Stevens v. Khalily

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ERIC STEVENS v. EDWARD KHALILY ET AL.
(AC 45400)
Alvord, Prescott and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

After the dissolution of the plaintiff’s marriage to his former spouse, T,
the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, T’s mother and
stepfather, seeking damages for, inter alia, defamation. The defendants
filed a motion to strike all counts of the complaint. The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion to strike as to all counts, finding, inter
alia, that, even when construed broadly and realistically, the plaintiff’s
defamation allegations failed to sufficiently allege a claim for defamation
with the requisite specificity. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims
only that the trial court improperly struck the defamation counts of
his complaint. Held that this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
granting the defendants’ motion to strike on the alternative ground that
the plaintiff failed to allege reputational harm, one of the four elements
necessary to establish a prima facie case of defamation per quod, and,
because the plaintiff failed to plead all elements of defamation, the
defamation counts were properly stricken.
Argued May 9—officially released July 25, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, defamation,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Shapiro,
J. granted the motion to dismiss filed by the named
defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon; there-
after, the court, Sheridan, J., granted the motion to
strike filed by the defendant Shahram Rabbani et al.,
and the plaintiff appealed to this court; subsequently,
the court, Cobb, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for
judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant Shah-
ram Rabbani et al., from which the plaintiff filed an amend-
ed appeal. Affirmed.
Christopher T. DeMatteo, with whom, on the brief,
was Norman A. Pattis, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Cristin E. Sheehan, for the appellees (defendant Shah-
ram Rabbani et al.).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Eric Stevens, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
defendants Shahram Rabbani (Shahram) and Diana Rab-
bani (Diana),1 following the court’s granting of the defen-
dants’ motion to strike all counts of the complaint brought
against them. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly struck counts nine and twelve, which alleged
defamation against Shahram and Diana respectively, for
failure to plead defamation with the requisite specificity.2
The plaintiff argues that counts nine and twelve of the
operative complaint3 ‘‘adequately identify the alleged
defamatory statements, who made them and to whom
they were made, which is what is required of defamation
pleadings under Connecticut law and practice.’’ We con-
clude that the court properly granted the motion to strike
counts nine and twelve because the plaintiff has failed to
plead reputational harm, an element required to establish
a prima facie case of defamation at common law. Because
the plaintiff has failed to plead all four elements of defama-
tion, we need not reach the plaintiff’s claim that the court
improperly granted the motion to strike on the grounds
that he failed to plead the elements of defamation with the
requisite specificity. We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, as alleged in the operative com-
plaint, and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s
claim on appeal. The plaintiff previously was married to
Tiffany Khalily, with whom he had a child. The defendants
are Tiffany Khalily’s mother and stepfather. On May 21,
2009, the plaintiff initiated a marital dissolution action
against Tiffany Khalily. The court rendered a judgment of
dissolution of marriage on September 6, 2011, that incorpo-
rated the parties’ marital separation agreement. Pursuant
to the judgment, Tiffany Khalily was granted full legal and
physical custody of their daughter, and the plaintiff was
granted visitation. Bitter postdissolution proceedings fol-
lowed regarding custody of and visitation with their child.
While the parties were involved in this contentious dispute,
the defendants made allegedly defamatory statements to
agents of the Department of Children and Families (depart-
ment) regarding the plaintiff.4
The plaintiff commenced this action on October 16,
2017. On March 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed the operative
revised complaint. The counts relevant to this appeal are
nine and twelve, which, as previously noted, allege defama-
tion by the defendants. In particular, the plaintiff alleged
in count nine that Shahram made statements to the depart-
ment about the plaintiff, including that the plaintiff was
in the habit of sleeping with transvestite prostitutes.
In count twelve, the plaintiff alleged that Diana told
the department that the plaintiff had engaged in physical
violence,5 had no interest in seeing or spending time with
his daughter, was only interested in seeing his child to the
extent that she was the beneficiary of a $50 million trust,
lived a dangerous lifestyle, and was so desperate for money
that he would prostitute his daughter.
In response to the revised complaint, the defendants,
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39, filed a motion to strike
all counts brought against them.6 In support of their motion
to strike, the defendants argued in relevant part that the
‘‘plaintiff’s claims of defamation within counts nine and
twelve fail to allege sufficient facts to comply with the
heightened pleading requirements for such claims.’’ The
defendants also argued that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims against them, counts seven and
ten, failed to state a claim because the plaintiff did not
allege that they engaged in any outrageous or extreme
conduct. The defendants argued that the prima facie tort
claims against them, counts eight and eleven, should also
be stricken because ‘‘the allegations supporting the claims
are already addressed by other causes of action.’’
The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike.
The plaintiff argued that he should be afforded and is
entitled to every reasonable inference drawn from the
pleadings at that stage and that those inferences support
the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation and prima facie tort. The plaintiff argued that,
‘‘[a]t a minimum, there is evidence to support the claims
that the . . . defendants conspired to [and/or] directly
acted to deprive the plaintiff of substantial real estate
holdings and millions of dollars and conspired to and
directly acted to defame the plaintiff and to deprive him
of a relationship with his daughter, notwithstanding court
orders allowing the plaintiff regular visitation.’’
In response to the plaintiff’s objection, the defendants
filed a reply, arguing that the ‘‘plaintiff has only made
dramatic conclusions that the [defendants] slandered him
in discussions with [the department] and fails to allege any
facts supporting when these statements were published,
to whom they were published, or how his reputation was
damaged. . . . The complaint should be stricken due to
the lack of the requisite factual allegations within the com-
plaint coupled with the admission that the plaintiff needs
to conduct discovery to find the basic information required
to properly plead this cause of action.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis added.)
On August 21, 2019, the trial court, Sheridan, J., issued
a memorandum of decision granting the motion to strike
as to counts seven, eight, ten and eleven but denying
the motion to strike as to counts nine and twelve, the
defamation counts. With respect to counts nine and twelve,
the court analyzed the sufficiency of the allegations con-
tained in the original complaint, not the operative revised
complaint.
On August 28, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for
reargument and reconsideration. The defendants argued
that the court’s decision in regard to counts nine and
twelve should be reconsidered because controlling appel-
late authority requires that defamation must be pleaded
with specificity. As a result, the defendants argued, ‘‘the
instant decision is inconsistent with controlling precedent
and should be reconsidered.’’ Additionally, the defendants
argued that the court improperly analyzed the sufficiency
of the original complaint dated October 6, 2017, rather
than the sufficiency of the revised complaint dated March
1, 2019. The court denied the defendants’ motion without
comment on November 19, 2019.
The defendants then filed a motion for clarification and/
or articulation, again raising that the court’s August 21,
2019 ruling on the motion to strike had improperly ana-
lyzed the sufficiency of the original complaint, rather than
the operative complaint. In response to the defendants’
motion, the court issued a decision on March 14, 2022, in
which it reconsidered its August 21, 2019 ruling on the
motion to strike with respect to counts nine and twelve.
After setting forth the relevant allegations from the opera-
tive complaint, the court concluded in relevant part that,
‘‘even when construed broadly and realistically, the allega-
tions in count[s] nine and twelve fail[ed] to sufficiently
allege a claim for defamation with the requisite specificity
as described in the relevant case law.’’7 Accordingly, the
court effectively set aside its prior ruling and struck counts
nine and twelve.
On March 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for judg-
ment pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44,8 stating that he
declines to replead and asking the court to enter judgment
on all counts brought against the defendants. On March
31, 2022, before the trial court acted on the plaintiff’s
motion for judgment, the plaintiff filed an appeal with this
court challenging the court’s March 14, 2022 order striking
counts nine and twelve. The trial court subsequently
granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment and ordered
that ‘‘judgment is entered in favor of the defendant[s] on
counts nine and twelve of the [operative] complaint.’’
This court, sua sponte, issued the following order on
June 22, 2022: ‘‘The parties are hereby ordered to file
memoranda . . . and give reasons, if any, why the appeal
should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment
because judgment had not been rendered on any of the
stricken counts of the amended complaint when the appeal
was filed; see Practice Book §§ 10-44 and 61-3; Pellecchia
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. App. 88,
90–91 [54 A.3d 658] (2012), cert. denied, 307 Conn. [9]50
[60 A.3d 740] (2013); unless judgment is rendered on all
of the stricken counts of the amended complaint as to the
defendants-appellees Diana Rabbani and Shahram Rab-
bani and the plaintiff-appellant files an amended appeal.
See Practice Book § 61-9.’’
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment with
the trial court with respect to the remaining stricken
counts brought against the defendants. On June 27, 2022,
the court, Cobb, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion and ren-
dered judgment on all counts brought against the defen-
dants. The plaintiff filed a response to this court’s motion
to dismiss, informing the court that he had obtained a
final judgment and filed an amended appeal in accordance
with Practice Book § 61-9.9
In his amended appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly struck counts nine and twelve of the operative
complaint for failure to plead defamation with the requisite
pleading specificity. According to the plaintiff, counts nine
and twelve of the operative complaint ‘‘adequately identify
the alleged defamatory statements, who made them and
to whom they were made, which is what is required of
defamation pleadings under Connecticut law and prac-
tice.’’ The defendants counter that ‘‘[t]he trial court prop-
erly determined that the allegations in counts nine and
twelve of the operative complaint fell short of the pleading
standard for defamation.’’
We begin by setting forth the controlling legal principles,
the elements of defamation and the pleading requisites
that relate to such. ‘‘A defamatory statement is defined as
a communication that tends to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) NetScout
Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., 334 Conn. 396, 410, 223
A.3d 37 (2020). ‘‘Defamation is comprised of the torts of
libel and slander: slander is oral defamation and libel is
written defamation.’’10 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 430 n.30, 125 A.3d
920 (2015).
‘‘At common law, [t]o establish a prima facie case of
defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the
defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the
defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third
person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a
third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s reputation suffered
injury as a result of the statement.’’ (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) NetScout Systems, Inc.
v. Gartner, Inc., supra, 334 Conn. 410. ‘‘Each statement
furnishes a separate cause of action and requires proof
of each of the elements for defamation.’’ Gleason v. Smoli-
nski, supra, 319 Conn. 431.
The court, in granting the defendants’ motion to strike,
determined that, ‘‘even when construed broadly and realis-
tically, the allegations in count[s] nine and twelve fail to
sufficiently allege a claim for defamation with the requisite
specificity as described in the relevant case law.’’ In so
holding, the court relied on language in Stevens v. Helm-
ing, 163 Conn. App. 241, 247 n.3, 135 A.3d 728 (2016)
(Helming), regarding the level of specificity required to
plead defamation. The defendants argue that Helming
‘‘required specificity in pleading [defamation].’’ The defen-
dants assert that to plead defamation with sufficient speci-
ficity, the plaintiff must ‘‘identify the statements, the third
parties to whom the allegedly defamatory statements were
made and when the statements were made within the
complaint.’’ The plaintiff counters that under Helming, a
defamation pleading is sufficient if it is detailed enough
to afford the defendant sufficient notice of the communica-
tions and enable him to defend himself. He asserts that
‘‘[a] defamation pleading should be held sufficiently spe-
cific when it identifies the speaker, recipient and nature
of the alleged defamatory statements.’’
In Helming, the plaintiff in a defamation action appealed
from the court’s granting of summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. Stevens v. Helming, supra, 163 Conn.
App. 242. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly
failed to consider an allegation concerning a defamatory
statement made by the individual defendant that was not
specifically pleaded in the complaint but was raised for
the first time in the plaintiff’s surreply to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. Id., 244. This court affirmed
the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor
of the defendants on the narrow ground that the trial court,
in ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
was limited to consideration of those facts alleged in the
complaint standing alone, which could not fairly be read
to include the alleged defamatory statement raised for the
first time in a surreply brief. Id., 246. This court noted that
the failure to include the allegation in the complaint could
not be overlooked under the rubric that we read pleadings
broadly and realistically, as that rule ‘‘is not a panacea for
every instance where a party fails to adhere to the basic
procedural requirements of pleading, especially in the con-
text of a defamation [count].’’ Id., 246–47.
Although not necessary to its holding, the court added
the following by way of a footnote: ‘‘Although this court
has not addressed the issue, we find persuasive the reason-
ing of various Superior Courts in requiring specificity in
pleading defamation. A claim of [defamation] must be
pl[eaded] with specificity, as the precise meaning and
choice of words employed is a crucial factor in any evalua-
tion of falsity. The allegations should set forth facts . . .
sufficient to apprise the defendant of the claim made
against him . . . . [A] complaint for defamation must, on
its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory
statements were made, by whom, and to whom . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 247 n.3. Because
Helming was decided on separate, unrelated grounds, this
language regarding the specificity of pleadings in defama-
tion actions is dicta.11 See Healey v. Mantell, 216 Conn.
App. 514, 526, 285 A.3d 823 (2022) (‘‘[d]ictum includes
those discussions that are merely passing commentary
. . . those that go beyond the facts at issue . . . and
those that are unnecessary to the holding in the case’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
We need not reach the question of the degree of particu-
larity required to plead defamation because the plaintiff
has utterly failed to allege reputational harm, an element
required to establish a prima facie case of defamation.
This court has held that we ‘‘may affirm a trial court’s
decision that reaches the right result, albeit for [a different]
reason.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield
Shores, LLC v. DeSalvo, 205 Conn. App. 96, 111, 256 A.3d
716 (2021) (affirming judgment of trial court when this
court agreed with alternative ground offered by party in
support of affirming judgment).
The defendants assert in their principal appellate brief
that the plaintiff’s allegations of defamation ‘‘do not suffice
as assertions of . . . how his reputation was damaged.
. . . Moreover, the plaintiff simply claims fear, terror, and
emotional distress but never alleges any facts showing
how his reputation was . . . damaged as a result of the
. . . alleged communications to [the department].’’12 (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus,
the defendants have proffered that the plaintiff failed to
allege reputational harm, an element necessary to establish
a prima facie case of defamation, as an alternative ground
to affirm the court’s judgment.13 Failure to plead all ele-
ments of a claim is dispositive of the action. Mercer v.
Champion, 139 Conn. App. 216, 235, 55 A.3d 772 (2012).
Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we affirm the
court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion to strike.
‘‘The standard of review in an appeal challenging a trial
court’s granting of a motion to strike is well established.
A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a
pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings
by the trial court. As a result, our review of the court’s
ruling is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those
alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we
construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to
sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts prov-
able in the complaint would support a cause of action,
the motion to strike must be denied. . . . A motion to
strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere
conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts
alleged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Campbell v.
Porter, 212 Conn. App. 377, 397–98, 275 A.3d 684 (2022).
A motion to strike is also properly granted if the complaint
lacks sufficient factual allegations that, if proven, would
satisfy all of the elements of the cause of action asserted.
See Mercer v. Champion, supra, 139 Conn. App. 235.
Whether a party must expressly allege facts sufficient
to prove the last common-law element of defamation, repu-
tational harm, turns on the type of defamation asserted,
defamation per se or defamation per quod. ‘‘While all libel
was once actionable without proof of special damages, a
distinction arose between libel per se and libel per quod.
. . . A libel per quod is not libelous on the face of the
communication, but becomes libelous in light of extrinsic
facts known by the recipient of the communication. . . .
When a plaintiff brings an action in libel per quod, he must
plead and prove actual damages in order to recover. . . .
‘‘Libel per se, on the other hand, is a libel the defamatory
meaning of which is apparent on the face of the statement
and is actionable without proof of actual damages. . . .
When the defamatory words are actionable per se, the
law conclusively presumes the existence of injury to the
plaintiff’s reputation. He is required neither to plead nor
to prove it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lega Sicil-
iana Social Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, 77 Conn. App.
846, 852, 825 A.2d 827, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901, 838
A.2d 210 (2003).
‘‘Statements deemed defamatory per se are ones in
which the defamatory meaning of the speech is apparent
on the face of the statement. . . . Our state has generally
recognized two classes of defamation per se: (1) state-
ments that accuse a party of a crime involving moral
turpitude or to which an infamous penalty is attached,
and (2) statements that accuse a party of improper conduct
or lack of skill or integrity in his or her profession or
business and the statement is calculated to cause injury
to that party in such profession or business.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Silano v. Cooney, 189 Conn.
App. 235, 242, 207 A.3d 84 (2019).
By contrast, there is no such presumption of reputa-
tional harm for defamation per quod. Lega Siciliana Social
Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, supra, 77 Conn. App. 852. ‘‘A
libel per quod is not libelous on the face of the communica-
tion, but becomes libelous in light of extrinsic facts known
by the recipient of the communication. . . . When a plain-
tiff brings an action in libel per quod, he must plead and
prove actual damages in order to recover.’’ Id.
Whether the plaintiff here was required to plead reputa-
tional harm turns on whether the allegedly defamatory
statements are defamation per se or defamation per quod.
The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the alleged defama-
tory statements fall within either category of defamation
per se. The plaintiff alleged that Shahram told the depart-
ment ‘‘that the plaintiff was in the habit of sleeping with
transvestite prostitutes . . . .’’ The plaintiff alleged that
Diana told the department ‘‘that [the plaintiff] engaged in
physical violence, that [the plaintiff] had no interest in
seeing or spending time with . . . his daughter, that the
plaintiff’s only interest in [his child] was that [his child]
was the beneficiary of a $50 million trust, that the plaintiff
was so desperate for money that he would prostitute [his
child] . . . and . . . that the plaintiff lives a dangerous
lifestyle . . . .’’ The plaintiff did not rely upon the defama-
tion per se presumption either in the trial court or on
appeal. His brief contains no analysis of that issue and his
counsel conceded at oral argument that these statements
are not defamatory per se.14 As such, the alleged state-
ments, if defamatory, must be defamation per quod.
We now turn to the facts pleaded in the operative com-
plaint. To state a claim of defamation per quod, the plaintiff
must have alleged, among other elements, that he suffered
an injury of reputational harm as a result of the allegedly
defamatory statement. If the plaintiff has not properly
pleaded all four elements of defamation, the defamation
count is properly stricken. Mercer v. Champion, supra,
139 Conn. App. 235 (affirming court’s striking of counts
when plaintiff’s complaint lacked sufficient factual allega-
tions to satisfy all elements of cause of action). The plaintiff
argues in his operative complaint only that he suffered
fear, terror and emotional distress as a result of the alleged
defamatory statements made by the defendants.15 The
plaintiff has pleaded no other harm; at oral argument
before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel only argued that
the court may reasonably infer reputational harm from the
harms pleaded. Neither fear, terror nor emotional distress,
however, relate to the community perception of the plain-
tiff, as is required to plead reputational harm. NetScout
Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., supra, 334 Conn. 410. None
of the harms alleged lend themselves to the conclusion
that, as a result of the statements made by the defendants,
the plaintiff’s reputation or standing in the community
suffered or that any third person was deterred from associ-
ating or dealing with him. Although the plaintiff’s counsel
argued at oral argument before this court that reputational
harm reasonably can be inferred from the harms pleaded,
he conceded that neither fear nor terror nor emotional
distress are reputational harms. Even viewing all well
pleaded facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff, he has failed to meet his requirement of pleading
reputational harm.16
In sum, the plaintiff was required to plead that his reputa-
tion suffered injury as a result of the allegedly defamatory
statements in order to have sufficiently stated a claim for
defamation per quod. The plaintiff’s complaint is utterly
devoid of any allegations of harm that he suffered to his
reputation as a result of the allegedly defamatory state-
ments made by the defendants. Accordingly, the court
properly granted the defendants’ motion to strike.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
Edward Khalily and Tiffany Khalily were also named as defendants in the
underlying matter. All counts against them, however, were dismissed on June
12, 2018, for insufficient service of process. See Stevens v. Khalily, 194 Conn.
App. 626, 222 A.3d 132 (2019) (affirming judgment of dismissal), cert. denied,
334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d 104 (2020). Accordingly, all references to the defendants
in this opinion are to Shahram Rabbani and Diana Rabbani only.
2
The plaintiff has not appealed from that portion of the court’s judgment
rendered following its granting of the motion to strike with respect to the
remaining counts brought against the defendants, which alleged intentional
infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort.
3
The plaintiff filed a revised complaint on March 1, 2019, which is the operative
complaint for purposes of this appeal. Counts one through six of the operative
complaint were brought against Edward Khalily and Tiffany Khalily and were
dismissed by the court on June 12, 2018. Counts seven through twelve of the
operative complaint are alleged against the defendants. Count seven alleges
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Shahram. Count eight alleges
prima facie tort against Shahram. Count nine alleges defamation against Shah-
ram. Count ten alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against Diana.
Count eleven alleges prima facie tort against Diana. Count twelve alleges defama-
tion against Diana.
4
The plaintiff’s operative complaint does not allege with specificity when the
defendants made the allegedly defamatory statements.
5
The plaintiff’s operative complaint does not allege with whom the plaintiff
engaged in physical violence.
6
Practice Book § 10-39 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A motion to strike shall
be used whenever any party wishes to contest: (1) the legal sufficiency of the
allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or
more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .’’
7
The court relied upon Stevens v. Helming, 163 Conn. App. 241, 247 n.3, 135
A.3d 728 (2016), for the proposition that the plaintiff’s pleadings failed to meet
the level of specificity required to plead defamation. We discuss that case in
greater depth subsequently in this opinion.
8
Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within fifteen days after
the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken
may file a new pleading; providing that in those instances where an entire
complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any count in a complaint, counter-
claim or cross complaint has been stricken, and the party whose pleading or
a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading within that
fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enter judgment
against said party on said stricken complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint,
or count thereof. . . .’’
9
Practice Book § 61-9 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Should the trial court, subse-
quent to the filing of a pending appeal, make a decision that the appellant
desires to have reviewed, the appellant shall file an amended appeal within
twenty days from the issuance of notice of the decision as provided for in
Section 63-1. . . . If the original appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
any amended appeal shall remain pending if it was filed from a judgment or
order from which an original appeal properly could have been filed. . . .’’
The plaintiff filed his original appeal from an order granting a motion to
strike. The granting of a motion to strike is not a final judgment. Gold v. Rowland,
296 Conn. 186, 242, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). The plaintiff then filed an amended
appeal from the court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment. Although
the plaintiff’s original appeal was jurisdictionally defective for a lack of a final
judgment, he properly filed an amended appeal under Practice Book § 61-9 from
a judgment from which an original appeal could have been filed. Accordingly,
we dismiss the original appeal for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
amended appeal is properly before this court.
10
The same analysis applies to both slander and libel. DeMorais v. Wisniowski,
81 Conn. App. 595, 603 n.6, 841 A.2d 226, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 923, 848 A.2d
472 (2004).
11
We note that Superior Court decisions post-Helming are split as to the
specificity required to plead defamation. See, e.g., A Better Way Wholesale Autos,
Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 19, 2021) (granting summary
judgment when ‘‘[t]he operative complaint . . . neglect[ed] to identify any spe-
cific words used, the date on which those words were uttered or published, or
the specific individual or entity that employed the allegedly offending words’’);
Bartucca v. Career Team, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 4, 2017) (denying motion to strike when
plaintiff pleaded subject matter of defamatory statements, who made statements,
and to whom statements were made).
12
Although the defendants’ brief put the plaintiff on notice of this alternative
ground for affirming the court’s judgment, he failed to respond or to allege any
reputational harm in his reply brief.
13
In neither his brief nor at oral argument before this court did the plaintiff
assert that he was denied the opportunity to replead his cause of action after
the court had granted the defendants’ motion to strike. Rather than asking to
replead, the plaintiff simply has continued to assert that the operative complaint
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for defamation. Regarding the element of
reputational harm, the plaintiff’s counsel insisted at oral argument that reputa-
tional harm can be reasonably inferred, given the context, from the facts per-
taining to harm that the plaintiff pleaded.
14
In light of the plaintiff’s failure to analyze this question, we express no
view regarding whether any of the alleged defamatory statements constitute
defamation per se.
15
In relevant part, count nine of the operative complaint states: ‘‘As a direct
and proximate result of the acts and omissions described herein the plaintiff
suffered fear, terror, and extreme emotional distress for which he seeks money
damages from the defendant Shahram Rabbani.’’ In relevant part, count twelve
of the operative complaint states: ‘‘As a direct and proximate result of the acts
and omissions described herein, the plaintiff suffered fear, terror and emotional
distress.’’ This is the only language of the operative complaint alleging harm
against the defendants.
16
We note that the plaintiff did plead reputational harm in count two of his
operative complaint, which alleges a defamation claim against Edward Khalily.
In count two, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘[t]he statements . . . [made by] Edward
Khalily . . . were untrue and defamatory and damaged the reputation of the
plaintiff by making him seem unfit to parent his minor child . . . .’’ (Empha-
sis added.) By contrast, in counts nine and twelve, the plaintiff failed to allege
that he suffered any reputational harm as a result of the defendants’ allegedly
defamatory statements. Instead, he argued only that he suffered fear, terror and
emotional harm, none of which reasonably construed assert the required harm
to his reputation.