J. B. v. C. B.

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J. B. v. C. B.

J. B. v. C. B.*
(AC 47360)
Clark, Westbrook and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis-
solved, appealed from the trial court’s judgment resolving certain motions
for contempt and for modification of child support filed by the parties. The
defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly relied on incomplete
or inaccurate financial disclosures in modifying the plaintiff’s child support
obligations. Held:

The trial court did not improperly rely on incomplete or inaccurate financial
disclosures by the plaintiff in making the requisite child support calcula-
tions in conjunction with its downward modification of child support, as the
defendant did not direct this court to anything in the record from which it
could conclude that it was error for the trial court to credit the plaintiff’s
testimony that certain payments from his parents were not likely to continue
indefinitely or that its decision not to include those payments as income
constituted legal error or an abuse of its discretion.

The trial court did not improperly deny the defendant’s motion for contempt,
as the court, rather than ignoring what the defendant maintained to be
extensive evidence of misconduct by the plaintiff, marked off the motion
for contempt with the consent of the defendant because she was unable to
identify a specific clear and unambiguous order of the court that the plaintiff
failed to comply with or otherwise violated and the court simply concluded
that such evidence was not relevant to the defendant’s motion for contempt.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
improperly modified child support without accounting for the extensive
litigation between the parties that already had occurred, including the finan-
cial burden placed on the defendant, as the claim was inadequately briefed.

The trial court did not improperly admit unqualified expert testimony from
the court-ordered reunification therapist, F, as this court concluded, on the
basis of its review of the record, that the trial court only permitted F to testify
as a fact witness regarding the parties’ efforts to engage in reunification
services as ordered by the court.
*
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests
of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the parties or
others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See
General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d)
(3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be
protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining
order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that
person’s identity may be ascertained.
J. B. v. C. B.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court made
selective and inconsistent evidentiary rulings that violated her due process
rights under either the state or federal constitutions, as the defendant
abandoned that claim due to inadequate briefing.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed
to maintain judicial neutrality and disregarded ethical and safety concerns,
as it was the defendant’s burden to provide this court with an adequate record
for review, which was lacking with respect to this claim.

The trial court did not improperly deny the defendant an opportunity to
deliver closing arguments at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing held
on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, as the court gave the defendant great
latitude to make whatever closing arguments she wanted and only stopped
her when it determined that she was exceeding the scope of argument by
attempting to introduce new evidence after the evidentiary portion of the
hearing had concluded and, to the extent that the court placed limitations
on the content of the defendant’s arguments, the defendant provided no
legal analysis from which to conclude that the court abused its considerable
discretion in doing so.

Argued October 16, 2025—officially released April 28, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford and tried to the court, Nguyen-O’Dowd,
J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting cer-
tain other relief; thereafter, the court, Chadwick, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification of child
support, denied the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and
marked off the defendant’s motion for contempt, and
the defendant appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed
in part; affirmed.
C. B., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, C. B., whose mar-
riage to the plaintiff, J. B.,1 was dissolved in April,
2023, appeals from postjudgment orders of the trial
1
The plaintiff did not file an appellee’s brief or otherwise participate
in the present appeal. Accordingly, we consider this appeal solely on
the basis of the defendant’s brief, the record, and the oral argument
of the defendant.
J. B. v. C. B.

court resolving certain motions for contempt and for
modification filed by the parties regarding, inter alia,
child support and reunification therapy.2 The defendant
claims that the court improperly (1) relied on incomplete
financial disclosures in modifying the plaintiff’s child
support obligations, (2) ignored evidence of financial
and other misconduct by the plaintiff in denying her
motion for contempt, (3) made modifications that failed
2
As reflected on the self-represented defendant’s appeal form and in
her appellate brief, she purports to appeal from decisions rendered by
the court on January 8, 22 and 31, 2024. The court’s January 8, 2024
orders resolved several pending motions for contempt as well as a motion
for modification of child support. With respect to the court’s January
22, 2024 ruling, the defendant describes this ruling as an order limit-
ing approval of her fee waiver request for appeal transcripts to $100.
Although the record shows that the defendant filed her fee waiver
application on January 22, 2024, the court’s order on that application
was rendered the following day, on January 23, 2024. Regardless of
the correct operative date of the order, we decline to review any claims
related to the order on the fee waiver application because, as provided
for in Practice Book § 63-6, “[t]he sole remedy of any party desiring
the court to review an order concerning the waiver of fees, costs and
security shall be by motion for review under [Practice Book §] 66-6.”
Whenever our rules of practice provide that a party’s sole remedy for
review of an order is by way of motion for review, the party cannot
properly raise a claim challenging that order by way of direct appeal
or amended appeal. See Fenner v. Hartford Courant Co., 77 Conn. App.
185, 188, 822 A.2d 982 (2003) (plaintiff could not prevail on claim that
trial court violated his due process rights by denying application for
waiver of fees for transcripts of entire trial because he failed to avail
himself of proper remedy for review of denial of fee waiver); Santoro v.
Santoro, 33 Conn. App. 839, 841–42, 639 A.2d 1044 (1994) (dismissing
claim regarding stay order raised in amended appeal because our rules
provide that sole remedy for review of an order regarding stay is by
motion for review). Similarly, the January 31, 2024 order from which
the defendant appeals is a denial of a fee waiver application that the
defendant filed in conjunction with an application for an emergency
ex parte order of custody. She did not request a hearing before the
trial court on the denied application, and, even if she had, any further
review by this court regarding the fee waiver request is limited to a
petition for review in accordance with General Statutes § 52-259b (d)
and Practice Book § 78b-1. The defendant cannot obtain review of the
court’s fee waiver ruling in a direct appeal. Finally, to the extent that
the defendant raises claims in her appellate brief directed at judgments
of the trial court other than those from which she has appealed, those
rulings are not properly before us on appeal and we decline to address
any claim directed at them.
J. B. v. C. B.

to account for prior litigation of the parties and the
financial burden placed on the defendant, (4) admitted
unqualified expert testimony, (5) made selective and
inconsistent evidentiary rulings that violated the defen-
dant’s due process rights, (6) failed to maintain judicial
neutrality and disregarded ethical and safety concerns,
and (7) denied the defendant an opportunity to deliver
closing arguments following a January 2, 2024 eviden-
tiary hearing.3 For the reasons that follow, we reject or
decline to review the defendant’s claims and affirm the
judgment of the court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts, which
were found by the court or are undisputed, and proce-
dural history. In this highly contentious divorce action,
the court, Nguyen-O’Dowd, J., conducted a multiday
trial that concluded on January 13, 2023. The court ren-
dered a decision on April 26, 2023, dissolving the parties’
marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. On
May 4, 2023, the court issued a corrected memorandum
of decision.4 With respect to custody of and parental
access to the parties’ two minor children, who were four
and six years old at the time, the court awarded the par-
ties joint legal custody of the children with the primary
residence awarded to the defendant. The court’s decision
provided that the plaintiff would be permitted to file
a motion to modify the custody orders and to request
a parenting access schedule after he completed court-
ordered reunification therapy.5 The dissolution judgment
incorporated by reference a prior reunification therapy
order of the court rendered on December 22, 2022.6 After
3
We set forth the defendant’s claims, to the extent they are properly
before us, in the order and manner in which they appear in the body of
her brief, which differs from the brief’s statement of the issues.
4
On May 31, 2023, the court issued additional clarifications and cor-
rections to its May 4, 2023 corrected decision.
5
The record indicates that, during the parties’ marriage, there were
instances of intimate partner violence by the plaintiff, and, on several
occasions, referrals were made to the Department of Children and
Families regarding the parties and the children.
6
The December 22, 2022 order provided in relevant part: “The par-
ties shall secure the services of Dr. Bruce Freedman as a reunification
therapist. The parties are to cooperate with Dr. Freedman and sign
J. B. v. C. B.

the dissolution trial, but before the court had rendered
a decision, the plaintiff filed a pendente lite motion for
contempt claiming that the defendant was in violation of
the December 22, 2022 order. Although the dissolution
court did not directly address this motion for contempt
as part of the dissolution judgment, the court included
in its final judgment additional orders pertaining to the
defendant’s ongoing obligations to facilitate the reuni-
fication efforts between the children and the plaintiff.7
As part of the financial orders attendant to the dis-
solution judgment, the court ordered the plaintiff to
pay the defendant $225 per week in child support. The
court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant an
additional $40 per week toward the satisfaction of an
existing pendente lite child support arrearage of $9902.
The court ordered that the defendant would retain the
parties’ marital home in East Hartford and that, begin-
ning the following month, she was solely responsible for
paying the mortgage, taxes, utilities, and insurance for
that property. Neither party filed an appeal challenging
the dissolution judgment or any of its attendant orders.
On June 1, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking a
downward modification of the court’s child support orders
in which he asserted that there had been a substantial
any releases requested by Dr. Freedman . . . . The costs associated
with the reunification therapist shall be split on a basis of 60 [per-
cent]/40 [percent]. However, the plaintiff shall be responsible for
the entire $2000 retainer. . . . The parties are to schedule with Dr.
Freedman for the first available appointment. The parties shall not tell
the children about reunification therapy. The children shall be made
aware of the reunification therapy through a therapeutic provider.”
7
Specifically, the court ordered in relevant part: “The defendant
shall not dictate where the reunification sessions shall take place. The
defendant shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that the children
are made available for sessions with Dr. Freedman and the plaintiff. .
. . The defendant shall not schedule any appointments or activities for
the children that conflict with appointments scheduled with Dr. Freed-
man. . . . The defendant shall document in writing and provide to the
plaintiff and the reunification therapist the specific efforts that she has
made to ensure that the children participate in reunification therapy
and specific efforts to encourage the children if they are resistant. . . .
The defendant’s failure to comply with this court order shall result in
her paying any missed or cancellation fees to Dr. Freedman.”
J. B. v. C. B.

change in circumstances because he had lost his job.
The plaintiff also filed a motion for contempt related to
the defendant’s obligations with respect to the marital
home.8 On June 14, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
contempt in which she asserted that the plaintiff was in
contempt regarding the court’s orders pertaining to the
marital home and asking the court, inter alia, to order
the plaintiff to “bring the mortgage back to good stand-
ing including [by paying] all fees, all penalties and all
attorney’s fees charged by the mortgage company . . . .”
Following a hearing, on June 29, 2023, the court, Klau,
J., entered an interim order on the plaintiff’s motion to
modify child support. As part of that order, the court
temporarily suspended the arrearage payments due under
the dissolution judgment and directed the plaintiff to
pay the defendant $160 per week in child support.9
On September 15, 2023, the defendant filed a sec-
ond motion for contempt in which she argued that the
plaintiff was not in compliance with various aspects of
the financial orders issued in conjunction with the dis-
solution judgment or with the temporary orders issued
on June 29, 2023. The defendant also argued that the
plaintiff should be held in contempt for violations of
the automatic orders applicable to all parties upon com-
mencement of a dissolution action. See Practice Book
§ 25-5. The defendant claimed she had discovered these
violations postjudgment.
Beginning on October 17, 2023, and concluding on
January 3, 2024, the court, Chadwick, J., conducted
several days of hearings on the plaintiff’s outstanding
8
The plaintiff asserted that, “unbeknownst to all involved,” the mort-
gage on the marital residence had gone into foreclosure as of May 3,
2023. The mortgage lender advised the parties that the loan could be
reinstated either by making a lump sum payment of approximately
$13,000 or by entering into a loan modification agreement. According
to the plaintiff, the defendant refused to contribute any funds toward
the lump sum payment despite being responsible for the mortgage,
and she also refused to sign paperwork needed to modify the loan. The
plaintiff viewed the defendant’s inaction as a wilful violation of the
May 4, 2023 court orders.
9
As found by the court, this interim amount was within 15 percent
of the presumptive amount payable pursuant to the child support
guidelines.
J. B. v. C. B.

motion for modification of child support and the par-
ties’ motions for contempt. On January 8, 2024, the
court issued orders denying the plaintiff’s motion for
contempt, concluding that he had failed to show that
the defendant had wilfully failed to comply with any
clear and unambiguous order of the court. With respect
to the motion for modification, the court granted the
motion. It found that the plaintiff had proven a substan-
tial change in circumstances and ordered the plaintiff to
pay the defendant $183 per week in child support and an
additional $37 per week until the existing child support
arrearage was satisfied in full. That same day, the court
marked off the defendant’s motion for contempt.10
The defendant filed a motion to reargue/reconsider the
court’s January 8, 2024 orders to the extent that they
modified the existing orders regarding reunification
therapy between the minor children and the plaintiff,
which modifications the defendant argued were not in
the best interests of the children. The court denied the
defendant’s motion, following which the defendant filed
the present appeal. Additional facts and procedural his-
tory will be set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set forth
the general standard that applies to our review of orders
in domestic relations cases. “An appellate court will not
disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases
unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found
that it could not reasonably conclude as it did [on the
10
The court later addressed the ongoing issues regarding the mortgage
and the marital home in a ruling on a separate motion for contempt
filed by the defendant in which she had raised similar concerns. The
court concluded that the defendant had failed to show that the plain-
tiff had failed to comply with any clear and unambiguous order of the
court regarding the mortgage. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff had
acknowledged during the hearing his belief that he owed the defendant
for the nearly $10,000 that she had paid to reinstate the mortgage on
the marital home, the court exercised its remedial authority and ordered
the plaintiff to make $1000 quarterly payments to the defendant until
she was fully reimbursed for her payments. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326
Conn. 81, 99−100, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017) (even in absence of finding of
contempt, trial court has broad discretion to issue remedial orders).
J. B. v. C. B.

basis of] the facts presented. . . . In determining whether
a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic
relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption
in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate
review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by
the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in
the record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed. . . . Our deferential stan-
dard of review, however, does not extend to the court’s
interpretation of and application of the law to the facts.
It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary
review on appeal. . . . As has often been explained, the
foundation for [our deferential] standard is that the
trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess
the personal factors significant to a domestic relations
case . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227 Conn. App. 698, 713, 323
A.3d 1142 (2024).
I
The defendant first claims that, in making the req-
uisite child support calculations in conjunction with
its downward modification of child support, the court
improperly relied on incomplete or inaccurate financial
disclosures by the plaintiff. In particular, the defendant
asserts that the plaintiff, in reporting his gross income,
failed to properly account for certain monetary gifts,
which included monthly payments that he received from
his parents. We are not persuaded that the court’s child
support calculation was made on the basis of inaccurate
or incomplete financial disclosures by the plaintiff.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. In her objection to the plaintiff’s motion for modi-
fication, the defendant argued that the court should
not order a decrease in child support in part because the
plaintiff had testified during the dissolution trial “that
his parents are able to pay for his financial obligations
J. B. v. C. B.

including child support and his bills.” On the plaintiff’s
financial affidavits filed with the court in support of
the motion for modification, he disclosed that he was
receiving $1500 per month from his parents, although
he did not include these payments in his calculation of his
total gross weekly income. At the interim hearing on the
motion for modification conducted by Judge Klau, the
court raised sua sponte whether the disclosed payments
by the plaintiff’s parents should be included as income
in calculating the presumptive amount due under the
child support guidelines. The court determined, over
an objection by counsel for the plaintiff, that it would
include the parents’ payments as income in calculating
its interim order. The court made clear, however, that
its interim ruling on the motion for modification was
without prejudice to any issue being revisited by the
court that rendered a final decision on the motion for
modification.
The issue of the parents’ payments to the plaintiff
was again raised and argued at the subsequent hearing
on the motion for modification before Judge Chadwick.
The plaintiff testified at the hearing, consistent with his
financial affidavits, that he received monthly payments
of $1500 from his parents but that he did not consider
those payments to be a permanent income source and,
thus, did not include them as regular income in his finan-
cial disclosure or on the child support guidelines work-
sheet submitted to the court.11 In her closing argument on
the motion for modification, the defendant argued that
the court should consider the $1500 payments from the
parents as income for purposes of calculating reasonable
support payments in accordance with the child support
guidelines. The plaintiff reasserted in his closing argu-
ment that the court should not consider the parents’
gifts to be income because they were not permanent in
nature. The court, in its memorandum of decision on the
motion for modification, did not expressly address the
issue of the parent’s payments to the plaintiff or whether
those payments were attributable as income. The court,
11
Although the defendant argued to the court that the plaintiff had
failed to report what she believed were other sources of income, as
J. B. v. C. B.

however, utilized the child support guidelines worksheet
provided by the plaintiff in calculating the presumptive
amount of child support due under the guidelines, and
that worksheet did not include the parents’ payments as
a component of the plaintiff’s net weekly income.
It is axiomatic that both parties in a dissolution action
have an obligation to provide the court with an accu-
rate financial affidavit. See Practice Book § 25-30. “Our
cases have uniformly emphasized the need for full and
frank disclosure in that affidavit. A court is entitled to
rely upon the truth and accuracy of sworn statements
required by [Practice Book § 25-30] . . . and a misrepre-
sentation of assets and income is a serious and intoler-
able dereliction on the part of the affiant which goes
to the very heart of the judicial proceeding.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, 186 Conn.
App. 665, 676, 201 A.3d 404 (2018). Section 46b-215a-1
(11) (A) (xxi) of the Child Support and Arrearage Guide-
lines provides that, in reporting gross income, parties
must include, with limited exceptions not relevant here,
any “regularly recurring gifts . . . .” Child Support and
Arrearage Guidelines (2015), § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (xxi).
Although the defendant asserts that the court did
not require full and accurate financial disclosures, that
reflected in the following colloquy, it appears that she failed to present
sufficient evidence to convince the court of her assertion:
“[The Defendant]: So, I submitted his bank statements. So, I’m asking
that you look and see that those numbers do reflect—
“The Court: Well, just because a deposit’s been made in the account
doesn’t make it income.
“[The Defendant]: The plaintiff has failed to show that it is not income,
and Judge Klau had said that the Venmo transfers—
“The Court: Well, we have to stop referring back to Judge Klau.
“[The Defendant]: Okay. Right. Well, I’m just saying it because this
is what he had said, was that any gifts of money—
“The Court: Well—
“[The Defendant]:—are considered income, and the plaintiff is not
proving that those are not gifts.
“The Court: Well, but you haven’t proven that they are, either.
“[The Defendant]: They’re significant, frequent, and regular transfers
of large amounts of money.
“The Court: I don’t know that.”
J. B. v. C. B.

assertion is not borne out by the record. Prior to grant-
ing the downward modification of the child support
order, the parties each submitted the required financial
disclosure affidavits, on which the court properly was
entitled to rely in making its calculations under the
child support guidelines. The plaintiff fully disclosed the
payments that he had been receiving from his parents
on his financial disclosure. If either party believed that
the financial disclosure of the opposing party contained
inaccuracies, they had a full and fair opportunity to raise
and prove this at the hearing, either through witness
testimony or by presenting other credible evidence. The
defendant raised the issue to the court that the plaintiff
should have disclosed and included as part of his income
certain monetary gifts, including those he received from
his parents.
In entering his interim order, Judge Klau had agreed
with the defendant that, at that time, the parents’ regu-
larly recurring gifts constituted income to the plaintiff,
and the court increased the plaintiff’s income that he
reported on his financial affidavit in calculating the
presumptive amount of child support. Judge Chadwick,
however, who was not bound by Judge Klau’s interim rul-
ing, reasonably could have agreed with the plaintiff that
the payments from the parents were not likely to continue
into the future and, thus, should not be considered as a
component of his income. The court did not explain the
reasoning behind its implicit ruling, nor was it asked to
do so by the defendant. Nevertheless, because we must
allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the cor-
rectness of the trial court’s action, it is reasonable to infer
that the court credited the plaintiff’s testimony that the
payments were not likely to continue indefinitely. The
defendant has not directed us to anything in the record
from which we may conclude that it was error for the
court to credit the plaintiff’s testimony or that its deci-
sion not to include the payments as income constituted
legal error or an abuse of its discretion.
“Generally, appellate courts presume that the trial
court knows and has applied the law correctly in the
J. B. v. C. B.

absence of evidence to the contrary. . . . [I]t is the burden
of the appellant to show to the contrary.” (Citation omit-
ted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Havis-Carbone v. Carbone, 155 Conn. App. 848, 867,
112 A.3d 779 (2015). The defendant has not done so here
on the basis of the record provided. There is nothing in
the record to support the defendant’s assertion that the
court’s downward modification of child support was made
on the basis of either incomplete or inaccurate financial
disclosures. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
denied her motion for contempt, arguing that the court
ignored extensive evidence of financial and other mis-
conduct by the plaintiff. The defendant’s briefing of this
claim is difficult to follow, addresses rulings not properly
before us; see footnote 2 of this opinion; contains little to
no relevant legal analysis and appears to misapprehend
the court’s action on her motion for contempt.
As part of its January 8, 2024 orders, the court did
not deny the defendant’s motion for contempt but rather
marked the motion off. The defendant has not directed
us to anything in the record that supports her assertion
that the court ignored evidence or arguments she offered.
On the contrary, the court was very solicitous of the
defendant and the fact that she was a self-represented
litigant. Our review of the pleadings and the transcript
of the hearing show that the court marked off the motion
for contempt with the consent of the defendant because
she was unable to identify a specific clear and unambigu-
ous order of the court that the plaintiff had failed to
comply with or otherwise violated. The court told the
defendant that the arguments she was advancing and
the relief that she sought were more appropriately the
subject of a motion to open and modify the dissolution
judgment, something the court could not do in response
to a motion for contempt. Thus, rather than ignoring
what the defendant maintains to be extensive evidence of
misconduct by the plaintiff, the court simply concluded
J. B. v. C. B.

that such evidence was not relevant to the defendant’s
motion for contempt. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
III
The defendant also claims that the court improp-
erly modified child support without accounting for the
extensive litigation between the parties that already had
occurred, including the financial burden placed on the
defendant. We decline to review this claim because it is
inadequately briefed.
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented to
this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,
rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order
to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and
efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their
arguments in their briefs. . . . [B]riefing is inadequate
when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and
disorganized.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C. B.
v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022).
The defendant’s briefing as to this claim is disorga-
nized, contains no citations to applicable legal principles,
sets forth no standard of review, and is generally difficult
to follow. It is not the duty of this court to speculate as to
the precise nature of a claim. Because we conclude that
this claim is inadequately briefed, we decline to review it.
IV
Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly
admitted unqualified expert testimony from Bruce Freed-
man, a licensed psychologist, who was the court-ordered
reunification therapist. We conclude, on the basis of our
review of the record, that the court only permitted Freed-
man to testify as a fact witness regarding the parties’
efforts to engage in reunification services as ordered by
the court. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim that he
provided improper expert testimony fails.
J. B. v. C. B.

The following additional facts are relevant to our con-
sideration of this claim. On October 17, 2023, the court
began the evidentiary hearing on the parties’ various
motions, including the plaintiff’s motion seeking to hold
the defendant in contempt for allegedly failing to comply
with orders requiring her to help facilitate reunification
therapy between the plaintiff and the parties’ minor chil-
dren. See footnotes 6 and 7 of this opinion. On that same
date, the defendant filed a motion in limine asking the
court to preclude “any testimony or exhibits presented
by [Freedman] . . . in any capacity, be it layperson, fact
witness or expert.” The defendant argued, inter alia,
that Freedman was biased against her, and that his role
as a court-appointed therapist should preclude him from
giving any opinion testimony, particularly with respect
to issues of parental alienation and potential modifica-
tion of the court’s custody orders.
Because Freedman was not scheduled to appear until
the next scheduled hearing date, the court took up the
defendant’s motion in limine at the end of the day. After
hearing from the parties, the court issued the follow-
ing ruling from the bench: “Well, the court’s afforded
the plaintiff great latitude in pursuing a motion for
contempt [regarding the reunification orders] that was
filed pendente lite, pursuing it postjudgment. The issue
of custody has to be raised through a motion to modify
Judge Nguyen’s memorandum of decision and judgment
in this case. So, while Dr. Freedman might provide testi-
mony with respect to the factual allegations with respect
to the motion for contempt and the scheduling, the this,
the that, and those things that the parties encountered,
and why it did or did not move forward as ordered or
anticipated, that might be relevant. But in reading your
disclosure and the opinions that you intend to offer, that
appears to go beyond the scope of anything the plaintiff
has pending at this time. So, while the court will, at this
time, deny the motion in limine and permit Dr. Freed-
man to testify, it’s only with the backdrop that the court
has just provided, and we’ll take up those issues as they
arise during the hearing; that, if there is an objection
J. B. v. C. B.

to relevance or the other issues that [the defendant] has
raised here today, we’ll address them as Dr. Freedman
testifies.” (Emphasis added.)
On October 24, 2023, the plaintiff called Freedman
to testify and, after asking him questions regarding his
background and experience as a licensed psychologist, the
plaintiff moved to have him qualified as an expert in the
field of reunification therapy. The defendant objected,
noting her motion in limine. The court reiterated its prior
ruling, stating: “We touched upon these issues last week
when this issue came up. And the court has no issue with
this witness testifying as to the witness’ observations,
dealings with the parties, and attempting to schedule
these sessions . . . so that the court can determine whether
there is compliance with the court order and whether a
party can be held in contempt. But the court is not going
to permit expert or opinion testimony with respect to . . .
parental alienation and a recommendation with respect
to custody. Those aren’t issues raised by your motion for
contempt. So, [to] the extent that this witness is a fact
witness you may proceed as such, but his expert opinions
are not relevant to the pending motion.”12
The standard applicable to our review of a trial court’s
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is well
established. “[T]he trial court has wide discretion in rul-
ing on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless
that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a
clear misconception of the law, the trial court’s decision
will not be disturbed. . . . In determining whether there
has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is
whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. .
. . [Our Supreme Court] [has] articulated the test for the
admission of expert testimony, which is deeply rooted in
common law. Expert testimony should be admitted [if]:
(1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly
12
On several occasions, the trial court sustained objections to or oth-
erwise disallowed testimony from Freedman that the court determined
fell outside the limitations it had set, including during the defendant’s
cross-examination of Freedman, when she twice attempted to elicit an
expert opinion from him.
J. B. v. C. B.

applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowl-
edge is not common to the average person, and (3) the
testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in con-
sidering the issues.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Czajkowski v. YMCA of Metropolitan Hartford, Inc.,
149 Conn. App. 436, 441, 89 A.3d 904 (2014).
In the present case, although the court denied the
defendant’s motion in limine, it did so only to the extent
that the defendant sought to preclude Freedman from
testifying outright, even as a fact witness, regarding
the parties’ efforts to schedule and conduct the court-
ordered reunification therapy. The court expressly indi-
cated that it would not allow Freedman to provide expert
testimony, including on the topics of parental alienation
and custody matters, because those topics were not the
subject of a motion currently before the court. Having
reviewed Freedman’s testimony, we are unconvinced
that the record supports the premise of the defendant’s
claim. Specifically, on the basis of our review of the hear-
ing transcript, and considering the arguments of the
defendant, we are not convinced that the court allowed
Freedman to provide improper or unqualified expert testi-
mony.13 We reject the defendant’s claim to the contrary.
V
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
made selective and inconsistent evidentiary rulings that
violated the defendant’s due process rights. We are not
persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to the
present claim. At the close of the hearing with respect
to the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the defendant
indicated that she wanted to admit certain exhibits in
rebuttal to the testimony of Freedman. The court, over
13
Because we conclude that the court did not permit Freedman to
provide expert testimony, we necessarily reject the defendant’s argu-
ment that the court failed to conduct a Porter hearing to assess Freed-
man’s qualifications. See State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 80–90, 698
A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 645 (1998).
J. B. v. C. B.

the objection of the plaintiff’s counsel, admitted into
evidence certain emails that the defendant offered. The
defendant also sought to offer other evidence that the
court did not admit. First, she offered several letters
that had previously been admitted at the dissolution
trial but predated the court’s order that was the subject
of the contempt motion. The plaintiff’s counsel objected
on hearsay grounds, and the court sustained the objec-
tions. The defendant next sought admission of certain
clinical notes from the medical records of the children’s
therapists. The plaintiff’s counsel objected, stating:
“They’re therapy notes. Private, privileged informa-
tion. They’re hearsay. The therapists aren’t here and
we’re not waiving privilege, Your Honor.”14 The court
again sustained the objection of the plaintiff’s counsel.
To the extent that the defendant seeks to challenge
the court’s evidentiary rulings, such rulings “will be
overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the
court’s discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable
presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s rul-
ing, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.
. . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the
questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the
law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion
that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin
v. Olson, 226 Conn. App. 392, 405, 318 A.3d 1067, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 902, 322 A.3d 1059 (2024). As we have
often explained, we will not permit parties to attempt
to dress up ordinary evidentiary issues in constitutional
garb to obtain a more favorable standard of review. See
Hoffkins v. Hart-D’Amato, 187 Conn. App. 227, 236,
201 A.3d 1053 (2019) (“[r]obing garden variety claims
[of an evidentiary nature] in the majestic garb of consti-
tutional claims does not make such claims constitutional
in nature” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In support of the present claim, the defendant first
argues that the court admitted “unreliable hearsay and
14
Counsel later elaborated that, because the parties had joint legal
custody of the children, both parents would have to waive privilege
with respect to the therapy notes and the plaintiff declined to do so.
J. B. v. C. B.

opinion testimony from [Freedman] . . . .” As we already
have concluded in part IV of this opinion, however, the
court properly allowed Freedman to testify only as a
fact witness. The court refused to qualify him as an
expert, and he was not permitted by the court to provide
opinion testimony. Furthermore, to the extent that the
defendant contends that the court allowed Freedman to
provide inadmissible hearsay testimony, the defendant
has not identified any particular testimony, objection or
ruling of the court for us to review. Accordingly, we are
unable to review that aspect of the defendant’s claim.
See Giordano v. Giordano, 153 Conn. App. 343, 358,
101 A.3d 327 (2014) (claim that trial court improperly
admitted hearsay evidence was not reviewable because
appellant failed to direct our attention to any specific
rulings by court).
The defendant next argues that the court improperly
sustained objections to “numerous” exhibits, includ-
ing those that she offered at the close of the hearing.
The defendant generally contends in her brief that the
exhibits “directly rebutted [Freedman’s] testimony and
revealed discrepancies in his statement about consent
and interactions that never occurred.” According to the
defendant, many of the exhibits at issue previously had
been “marked, authenticated, and entered [into] evi-
dence” during other proceedings in this matter, including
the dissolution trial.
Having reviewed the relevant portions of the tran-
script, we note that the court declined to admit the
defendant’s exhibits after sustaining objections made
by the plaintiff’s counsel on hearsay and other grounds.
The defendant provides no legal analysis challenging
the factual or legal bases for the court’s rulings and,
accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that
the court abused its discretion in declining to admit the
defendant’s exhibits.
Finally, to the extent that the defendant is claiming
that the refusal to admit her exhibits effectively deprived
her of a meaningful opportunity to defend against the
J. B. v. C. B.

motion for contempt and thus implicated her right to
due process, she has provided no relevant constitutional
analysis. As we stated in part III of this opinion, adequate
briefing of an issue is required to avoid abandoning it. See
C. B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 630. We conclude
that, to the extent the defendant has raised a viable due
process claim under either the state or federal constitu-
tions, she has abandoned her claim due to inadequate
briefing. In short, the defendant’s claim of selective and
inconsistent evidentiary rulings fails.
VI
The defendant claims that the court failed to maintain
“judicial neutrality” and disregarded ethical and safety
concerns. We decline to review this claim.
The disjointed arguments advanced by the defendant
in support of this claim generally are repetitive of her
criticism of the testimony provided by Freedman and
assert that the trial court either should have precluded
his testimony or found it not credible. She also makes a
number of allegations that Freedman acted unethically
by disclosing confidential or privileged communications,
or violated contractual obligations, but fails to provide
any factual or legal analysis or citations to the record
that connect her allegations regarding Freedman to her
claim that the trial court did not maintain neutrality or
disregarded ethical or safety concerns. It is axiomatic
that this court cannot pass upon the credibility of wit-
nesses or weigh evidence. See Lynch v. Lynch, 13 Conn.
App. 433, 437, 537 A.2d 503 (1988). “This court can-
not find facts or draw conclusions from primary facts
found, but can only review such findings to determine
whether they could legally, logically and reasonably be
found, thereby establishing that the trial court could
reasonably conclude as it did.” Id. It is the appellant’s
burden to provide this court with an adequate record for
review, which is lacking here with respect to this claim.
See Practice Book § 61-10. Accordingly, we decline to
consider this claim further.
J. B. v. C. B.

VII
Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly
denied her an opportunity to deliver closing arguments
at the conclusion of the January 2, 2024 evidentiary
hearing. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. On October 24, 2023, the court resumed the hear-
ing with respect to the plaintiff’s motion for contempt
relating to reunification. The only witness who remained
to testify was Freedman, and the defendant conducted
an extensive cross-examination of him and subsequently
was permitted to offer additional evidence in rebuttal
to Freedman’s testimony, including additional narra-
tive testimony. After all evidence was presented, the
court heard closing arguments from the parties. The
court permitted the defendant to make lengthy closing
remarks, and the court gave her considerable latitude as
a self-represented party regarding the scope and content
of her arguments. The court then concluded the hearing
with respect to the motion for contempt, took the mat-
ter under advisement, and indicated that it would issue
a written decision at a later date. Prior to adjourning
for the day, however, the following colloquy occurred:
“[The Defendant]: Your Honor, I just—I didn’t get to
finish speaking on my closing. Would I be able to submit
it as a brief or anything?
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I object to that, Your Honor.
I actually continue my objection [to] her entire closing as
it is irrelevant and deals with things that have already
been litigated prior to the order we’re here to enforce.
“The Court: I thought we had finished. Are we not
finished? . . . Do you need more time? You can’t have it
tonight because it’s five o’clock.
“[The Defendant]: I just wanted to say that—just a
couple more things . . .
“The Court: All right. Then you’ll have to say it at
another time. So, then what I’m hearing is that the
J. B. v. C. B.

hearing is not finished . . . [and] at our next hearing you
would like additional time to provide your further sum-
mation or closing. Is that what I’m hearing?
“[The Defendant]: Would I be able to say one para-
graph? . . .
“The Court: Yes. So, we’re adjourned until the next
hearing and you’ll be permitted to proceed at that time. .
. . Court’s not going to deprive you of time if you require
it or request it. So, we’ll stand adjourned, and we’ll take
it up at the next hearing.”
At the next hearing date on January 2, 2024, the court
permitted the defendant to make additional closing
remarks, although the court made clear to the defen-
dant that it was not opening the evidence and would
not permit the defendant to provide additional narra-
tive testimony, stating “[t]his is your summation or
closing argument . . . not an opportunity . . . to testify
anew about new issues.” The court eventually stopped
the defendant, stating: “Your closing statement is your
final argument. It’s not testimony. It’s not evidence. We
had concluded evidence. . . . So, have you read your one
last paragraph?” The defendant responded, “[y]es, Your
Honor,” and the court indicated it was time to move on
to the parties’ other motions.
Except in certain limited circumstances in which argu-
ment on motions is a matter of right, whether to hear
argument on a motion in civil matters is a matter left to
the discretion of the court subject to appropriate consti-
tutional limitations. See Practice Book § 11-18 (a).15 It
logically follows that, if a court conducts a hearing on a
motion, placing reasonable limitations on the scope and
duration of arguments or summations by counsel also
is a matter of discretion for the court. See Palkimas v.
Lavine, 71 Conn. App. 537, 548, 803 A.2d 329 (“[a] trial
15
Practice Book § 11-18 (a) provides in relevant part that “[o]ral argu-
ment is at the discretion of the judicial authority except as to motions
to dismiss, motions to strike, motions for summary judgment, motions
for judgment of foreclosure, and motions for judgment on the report of
an attorney trial referee and/or hearing on any objections thereto. . . .”
J. B. v. C. B.

court is invested with a large discretion with regard to
arguments of counsel”), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 919, 812
A.2d 863 (2002). Accordingly, we review the defendant’s
present claim under an abuse of discretion standard.
“When reviewing claims under an abuse of discretion
standard, the unquestioned rule is that great weight is
due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable
presumption should be given in favor of its correctness
. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could
reasonably conclude as it did.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority,
278 Conn. 692, 713, 900 A.2d 498 (2006).
In the present case, the trial court gave the defendant
great latitude to make whatever closing arguments she
wanted and only stopped the defendant when the court
determined that she was exceeding the scope of argu-
ment by attempting to introduce new evidence after
the evidentiary portion of the hearing had concluded.
Having reviewed the transcripts of the proceedings in
their entirety, we conclude that there is simply no sup-
port in the record for the defendant’s assertion that the
trial court refused to give her an opportunity to deliver
closing arguments. The court, in fact, gave the defen-
dant multiple opportunities to present her arguments,
once after the close of evidence on October 24, 2023, and
again at the January 2, 2024 hearing. To the extent that
the court placed limitations on the content of the defen-
dant’s arguments, the defendant has provided no legal
analysis from which to conclude that the court abused
its considerable discretion in so doing. Accordingly, we
reject the defendant’s claim.
The appeal is dismissed as to those claims challenging
the rulings on the plaintiff’s applications for waiver of
fees; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.