McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

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McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

NOLA MCLAUGHLIN v. FRANCIS
W. MCLAUGHLIN
(AC 47254)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving his
marriage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. The defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the court’s valuation of the marital residence was
clearly erroneous because the court improperly admitted into evidence and
relied on the plaintiff’s testimony as to its value. Held:

The trial court’s factual finding as to the value of the parties’ marital resi-
dence was not clearly erroneous, as that court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting into evidence the plaintiff’s valuation testimony because the
plaintiff’s equitable interest in the marital residence, in conjunction with
her thirty-two years of living in and becoming familiar with the home,
established that she possessed a sufficient ownership interest in the marital
residence for purposes of testifying as to its value, and the record contained
other evidence on which the court reasonably could have based its valuation.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed
to award the defendant alimony pursuant to the parties’ premarital agree-
ment, as the defendant failed to raise that claim before the trial court, and,
therefore, the claim was not properly before this court.

Argued October 6, 2025—officially released January 27, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Britain, where the defendant filed a
notice seeking enforcement of a premarital agreement;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Allard, J.;
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Tara C. Dugo, for the appellant (defendant).
Brandon B. Fontaine, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Francis W. McLaughlin,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

his marriage to the plaintiff, Nola McLaughlin. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1)
erroneously valued the marital residence by improperly
admitting into evidence and relying on the plaintiff’s
testimony as to its value and (2) failed to award him
alimony pursuant to the parties’ premarital agreement.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of the present appeal. The parties began
dating on February 1, 1990, became engaged two weeks
later, and started living together that same month in
a house purchased by the defendant and located at 64
Lido Road in Unionville (marital residence). On July
29, 1992, the parties executed a premarital agreement
prepared by the defendant’s attorney. The premarital
agreement provides in relevant part: “Both parties agree
that [the defendant] is entitled to $65,000.00 he origi-
nally invested in the single-family home known as and
located at 64 Lido Road, Unionville, CT 06085, after
the payment of the mortgage on the premises and the
remainder of the equity presently in existence and all
future equity in that house shall be shared equally . . . .”1
The parties married on September 12, 1992, and are the
parents of two children, neither of whom were minors
at the time of the dissolution proceedings.
In February, 2022, the plaintiff commenced the present
dissolution action. On July 18, 2022, the defendant filed
a notice seeking enforcement of the premarital agree-
ment. In response, on November 1, 2022, the plaintiff
filed a memorandum of law arguing that the premarital
agreement is unenforceable “on the basis that [it] was
not validly executed due to a lack of full disclosure and
lack of reasonable opportunity to obtain independent
counsel.” Alternatively, she argued that “enforcement
would be unjust based on public policy or unforeseen
1
The premarital agreement further provides that “[e]ach party to this
agreement agrees to share in all joint gifts, earnings and all acquired
assets after the marriage and to provide for each other in all such
property either as a result of death or dissolution of their future mar-
riage . . . .”
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

circumstances.” The court held a hearing concerning the
enforceability of the premarital agreement on November
3, 2022, at which both parties testified. On January 6,
2023, the court, Allard, J., issued an order reserving
“determination of the enforcement of the 1992 prenup-
tial agreement until the time of trial.” The case was then
tried before the court over several dates in 2023.
During trial, the defendant testified that the value of
the marital residence was $355,000.2 This value differed
from the $405,900 listed as the coverage limit for the
dwelling on the home insurance policy. The defendant
explained that he used $405,900 for purposes of insur-
ance coverage because “[his] agent advised it—cost of
materials is so high now, [if] the house had to be replaced
the materials would cost so much more nowadays.” The
defendant also noted that the home required repairs,
including upgrading the central air conditioning, replac-
ing the furnace,3 and rebuilding the deck, but his response
was equivocal when asked by his counsel if these repairs
were included in his valuation of the marital residence or
if his valuation reflected the home’s “as-is condition.”4
The plaintiff also was asked to opine on the value of
the marital residence. The defendant’s counsel objected
2
The plaintiff introduced into evidence two financial affidavits com-
pleted by the defendant. The affidavit the defendant signed in September,
2022, listed $355,000 as the value of the marital residence. The affidavit
he signed in February, 2023, however, listed $365,000 as the value of
the marital residence. When questioned by the plaintiff’s counsel, the
defendant stated the value listed on the February affidavit as $355,000
but noted, relative to the disparity, that he has “bad eyes” and conceded
“[w]hatever is there, is there” when the plaintiff’s counsel followed up
with, “[i]f I represented to you that [plaintiff’s exhibit 7] says $365,000,
would you have any reason to doubt me?”
3
The defendant estimated that the costs to upgrade the central air
conditioning and to replace the furnace would be $7900 and $6900,
respectively. He further estimated that rebuilding the deck would cost
between $12,000 and $15,000.
4
We note the following colloquies regarding the defendant’s consid-
eration of the future contemplated repairs to the home in his valuation:
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: On your financial affidavit you valued the
house at $355,000. Do you believe that is in as-i[s] condition without
[the central air conditioning and furnace] repairs being done?
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

on the basis that the plaintiff was not an expert; nor
did she have title to the home. The plaintiff’s counsel
responded that the plaintiff “has an equitable claim in the
property regardless of how it’s titled. And . . . a person
with an equitable or direct claim in a property can testify
as to its value without being an expert witness.” The
court overruled the evidentiary objection and allowed
the plaintiff to testify regarding her opinion as to the
value of the marital residence. The plaintiff based her
valuation on the size and interior layout of the home, the
renovations that had been made, including construction
of an additional garage for the defendant’s cars, and
the home’s location in “a prestigious town . . . .” The
plaintiff stated that the value of the marital residence
was “at least $400,000.”
On October 23, 2023, the court issued its memorandum
of decision, in which it concluded that the premarital
agreement was valid and enforceable and ordered, inter
alia, that the marriage be dissolved, that no alimony
be awarded to either party, and that the defendant pay
the plaintiff, pursuant to the premarital agreement,
“[The Defendant]: I don’t know. I’m not a real estate agent.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. But what—when you put a value
of 355—
“[The Defendant]: Um-hm.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —did you say that but a buyer would have
to put $15,000 worth of work—
“[The Defendant]: Correct.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —into it?
“[The Defendant]: Yes.
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. So, you valued it in as-is condition?
“[The Defendant]: No.”
***
“The Court: So, valued as what?
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: As though this work had been done,
it—that it had a new air conditioner and—
“[The Defendant]: Correct.”
Thereafter, the following additional colloquy occurred:
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Does [your valuation of the home] include
the redoing of the deck?
“[The Defendant]: Does my value?
“[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes.
“[The Defendant]: No.”
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

her share of the home’s equity. In issuing its order, the
court found that the value of the marital residence was
$400,000 and, pursuant to the premarital agreement,
credited to the defendant his $65,000 premarital invest-
ment in the home and divided the remaining balance
equally to quantify the plaintiff’s share at $167,500.
This appeal from the dissolution judgment, challenging
the court’s valuation of the marital residence and deci-
sion not to award alimony to the defendant, followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court’s valuation of
the marital residence was clearly erroneous because the
court improperly admitted into evidence and relied on
the plaintiff’s testimony as to its value. The defendant
asserts that the court abused its discretion in admitting
the plaintiff’s testimony because she did not hold title
to the marital residence and, for that reason, was not
qualified to opine on the property’s fair market value.
The plaintiff responds that her testimony was admissible
because she “had sufficient ownership interest in the
marital home . . . .” We agree with the plaintiff.
The following standard of review and legal principles
are relevant to our consideration of this issue. “The trial
court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned
only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s dis-
cretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption
in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only
upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus,
our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions
of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it
did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v.
Olson, 226 Conn. App. 392, 405, 318 A.3d 1067, cert.
denied, 350 Conn. 902, 322 A.3d 1059 (2024). Moreover,
“[a] finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it
is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and
determine credibility, we give great deference to its
findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not
examine the record to determine whether the [court] could
have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . .
. Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in
favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Kirwan v. Kirwan,
185 Conn. App. 713, 736, 197 A.3d 1000 (2018).
Our Supreme Court has held that a party, although
having no qualification other than an ownership interest
in real property, is competent to testify as to the value
of that real property. See, e.g., Wahba v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 349 Conn. 483, 510–11, 316 A.3d
338 (2024); Lovejoy v. Darien, 131 Conn. 533, 536, 41
A.2d 98 (1945). In applying this exception to the general
rule that lay witnesses may not provide expert opinions,
our courts have considered the owner’s familiarity with
the property to establish a basis for his or her opinion as
to its value. See Misisco v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680,
685, 192 A.2d 891 (1963).
The defendant’s position is that the law in Connecti-
cut provides that “a spouse who does not hold title to
real property cannot testify as to its value.” (Emphasis
omitted). He relies on Porter v. Thrane, 98 Conn. App.
336, 908 A.2d 1137 (2006), to support his contention
that such a rule exists. Porter, however, cannot be read
for that proposition. Our case law does not support the
requirement that a witness hold title to property to be
deemed competent to testify to its value. Rather, as set
forth in Porter, courts routinely examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the witness’ familiarity with
the property to assess the admissibility of such opinion
evidence. See id., 341–42. In fact, the court in Porter
illustrated circumstances in which nonowners were per-
mitted to testify as to a property’s value. Id., 341 n.5.
For instance, in O’Connor v. Dory Corp., 174 Conn. 65,
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

70, 381 A.2d 559 (1977), the former owner of property
was permitted to testify as to its value where reasonable
qualifications were established. In addition, in Lovejoy v.
Darien, supra, 131 Conn. 536, our Supreme Court held
that “[t]he admission of evidence of the [owner’s] son as
to the value of the [oyster] bed was within the discretion
of the trial court . . . as was the ruling excluding testi-
mony of a witness who had not worked on the ground for
twenty-seven years.” (Citation omitted.)
We also note that our Supreme Court’s decision in
Misisco v. La Maita, supra, 150 Conn. 685, presented
such a situation, as that court determined that it was
not erroneous for the trial court to allow the nonowner
plaintiff to opine on the property’s value because he
“had occupied the property for at least five years and
had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with its
value . . . .” The commentary to § 7-1 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence references Misisco as an exception to
the rule that lay witnesses cannot provide expert opin-
ions.5 Our law, thus, contemplates that a witness need
not be a titleholder of the property to testify to its value
when that witness had sufficient opportunity to become
acquainted with the property. Therefore, we decline to
accept the defendant’s proposition that Connecticut law
establishes that an occupant of a marital residence who
5
As noted in the commentary to § 1-1 (b) of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence, “[w]hen the Code was initially adopted by the judges of the
Superior Court in 1999 and then readopted by the Supreme Court in
2014, the adoption included both the rules and the commentary, thereby
making both equally applicable.” Conn. Code Evid. § 1-1 (b), commentary.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that “the [c]ode cannot be properly
understood without reference to the accompanying [c]ommentary. The
[c]ommentary provides the necessary context for the text of the [c]ode,
and the text of the [c]ode expresses in general terms the rules of evidence
that the cases cited in the [c]ommentary have established.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 60, 890 A.2d
474, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1197, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904
(2006); see also E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence
(6th Ed. 2019) §§ 1.7.1 and 1.7.2, pp. 32–33 (“[t]he cases cited [in the
commentary] are those that the [code] drafters believe accurately state
the proposition embodied in the rule [of evidence],” and the commentary
“can be cited as ‘authoritative’ ”).
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

does not additionally hold title to the property cannot
offer such opinion evidence.
The facts of this case compel us to uphold the trial
court’s ruling that the plaintiff was competent to express
an opinion regarding the value of the marital residence
where she had lived for thirty-two years prior to moving
out in March, 2022, one month after filing this dissolu-
tion action. In her thirty-two years of living at the home,
the plaintiff had ample opportunity and time to become
acquainted with the property. She provided a detailed
explanation for why she believed the value of the marital
residence to be $400,000, including the improvements
that had been made to it, the size and description of the
interior, and the “prestigious town” in which it was
located. Additionally, the defendant did not present
any evidence of substantial changes to or deterioration
of the home that occurred since the plaintiff moved out
that would have altered her familiarity with the property
and, thus, its value. On cross-examination, the defendant
could have questioned the plaintiff’s understanding of
the repairs and renovations that he noted in his testi-
mony or the number of bedrooms within the home to
challenge the basis for her valuation, but he failed to do
so. See Misisco v. La Maita, supra, 150 Conn. 685 (“The
defendant had the opportunity of testing the plaintiff’s
knowledge of the value on cross-examination. The weight
to be given the testimony was for the trier to decide.”).
Additionally, the parties executed a premarital agree-
ment prepared by the defendant’s attorney that gave the
plaintiff a financial interest in the marital residence. Spe-
cifically, the premarital agreement provided in relevant
part: “It is further agreed and understood between the
parties that upon the marriage to each other as follows
. . . Both parties agree that [the defendant] is entitled to
$65,000.00 he originally invested in the single-family
home known as and located at 64 Lido Road, Unionville,
CT 06085, after the payment of the mortgage on the
premises and the remainder of the equity presently in
existence and all future equity in that house shall be
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

shared equally . . . .” Upon marriage to the defendant,
the premarital agreement expressly entitled the plaintiff
to an equal share of the marital residence’s present and
future equity, less the initial $65,000 the defendant
invested. Although the plaintiff is not a titleholder of
the property, under the terms of the parties’ premarital
agreement, she possessed a financial interest similar to
that of a property owner for more than thirty years. Her
contractual right to the property’s equity, in conjunc-
tion with her thirty-two years of living in and becoming
familiar with the home, established that the plaintiff
possessed sufficient ownership interest in the marital
residence for purposes of testifying as to its value. We,
therefore, conclude that the court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in admitting the plaintiff’s testimony.
Finally, we note that the record contains other evidence
on which the trial court reasonably could have based
its valuation. Specifically, the plaintiff presented evi-
dence of the insurance policy for the marital residence,
which assigned coverage for the dwelling and the other
structures on the property at $405,900 and $40,600,
respectively. Because the trial court’s finding is sup-
ported by the evidence and we are not left with any firm
conviction that a mistake was made, we conclude that it
was not clearly erroneous. See Kirwan v. Kirwan, supra,
185 Conn. App. 738.
II
The defendant next claims that the court’s order failed
to “compl[y] with the clear terms of the parties’ [pre-
marital] agreement . . . that the parties were to share
in each other’s earnings in the event of a dissolution of
marriage.” The plaintiff responds that the defendant “did
not preserve this issue by raising it in the trial court.”
She asserts that, “at trial, the parties treated property as
falling under the agreement, while alimony from future
income and earnings was treated separately under the
usual statutory considerations.” In his reply brief, the
defendant contends that this court should disregard
the plaintiff’s contention because “the defendant has
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

maintained throughout the litigation that the parties’
incomes should be shared as part of the court’s orders.”
We are not persuaded.
“It is well known that this court is not bound to con-
sider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or
arose subsequent to the trial. Practice Book § 60-5. The
requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly means
that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention
of the court the precise matter on which its decision
is being asked. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious:
to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has
not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial
court . . . to address the claim—would encourage trial
by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court
and the opposing party.” (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ochoa v. Behling, 221 Conn.
App. 45, 50–51, 299 A.3d 1275 (2023); see also Gainty
v. Infantino, 222 Conn. App. 785, 802, 306 A.3d 1171
(2023) (declining to review claims of error with respect
to trial court’s order requiring defendant to reimburse
plaintiff for educational expenses where defendant did
not raise claims with trial court), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024); Kennynick, LLC v. Standard
Petroleum Co., 222 Conn. App. 234, 235 n.2, 305 A.3d
632 (2023) (declining to review claim of error with respect
to compound prejudgment interest where defendant did
not raise claim with trial court despite plaintiff expressly
requesting that award in posttrial briefing).
On appeal, the defendant asserts that the terms of the
premarital agreement require “that [the parties’] earn-
ings be shared, whether it be in the form of alimony or
otherwise” in the event of a dissolution of the marriage.
Although the defendant maintained his request for ali-
mony throughout the trial, the record does not reflect
his contention on appeal that the premarital agreement
serves as the legal basis for an award of alimony. Rather,
our thorough review of the record, including the defen-
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin

dant’s amended proposed orders,6 closing argument,7
and motion for reargument,8 reveals that he sought an
alimony award based on the factors contained in General
Statutes § 46b-82 and not on the provisions of the pre-
marital agreement. Because the defendant did not raise
this claim with the trial court, it is not properly before
this court, and we therefore decline to review it.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

6
In his amended proposed orders, the defendant detached his request
for alimony from his proposed division of assets under the premarital
agreement. Specifically, the proposed orders contained, inter alia, one
section titled “Alimony” and two sections titled, respectively, “Enforce-
ability of the Prenuptial Agreement” and “Division of Assets.” The
latter two sections discussed the division of marital assets under the
premarital agreement and did not make any reference to a division of
future earnings or alimony. The absence of these terms and the place-
ment of a proposal of alimony into a separate section indicate that
the defendant did not consider an award of alimony to fall within the
parameters of the premarital agreement.
7
General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part that, in award-
ing alimony, the court must consider, inter alia, the age, health, amount
and sources of income and earning capacity of the party requesting
spousal support. During closing argument, the defendant’s counsel
argued for an award of alimony by applying these factors, stating,
“[w]ith regard to alimony currently, our case law is basically pretty
clear on the reasons for alimony. . . . We have an age difference of
these parties, we have a health difference in these parties. We have [the
plaintiff’s] ability to continue to earn at the top of her game $90,000 a
year and [the defendant] in a situation where he’s not going to earn any
money. He’s limited by Social Security, number one, and number two,
he’s limited by his skills and his health. There should be no reason why
he doesn’t receive some type of spousal support to maintain him in the
same lifestyle he was accustomed to during the marriage.”
8
In his motion for reargument, the defendant asserted that, “[h]ad
the court considered the statutory factors set out in [General Statutes
§] 46b-82, it would have found that despite the gender of the recipient,
this is an alimony case.”