Jones v. State

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Jones v. State

MARQUIS JONES v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(AC 47824)
Cradle, C. J., and Moll and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner appealed following the denial of his petition for certification
to appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his petition for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered DNA evidence. The petitioner claimed,
inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying his posttrial motion
for permission to amend his petition to conform to the evidence presented
at the trial on the petition. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for cer-
tification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claims
involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court
could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised
were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion
for permission to amend his petition for a new trial, as there was nothing in
the record to support the petitioner’s argument that granting him permis-
sion to amend the petition would not cause a substantial delay of the trial
on the petition or that he suffered an injustice by such denial.

Argued October 21, 2025—officially released February 17, 2026

Procedural History

Petition for a new trial following the petitioner’s con-
viction of the crime of felony murder, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and
tried to the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial
referee; thereafter, the court denied the petitioner’s
motion for permission to amend the petition; judgment
dismissing the petition; subsequently, the court denied
the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner
appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Nicole Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the
brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (petitioner).
Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph Corradino,
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Jones v. State

Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The petitioner, Marquis Jones, appeals
following the denial of his petition for certification to
appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his
petition for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court
abused its discretion in denying his petition for certi-
fication to appeal and improperly denying his posttrial
motion for permission to amend his petition for a new
trial to conform to the evidence presented at the hearing
on that motion. We conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the petition for certification to
appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.
This court set forth the following facts, which the jury
reasonably could have found, in the petitioner’s direct
appeal from his conviction. “On the evening of December
26, 2002, the eighteen year old victim, accompanied
by his cousin, Sam Moore, attended a party at a club in
Bridgeport. The [petitioner] was at the club at the same
time as the victim and Moore. After leaving the club,
the victim and Moore went to a nearby restaurant. The
[petitioner], who was armed with a gun, arrived at the
same restaurant at approximately 1 a.m. While there,
the [petitioner] learned that the victim and Moore were
interested in purchasing marijuana. The [petitioner]
told an acquaintance, Gary Browning, that the victim
and Moore had money and that he wanted to rob them.
Browning arranged to sell marijuana to the victim and
led him to a nearby backyard to complete the sale. There-
after, the [petitioner] approached the victim from behind
and stated: ‘You know what time it is, run that shit.’ As
Browning walked away from the victim, the [petitioner]
shot the victim in the back of the head and took money
and drugs from him. The gunshot caused the victim’s
death. The victim’s body was found on the snow coated
ground the next morning.” (Footnote omitted.) State
Jones v. State

v. Jones, 135 Conn. App. 788, 791, 44 A.3d 848, cert.
denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d 885 (2012).
The petitioner was arrested on June 4, 2008.1 On May
28, 2010, following a jury trial, the petitioner was con-
victed of felony murder. He was sentenced to a total
effective sentence of forty years of incarceration. Id.,
790 n.1. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction
on direct appeal. Id., 806.
In May, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, which he later amended, wherein he
alleged, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel was
ineffective and his rights to due process and a fair trial
were violated by the failure of the state to disclose mate-
rial evidence that was favorable to the defense in that a
“hit notification” generated by the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS)2 database identifying the DNA profile
of Rafail E. Ferrer as consistent with the DNA profile
obtained from a sample taken from a bloodstain in the
victim’s car was sent to the agencies that investigated
and prosecuted the crime, specifically, the police depart-
ment, the prosecutor, and the major crimes unit, but not
to the petitioner’s trial counsel. He further alleged that
the evidence was material to a third-party culpability
defense. Following a two day trial, the habeas court,
Newson, J., issued a memorandum of decision in which
it denied the petitioner’s habeas petition. In so doing, the
habeas court held, inter alia, that the DNA evidence at
issue was not material to the petitioner’s defense. The
petitioner appealed to this court following the denial of
1
The record reflects that Moore signed a written statement on Decem-
ber 27, 2002, in which he averred that he did not see the victim after
the victim left the restaurant. On July 11, 2008, Moore testified at the
probable cause hearing that he met the victim shortly after the victim
left the restaurant and that the petitioner shot and killed the victim.
Moore did not testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial.
2
“CODIS contains DNA profiles from unsolved crimes and compares
them to known samples from convicted felons that are periodically
added to the database.” State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 180 n.2,
252 A.3d 811 (2020).
Jones v. State

his petition for certification to appeal from the denial of
his habeas petition. See Jones v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 212 Conn. App. 117, 274 A.3d 237, cert. denied,
343 Conn. 933, 276 A.3d 975 (2022).
In November, 2019, while the petitioner’s habeas action
was pending before the habeas court, the petitioner filed
the petition for a new trial underlying this appeal “based
on the availability of newly discovered DNA evidence that
was not available to [the petitioner] at the time of the
original trial.” Specifically, the petitioner again alleged
that two car keys were found by the victim’s body, the
car to which these keys belonged was located nearby and
there were what appeared to be bloodstains on the front
seat. A search warrant was executed for the vehicle, and
a sample of the bloodstained upholstery was sent to the
state forensic laboratory for testing, which eliminated
the victim as a contributor and, in November, 2008, there
was a CODIS “hit notification” to Ferrer. The petitioner
alleged that this information was not disclosed to the
defense until December, 2018. The petitioner asserted
that the newly discovered evidence was “exculpatory,
material to the question of who committed the crime at
issue, and likely would have produced a different result
had such evidence been presented at [the petitioner’s]
original trial.” The respondent, the state of Connecticut,
filed an answer essentially leaving the petitioner to his
proof on the allegations of his petition, and asserted, by
way of special defense, that the petitioner’s claim was
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The petitioner denied the respondent’s special
defenses.
The hearing on the petition for a new trial commenced
on October 28, 2021. On that day, the court, Hon. Dale
W. Radcliffe, judge trial referee, was informed by the
parties that the DNA evidence that was the subject of
the petition for a new trial also was the subject of the
Jones v. State

petitioner’s habeas petition, the petitioner appealed to
this court from the denial of his habeas petition, and that
appeal was still pending as of that date. Although the
petitioner initially rested his case that day, his counsel
asked the court to keep the evidence open because he
had not yet been able to obtain the record of the peti-
tioner’s criminal trial, which he sought to introduce
into evidence. The court agreed, at that time, to “leave
the evidence open” and directed the parties to contact
the caseflow coordinator to schedule a date to continue
the trial. The court thereafter issued an order stating:
“The [petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus] is scheduled for argument in
the Appellate Court on January 11, 2022. The result of
that appeal will have a bearing on this matter, given the
fact that the [habeas] court . . . considered the claim of
[the] DNA evidence in the denial of the habeas petition.
A conflict between two proceedings, determining the
same issues between the same parties, must be avoided.”
On April 26, 2022, this court affirmed the judgment of
the habeas court. Pertinent to the petitioner’s petition
for a new trial, this court agreed with the habeas court’s
conclusion that the DNA evidence was not material to
the petitioner’s defense.3 Jones v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 212 Conn. App. 143–44.
3
This court explained, inter alia: “The car that contained the blood-
stains was not found at the crime scene but on a nearby street. There is no
evidence that the victim or anyone else associated with the murder was
in or near the car that night. There is no evidence establishing how long
the car had been parked there. There is no indication that the victim’s
murder is connected to the victim’s car or that the blood was left during
or as a result of the murder—indeed, there was no evidence to suggest
that the bloodstains occurred near the time of the murder. Further, the
petitioner presented no evidence connecting Ferrer to the crime or the
crime scene. Finally, as the habeas court stated, ‘[t]he petitioner’s own
testimony at the habeas trial supports the irrelevance of anything found
inside of [the victim’s] vehicle. . . . Nowhere in his testimony did the
petitioner reference anything to do with the [victim’s] vehicle, nor did
he ever reference any “unknown male” supposedly being in the vehicle
with them or at the scene of the shooting.’ ” Jones v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 212 Conn. App. 143–44.
Jones v. State

On November 30, 2022, the hearing on the petitioner’s
petition for a new trial reconvened. The petitioner called
Moore to testify. During his testimony, Moore testi-
fied that he was with the petitioner when he heard the
shots that killed the victim and that, therefore, he did
not believe that the petitioner killed the victim. Moore
alluded to being coerced by law enforcement to sign a
statement to the contrary several years earlier.4 After
Moore testified, the court admitted into evidence Moore’s
written statement from 2002 as a prior inconsistent
statement. The court also admitted into evidence the
transcript of Moore’s testimony from the probable cause
4
During Moore’s testimony, the following colloquy occurred:
“[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Did you give a statement to the police
related to the killing [of your cousin]?
“[Moore]: Nah. The cops—the cops came, (indiscernible) they took my
[cousin’s] car. They started trying to get me to talk to them. I wouldn’t
talk to them. They kept telling me that [the petitioner] made a state-
ment towards me, that (indiscernible) made a statement. Listen, I’m
going to tell you what I told them back [then]. I don’t want nothing to
do with this. I didn’t come to his trial. They gave me fifteen—they gave
me eight more years because I didn’t come to his trial. I was supposed to
get eight years; I end up doing fifteen years in prison because I didn’t
come to this [man’s] trial. And they tried to force me to come to this
[man’s] trial. I didn’t come. They—they kept forcing me to talk to them.
I kept trying not to talk to these people. They kept trying to force me to
talk to them about this case. Listen, man, I been saying nothing about
this shit. I been trying—I’m just trying to be left alone so I don’t get
no more trouble. They took my [cousin] (indiscernible) and get fifteen
years, man. And I did fifteen years in prison because I wouldn’t talk on
this man. I don’t want nothing to do with this. . . . I—listen, I know
my [cousin is] gone. That’s it. I don’t know nothing else. That’s what I
keep telling them. And they keep trying to switch this shit and turn this
shit and keep following all of me. . . . I know I’m supposed to get eight
years in a case back in 2004. . . . I was vetted to do a deal for eight years
and try to get me to come to this [man’s] trial. I didn’t want to come.
Next thing I know, my charge got upped to attempted murder and I got
fifteen years. I do not want nothing to do with this. . . .
“[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: [C]an I show you a statement; can you
review it for me?
“[Moore]: Listen, man, there’s no—I’m not getting involved.
“The Court: Well, the question, Mr. Moore, was whether or not you
had given a statement in this matter.
“[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Can you review that for me, please?
“[Moore]: They were—on the—on the day in question, I gave a verbal
statement. I gave a verbal statement. Then, the cops, they transcribed it.
Jones v. State

hearing in 2008.5 After the parties rested their respective
cases, the court heard closing arguments and ordered the
parties to file simultaneous proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law on December 28, 2022.
On December 27, 2022, just one day before the par-
ties’ posttrial briefs were due to be filed, the petitioner
filed a motion for permission to amend his petition for
a new trial, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-62,6 to con-
They asked me to sign it. My mother came and got me. I left. Listen, I do
not want nothing to do with this. I been telling them that since 2002. . . .
“The Court: [D]id you sign a statement on the day—
“[Moore]: Yeah. I had no choice.
“The Court: And is that the statement that you signed? Do you want
to take a look at it?
“[Moore]: I’m not even looking over it, man. I don’t want to refresh
old wounds. I don’t want to get into it. And I don’t want to say nothing
that’s going to incriminate me.
“The Court: We just want you to tell us whether that’s your signa-
ture—whether you actually signed it.
“[Moore]: I’m not sure. . . . I plead the fifth, man. I’m not going to
get involved in it out of fear, man. I got time right now. . . . I don’t
want—if you want—if you all want to get honest, man, I don’t think
[the petitioner] killed my [cousin]. . . . I saw [the petitioner] that night.
I’m tired—I keep telling them, my statement been the same thing. I
don’t care about criminal buying trouble for something that I don’t
think they did. I never been—I ain’t no motherfucking rat, and I’m
just telling the truth. It ain’t rat, it no snitching, they just the truth.
What’s right is right. I saw that man on the side of the Chinese store. I
ran into [the petitioner] and I kept telling Detective [Hector] Teixeira
that. He kept switching my words up. I ran into [the petitioner]; it
was dark. . . . I heard the shots when I was near [the petitioner]. I was
near him. He came out the back near a house. I walked right up to [the
petitioner] and I asked him did he see my [cousin]. Me—me and [the
petitioner] were staring at each other. It was an aggressive standoff.
We was both young. It was an aggressive standoff. We was right there
like this looking at each other. And I—I heard two shot[s] go off. So, if
you asking me, if you asking Samuel Leroy Moore, I do not believe [the
petitioner] killed [the victim].”
5
Counsel for the petitioner later conceded that Moore’s testimony at the
probable cause hearing was inconsistent with his original written state-
ment. Moore did not testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial. Detective
Hector Teixeira also did not testify at the petitioner’s criminal trial.
6
Practice Book § 10-62 provides: “In all cases of any material vari-
ance between allegation and proof, an amendment may be permitted at
any stage of the trial. If such allegation was made without reasonable
excuse, or if the adverse party was actually misled thereby to his or
Jones v. State

form to the evidence presented at trial.7 The petitioner
represented that “[t]he proposed amended petition clari-
fies and focuses the procedural history and includes an
additional claim as a basis for a new trial related to the
testimony of [Moore] at the November 30, 2022 hearing
on the petitioner’s petition for [a] new trial. Counsel for
the [respondent] objects to this request to amend the
pleadings.” Specifically, the petitioner asserted: “At
the November 30, 2022 hearing, [Moore] surprised the
undersigned counsel by offering a passionate recantation
of his probable cause testimony and explained that he had
fabricated a statement and his probable cause testimony
against the petitioner at the probable cause hearing
in response to being pressured by [Detective] Hector
Teixeira of the Bridgeport Police Department. Moore’s
testimony also suggested that he was either retaliated
against for failing to testify at the petitioner’s criminal
trial, or that he was denied an inducement because of
that failure, in that he testified that he received eight
additional years of his sentence as a result of his refusal
to testify against the petitioner at his trial. This new
testimony significantly alters any close consideration
of the petitioner’s case. It also reveals that additional
exculpatory evidence had been concealed by the [state]
at both his criminal trial and afterward up until the time
of [Moore’s] 2022 testimony.”8 The petitioner argued:
her prejudice in maintaining the action or defense upon the merits, or
if such amendment requires postponement of the trial or additional
expense to the adverse party and this is shown to the satisfaction of
the judicial authority, such amendment shall be made only upon pay-
ment of costs or upon such terms as the judicial authority may deem
proper; but in any other case, without costs. Immaterial variances shall
be wholly disregarded.”
7
The petitioner also filed on that date a motion for extension of time
to file posttrial briefs.
8
In his proposed second amended complaint, which he filed with his
motion for permission to amend, the petitioner alleged, inter alia:
“
(51) Furthermore, [Moore’s] testimony at the probable cause hearing
was false in that [Moore] did not witness any robbery of the victim, nor
did he see the petitioner with a gun in the vicinity of the crime scene,
but rather his original statement to the police that he had not seen
anything was true, and his subsequent statement and probable cause
testimony came as a result of misinformation and pressure from law
Jones v. State

“Granting this amendment will not work an injustice
to the [respondent] for several reasons. First, while the
testimony of [Moore] was perhaps unexpected at the
November, 2022 trial, [the respondent] had previously
been on notice that [Moore] initially gave a statement
attesting that he had not witnessed the shooting, then
made a statement that he had witnessed the petitioner
participate in the shooting and testified consistently with
that at the probable cause hearing, and that [Moore] had
subsequently refused to cooperate at the criminal trial.
Second, the petitioner’s theory would be that [the respon-
dent], directly or through the police, had concealed the
facts related to [Moore’s] testimony up until the time of
the hearing on the [petitioner’s petition] for [a] new trial.
[The respondent] should not be able to argue injustice or
prejudice where its own actions kept the information out
of the possession of the petitioner at any earlier point.
Third, any arguable ‘injustice’ to [the respondent] would
pale in comparison to the injustice uncovered by the
testimony presented by Moore. The finding of probable
cause based solely upon the false testimony of a single
witness, that morphed into a trial based upon the unreli-
able testimony of a single individual who was testifying
for his own gain and very likely directly responsible for
enforcement, and the hope of a reduction in the sentence that he received
in his own criminal matter.
“(52) The information contained in paragraph (51) is newly discovered
evidence for purposes of [General Statutes] § 52-582 (a) which allows
for a petition to be filed at ‘any time’ if it [is] based upon ‘other newly
discovered evidence.’
“(53) Whether or not the information included in paragraph (51) is
newly discovered evidence for purposes of a petition for new trial, it is
relevant to consideration of (A) the probability of the petitioner’s suc-
cess on a retrial, and (B) whether an injustice has been done.
“(54) The information contained in paragraph (51) had been fraudu-
lently concealed from the petitioner by the [respondent] in that law
enforcement officials had actual knowledge of the circumstances sur-
rounding [Moore’s] statement and testimony, and they knew or should
have known that the information was fabricated by [Moore], and the
[respondent] did not disclose that information to the petitioner.
“(55) Due to this fraudulent concealment, the time limitation period
under . . . § 52-582 began to accrue only at the discovery of that concealed
evidence, [General Statutes] § 52-595.”
Jones v. State

the death of the victim, and resulted in an unreliable
conviction for the petitioner is a massive injustice if the
petitioner’s claim is proven. [The respondent] shares
the same interest as the petitioner in ensuring that jus-
tice is done, even if that means reevaluating previously
obtained convictions. Allowing this amendment will not
bring about substantial delay to the trial because while
the petitioner would ask for an opportunity to present
additional evidence, the court could alternatively allow
the amendment without accepting new evidence. While
the undersigned is very mindful that the court has sig-
nificantly accommodated the petitioner’s presentation
of evidence in this matter, the undersigned counsel feels
compelled to make this request on behalf of the petitioner
in the interests of justice and based upon his observations
at the November 30, 2022 hearing.” (Footnote omitted.)
In his motion, the petitioner asked for “the opportunity
to present limited evidence related to [Teixeira] and
other evidence that would substantiate the testimony of
[Moore] at the petition for [a] new trial.” He represented
to the court that “this would take up less than half a day
of the court’s time.”
On January 27, 2023, the court held a hearing on the
petitioner’s motion for permission to amend his petition.
At the hearing, the court began by recounting the history
of the case and then addressed counsel for the petitioner,
stating: “[I]t is your motion to extend time for filing of
proposed findings of fact. It’s also your motion to amend
. . . the pleadings and essentially to change the theory
of the case as pled and tried. I’ll hear you on that.” In
support of his motion for permission to amend, counsel
for the petitioner argued, inter alia: “[I]f the defense
knew that Detective Teixeira had obtained a fabricated
statement through police pressure, would an attorney,
if an attorney knew that, present some theory based on
that action at the trial to also undermine the testimony
of Browning, who only said . . . what he said after talking
Jones v. State

to Detective Teixeira after maybe the fifth or sixth time
giving a statement.”
In response to that argument, the court told counsel
for the petitioner: “But that simply wasn’t part of the
evidence here.” The court further explained: “I think I
would be compelled to say at that point . . . that this issue
was not brought to the court’s attention. This individual
didn’t testify at the original trial. And nothing said by
[Moore] here—this is not the first time that he’s given an
inconsistent statement. That was already known. That
nothing here would rise to the level of . . . a new trial on
that basis. I will be happy to decide that—that issue,
even though it wasn’t raised based on what I saw. But
if you would rather proceed on the other issue and save
that for a habeas action, you may do so. . . . I mean, that’s
the way I would be prepared to rule as far as that issue is
concerned, particularly based on the four corners of the
case as it was tried here. And I don’t have before me a
motion to reopen, and that would be highly problematic
to begin with. . . . And that’s really what you’d require
here.” The respondent then objected to the petitioner’s
motion and argued: “[W]e have had several days of trial
before Your Honor. Evidence has been presented, argu-
ments were made before Your Honor, and the evidence
has . . . since been closed. I think to amend the petition
at this point in time not only places [the respondent] at
an unfair [dis]advantage because . . . we’re adding an
additional claim that was not really brought to light but
I think it also . . . expands the universe in a way that nei-
ther party really was prepared to go forward.” The court
denied the motion for permission to amend the petition,
noting that it was “filed posttrial . . . .”9
On June 22, 2023, the court filed a memorandum of
decision wherein it dismissed the petitioner’s petition for
a new trial on the ground that, even if the petitioner’s
claim regarding the newly discovered DNA evidence was
9
Specifically, the court explained:
“
The Court: My intention would be at this point to deny the request for
permission to amend and make a specific finding that I am not deciding
at this point, and I’ll have the—and . . . I am not deciding at this point
Jones v. State

not barred by the doctrine of res judicata in that it was
considered and rejected by the habeas court, that evidence
was not material to the petitioner’s defense at his crimi-
nal trial. The petitioner thereafter sought certification
to appeal, which the court denied. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the petitioner does not challenge the court’s
judgment as it pertains to the newly discovered DNA
evidence. Rather, the petitioner claims that the court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for permission
to amend his petition for a new trial to include a claim
related to Moore’s testimony10 and denying his petition
for certification to appeal. We are not persuaded.
“It is well established that we apply the abuse of dis-
cretion standard when reviewing a court’s decision to
whether the failure to call [Moore] as a witness was fully and fairly liti-
gated in the earlier proceeding because it was not the subject of this trial.
“[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: And I think that I’m hearing the court
pretty clear about the benefits to [the petitioner] of not having it halfway
done in this proceeding . . . .
“The Court: I’m going to deny your motion for permission to amend
the pleadings in that it was filed posttrial, and I’m going to specifically
indicate, however, that I am not deciding based upon this motion or
on the evidence presented in [this case] whether the issue of calling
[Moore] as a witness at trial had been fully and fairly litigated, whether
the statement—the alleged statement of [Teixeira] would constitute
newly discovered evidence twenty years later; that would seem to be
problematic, but nonetheless, I’m not making a decision on that.
“[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Understood, and it’s appreciated. Thank
you, Your Honor.”
The court granted the petitioner’s motion for an extension of time to
file posttrial briefs and set a new date on which the parties would file
simultaneous briefs.
10
The petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that his second
amended petition became the operative petition when the respondent
did not file a written objection within fifteen days pursuant to Practice
Book § 10-60 (a) (3). We decline to consider this argument because it was
not distinctly raised before the trial court. See, e.g., United Concrete
Products, Inc. v. NJR Construction, LLC, 207 Conn. App. 551, 579,
263 A.3d 823 (2021) (“Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will
not review claims made for the first time on appeal. . . . [A]n appellate
court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly
raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to matters
in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial
court. . . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly means
Jones v. State

deny a request for certification to appeal from a denial
of a petition for a new trial. . . . Therefore, the threshold
issue that we must now decide is whether the court abused
its discretion in denying the petition for certification
to appeal. Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111
S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), establishes the
framework for satisfying the criteria necessary to show
an abuse of discretion. A petitioner satisfies that bur-
den by demonstrating: [1] that the issues are debatable
among jurists of reason; [2] that a court could resolve
the issues [in a different manner]; or [3] that the ques-
tions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Myers v.
Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 592, 620,
284 A.3d 309 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1021, 293
A.3d 897 (2023), and cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1021, 293
A.3d 897 (2023). In our review of whether the court
abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal,
we necessarily must examine the petitioner’s underlying
claim that the court improperly denied his motion for
permission to amend his petition for a new trial to add
a claim related to Moore’s testimony. See id.
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion of a party to amend
its complaint will be disturbed only on the showing of a
clear abuse of discretion. . . . Whether to allow an amend-
ment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. [An appellate] court will not disturb a trial court’s
ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a
clear abuse of that discretion. . . . It is the [petitioner’s]
burden in this case to demonstrate that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion. . . .
“[Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-62] [a] trial court
may allow, in its discretion, an amendment to pleadings
before, during, or after trial to conform to the proof. . . .
Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend
are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing
that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the
precise matter on which its decision is being asked.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)).
Jones v. State

parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering
the amendment. . . . The essential tests are whether the
ruling of the court will work an injustice to either the
plaintiff or the defendant and whether the granting of
the motion will unduly delay a trial. . . . The trial court is
in the best position to assess the burden which an amend-
ment would impose on the opposing party in light of the
facts of the particular case.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Zhuleku v. Naugatuck Valley
Radiology Associates, 232 Conn. App. 143, 152–53,
336 A.3d 101, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 907, 335 A.3d
846 (2025).
“While our courts have been liberal in permitting
amendments . . . this liberality has limitations. Amend-
ments should be made seasonably. . . . The motion to
amend is addressed to the trial court’s discretion which
may be exercised to restrain the amendment of plead-
ings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay
of the trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) KDM
Services, LLC v. DRVN Enterprises, Inc., 211 Conn.
App. 135, 140, 271 A.3d 1103 (2022).
As noted herein, the petitioner filed his petition for
a new trial in November, 2019, on the basis of newly
discovered DNA evidence pertaining to a previously
unidentified individual that was collected from a blood-
stain from the victim’s car. Three years later and almost
thirty days after the close of evidence, the petitioner
sought to add an entirely new claim that was unrelated
to his claim regarding the DNA evidence. After Moore
expressed his belief that the petitioner did not kill the
victim, neither party made any further inquiry of Moore,
and no further record was developed pertaining to his
testimony. The petitioner did not request a continuance
or ask the court to keep the evidence open to further
develop a claim related to Moore’s testimony. Although
the petitioner suggested in his motion that only one-half
day would be necessary to present further evidence to
support his proposed amended petition, he did not file
a motion to reopen the evidence or provide an estimate
Jones v. State

as to how long it would take to investigate and prepare
that new claim for the presentation of that evidence to
the court. The record also does not reflect that there was
any inquiry of the respondent as to how long it would
need to investigate and prepare to defend the petitioner’s
proposed amended petition. There simply is nothing in
the record to support the petitioner’s argument that
granting him permission to amend his petition would
not cause a substantial delay of the trial.
Moreover, as noted, the petitioner argued in his motion
for permission to amend that the proceeding would not be
unduly delayed by the addition of the new claim because
the court could grant the motion for permission to amend
and decide it without the presentation of additional evi-
dence. The court stated at the hearing on the motion for
permission to amend that the minimal record pertaining
to the petitioner’s proposed amended petition did not
support a new trial. In other words, the court told the
petitioner that it would deny a petition for a new trial
based on his proposed amendment, but, rather than
consider Moore’s testimony and foreclose in its entirety
any claim as to its materiality to the petitioner’s defense,
the court suggested that the petitioner might be able to
use that testimony in a new proceeding. To that end, the
court specifically noted, for the petitioner’s benefit, that
it was not considering the claim pertaining to Moore’s
testimony. On the record before us, we would be hard-
pressed to conclude that the petitioner suffered an injus-
tice by the court’s denial of his motion for permission to
amend his petition for a new trial.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the peti-
tioner’s motion for permission to amend his petition
for a new trial. We therefore further conclude that the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the issues raised
are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could
resolve the issues in a different manner or that the ques-
tions raised merit encouragement to proceed further.
Jones v. State

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the petition for certification to appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.