Bridgette G. Healey, and Claire A. Healey collectively as the defendants and,
where appropriate, individually by name.
Although the defendants’ appeal form lists the date of the court’s denial
of their motion to reargue the court’s decision denying their motion to open
and dismiss the judgment of possession, and the defendants’ appellate brief
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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey

defendants claim that the judgment of possession,
although valid when originally rendered, is no longer
valid as a result of the fact that Connor Healey (Con-
nor),2 the son of Gregg P. Healey and Bridgette G.
Healey, who also resides at the premises, has since
turned eighteen years old and was never served with
a notice to quit. As a result, the defendants claim that
the court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction
with respect to the judgment of possession and that
the judgment, therefore, should have been dismissed.
We conclude that the defendants are not aggrieved by
the denial of their motion to open and dismiss and,
accordingly, dismiss their appeal.

The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to the defendants’ appeal. This case has a lengthy
procedural history, largely due to the numerous
motions and appeals filed by the defendants. This case
originated in 2010 as a foreclosure action against Gregg
P. Healey and Bridgette G. Healey after they defaulted
includes one sentence stating that the defendants are appealing from the
denial of their motion to reargue, the substance of their claim on appeal
challenges the court’s decision denying their motion to open and dismiss
the judgment of possession. Because any defect in the appeal form is techni-
cal and not jurisdictional in nature, we treat the defendants’ appeal as being
from the court’s denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment
of possession. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281 Conn. 262, 275, 914 A.2d 1025
(2007) (‘‘[T]he forms for appeals and amended appeals do not in any way
implicate appellate subject matter jurisdiction. They are merely the formal,
technical vehicles by which parties seek to invoke that jurisdiction. Compli-
ance with them need not be perfect; it is the substance that matters, not
the form.’’).
2
The defendants’ claim on appeal and in their motion to open and dismiss
also concerned Ryan Healey, the other son of Gregg P. Healey and Bridgette
G. Healey. On June 30, 2021, Ryan passed away from cancer; therefore, we
limit our discussion in this opinion to Connor. We note that doing so in no
way affects our decision in this appeal. Because Ryan and Connor were
minors when the notice to quit was served on the defendants, both are
nonparties to this action, and both turned eighteen years old after the
judgment of possession was rendered, and, accordingly, the basis for our
decision is the same, regardless of whether it pertains to one or both sons.
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on a note secured by a mortgage on real property
located at 61 East Meadow Road in Wilton.3 After sev-
eral years of litigation, a judgment of strict foreclosure
was rendered in 2016. The defendants appealed from
that judgment, which was affirmed by this court in 2017.
The litigation between the parties continued over the
course of two more years, during which time the defen-
dants filed several more motions and requests that were
denied by the court, along with two more appeals that
were dismissed as frivolous.
After the dismissal of the last of the defendants’
appeals in 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to reset the
law day. On January 14, 2019, the court granted the
motion and rendered a new judgment of strict foreclo-
sure. The court also set a new law day for February 5,
2019. After the passing of the law day, title to the
subject property became absolute in the plaintiff on
February 7, 2019.4 The plaintiff subsequently com-
menced the present summary process action against
the defendants in August, 2019, seeking a judgment of
possession of the subject premises. A notice to quit
possession was served on Gregg P. Healey; Bridgette
G. Healey; Claire A. Healey, also known as Jane Doe
1; John Doe 1; John Doe 2; Jane Doe 2; and Jane Doe
3.5 The original complaint listed the wrong address for
3
The foreclosure action initially was commenced by JPMorgan Chase
Bank, National Association (JPMorgan). On December 22, 2015, the court
granted JPMorgan’s motion to substitute U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as trustee
for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, as the plaintiff in that action.
4
‘‘Where there [is] no appellate stay in effect when the law days [begin]
to run . . . absolute title to the property [transfers] to the plaintiff as a
matter of law after all law days expired.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
DXR Finance Parent, LLC v. Theraplant, LLC, 223 Conn. App. 362, 370,
309 A.3d 347, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 957, 310 A.3d 380 (2024). In the present
case, because there was no appellate stay in effect when the law day passed,
the running of the law day on February 5, 2019, carried out the judgment
of strict foreclosure.
5
The John Does and Jane Does, who had been included in the notice to
quit to cover any other potential adults residing at the premises, were
removed from the case on November 1, 2019, by order of the court, after
it was determined that the only other occupants at the premises were minors.
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the subject property. The plaintiff subsequently
requested leave to amend the complaint, which was
granted, and the complaint was amended to reflect the
correct address. The defendants filed an answer deny-
ing the allegations of the complaint along with a special
defense, in which they asserted that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the action ‘‘because
the original summons and complaint are defective and
cannot be amended . . . .’’
Following a hearing, the court rendered judgment of
possession in favor of the plaintiff on October 31, 2019,
from which the defendants timely appealed to this
court. On October 19, 2021, this court affirmed the judg-
ment of possession. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v.
Healey, 208 Conn. App. 903, 259 A.3d 723 (2021), cert.
denied, 341 Conn. 902, 269 A.3d 789 (2022). On February
28, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to open and
dismiss the judgment of possession for mootness and
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In that motion, they
claimed that the judgment became invalid because Con-
nor,6 who had not been served with the notice to quit
as he was a minor at the time, turned eighteen years
old after the judgment of possession had been rendered,
but before it was executed. On April 5, 2022, the court,
Baio, J., heard arguments on the motion to open and
dismiss. On July 8, 2022, the court rendered judgment
denying the motion, finding that the notice to quit had
been properly served on all the adult occupants and
that the fact that a minor residing in the property had
reached the age of majority after the judgment had been
rendered did not cause the notice to quit to become
defective.
On August 1, 2022, the defendants filed a motion to
reargue the denial of their motion to open and dismiss
6
The defendants’ motion referred to both Ryan and Connor. For the
reasons explained earlier in this opinion; see footnote 2 of this opinion; we
refer to Connor as the relevant nonparty.
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the judgment, which the court denied. This appeal fol-
lowed. Thereafter, the parties submitted their appellate
briefs. We subsequently ordered the parties to file sup-
plemental briefs concerning the issue of whether the
defendants ‘‘had standing to file the February 28, 2022
motion to open the judgment of possession on behalf
of a nonparty, [Connor] Healey; see St. Paul’s Flax Hill
[Co-operative] v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728, 738 n.8
[6 A.3d 1168] (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906 [12
A.3d 1002] (2011); and whether they are aggrieved by
the trial court’s July 8, 2022 order denying that motion.
See M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National Hall Properties,
LLC, 163 Conn. App. 372 [136 A.3d 665], cert. denied,
321 Conn. 902 [136 A.3d 1272] (2016).’’7

In their supplemental brief, the defendants assert,
inter alia, that they are aggrieved by the denial of their
motion to open and dismiss. First, they assert that they
are statutorily aggrieved due to ‘‘the fact that the plain-
tiff no longer complies with the summary process stat-
utes.’’ This claim is premised on the fact that Connor
had never been served with a notice to quit and the
defendants’ assertion that the judgment of possession
became invalid when Connor, a minor residing at the
property, reached the age of majority after the judgment
of possession had been rendered but before it was exe-
cuted. Second, the defendants argue that they are classi-
cally aggrieved, as they have ‘‘a personal interest in
occupying their long-time residence,’’ and ‘‘they could
be unlawfully disposed of their residence . . . [which]
7
We also ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the following
issue: ‘‘Whether this appeal from the denial of a motion to open a judgment
of possession rendered in a summary process matter must be dismissed as
jurisdictionally late because it was not filed within the five day appeal period
provided by General Statutes § 47a-35. See [Housing Authority] v. Parks,
211 Conn. App. 528 [273 A.3d 245] (2022).’’ Because we conclude that the
issue of aggrievement is dispositive of this appeal, we do not address this
issue.
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would unfairly deprive the defendants’ rights of posses-
sion.’’ The plaintiff counters in its supplemental brief
that the defendants are not aggrieved because ‘‘the
motion to open is solely directed at purported issues
of service as to [Connor] and not to any of the defen-
dants.’’
We begin with the relevant legal principles. ‘‘A thresh-
old inquiry of this court upon every appeal presented
to it is the question of appellate jurisdiction. . . . It is
well established that the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Appellate Court . . . is governed by [General Stat-
utes] § 52-263,8 which provides that an aggrieved party
may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the
final judgment of the court. . . . [O]nce the question
of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be
disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . .
and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding
further with the case. . . . If it becomes apparent to
the court that such jurisdiction is lacking, the appeal
must be dismissed.’’ (Footnote added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) M.U.N. Capital, LLC v. National
Hall Properties, LLC, supra, 163 Conn. App. 374.
‘‘The terms aggrievement and standing have been
used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut
jurisprudence. We previously have stated that [t]he
question of aggrievement is essentially one of standing
. . . . Although these two legal concepts are similar,
they are not, however, identical. Aggrievement is estab-
lished if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a
8
General Statutes § 52-263 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the trial of
all matters of fact in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to
the court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any
action or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the
decision of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising
in the trial, including the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he
may appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the
court . . . .’’
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certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has
been adversely affected.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gladysz v.
Planning & Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 249, 255,
773 A.2d 300 (2001). ‘‘Aggrievement, in essence, is appel-
late standing.’’ Marine Midland Bank v. Ahern, 51
Conn. App. 790, 797, 724 A.2d 537 (1999), appeal dis-
missed, 252 Conn. 151, 745 A.2d 189 (2000). ‘‘It is axiom-
atic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of stand-
ing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of
jurisdiction. . . . There are two general types of
aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either
type will establish standing, and each has its own unique
features. . . . The test for determining [classical]
aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold deter-
mination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must
demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in
the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from
a general interest shared by the community as a whole;
second, the party claiming aggrievement must establish
that this specific personal and legal interest has been
specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 554–55, 248 A.3d 675 (2020).
‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not
by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.
In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, par-
ticular legislation grants standing to those who claim
injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Con-
servancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 487, 815 A.2d
1188 (2003).
The defendants’ argument that they are classically
aggrieved, as they have ‘‘a personal interest in occu-
pying their long-time residence’’ and ‘‘they could be
unlawfully disposed of their residence . . . [which]
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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey

would unfairly deprive the defendants’ rights of posses-
sion’’ is unavailing. The defendants’ motion to open and
dismiss is premised on a claim that Connor, an adult
presently residing at the property, had never been
served with a notice to quit as required by General
Statutes § 47a-23 (a). The defendants acknowledge that
Connor was a minor when the notice to quit was served
on them and, thus, that ‘‘it was not necessary to include
the name of a minor child in the notice to quit . . . .’’
Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 841, 43 A.3d
750, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 844 (2012).
They also made no claim in their motion that service
of the notice to quit on them was defective in any way.
Instead, the motion is premised on a claim that, because
Connor turned eighteen years old after the judgment
of possession had been rendered but before it was exe-
cuted, Connor became an adult residing in the house
who is not a party to the judgment, and because there
is no way to legally add him as a defendant to the action
retroactively, the statutory requirement of service of
the notice to quit on each adult occupant had not been
satisfied. Despite the defendants’ arguments to the con-
trary, the inescapable conclusion is that the entirety of
their claim is premised on Connor, a nonparty to the
action, and the fact that Connor is now an adult residing
in the house who was never served with a notice to
quit. Thus, the defendants, in filing their motion to open
and dismiss, were attempting to invalidate the judgment
of possession on the basis of a right or interest that
allegedly belonged to nonparty.
We therefore conclude that the defendants are not
classically aggrieved by the trial court’s decision deny-
ing the motion to open and dismiss. Even if the defen-
dants arguably have a specific, personal, and legal inter-
est in the subject matter of the decision, they have not
identified a special, personal interest belonging to them
that has been specifically and injuriously affected by
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the court’s decision denying the motion to open and
dismiss. In other words, the defendants cannot be
aggrieved by the denial of a motion that invoked the
rights of a nonparty to the action when, as here, the
interest asserted in the motion was wholly premised
on Connor’s rights.
The defendants’ arguments in support of their claim
that they are statutorily aggrieved also lack support.
The defendants’ statutory aggrievement argument is
similarly premised on the fact that Connor was never
served with a notice to quit and the plaintiff’s alleged
failure to comply with § 47a-23 (c).9 As we have stated
in this opinion, ‘‘the standing question in . . . cases [of
statutory aggrievement] is whether the . . . statutory
provision on which the claim rests properly can be
understood as granting persons in the [party’s] position
a right to judicial relief. . . . The [party claiming
aggrievement] must be within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Cornelius v. Rosario, 138 Conn. App. 1, 7, 51 A.3d
1144, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 934, 56 A.3d 713 (2012),
cert. denied sub nom. Cornelius v. Nelson 571 U.S. 819,
134 S. Ct. 386, 187 L. Ed. 2d 28 (2013). The defendants,
as adult occupants of the premises, are arguably within
the zone of interests protected by the statute, but,
because they do not claim that they were not properly
served with the notice to quit, there is no judicial relief
that they can seek under the statute. Because the defen-
dants’ claim concerning the plaintiff’s alleged failure to
comply with § 47a-23 (c) relates to Connor, a nonparty,
the defendants have not demonstrated that they are
statutorily aggrieved under § 47a-23 (c).
In conclusion, this court lacks jurisdiction over this
appeal because the defendants are not aggrieved by the
9
General Statutes § 47a-23 (c) requires that a copy of the notice to quit
‘‘shall be delivered to each lessee or occupant or left at such lessee’s or
occupant’s place of residence . . . .’’
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denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment
of possession.10
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

10
With respect to the issue of standing, Connecticut courts have consis-
tently held that ‘‘one party has no standing to raise another’s rights.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted). Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. Partnership v. Nor-
walk, 320 Conn. 535, 548, 133 A.3d 140 (2016); see also Sadloski v. Manches-
ter, 235 Conn. 637, 643, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995) (taxpayer lacked standing to
assert rights of other taxpayers who did not file appeal); Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC v. Ishikawa, 220 Conn. App. 625, 633, 298 A.3d 1276 (2023)
(Bayview) (defendant in foreclosure action lacked standing to assert special
defense of lack of notice that was personal to defendant’s former spouse);
St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, supra, 124 Conn. App. 737 n.8
(defendant lacked standing to assert claim that notice served on his mother
was defective), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011); McGinty
v. McGinty, 66 Conn. App. 35, 39 n.6, 783 A.2d 1170 (2001) (plaintiff mother
lacked standing to assert right that belonged to her minor child). The standing
issue in the present case arises in the context of the defendants asserting the
rights of a third party defensively. In Bayview, this court recently addressed
a standing issue similar to the one in the present case and determined that
the defendant lacked standing to raise her second special defense, which
was based on a lack of notice to quit to her former spouse. Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC v. Ishikawa, supra, 633. In making that determination in
Bayview, this court also recognized that the standing issue in that case did
not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the underlying
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. Id., 633 n.10. Rather, its
determination that the defendant could not raise a defense personal to her
former spouse was made for prudential reasons consistent with the federal
doctrine of prudential standing, which arises when a litigant asserts the
rights of a third party defensively. Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 n.12, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). Although the doctrine
of prudential standing is not derived from article three of the United States
constitution, the doctrine ‘‘encompass[es] . . . at least three broad princi-
ples,’’ including ‘‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another per-
son’s legal rights . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lexmark Inter-
national, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126, 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014); see also Sprint Communications Co.,
L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289–90, 128 S. Ct. 2531, 171 L. Ed.
2d 424 (2008) (explaining that United States Supreme Court has imposed
‘‘prudential limitations . . . in prior cases where a plaintiff has sought to
assert the legal claims of third parties’’).
In the present case, the defendants’ motion to open and dismiss is premised
on the rights of Connor, a nonparty to the action, and the fact that Connor
is now an adult residing in the house who was never served with a notice
to quit. The defendants are precluded, however, from asserting the rights
of Connor for the same prudential considerations this court outlined in
Bayview. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Ishikawa, supra, 220 Conn.
App. 633 n.10; see also Warth v. Selden, supra, 422 U.S. 509 (‘‘the prudential
standing rule . . . bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests
of others in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves’’). Because
prudential standing does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
we focus our decision on the issue of aggrievement as set forth in our
supplemental order, which is dispositive.