Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

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Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

ANSONIA POLICE UNION FOP LOCAL
913 v. CITY OF ANSONIA
(AC 48469)
Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain-
tiff’s application to vacate an arbitration award after finding that the award
violated the public policy embodied in Connecticut’s whistleblower statute
(§ 31-51m) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA)
(§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant claimed that the court improperly con-
cluded that the arbitration award violated the public policy embodied in
§ 31-51m. Held:

This court dismissed the appeal as moot, as the defendant failed to challenge
an independent ground supporting the trial court’s judgment granting the
plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award, namely, that the
arbitration award violated the public policy underlying CFEPA.

Argued March 24—officially released May 5, 2026

Procedural History

Application to vacate an arbitration award, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the court, Hon.
Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee; judgment granting
the application, from which the defendant appealed to
this court. Appeal dismissed.
Joseph F. Androski, assistant corporation counsel,
with whom, on the brief, was John P. Marini, for the
appellant (defendant).
Rachel M. Baird, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, the city of Ansonia, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court granting the appli-
cation of the plaintiff, Ansonia Police Union FOP Local
913, to vacate an arbitration award issued in the defen-
dant’s favor. On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court improperly concluded that the arbitration award
violated the public policy embodied in Connecticut’s
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

whistleblower statute, General Statutes § 31-51m.1 We
do not reach the merits of this claim because we conclude
that this appeal is moot on the basis of the defendant’s
failure to challenge an independent ground supporting
the court’s judgment, namely, that the arbitration award
violated the public policy underlying the Connecticut Fair
Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes
§ 46a-51 et seq. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. “The [plaintiff] instituted this action on behalf
of its member Detective Jonathan Troesser (Troesser),
who is an employee of the Ansonia Police Department
1
General Statutes § 31-51m provides in relevant part: “(b) No employer
shall discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize any employee because
(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports,
verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of any state or
federal law or regulation or any municipal ordinance or regulation to a
public body, (2) the employee is requested by a public body to participate
in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by that public body, or a
court action, or (3) the employee reports a suspected incident of child
abuse or neglect pursuant to sections 17a-101a to 17a-101d, inclusive,
or 17a-103. No municipal employer shall discharge, discipline or oth-
erwise penalize any employee because the employee, or a person acting
on behalf of the employee, reports, verbally or in writing, to a public
body concerning the unethical practices, mismanagement or abuse of
authority by such employer. The provisions of this subsection shall
not be applicable when the employee knows that such report is false.
“(c) Any employee who is discharged, disciplined or otherwise penal-
ized by his employer in violation of the provisions of subsection (b)
may, after exhausting all available administrative remedies, bring a
civil action, within ninety days of the date of the final administrative
determination or within ninety days of such violation, whichever is
later, in the superior court for the judicial district where the violation
is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office,
for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and
reestablishment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise
been entitled if such violation had not occurred. An employee’s recovery
from any such action shall be limited to such items, provided the court
may allow to the prevailing party his costs, together with reasonable
attorney’s fees to be taxed by the court. Any employee found to have
knowingly made a false report shall be subject to disciplinary action by
his employer up to and including dismissal.
“(d) This section shall not be construed to diminish or impair the rights
of a person under any collective bargaining agreement.”
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

[(department)]. In 2022,2 Troesser made a complaint
regarding the [department] alleging that a fellow police
officer ha[d] experienced harassment based on her race or
gender.3 The complaint was initially made anonymously,
but the [department] did an investigation and determined
that Troesser was the complainant. . . .
“After receiving . . . Troesser’s complaint, an internal
affairs investigation was initiated. During this inves-
tigation, Lieutenant Patrick Lynch concluded that the
complaint was based on ‘a combination of [Troesser’s]
conversations . . . information from third parties . . .
rumor, gossip, innuendo, and his personal experiences
in the department.’ . . .
“On August 5, 2022, Troesser received a written
warning for submitting the anonymous complaint. The
2
In their respective appellate briefs, the parties indicate that the
complaint was made near the end of 2021. This discrepancy does not
affect our resolution of this appeal.
3
The complaint, which was submitted to Ansonia Police Commissioner
John Tar, stated as follows: “I want to anonymously make a complaint
to you so that it can be investigated without having the [department]
involved so it cannot be covered up. Officer Ovelize was treated very
poorly during her training by Officer Castillo. He was rude and disre-
spectful to her. At one point, she stated that she spoke five languages to
which he made a comment asking her if she spoke ‘ebonics.’ I think she
was deeply offended by that. She also said that when she would ask him
questions he would make her feel dumb and respond with ‘duh.’ When
she went to [S]ergeant Flynn about it, he basically told her to ignore
it instead of taking a report of her complaint. When she resigned, she
told Chief Williams that she was treated poorly in the department but
he did not ask for details or by whom. She stated that she knew she was
just a number and was not treated like a person in the [department].
Officer Ovelize also stated that other new [o]fficers from Bridgeport
were treated in the same way by Officer Castillo. He even told [Officer]
Ovelize that the reason he was training her was that he was ‘the best.’
I think you should investigate and talk to Officer Ovelize and the other
new hires from Bridgeport. There is a group within the department that
are untouchable including the [a]cting [c]hief, [S]ergeant Flynn, [O]fficer
Castillo and others. Another example of this was when Dispatcher Power
was insulted by Officer Mendenhall and she heard it from inside dispatch.
She made a comment to Sergeant Flynn who was standing right next to
him and he pretended as though he did not hear anything. Officers and
dispatchers are scared to report issues like these because of retaliation
taken by this group which is protected by the [a]cting [c]hief.”
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

written warning claimed that Troesser had engaged in
‘criticism and malicious gossip,’ prohibited conduct
under § 2.3.18 of the [department’s] 1987 Duty Manual
[(manual)].4 . . .
“This warning was not based on the complaint in its
entirety. The [department] identified three sentences in
the complaint as constituting prohibited conduct under
§ 2.3.18 [of the manual]: (1) ‘I want to anonymously
make a complaint to you so that it can be investigated
without having the [department] involved so it cannot
be covered up’; (2) ‘[t]here is a group within the depart-
ment that are untouchable including the [a]cting [c]hief,
[S]ergeant Flynn, [O]fficer Castillo and others’; and (3)
‘[o]fficers and dispatchers are scared to report issues like
these because of retaliation taken by this group which is
protected by the [a]cting [c]hief.’ . . .
“Pursuant to the written collective bargaining agree-
ment entered into between the parties [in effect from July
1, 2017 through June 30, 2022], an arbitration hearing
was held on the warning before the Connecticut State
Board of Mediation and Arbitration Labor Department
(SBMA) . . . . The SBMA concluded [in an arbitration
award dated August 15, 2023] that the [defendant] had
just cause to discipline Troesser, reasoning that, while
public policy protects employees from retaliation for
filing good faith complaints alleging employment dis-
crimination, the present case did not meet these circum-
stances. . . . Instead, the SBMA stated that ‘[Troesser’s]
reckless allegations of “retaliation” and a “cover-up,”
while later admitting that he had no facts to support
such claims, need not be tolerated.’ ” (Citations omitted;
footnotes added; footnote omitted.)
4
Section 2.3.18 of the manual prohibits the following: “Criticism and
Malicious Gossip—criticizing any other member or employee of the
[d]epartment, except in the line of duty as a superior to a subordinate,
or maliciously gossiping about any superior, order, policy, procedure,
case or event that should remain police information; causing to discredit,
lower or injure the morale of personnel in the [d]epartment, or that of
any individual of the [d]epartment, or speaking slightingly of any race,
nationality, or religion.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

On September 14, 2023, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-4185 and Practice Book § 23-1,6 the plaintiff filed
with the Superior Court an application to vacate the
arbitration award. The plaintiff asserted that the arbi-
tration award violated “[1] [t]he clearly defined public
policies prohibiting harassment and retaliation against
[Troesser] for opposing and reporting gender and race
discrimination as set forth in [CFEPA]; [and] [2] [t]he
protections afforded under . . . § 31-51m for [Troesser’s]
report of a violation or a suspected violation of a state or
federal law or regulation or any municipal ordinance or
regulation to Ansonia Police Commissioner John Tar, a
member of a public body . . . .”7 Both parties submitted
briefs addressing the plaintiff’s application. On Septem-
ber 26, 2024, the trial court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens,
5
General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides: “Upon the application of any
party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in
which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land,
for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court
is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the
award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been
procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been
evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if
the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitra-
tors have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.”
6
Practice Book § 23-1 provides: “In proceedings brought for confirm-
ing, vacating or correcting an arbitration award under chapters 862 and
909 of the General Statutes, the court or judge to whom the application
is made shall cause to be issued a citation directing the adverse party
or parties in the arbitration proceeding to appear on a day certain and
show cause, if any there be, why the application should not be granted.”
7
In its application to vacate the arbitration award, the plaintiff also
claimed that the award violated Troesser’s due process rights pursuant
to the federal and state constitutions. Additionally, in its principal
brief filed in support of its application, the plaintiff alluded to a viola-
tion of Troesser’s freedom of speech rights under the federal and state
constitutions. In its memorandum of decision granting the plaintiff’s
application, the trial court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee,
declined to consider these constitutional claims because neither party
had addressed them substantively.
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

judge trial referee, heard argument on the plaintiff’s
application.
On January 23, 2025, the court issued a memorandum
of decision granting the plaintiff’s application to vacate
the arbitration award. The court determined that the
plaintiff “ha[d] presented a legitimate, colorable claim
of violation of public policy along with the identification
of explicit, well-defined and dominant public policies
based on CFEPA and § 31-51m,” whereupon it “further
conclude[d] that it [was] to engage in a de novo review
of the parties’ positions.” With respect to CFEPA, the
court stated that “Troesser engaged in legally protected
activity when he submitted the anonymous complaint
that was based on credible allegations of discriminatory
behavior, and after his employer became aware that he
was the author of the complaint, he suffered an adverse
employment action in the form of a written warning.
The court, therefore, concludes that the [plaintiff] has
alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under [General Statutes] § 46a-60 (b)8 of
CFEPA, and as a matter of law, the [arbitration] award
confirming the disciplinary action against Troesser for
making the complaint violates the clear public policy of
CFEPA protecting such complaints.” (Footnote added.)
As to § 31-51m, the court stated that, “[w]hen viewed
as a whole, it is clear that the complaint was submitted
in order to report discriminatory behavior within the
department, and that Troesser was engaging in protected
behavior by doing so. Troesser submitted his anonymous
8
General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) provides in relevant part: “It shall be
a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (4) [f]or any
person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge,
expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person
has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such
person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding
under section 46a-82, 46a-83 or 46a-84 . . . .”
Section 46a-60 was amended after Troesser received the written
warning on August 5, 2022. See Public Acts 2022, No. 22-82, § 10;
Public Acts 2025, No. 25-139, § 6. Those amendments, however, have
no bearing on our analysis in this opinion. In the interest of simplicity,
we refer to the current revision of the statute.
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

complaint containing suspected violations of state and
federal law to a member of the public body and was penal-
ized as a result. Therefore . . . the [arbitration] award
violates the public policy established under § 31-51m
and, therefore, should be vacated on [that] ground.” This
appeal followed. Additional procedural history will be
set forth as necessary.
In its appellate brief filed on June 5, 2025, the defen-
dant briefed a single claim separated into two subsec-
tions. In the first subsection, the defendant asserted
that the court misapplied the governing legal standard
by substituting its own factual findings for the SBMA’s
factual findings, which, as the defendant posited, were
binding on the court. In the second subsection, the defen-
dant contended that the arbitration award did not violate
the public policy embodied in § 31-51m, which conclusion,
the defendant maintained, was inescapable but for the
court’s improper fact-finding. On March 20, 2026, this
court ordered, sua sponte, the parties to be prepared
to address at oral argument “whether the defendant’s
claim that the trial court erred in finding that the arbi-
tration award violates public policy is moot because the
defendant fails to challenge the trial court’s finding that
the award ‘violates the clear public policy of’ [CFEPA],
which is a binding adverse finding that the award violates
public policy.”
During oral argument before this court on March 24,
2026, in addressing the mootness issue, the defendant’s
appellate counsel9 did not argue that the defendant’s
appellate brief distinctly examined the trial court’s con-
clusion that the arbitration award violated the public
policy embodied in CFEPA; instead, counsel argued that
the trial court’s analyses regarding § 31-51m and CFEPA
were similar, such that “a separate CFEPA section in
[the defendant’s] brief would have been the same argu-
ment repeated.” As to the mootness issue, the plaintiff’s
9
At oral argument, Attorney Joseph F. Androski appeared on behalf
of the defendant. We note that the defendant’s appellate brief was filed
by Attorney John P. Marini, then of the Marino Law Firm, LLC, and
later of Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP.
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

counsel argued that the defendant had failed to challenge
on appeal the court’s determination that the arbitration
award violated the public policy underlying CFEPA. We
conclude that this appeal is moot.
“Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
addressed as a threshold matter because it implicates
this court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . [I]t is not
the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions,
disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from
the determination of which no practical relief can follow. .
. . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is
whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff
or defendant in any way. . . . Where an appellant fails to
challenge all bases for a trial court’s adverse ruling on
[the appellant’s] claim, even if this court were to agree
with the appellant on the issues that [the appellant] does
raise, we still would not be able to provide [the appellant]
any relief in light of the binding adverse finding[s] [not
raised] with respect to those claims. . . . Therefore, when
an appellant challenges a trial court’s adverse ruling,
but does not challenge all independent bases for that
ruling, the appeal is moot.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Wright, 235 Conn. App. 143, 182–83,
345 A.3d 504 (2025).
In granting the plaintiff’s application to vacate the
arbitration award, the court concluded that the award
violated the public policy underlying two statutes,
CFEPA and § 31-51m, with the court addressing the
public policy violation as to each statute in separate sec-
tions of its decision. In other words, the court vacated
the arbitration award on two independent grounds, one
predicated on CFEPA and the other on § 31-51m. On the
basis of its appellate brief, we interpret the defendant’s
claim on appeal to be that the court improperly substi-
tuted its factual findings for those of the SBMA and
relied on said fact-finding to conclude that the arbitra-
tion award violated the public policy of § 31-51m. The
defendant makes only passing references to CFEPA on
a couple of pages of its appellate brief, and, therefore,
Ansonia Police Union FOP Local 913 v. Ansonia

it has abandoned any claim of error vis-à-vis the court’s
CFEPA analysis.10 See Robb v. Connecticut Board of
Veterinary Medicine, 204 Conn. App. 595, 611, 254
A.3d 915 (“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . .
Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required
in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and
efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . .
the parties must clearly and fully set forth their argu-
ments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not merely
cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship
between the facts of the case and the law cited.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 338 Conn. 911,
259 A.3d 654 (2021).
In short, the defendant has failed to challenge all of
the independent grounds underlying the court’s judg-
ment granting the plaintiff’s application to vacate the
arbitration award. Accordingly, we conclude that this
appeal is moot, and, therefore, we lack subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain it.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

10
We are not persuaded by the argument raised by the defendant’s
appellate counsel during oral argument that the defendant’s failure to
brief a claim challenging the court’s conclusion regarding CFEPA can be
excused because (1) the court employed similar analyses in its decision
as to both CFEPA and § 31-51m and (2) the defendant briefed a claim
directed to the court’s § 31-51m analysis. We decline the invitation to
import a claim into the defendant’s brief that it did not assert.