Membrino v. Membrino

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Membrino v. Membrino

CONRAD O. MEMBRINO v. RALPH G.
MEMBRINO ET AL.
(AC 48017)
Alvord, Elgo and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his com-
plaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with
proceedings in the Probate Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
plaintiff claimed that the court improperly determined that the allegations
asserted in his claim against the defendants were barred by the litigation
privilege. Held:

The trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, as the plaintiff’s claims were
predicated on the defendants’ alleged conduct in furtherance of a probate
proceeding in which the plaintiff participated and, thus, the specific claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as alleged by the plaintiff was
the type of action the litigation privilege was intended to prevent.

Argued December 15, 2025—officially released June 2, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,
where the plaintiff withdrew his claims as to the defen-
dant Eric Somma et al.; thereafter, the court, Massicotte,
J., dismissed the action as to the named defendant; sub-
sequently, the court, Massicotte, J., rendered judgment
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Conrad O. Membrino, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom was Brooke Weise,
for the appellees (defendant Roberta Minuto et al.).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. This appeal concerns a civil action that
was commenced in 2017 and arose out of a probate mat-
ter originating in 2012. The self-represented plaintiff,
Membrino v. Membrino

Conrad O. Membrino, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court dismissing his complaint, alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress, against the defendants
Roberta Minuto (Roberta) and Alda Membrino (Alda).1
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
dismissed his action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the allegations asserted in his
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were
barred by the litigation privilege.2 We affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal. The plaintiff
commenced the present action in September 2017. The
operative complaint, filed on May 28, 2019, includes the
following allegations. The plaintiff is the son of Emily
Membrino (Emily), who died in September 2014. Emily
had three children, the plaintiff, Roberta, and Ralph G.
Membrino (Ralph), who died in 2018. Ralph was married
to Alda.
The plaintiff alleged that he moved to Philadelphia in
1994 and thereafter spoke with Emily on the telephone
1
Eric Somma, Tom Minuto, and Susan Angela Minuto Burgess also
were named as defendants. In May 2019, the plaintiff withdrew his
claims as to these individuals. Ralph G. Membrino also was named as a
defendant, but he died in October 2018. In April 2024, the court, Mas-
sicotte, J., dismissed the action as to Ralph following the defendant
Roberta Minuto’s motion to dismiss, on the basis that the plaintiff had
failed to comply with a prior order that he open the estate and file a
motion to substitute the estate as a party. We refer to Roberta Minuto
and Alda Membrino collectively as the defendants and individually by
name where appropriate.
2
The plaintiff includes more than twenty-five paragraphs in the
statement of issues contained in his appellate brief, most of which are
abandoned due to a lack of briefing. “[When] a claim is asserted in the
statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in
the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is
deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and
efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the par-
ties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App.
84, 90, 349 A.3d 614 (2026). We address only those arguments that are
set forth in the plaintiff’s brief.
Membrino v. Membrino

every day. He alleged: “Ralph . . . and . . . Roberta . . . act-
ing in concert with . . . Alda . . . fraudulently instituted
an involuntary conservatorship proceeding against Emily
. . . in 2012 and falsely testified at a Probate Court hear-
ing on February 24, 2012, that Emily . . . suffered from
dementia. As a result of that involuntary proceeding,
Ralph . . . on March 8, 2012, was appointed conservator
of the estate of Emily . . . . He admitted under oath at
the February 24, 2012 hearing that one of his reasons for
seeking conservatorship over [Emily] was to prevent the
plaintiff from being with [Emily].” The plaintiff further
alleged that, as a result of the involuntary proceeding,
Roberta was appointed conservator of the person of
Emily.
The plaintiff alleges that Ralph informed the plaintiff
on December 6, 2012, that his access to Emily was being
restricted from that time forward. The plaintiff alleges
that he “was able to see [Emily] only twice during that
period before he saw her when she was dying—Christmas
2013 and Easter 2014. On both occasions Ralph [and the
defendants] caused police officers to be summoned within
one hour of the plaintiff being with [Emily]. The plaintiff
was not allowed to take [Emily] out on either occasion.
. . . The telephone was connected only twice during the
last month of Emily’s life—on September 3, 2014, and
on September 9, 2014. After September 9, 2014, Roberta
. . . then totally disconnected Emily[’s] telephone for
the specific purpose of preventing the plaintiff from
having any contact with [Emily] during the final days
of her life. . . . Upon a request for emergency relief, the
Probate Court ruled that the plaintiff could see [Emily]
on Sunday, September 21, 2014, for three hours in the
presence of the conservators. The plaintiff saw [Emily]
in the presence of Mary Ann and Dee Cianciolo on Sep-
tember 21, 2014, and September 22, 2014. On September
21, 2014, Emily could barely talk, and, on September
22, 2014, Emily could not talk at all. Telephone contact
never was restored.” Emily died on September 26, 2014.
The plaintiff alleges that he appealed the appointments
of Roberta and Ralph. He further alleges that he was
Membrino v. Membrino

appointed as coexecutor of Emily’s estate in December
2014, at which time he alleges that he discovered that
Emily did not have dementia and that Ralph and the
defendants “fraudulently persuaded the Probate Court
to declare her incompetent” and then “fraudulently
concealed this fact from the plaintiff . . . .”
The plaintiff alleges that, “[b]ecause of the power they
had fraudulently obtained over [Emily], the defendants
. . . were able to inflict injuries upon the plaintiff in the
ways described above and hereinafter.” The plaintiff
alleges that, on January 9, 2013, Ralph and the defen-
dants “engaged the plaintiff in an angry confrontation
and falsely accused him of criminal wrongdoing, as a
result of which he was arrested and prosecuted although
he was innocent of any wrongdoing.” He alleges that, as
a result of the wrongful prosecution, he was prevented
from having contact with Emily until after “the criminal
prosecution . . . was dismissed” on March 22, 2013. The
plaintiff further alleges that, on April 30, 2013, Roberta
issued orders to Emily’s caregivers that the plaintiff
was not permitted to take Emily out of the house. He
further alleges that Roberta, on November 29, 2013,
had the locks to Emily’s house changed so that the plain-
tiff could not see Emily, that Roberta disconnected the
telephone for days at a time so that the plaintiff could
not call Emily, and that Ralph and the defendants “then
also began unlawfully taping telephone calls between the
plaintiff and [Emily] without either the plaintiff’s or
Emily’s knowledge or permission.” The plaintiff alleges
that the defendants prevented him from seeing Emily on
various occasions, including Mother’s Day and Emily’s
ninety-fifth birthday, and that, on or about June 24,
2014, the plaintiff was notified that Roberta had sent
a letter to his attorney forbidding the plaintiff from
seeing Emily unless Roberta was present. The plaintiff
also alleges that he was precluded from having contact
with Emily’s health care providers during her final ill-
ness and, as a result, was denied any information about
her condition.
The plaintiff alleges that the conduct of Ralph and the
defendants “was extreme and outrageous and was carried
Membrino v. Membrino

out in reckless disregard of the fact that it would cause
the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” As a
result, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered “severe emo-
tional distress manifested in sleeplessness, depression,
anxiety, loss of appetite, and mood swings, among other
things.” He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
On May 1, 2024, the court, Massicotte, J., sua sponte
issued an order stating that it had “reason to question
its subject matter jurisdiction to hear . . . the plaintiff’s
complaint . . . based on the litigation privilege.” The court
cited Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 725,
161 A.3d 630 (2017), and informed the parties that the
litigation privilege implicates the court’s jurisdiction.
The court ordered the parties to submit briefing on the
issue. The parties submitted briefing, and the court held
a hearing on August 8, 2024.
On August 26, 2024, the court issued its memorandum
of decision. It first stated that a probate proceeding is
a judicial proceeding and explained that “[t]here is a
sound public policy reason for permitting the complete
freedom of expression that the grant of absolute immu-
nity provides as the Probate Court has the authority
to adjudicate issues related to conservatorships pro-
tecting the conserved and the disposition of property.
There is a strong public interest in permitting persons
to speak freely about the serious matters within the
court’s authority.” The court next examined the alle-
gations of the plaintiff’s complaint and concluded that
“the plaintiff’s claims of fraud and testimonial lies in
the probate proceedings, as well as the infliction of emo-
tional distress from the fraud and its consequences in
the course of the proceedings, are subject to the litiga-
tion privilege. All action complained of occurred in the
proceeding, including the lies he claims, and his harm
flowed from the alleged lies and fraud. The actions he
complains of outside the courtroom all occurred while
the proceeding was pending and were in furtherance of
the judicial proceeding and the authority bestowed on
the defendants as a result of the conservatorship. The
plaintiff admitted that the statements made and actions
Membrino v. Membrino

taken by the defendants were taken because of the power
vested in the conservators by the court. In addition, the
actions were necessarily considered by the judge in the
emergency petition about when and under what condi-
tions the plaintiff could see [Emily].” The court then
stated that it “cannot extend the justiciable limits of its
jurisdiction” in rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that
the litigation privilege should not operate to protect the
alleged perjury his family members committed in the
probate proceedings. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the plaintiff’s action.3 This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly dismissed his complaint on the basis that the litiga-
tion privilege applied. The defendants respond that the
court properly determined that the litigation privilege
applied to the plaintiff’s allegations of tortious conduct
in the course of a probate proceeding. We agree with the
defendants.
We first set forth our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. “Because the litigation privilege impli-
cates subject matter jurisdiction, we apply plenary review
to the trial court’s decision, indulging every presump-
tion in favor of jurisdiction, construing the complaint
in the plaintiff’s favor, and taking the allegations as
true, including facts necessarily implied.” Ammar I. v.
Dept. of Children & Families, 351 Conn. 656, 667–68,
332 A.3d 180 (2025); see also Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik,
349 Conn. 120, 137, 314 A.3d 583 (2024) (“Whether the
litigation privilege applies in a given case is a question of
law subject to de novo review. . . . When deciding whether
the privilege applies, every presumption in favor of the
court’s jurisdiction should be indulged.” (Citation omit-
ted.)). “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the author-
ity of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy
3
Alda filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. On November 6, 2024,
the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the counterclaim
as untimely and entered an order providing that, “[g]iven the procedural
posture of the case—the underlying action has been dismissed and no
revised counterclaim may be filed—what remains of the original action
is dismissed.”
Membrino v. Membrino

presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks
discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it
is without jurisdiction. . . . The subject matter jurisdic-
tion requirement may not be waived by any party, and
also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte,
at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa,
322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).
“Before addressing the applicability of the litigation
privilege, [w]e begin our analysis with a review of [this]
doctrine . . . as set forth in Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn.
523, 531–40, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). In Simms, we noted
that the doctrine of absolute immunity originated in
response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes from
suing their accusers for defamation. . . . The doctrine
then developed to encompass and bar defamation claims
against all participants in judicial proceedings, including
judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses. . . . We further
noted that, [l]ike other jurisdictions, Connecticut has
long recognized the litigation privilege, and that [t]he
general rule is that defamatory words spoken upon an
occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely,
knowingly, and with express malice, impose no liability
for damages recoverable in an action in slander . . . .
“Recently, in Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 10, 266
A.3d 127 (2021), we recognized the policy rationales
underlying this privilege. Although we articulated
these rationales in relation to a claim brought against
an attorney for communications made during a judicial
proceeding, we also have relied on these rationales to
apply immunity to claims brought against party oppo-
nents and witnesses: [T]he purpose of affording absolute
immunity to those who provide information in connec-
tion with judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is that
in certain situations the public interest in having people
speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will
occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and
malicious statements. . . . [T]he possibility of incurring
the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a
Membrino v. Membrino

[retaliatory] suit might well deter a citizen with a legiti-
mate grievance from filing a complaint. . . . Put simply,
absolute immunity furthers the public policy of encourag-
ing participation and candor in judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those
persons whom the common-law doctrine [of absolute
immunity] was intended to protect nevertheless faced
the threat of suit. In this regard, the purpose of the
absolute immunity afforded participants in judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings is the same as the purpose of
the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state. . . . As a
result, courts have recognized absolute immunity as a
defense in certain retaliatory civil actions in order to
remove this disincentive and thus encourage citizens to
come forward with complaints or to testify.” (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn.
582, 590–91, 271 A.3d 53 (2022). Our appellate courts
have recognized that absolute immunity applies not
only to defamation actions but extends to civil actions
including intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from statements made during judicial proceed-
ings. See id., 592.
The following factors are “relevant to any determina-
tion of whether policy considerations support applying
absolute immunity to any particular cause of action: (1)
whether the alleged conduct subverts the underlying
purpose of a judicial proceeding in a similar way to how
conduct constituting abuse of process and vexatious
litigation subverts that underlying purpose; (2) whether
the alleged conduct is similar in essential respects to
defamatory statements, inasmuch as the privilege bars
a defamation action; and (3) whether the alleged con-
duct may be adequately addressed by other available
remedies.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 592–93. “Since
. . . Simms, this court has clarified that these factors
. . . are simply instructive, with the focus being on the
issues relevant to the competing interests in each case
in light of the particular context of the case. . . . We
are not required to rely exclusively or entirely on these
Membrino v. Membrino

factors; rather, they are useful when undertaking a care-
ful balancing of all competing public policies implicated
by the specific claim at issue and determining whether
affording [parties] this common-law immunity from this
common-law action is warranted.”4 (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG
v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 139.
We first look to whether the plaintiff’s claim challenges
the purpose of the underlying judicial proceeding. “[I]n
determining whether the plaintiff’s claim challenges the
purpose of an underlying judicial proceeding, we look
at the elements of the claim itself.” Scholz v. Epstein,
supra, 341 Conn. 15. The elements of a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress do not
challenge the purpose of the proceeding,5 and our courts
previously have extended absolute immunity to civil
actions alleging intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress arising from statements made during judicial pro-
ceedings. See Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families,
supra, 351 Conn. 666 (“[o]ur decisions have expanded the
litigation privilege beyond defamation claims to bar a
variety of retaliatory civil claims arising from communi-
cations or communicative acts occurring in the course of
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, including, but not
limited to, claims for tortious interference, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of
[the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, § 42-110a
4
Although none of the parties address these factors in their appellate
briefing and the trial court did not analyze the factors, whether absolute
immunity applies to a cause of action is a question of law subject to de
novo review and implicates subject matter jurisdiction. See Dorfman
v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 592. Accordingly, we proceed to consider
the factors outlined in Simms.
5
“In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under
. . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must
be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict
emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional
distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause
of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by
the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton
v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
Membrino v. Membrino

et seq.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Turning
to the specific allegations, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendants “fraudulently instituted an involuntary
conservatorship proceeding against Emily . . . in 2012
and falsely testified at a Probate Court hearing on Febru-
ary 24, 2012, that Emily . . . suffered from dementia.”
Our Supreme Court has stated that “it is not enough
for the plaintiff to allege that the misconduct at issue
constituted an improper use of the judicial system, but,
rather, the cause of action itself must challenge the pur-
pose of the underlying litigation or litigation conduct.”
(Emphasis in original.) Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342
Conn. 596–97. Our Supreme Court “[has] refused to
apply absolute immunity to causes of action alleging the
improper use of the judicial system,” including claims
for abuse of process, vexatious litigation, malicious
prosecution and retaliatory litigation in violation of
General Statutes § 31-290a “because these claims seek
to hold an individual liable for . . . the improper use of
the judicial process for an illegitimate purpose, namely,
to inflict injury [on] another individual in the form of
unfounded [legal] actions.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn.
138. Although the plaintiff includes an allegation that
the defendants fraudulently instituted the underly-
ing conservatorship proceeding, the plaintiff’s cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
his remaining allegations do not challenge the purpose
of the underlying litigation, and, therefore, this factor
is neutral.
As to the second factor, the alleged conduct in the
present case, like a defamation claim, is predicated on
alleged false communications during the probate proceed-
ing. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants testified
falsely that Emily suffered from dementia. See, e.g., id.,
141 (considering whether complaint alleges defendant’s
participation in prior proceeding). The plaintiff does
not allege any misconduct prior to the conduct during
the probate proceeding. Cf. id., 147 (alleged fraud did
not commence during action but, rather, began months
Membrino v. Membrino

earlier). The remaining allegations of conduct outside of
the probate proceeding constitute the plaintiff’s claimed
injuries from the fraudulent conduct commencing and
occurring during the probate proceeding.6 Thus, this
factor weighs in favor of application of the litigation
privilege.
The third factor, “whether the alleged conduct may
be adequately addressed by other available remedies”;
Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 593; weighs heav-
ily in favor of application of the litigation privilege.
The plaintiff indisputably was active in the probate pro-
ceeding, and the remedies generally available to deter
misconduct of the nature alleged fully were available
to him within that proceeding. Furthermore, both in
his submission to the trial court and during the hearing
addressing that court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the
plaintiff acknowledged that he was pursuing an appeal
in the probate matter.
The plaintiff’s primary argument on appeal is that
the “defendants’ nonlitigation conduct is not shielded
by the litigation privilege.”7 The plaintiff directs this
6
For example, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants prevented him
from seeing Emily on various occasions and additionally alleges that,
“upon a request for emergency relief, the Probate Court ruled that the
plaintiff could see [Emily] on Sunday, September 21, 2014, for three
hours in the presence of the conservators.” Thus, the actions alleged
were undertaken in the context of the Probate Court action.
7
The plaintiff raises several other contentions, all of which are unavail-
ing.
First, the plaintiff maintains that his action was pending “for almost
seven years before subject matter jurisdiction was ever mentioned.” He
argues that “a party can forfeit subject matter jurisdiction if they do
not invoke it in a timely manner” and, thus, the defendants forfeited
any claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
“[A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which
it is without jurisdiction. . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may
be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own
motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its
attention. . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceed-
ings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield Merrittview Ltd.
Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535, 548, 133 A.3d 140 (2016);
see also Brady v. Bickford, 179 Conn. App. 776, 790–91, 183 A.3d
Membrino v. Membrino

court’s attention to the defendants’ alleged actions
occurring outside the courtroom, including calling the
police when the plaintiff visited Emily, disconnecting
Emily’s telephone, recording calls between the plaintiff
and Emily, and changing the locks on Emily’s house.
We are not persuaded that such alleged conduct falls
outside the litigation privilege, where the misconduct
alleged by the plaintiff is the “[fraudulent institution
of] an involuntary conservatorship proceeding” and
false testimony at a Probate Court hearing. Thereafter,
the plaintiff alleged that, “[b]ecause of the power they
had fraudulently obtained over [Emily], the defendants
. . . were able to inflict injuries upon the plaintiff.” In
other words, the alleged wrongdoing concerns fraudulent
actions and testimony during the probate proceeding,
which proceeding resulted in the establishment of a
conservatorship. To the extent that the plaintiff alleges
that the subsequent conduct of the defendants pursuant
to the conservatorship caused him harm, he does not
allege such conduct to be improper independent of the
alleged probate proceeding misconduct.8
Moreover, as this court previously has stated, “[t]he
burden [is] upon the pleaders to make such averments
27 (2018) (“[T]he litigation privilege implicates a trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. . . . A claim that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at
any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Second, the plaintiff raises several contentions that are not pertinent
to the present action. He contends that the court “ignored the fact that
evidence showed [Emily] did not have dementia” and “ignored” law
regarding limitations on a conservator’s authority. The plaintiff also
maintains that there was impropriety in the failure to open Ralph’s
estate and notes that an appeal is pending in the Superior Court with
respect to that issue. Each of these contentions relate to separate pro-
bate matters and are not implicated by the court’s determination that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the present action.
8
Although neither party separately analyzes Alda’s conduct, our review
of the record reveals that the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she,
along with Ralph and Roberta, testified in the probate proceeding. See
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 142 (“unless the defendants
participated in [the judicial] proceedings as parties or witnesses, the
[litigation] privilege does not attach to them”). Moreover, the plaintiff’s
Membrino v. Membrino

that the material facts [alleged in a complaint] should
appear with reasonable certainty. . . . Whenever that
language fails to define clearly the issues in dispute, the
court will put upon it such reasonable construction as
will give effect to the pleadings in conformity with the
general theory which it was intended to follow, and do
substantial justice between the parties. . . . But essential
allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote
implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone
v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79, 99, 72 A.3d 1138 (2013).
The plaintiff’s complaint, reasonably construed, does not
allege any misconduct separate and apart from that taken
in furtherance of the probate proceeding. Accordingly,
the allegations supporting his claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress are based on communications
and conduct that are protected by absolute immunity
from suit.
The plaintiff primarily relies on Fiondella v. Meriden,
186 Conn. App. 552, 554, 200 A.3d 196 (2018), cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 961, 199 A.3d 20 (2019), in support
of his claim that the defendants’ conduct is not shielded
by the litigation privilege. The present case, however,
is not factually similar to Fiondella. In Fiondella, this
court concluded that the litigation privilege did not bar
an action alleging that the defendants had conspired to
conceal from the plaintiffs the existence of a declaratory
judgment action, which was contrary to their property
rights and interests. Id., 555–57. This court stated that
“[t]he plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on the defen-
dants’ alleged intentional conduct to deprive them of
notice of the declaratory judgment action rather than
on the defendants’ conduct or statements made during
complaint contains only one allegation attributed to Alda individually,
that she prevented the plaintiff from seeing Emily on April 21, 2014.
That allegation, however, is prefaced by the plaintiff’s acknowledg-
ment that the defendants had the ability to inflict the alleged injuries
“[b]ecause of the power they had fraudulently obtained over [Emily].”
In sum, the plaintiff alleges injury stemming from the misconduct the
defendants engaged in during the probate proceeding. Accordingly, we
are convinced that the trial court properly concluded that the litigation
privilege applied not only to Roberta but also to Alda.
Membrino v. Membrino

a judicial proceeding.” Id., 563. Moreover, the plaintiff
in Fiondella was not a party to the underlying declara-
tory judgment action. Id., 562. In contrast, the present
claims are predicated on the defendants’ alleged conduct
in furtherance of the probate proceeding in which the
plaintiff participated.
Having considered “the issues relevant to the compet-
ing interests in [this] case . . . in light of the particular
context of the case”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
Scholz v. Epstein, supra, 341 Conn. 11; we are persuaded
that the specific claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as alleged by the plaintiff is the type of
action the litigation privilege was intended to prevent.
Accordingly, the court properly determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.