In re Zayden J.

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In re Zayden J.

IN RE ZAYDEN J.*
(AC 46639)
Suarez, Westbrook and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
child, Z. The mother had an IQ of 64 and had received assistance from
state agencies, including, but not limited to, daily living services and
financial support, for the majority of her life. She had a history with
the Department of Children and Families dating back to 2015 because
of her ongoing mental health issues. On the day Z was born, a hospital
social worker reported concerns regarding the mother’s mental health
to the department, including that she had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, intellectual disability,
autism spectrum disorder, and psychosis, and that, throughout the moth-
er’s pregnancy, she had been seen at various hospitals for treatment or
intervention due to her unstable mental health and suicidal ideations.
After Z had been adjudicated neglected, the court ordered specific steps
to facilitate the return of Z to the mother and vested the care and custody
of Z in the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The
petitioner thereafter filed a petition for termination of the mother’s
parental rights with respect to Z. Three days prior to the start of trial
on the petition, the mother filed a motion for a sixty day continuance,
stating that a putative father for Z had been identified and that he was
scheduled to take a DNA test. The court denied the mother’s motion
for a continuance and moved forward with the trial. In its memorandum
of decision terminating the parental rights of the mother as to Z, the
court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with Z and that the mother
was unwilling or unable to progress toward reunification. The court
found that, although the department had offered the mother mental
health and medication management services, offered her in-home ser-
vices to assist with her daily living skills, and made arrangements to
ensure that the mother had visitation with Z, the mother consistently
refused the mental health services, did not consistently engage in her
individual therapy, stopped taking needed medication, and revoked all
releases for the department to communicate directly with her providers.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
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In re Zayden J.
The court further found that, although the mother participated routinely
with her allotted visitation, she was not able to progress in her parenting
skills. In the portion of the memorandum of decision addressing the
seven mandatory factors articulated in the statute (§ 17a-112 (k)) govern-
ing the termination of parental rights, the court emphasized that the
mother never consistently engaged in therapy and medication manage-
ment, thus making limited, if any, progress toward stabilizing her mental
health; that the mother could not regulate her own conduct and focus on
Z’s well-being during visitation sessions; and that she routinely disrupted
visitations by being rude to the staff and requiring emergency personnel
intervention. In addition, the court found that there was limited evidence
as to Z’s ties with the mother, that he had been in the care of his foster
parents since birth, and that he was bonded to his foster family. The
court ultimately found that it was in Z’s best interest to terminate the
mother’s parental rights. Held:
1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
erroneously determined that the department made reasonable efforts
to reunify her with Z, this court having found that her claim was moot;
although the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence both
that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with
Z and that she was unwilling or unable to progress toward rehabilitation,
the mother failed to challenge on appeal the court’s finding that she
was unwilling or unable to progress toward rehabilitation, and, therefore,
even if this court were to agree with her claim, it could not provide
her with any relief because there was a second independent basis for
upholding the court’s determination.
2. The trial court’s conclusion that the termination of the respondent moth-
er’s parental rights was in Z’s best interest was not clearly erroneous:
although there was evidence in the record that the mother loved Z
and attended many of her supervised visits with him, this court has
recognized that love and a biological bond is not enough to avoid the
termination of parental rights; moreover, there was evidence that when
the mother attended her supervised visits with Z, she was often unable
to control her behavior during these visits, which raised serious concerns
for Z’s safety, these facts, in addition to the court’s other findings in its
memorandum of decision, were grounded in the evidence and strongly
supported the court’s best interest determination, and this court would
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
3. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
improperly denied her motion for a continuance: although the mother
asserted that the trial court’s denial of her motion deprived her of her
constitutional due process right to a fair trial, this court’s careful review
of the grounds stated in support of the mother’s motion for a continuance
revealed that they related to the putative father’s potential parental
rights as to Z and that they did not interfere with the parental rights of
the mother or her ability to effectively challenge the allegations in the
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In re Zayden J.
petition for termination of her parental rights; moreover, the mother’s
written motion and her arguments before this court failed to demonstrate
that, even if the putative father’s rights were adversely affected by
the court’s denial of the motion for a continuance, the adverse ruling
somehow affected fundamental rights personal to her, and, therefore,
her claim was not of constitutional magnitude; furthermore, for the
same reasons that her claim was not of constitutional magnitude, her
claim failed under the abuse of discretion standard of review, under
which it was appropriate for this court to review the claim.

Argued January 25—officially released April 18, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Mat-
ters, where the court, McLaughlin, J., denied the
respondent mother’s motion for a continuance; there-
after, the case was tried to the court, McLaughlin, J.;
judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights,
from which the respondent mother appealed to this
court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).

Alma Rose Nunley, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Tabitha M.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her
** April 18, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Zayden J.

biological son, Zayden J. (Zayden).1 On appeal, the
respondent claims that the court erred in (1) determin-
ing that reasonable efforts were made to reunify her
with Zayden, 2 (2) concluding that it was in the best
interest of Zayden to terminate her parental rights, and
(3) denying her motion for a continuance. We conclude
that the appeal is moot as to the first claim and dismiss
that portion of the appeal. With respect to the remaining
claims in the appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
court.
The following facts, as found by the court, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. ‘‘The [respondent] was born . . . in June of
1989. She is now thirty-three years old. . . . She has
an IQ of 64 and has received assistance, including, but
not limited to, daily living services and financial sup-
port, from the Department of Developmental Services
1
We note that the court also terminated the parental rights of John Doe
in the underlying proceeding because, at the time of trial, the identity of
Zayden’s biological father was unknown. Following trial, Lee Roy B. came
forward as a putative father and submitted to a DNA test that confirmed
he was the biological father of Zayden. On March 30, 2023, the petitioner
moved to cite in and amend the neglect petition to include Lee Roy B., which
the court granted. The parental rights of Lee Roy B. were not terminated
in the underlying proceeding, and he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly,
all references in this opinion to the respondent are to Tabitha M. only.
2
We note that the respondent labeled her first claim as ‘‘[t]he trial court
erred in its findings that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.’’ The
respondent specifically argues in her first claim, however, that ‘‘the petitioner
did not do everything reasonable in this case to effectuate reunification’’ and
that ‘‘the petitioner failed to properly engage the respondent in meaningful
services.’’ The respondent concludes her first claim by asserting that ‘‘the
trial court erred in finding that the respondent . . . failed to rehabilitate
because the trial court did not take into consideration that [she] required
much more intensive services to help her address her mental health issues
. . . .’’ After a careful review of the respondent’s appellate brief, we consider
the substance of her argument in her first claim to be challenging the court’s
finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the respondent with
Zayden. See In re Aurora H., 222 Conn. App. 307, 326 n.10, 304 A.3d 875
(‘‘[i]n our consideration of claims raised on appeal, this court is customarily
mindful to evaluate their substance rather than to be bound by imprecise
form’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 931, 306 A.3d 1 (2023).
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In re Zayden J.

(DDS) for the majority of her life. [The respondent’s]
grandmother primarily raised her due to [her] mother’s
unstable mental health and her father’s numerous incar-
cerations.
‘‘[The respondent] has a history with [the Department
of Children and Families (department)] dating back to
2015 because of her ongoing mental health issues. In
2016, the court adjudicated the [respondent’s] oldest
son, Tyshawn, neglected. At first, the court ordered
joint guardianship of Tyshawn with the [respondent]
and the maternal grandaunt; however, in 2018, after
several negative incidents between the [respondent]
and the grandaunt and the continuation of intimate
partner violence between the [respondent] and her part-
ners,3 the [respondent] lost custody of Tyshawn. Tys-
hawn remains in the sole care and custody of the mater-
nal grandaunt.’’ (Footnote in original.)
Zayden was born in October, 2020. ‘‘[The day Zayden
was born], a hospital social worker reported concerns
regarding the [respondent’s] mental health to [the
department]. The hospital social worker told [the
department] that the [respondent] was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder, [attention deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der], intellectual disability, [autism spectrum disorder],
and psychosis. The social worker went on to explain
that throughout the [respondent’s] pregnancy, [she] had
been seen at various hospitals . . . for treatment or
intervention due to her unstable mental health and sui-
cidal ideations. . . . The hospital social worker noti-
fied [the department] that it would not be in [Zayden’s]
‘‘The [respondent] has a history of intimate partner violence . . . with
3

several past partners. In 2018, [the department] received a report that the
[respondent’s] then partner . . . struck the [respondent] several times with
a coat hanger while [she] was unclothed. A woman who was present during
the assault recorded the incident and showed the video to [the department].
The woman also uploaded the video of the incident to a social media plat-
form. In addition, the [respondent] reported to [the department] that she
suffers from migraines as a result of the physical abuse she endured at the
hands of her older child’s father . . . .’’
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best interest to be returned to [the respondent’s] care
because of her unstable mental health and inability to
make rational decisions.’’
‘‘In October, 2020, the [respondent] was residing at
[a residential treatment program for individuals with
both mental health and substance abuse disorders (pro-
gram)]. This residence was part of a court order associ-
ated with a criminal case.4 . . . In November, 2020,
the [respondent] left [the program] against medical
advice and court orders. The [respondent] failed to com-
plete the program prior to leaving.’’ (Footnote in origi-
nal.)
On October 30, 2020, the petitioner filed a neglect
petition and an order of temporary custody (OTC) with
respect to Zayden. The court, Wilkerson Brillant, J.,
granted the OTC ex parte and ordered preliminary spe-
cific steps to facilitate the return of Zayden to the
respondent. On November 6, 2020, the court sustained
the OTC, reconfirmed the specific steps, and vested the
care and custody of Zayden in the petitioner.
‘‘In 2021, the [respondent] was brought to hospital
emergency rooms on several occasions for observation
or assessment due to her suicidal ideations or depres-
sion, including on March 22 and 24, April 5, May 15,
August 3 and 4, September 27 and 28, and October 10.
The [respondent] also had intervention from emergency
personnel, not always leading to transport to the hospi-
tal, for suicidal ideations on June 13 and 14, August 3
and 31, September 17 and 28, and October 10 and 19.’’
4
‘‘The [respondent] has a criminal history from 2017 until 2020. Charges
include assault in the third degree, breach of the peace, violation of protec-
tive orders, and violation of probation. In August, 2020, she was incarcerated
for a violation of probation. The [respondent’s] residence at [the program]
was a condition of her probation. She was ordered to stay at [the program]
until January, 2021. When the [respondent] left the program early, the court
issued an arrest warrant for [her] for failure to appear and a violation of
probation. The court eventually vacated the warrant, and the [respondent]
remained on probation.’’
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In re Zayden J.

On February 24, 2022, the petitioner filed a termina-
tion of parental rights petition with respect to Zayden.
On March 17, 2022, the respondent filed a motion for
a transfer of guardianship to Zayden’s cousin, T. The
court thereafter consolidated the trial on the respon-
dent’s motion to transfer guardianship and the petition
to terminate parental rights.
‘‘On May 25, 2022, the court, Maronich, J., adjudi-
cated [Zayden] neglected, based on the [respondent’s]
nolo contendere plea, and committed [him] to [the peti-
tioner’s] care and custody. The court also ordered final
[specific] steps for the [respondent]. These [specific]
steps were similar in sum and substance to the prelimi-
nary [specific] steps that the court ordered at the OTC
proceeding in October, 2020. At the adjudication hear-
ing, the court canvassed the [respondent] on her deci-
sion to file a written nolo contendere plea, on the dispo-
sition of commitment, and on the specific steps.’’ On
July 12, 2022, the court, Reid, J., approved a perma-
nency plan of termination of the respondent’s parental
rights as to Zayden.
On February 6, 2023, three days prior to the start of
the consolidated trial on the petition to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights and the motion to transfer
guardianship, the respondent filed a motion for a sixty
day continuance, stating that a putative father for
Zayden had been identified and that he was scheduled
to take a DNA test. The court, McLaughlin, J., denied
the respondent’s motion for a continuance. The court
then held the consolidated trial on February 9 and 16,
2023. The court heard testimony from multiple wit-
nesses, including the respondent, and several exhibits
were admitted into evidence.
On April 28, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision terminating the parental rights of the respon-
dent as to Zayden and denying her motion to transfer
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In re Zayden J.

guardianship. In its memorandum of decision, the court
5

found by clear and convincing evidence that ‘‘[the
department] made reasonable efforts to locate the
[respondent]’’ and that ‘‘[the department] made reason-
able efforts to reunify the [respondent] and [Zayden].
Further, the [respondent] proved unwilling or unable
to progress toward reunification.’’ The court reasoned
that, ‘‘[a]t every turn, [the department] offered the
[respondent] mental health and medication manage-
ment services. DDS also offered the [respondent] in-
home services to assist with her daily living skills. [The
department] made arrangements to ensure that the
[respondent] had visitation with [Zayden]. The [respon-
dent] consistently refused and hindered her mental
health services. She did not consistently engage in her
individual therapy and stopped taking needed medica-
tion. The [respondent] revoked all releases for [the
department] to communicate directly with her provid-
ers. Although the [respondent] did participate routinely
with her allotted visitation, she was not able to progress
in her parenting skills. [The department] made reason-
able efforts to reunify the [respondent] with [Zayden].
Despite these reasonable efforts, the [respondent] was
unwilling or unable to make sound progress toward
mental health stability and competent parenting.’’ The
court further found by clear and convincing evidence
after consideration of the seven mandatory factors
articulated in General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) that it was
in Zayden’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights and that a transfer of guardianship was
not in his best interest. This appeal followed. Additional
facts and procedural history will be provided as neces-
sary.
5
The court also terminated John Doe’s parental rights as to Zayden;
however, the court did not appoint the petitioner as Zayden’s statutory
parent because of the pending paternity test for the newly disclosed putative
father. The respondent did not appeal the court’s denial of the motion to
transfer guardianship.
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In re Zayden J.

Before turning to the respondent’s claims, we first
set forth the legal principles that govern our review.
‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on
a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional
phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court
must determine whether one or more of the . . .
grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate
those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the
statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j)
carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, constitute countervailing inter-
ests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of
parental rights in the absence of consent. . . . Because
a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her
child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly
complied with before termination can be accomplished
and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re A’vion A., 217 Conn. App. 330,
336–37, 288 A.3d 231 (2023). ‘‘If the trial court deter-
mines that a statutory ground for termination exists,
then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the
dispositional phase, the trial court must determine
whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
. . . The best interest determination also must be sup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) In re Autumn O., 218 Conn.
App. 424, 431, 292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025,
294 A.3d 1026 (2023).
I
The respondent first claims that the court erred in
determining that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify her with Zayden. Specifically, she
argues that ‘‘the [department] did not offer nor provide
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In re Zayden J.

meaningful services to the respondent which would
have enabled her to better understand [Zayden’s] needs
and be able to address and meet those needs of
[Zayden]. While there were some existing services in
place already, not enough was done to determine if the
services were useful and beneficial to the respondent
in helping her address her mental health issues.’’ The
respondent further asserts that ‘‘the trial court did not
take into consideration that [she] required much more
intensive services to help her address her mental health
issues . . . .’’ We conclude that the respondent’s
appeal is moot with respect to this claim.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .
Because courts are established to resolve actual contro-
versies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a
resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A
case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the
appellant any practical relief through its disposition of
the merits . . . . In determining mootness, the disposi-
tive question is whether a successful appeal would ben-
efit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . Our
review of the question of mootness is plenary. . . .
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) provides in relevant part that
the Superior Court may grant a petition [for termination
of parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that . . . the [department] has made reason-
able efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent . . . unless the court finds . . . that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts . . . . In construing that statutory lan-
guage, our Supreme Court has explained that, [b]ecause
the two clauses are separated by the word unless, this
statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accord-
ingly, the [petitioner] must prove either that it has made
reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the
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In re Zayden J.

parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunifica-
tion efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to sat-
isfy this statutory element. . . .
‘‘Because either finding, standing alone, provides an
independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1) . . .
in cases in which the trial court concludes that both
findings have been proven, a respondent on appeal must
demonstrate that both determinations are improper. If
the respondent fails to challenge either one of those
independent alternative bases . . . the trial court’s
ultimate determination that the requirements of § 17a-
112 (j) (1) were satisfied remains unchallenged and
intact. . . . In such instances, the appeal is moot, as
resolution of a respondent’s claim of error in her favor
could not [afford] her any practical relief.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re A’vion A., supra, 217 Conn. App. 354–55.
In the present case, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the department made reason-
able efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify her
with Zayden and that she was unwilling or unable to
progress toward rehabilitation. In her appellate brief,
the respondent challenges only one of the two separate
and independent bases for upholding the court’s deter-
mination that the requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had
been satisfied. Specifically, the respondent does not
challenge the court’s finding that she was unwilling or
unable to progress toward rehabilitation. See footnote
2 of this opinion. Therefore, even if we were to agree
with her claim that the department did not make reason-
able efforts to address her mental health issues in order
to reunify her with Zayden, we could not provide her
with any relief in connection with this claim because
there is a second independent basis for upholding the
court’s determination, which she does not challenge.
See In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583, 588, 210 A.3d
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In re Zayden J.

682, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912, 211 A.3d 71 (2019).
Accordingly, we dismiss this claim as moot.
II
The respondent also claims that the court erred in
concluding that it was in Zayden’s best interest to grant
the petition for termination of her parental rights. Spe-
cifically, the respondent argues that ‘‘[she] clearly loves
her son and she has brought food and clothing for him
to the visits, she has, in her own way, tried to teach
him his ABCs and 123s, and she has tried to help him
maintain a relationship with his older brother and other
extended family members who could not attend the
visits that the respondent had with Zayden.’’ The
respondent also contends that she has ‘‘offered other
family members and the putative father as resources
for Zayden while she works on her mental health
issues.’’ The petitioner argues that there was ample
evidence to support the court’s best interest determina-
tion.6 We agree with the petitioner.
‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn
the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the
court’s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The best
interests of the child include the child’s interests in
sustained growth, development, well-being, and conti-
nuity and stability of [his] environment. . . . In the
dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights
hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the
continuation of the [respondent’s] parental rights is not
6
We note that the attorney for Zayden filed a letter with this court adopting
the brief of the petitioner.
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In re Zayden J.

in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this deci-
sion, the court is mandated to consider and make writ-
ten findings regarding seven statutory factors deline-
ated in [§ 17a-112 (k)]. . . . The seven factors serve
simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory
prerequisites that need to be proven before termination
can be ordered. . . . There is no requirement that each
factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
. . .
‘‘It is axiomatic that a trial court’s factual findings
are accorded great deference. Accordingly, an appellate
tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termi-
nation of parental rights is in a child’s best interest
unless that finding is clearly erroneous. . . . A finding
is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence
in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. . . . On appeal, our function is to
determine whether the trial court’s conclusion was fac-
tually supported and legally correct. . . . In doing so,
however, [g]reat weight is given to the judgment of
the trial court because of [the court’s] opportunity to
observe the parties and the evidence. . . . We do not
examine the record to determine whether the trier of
fact could have reached a conclusion other than the
one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presump-
tion is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 152–53, 290 A.3d
901 (2023).
In its memorandum of decision, the court considered
and made findings under each of the seven statutory
factors in § 17a-112 (k) before determining, by clear
and convincing evidence, that it was in Zayden’s best
interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
In the dispositional portion of its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court emphasized that the respondent ‘‘never
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consistently engaged in therapy and medication man-
agement, thus making limited, if any, progress toward
stabilizing her mental health. . . . Further, while the
[respondent] always attended her visitation sessions
with Zayden, she did not gain any insight into her parent-
ing. The [respondent] never understood portion control
for [Zayden] and never was able to properly soothe
[him]. The [respondent] could not regulate her own
conduct and focus on [Zayden’s] well-being. Moreover,
the [respondent] routinely disrupted visitations in that
she was rude to the staff and required emergency per-
sonnel intervention.’’
In addition, the court found that ‘‘[t]here was limited
evidence as to [Zayden’s] ties with the [respondent].
. . . [Zayden] has been in the care of his foster parents
since birth. He is now two. All he has known are his
current foster parents. The foster family cares for
Zayden and ensures his health, education, and every
need are tended to. He is bonded to this family.’’ Fur-
thermore, the court credited the testimony of the
respondent’s case manager at the department, Sherene
Williams, who supervised some of the respondent’s vis-
its with Zayden. Specifically, Williams testified at trial
that the department assessed each of the six relative
resources identified by the respondent and determined
that they were not appropriate for placement for various
reasons: T became ill and stated that she could not be
a resource at this time; one was not able to pass the
department’s checks; one had an active department
case against her; one told the department that she did
not want to be a resource for Zayden; and two were
not employed at the time and only wanted guardianship
of Zayden instead of being a foster parent to him.
The court’s finding that the termination of the respon-
dent’s parental rights is in Zayden’s best interest is
supported by the evidence in the record. Although there
is evidence in the record that the respondent loves
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Zayden and attended many of her supervised visits with
him, this court has recognized that ‘‘love and a biologi-
cal bond is not enough.’’ In re Emily S., 210 Conn. App.
581, 628, 270 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 342 Conn. 911, 271
A.3d 1039 (2022). Moreover, there was evidence that
when the respondent attended her supervised visits
with Zayden, she was often unable to control her behav-
ior during these visits, which raised serious concerns
for Zayden’s safety. For example, Williams testified that
the police had to be called three times during the
respondent’s supervised visits at the department. Two
of those instances were because the respondent refused
to relinquish Zayden to department personnel at the
conclusion of her visits.7 Williams also testified that
Zayden has lived with his foster parents since birth,
has developed a strong bond with them, and refers to
them as mom and dad. Furthermore, the court credited
Williams’ testimony that the department evaluated each
of the relative resources provided by the respondent
and deemed each of them inappropriate as a relative
placement resource for Zayden. It is well established
that ‘‘we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand
observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.
. . . In a case that is tried to the court . . . the judge
is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, and the
weight to be given to their specific testimony.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Christina C., 221 Conn.
App. 185, 221, 300 A.3d 1188, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
907, 301 A.3d 1056 (2023).
These facts, which are grounded in the evidence,
strongly support the court’s best interest determination,
7
Williams also testified that, during the last supervised visit where the
police had to be called, the respondent threatened to jump out of a fourth
floor window when Zayden was out of her hands. After this incident, the
department moved the supervised visits to a third-party provider due to
safety concerns.
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and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s
conclusion that the termination of the respondent’s
parental rights is in Zayden’s best interest was not
clearly erroneous.
III
Finally, the respondent claims that the court improp-
erly denied her motion for a continuance. She asserts
that the denial of her motion violated her fundamental
‘‘right of family integrity.’’ We disagree.
As set forth previously in this opinion, on February
6, 2023, three days prior to the scheduled beginning of
the consolidated trial on the petition to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights and the respondent’s
motion to transfer guardianship, the respondent filed
a motion for a sixty day continuance, stating that a
putative father for Zayden had been identified and that
he was scheduled to take a DNA test. As grounds for
her motion, the respondent asserted that ‘‘[a putative]
father, [Lee Roy B.], has been identified and a DNA test
[has been] scheduled. The DNA test has been delayed.
[The putative] father needs to be given reasonable
efforts. In addition, several relatives have been identi-
fied for a [transfer of guardianship] but [the department]
has refused all relatives.’’ The court denied the respon-
dent’s motion for a continuance. The court then held
a trial on February 9 and 16, 2023.
In raising a challenge of constitutional dimension
with respect to the court’s denial of the motion for a
continuance, the respondent asserts a deprivation of
her due process right to a fair trial. The petitioner argues
that we should not review the respondent’s constitu-
tional claim and, in the alternative, argues that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in denying the
respondent’s motion for a continuance.
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It is necessary to consider whether to review the
respondent’s claim as a claim of constitutional dimen-
sion, as the respondent argues, or whether we should
review the court’s ruling for an abuse of its discretion,
as the petitioner argues. ‘‘The due process rights of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution
apply in proceedings brought by the state to terminate
parental rights. . . . A reviewing court ordinarily ana-
lyzes a denial of a continuance in terms of whether the
court has abused its discretion. . . . This is so where
the denial is not directly linked to a specific constitu-
tional right. . . . If, however, the denial of a continu-
ance is directly linked to the deprivation of a specific
constitutional right, some courts analyze the denial in
terms of whether there has been a denial of due process.
. . . Even if the denial of a motion for a continuance
on the ground of lack of due process can be directly
linked to a claim of a denial of a specific constitutional
right, if the reasons given for the continuance do not
support any interference with the specific constitu-
tional right, the court’s analysis will revolve around
whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . In
other words, the constitutional right alleged to have
been violated must be shown, not merely alleged.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.) In
re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 601–603, 767 A.2d
155 (2001).
Our careful review of the grounds stated in support
of the respondent’s motion for a continuance reveals
that they relate to the putative father’s potential paren-
tal rights as to Zayden. The reasons stated in the motion
for a continuance do not interfere with the parental
rights of the respondent, her ability to effectively chal-
lenge the allegations in the termination of parental
rights petition, or her ability to pursue her motion to
transfer guardianship. Specifically, the motion relates
to Lee Roy B.’s right to have the department make
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reasonable efforts to reunify him with Zayden, if he
was found to be the biological father. In neither the
respondent’s written motion nor her arguments before
this court does the respondent demonstrate how the
grounds of the motion implicated the adjudication of
her parental rights. ‘‘[I]t bears emphasis that termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings concern only the
rights of the respondent parent.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deboras S.,
220 Conn. App. 1, 39, 296 A.3d 842 (2023). Lee Roy B.
was not a party to the underlying termination proceed-
ing and the respondent is unable to demonstrate that,
even if his rights were adversely affected by the court’s
denial of the motion for a continuance, the adverse
ruling somehow affected fundamental rights personal
to her. The respondent’s claim is not of constitutional
magnitude, and thus it is proper to analyze the claim
under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
‘‘The determination of whether to grant a request for
a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court,
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. . . . A reviewing court is bound by the prin-
ciple that [e]very reasonable presumption in favor of
the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion will
be made. . . . To prove an abuse of discretion, an
appellant must show that the trial court’s denial of a
request for a continuance was arbitrary. . . . [Our
Supreme Court has] articulated a number of factors
that appropriately may enter into an appellate court’s
review of a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in
denying a motion for a continuance. Although resistant
to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around the
circumstances before the trial court at the time it ren-
dered its decision, including: the timeliness of the
request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;
the age and complexity of the case; the granting of
other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on
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the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;
the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in
support of the request; [and] the [party’s] personal
responsibility for the timing of the request . . . .’’ In
re Na-Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 15–16, 303 A.3d 1206,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
Having determined that the respondent’s claim is not
of constitutional magnitude, and is therefore reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, we conclude
that she has failed to show how the court abused its
discretion in denying her motion for a continuance
given her failure to demonstrate how the grounds of
the motion implicated the adjudication of her paren-
tal rights.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the respon-
dent’s claim that the department did not make reason-
able efforts to reunify her with Zayden; the judgment
is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.