In re Probate Appeal of Barbera

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In re Probate Appeal of Barbera

IN RE PROBATE APPEAL OF JAMES BARBERA III
(AC 48128)
Elgo, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing his
appeal from a decree of the Probate Court denying his motion for payment
of attorney’s fees and petition to surcharge. He claimed that he incurred
attorney’s fees for the benefit of a trust and its beneficiaries in pursuing
the defendant’s removal as trustee of that trust and that the defendant should
have been surcharged for attorney’s fees that the defendant incurred for
his defense against the action to remove him as trustee and paid out of the
trust’s assets. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
concluded that he had not appealed from a decree of the Probate Court
approving the final accounting of a successor trustee, which had been issued
on the same day as the decree denying his motion for payment and his
petition to surcharge. Held:

The Superior Court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion to entertain the plaintiff’s motion for payment of attorney’s fees that
he incurred for the benefit of the trust and its beneficiaries in securing the
defendant’s removal as trustee because, in the absence of express statutory
authorization, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an equitable
claim, and the statutes that the plaintiff claimed authorized his claim (§§ 45a-
98 (a) (6), 45a-110 (c), and 45a-175 (g)) were inapplicable to the facts of
the case.

The Superior Court’s finding that the plaintiff did not appeal from the final
accounting decree was not clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and
pleadings in the record because there was no indication in any of the
pleadings that the plaintiff filed with the court between the commencement
of his probate appeal and the first day of trial that the propriety of the final
accounting decree was at issue, as the plaintiff maintained that his appeal
pertained solely to the propriety of the Probate Court’s decision to deny
his motion for payment and his petition to surcharge, and the court and the
defendant were entitled to rely on those pleadings.

The Superior Court’s finding that the final accounting filed by the successor
trustee incorporated expenditures itemized in a prior accounting filed by
the defendant was not clearly erroneous, as it was substantiated by the
parties’ exhibits, which demonstrated, inter alia, that the successor trustee
adopted the account on file into his final accounting.

The Superior Court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s petition to sur-
charge the defendant for attorney’s fees that were paid to the defendant’s
counsel with trust assets was time barred pursuant to statute (§ 45a-186
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In re Probate Appeal of Barbera
(b)), as the plaintiff failed to appeal from the final accounting decree, in
which the Probate Court approved the final accounting incorporating those
expenditures, within thirty days.
Argued September 18—officially released December 16, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the
district of Greenwich denying the plaintiff’s motion for
payment and his petition to surcharge, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk and tried to the court, Hon. Robert L. Genuario,
judge trial referee; judgment dismissing the appeal,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Robert D. Russo, with whom were Liam S. Burke and,
on the brief, Amanda T. Heffernan, for the appellant
(plaintiff).
Gerard N. Saggese III, with whom was Juliette G.
Taylor, for the appellee (defendant Ronald A. Young).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, James Barbera III, appeals
from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his
appeal from a November 29, 2021 decree of the Probate
Court for the district of Greenwich. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly con-
cluded that (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain his motion for payment of attorney’s fees that
he incurred in an effort to remove the defendant Ronald
A. Young as trustee of the Evelynann L. Barbera Revoca-
ble Trust (trust),1 (2) the plaintiff had not appealed from
1
Michael Barbera, Robert Barbera, Mary Bellantoni, Antoinette Dombrow-
ski, Patricia Enright, James Fulton, Bradley Jacobs, Maureen Jernigan, Kath-
erine Kelley, Rebecca Kelley, Shawn Kelley, Lawrence Mannix, Richard
Margenot, Gerard Saggese, and Annette Shanley also were named as defen-
dants in the plaintiff’s appeal to the Superior Court but have not appeared
or participated in this appeal. Also named as a defendant was the successor
trustee of the trust, Nicholas Bellantoni, who has appeared in this appeal
but has not filed an appellate brief. For clarity, we refer to Ronald A. Young
as the defendant in this opinion.
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In re Probate Appeal of Barbera

the decree of the Probate Court approving the final
accounting of the successor trustee, Nicholas Bellan-
toni (successor trustee), (3) the final accounting of the
successor trustee incorporated expenditures itemized
in a prior accounting filed by the defendant one year
earlier, and (4) the plaintiff’s petition to surcharge was
barred by the statute of limitations contained in General
Statutes § 45a-186 (b).2 We affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
The following facts, as set forth in the Superior
Court’s October 2, 2024 memorandum of decision, are
relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff is the nephew of
Evelynann Barbera (testator) and a beneficiary of the
trust. The defendant is the great nephew of the testator
and also a beneficiary of the trust. ‘‘On or about March
15, 2002, [the testator] entered into a revocable trust
agreement, pursuant to which she and [the defendant]
were cotrustees of the trust . . . . The trust provided
that, upon her death, [it] would become irrevocable.
The [testator] passed away on June 13, 2014, and [the
defendant] became the sole trustee at that time. Thus,
[the defendant] was cotrustee from 2002 to June 13,
2
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff also claims that the Superior Court
improperly relied ‘‘upon the findings of the Probate Court in rendering
its decision’’ and improperly made ‘‘findings without consideration of the
Probate Court’s determination.’’ The plaintiff has not provided citation to
any legal authority for those claims and his analysis thereof consists of a
single paragraph of abstract assertion. We, therefore, decline to review those
inadequately briefed claims. See, e.g., Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642, 689,
295 A.3d 75 (2023) (‘‘[Our appellate courts] are not required to review issues
that have been improperly presented . . . through an inadequate brief. . . .
Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid
abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a
claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation
of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619, 635, 882 A.2d 98 (parties
must analyze relationship between facts of case and applicable law), cert.
denied, 276 Conn. 924, 888 A.2d 92 (2005), and cert. denied, 276 Conn. 925,
888 A.2d 92 (2005).
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2014, and sole trustee from 2014 until his removal by
the Probate Court pursuant to [a] decree of January,
2019. [The defendant] has a financial background and,
since the early 2000s, worked as a financial advisor
regarding ‘strategies for wealth creation.’ In 2008, [the
defendant] became more involved in the management
of the trust assets because the [testator] began to show
diminishing capacity due to the natural aging process.
During [the defendant’s] tenure as trustee, the largest
asset of the trust was a commercial property in the
downtown commercial shopping district of Rye, New
York.
‘‘The plaintiff also has a financial background in the
accounting field, though he is not a certified public
accountant. He acquired his interest in the trust when
his father passed away, pursuant to terms of the trust,
which provided for a per stirpes distribution of the
interest of deceased beneficiaries. . . .
‘‘[The defendant] filed an accounting for the trust,
dated March 23, 2018, with the Probate Court for the
period of March 15, 2002, to April 30, 2015. In July
of 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended supplemental
objection to that accounting filed by [the defendant].
. . . As a part of those objections, he petitioned the
Probate Court to remove [the defendant] as trustee
(July, 2018 objections). In the July, 2018 objections, the
plaintiff alleged various breaches of fiduciary duties by
[the defendant] and sought, inter alia, an order of the
Probate Court removing and replacing him as trustee
and the issuance of a surcharge. . . . [T]he objections
raised by the plaintiff in his July, 2018 objections include
an inability or refusal to completely and accurately
account for $111,302.26 in trust assets, which the plain-
tiff alleged . . . represented loans made by [the defen-
dant] to himself from trust assets. The objections also
included claims that [the defendant] breached his fidu-
ciary duty by investing trust assets in businesses in
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which he had an interest, and which investments were
not appropriately documented or accounted for. The
plaintiff also objected to investments in private compa-
nies, including an investment in a company referred to
as the ‘SeeSmart’ investment, which this court finds
resulted in a total loss to the trust of its funds invested
in SeeSmart. The objections included other transactions
by [the defendant] in which he loaned trust funds to
himself, made nontraditional investments and paid him-
self trustee fees in excess of what was appropriate.
‘‘[The defendant] acquired his interest in the trust by
purchasing the interest of other beneficiaries in 2016,
including that of his cousin, [Robert] Barbera, and that
of his grandmother. Prior to the acquisition of his inter-
est in the trust . . . the defendant . . . had no direct
interest as a beneficiary in the trust. There is no evi-
dence to indicate that these transactions were other
than arm’s length, mutually agreeable financial transac-
tions between [the defendant] and the two beneficiaries
of the trust from which he acquired his interest. As a
result of these transactions, [the defendant’s] interest
in the trust is approximately 55 percent [of] the trust
assets; the plaintiff’s interest is approximately 7.25 per-
cent.
‘‘Following a hearing on the accounting for the period
of March 15, 2002, through April 30, 2015, and the July,
2018 objections, the Probate Court issued a decree
dated January 9, 2019 (January, 2019 decree). In the
January, 2019 decree, the Probate Court (1) removed
[the defendant] as trustee based on ‘an appearance of
impropriety’; (2) reduced [the defendant’s] trustee fee
from $273,666.55 to $156,000 pursuant to the principles
articulated in Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374 [119 A.
341] (1923); (3) ordered that [the defendant] amend his
accounting to reflect the reduction in his trustee’s fee;
and (4) appointed [the] successor trustee . . . .
Despite removing [the defendant] as trustee for an
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appearance of impropriety and reducing the amount
of his fees, the Probate Court did not find that [the
defendant] engaged in financial malfeasance, fraud or
bad faith, or that he breached any of his fiduciary duties.
In addition, the [Probate] Court expressly declined to
surcharge [the defendant]. The plaintiff’s request to sur-
charge [the defendant] in [the] July, 2018 objections
did not include a request to surcharge [the defendant]
for the legal fees that are the subject of this case because
those fees had not yet been specified in the March 23,
2018 accounting, which was the subject of the July,
2018 objections. No appeal was taken from the January,
2019 decree.
‘‘On August 16, 2019, [the defendant] filed an interim
account for the period of May 1, 2015, through January
9, 2019 (August, 2019 accounting). The August, 2019
accounting specifies for the first time that $407,327.53
in legal fees were paid from the trust to [the defendant’s]
counsel from May 22, 2015, through August 31, 2018.
These fees were not reflected in the previous account-
ing filed by [the defendant] that covered the period
from March 15, 2002, through April 30, 2015. On Septem-
ber 10, 2019, [the defendant] filed an amended first and
final account for the period of March 15, 2002, through
April 30, 2015 . . . as ordered in the January, 2019
decree. In a decree dated September 24, 2019 (Septem-
ber, 2019 decree), the Probate Court held that the
August, 2019 accounting would be ‘kept for informa-
tional purposes only,’ and that, ‘at this time, the [Pro-
bate] Court is satisfied that [the defendant] has fulfilled
what was ordered of him pursuant to the [January, 2019
decree].’ No appeal was taken from the September,
2019 decree.
‘‘On November 25, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion
for payment, requesting reimbursement for [$242,287]
in attorney’s fees he claimed that he incurred for the
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benefit of the trust and his fellow beneficiaries in pursu-
ing [the defendant’s] removal as trustee. Also, on
November 25, 2020, the plaintiff filed the petition to
surcharge [the defendant] for $344,074.08 in attorney’s
fees [that the defendant] incurred for his defense
against the action to remove him as trustee and paid
out of trust assets, which fees were incurred between
May 1, 2015, and January 9, 2019, as reflected in the
August, 2019 accounting. On April 26, 2021, [the defen-
dant] filed an opposition to both of the plaintiff’s
motions. In a decree dated November 29, 2021, the
Probate Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for payment
and the petition to surcharge (November, 2021 decree).
The November, 2021 decree provides that the plaintiff
did achieve a benefit to the trust and its beneficiaries
in reducing [the defendant’s] trustee fees by
$117,666.55, but the benefit was offset by the fact that
an extraordinary amount of time and expense were
incurred by the trust in defending against claims that
were denied. The November, 2021 decree clarified that
[the defendant] was removed as trustee based on the
[Probate] Court’s concern over an appearance of impro-
priety and a lack of professionalism as a fiduciary. How-
ever, the [Probate] Court also noted that, notwithstand-
ing these actions, [it] did not find financial malfeasance,
fraud, or bad faith [on the part of the defendant].
‘‘In a separate decree dated November 29, 2021, the
Probate Court approved the final account[ing] filed by
the successor trustee . . . (final accounting decree).’’
In that decree, the Probate Court stated: ‘‘After due
hearing, the COURT FINDS that . . . [n]otice was
given in accordance with the order(s) of notice pre-
viously given. The [successor trustee] has sent a copy
of the final account to all parties and attorneys of
record. After having examined the final account,
together with all supporting documents, the court FUR-
THER FINDS THAT . . . [o]bjections were raised and
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considered. WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED AND
DECREED that . . . [t]he final account is approved.
The rest, residue and remainder, if any, of the estate
or trust is to be distributed, transferred and paid by the
[successor trustee] in accordance with the findings of
the court above. The [successor trustee] shall submit an
affidavit of closing to the court.’’ The successor trustee
complied with that directive and filed an affidavit of
closing with the Probate Court in March, 2022.
On December 28, 2021, the plaintiff commenced a
probate appeal in the Superior Court,3 claiming that the
Probate Court had ‘‘erroneously reached certain factual
conclusions’’ in denying his motion for payment and
his request to surcharge. The defendant filed an answer
and six special defenses, in which he alleged, inter alia,
that the plaintiff’s claims were time barred by the statute
of limitations contained in § 45a-186 (b) and otherwise
were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and
res judicata. In his reply to those special defenses, the
plaintiff summarily denied the allegations contained
therein.
On April 10, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, claiming that the appeal was moot because
the plaintiff had not appealed from the final accounting
decree.4 The defendant further alleged that the appeal
3
‘‘[P]robate appeals are not civil actions. They are not commenced by
the service of process . . . . Probate appeals are, rather, properly com-
menced by filing the complaint with the Superior Court.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Burnell v. Chorches, 173 Conn. App. 788,
796, 164 A.3d 806 (2017).
4
On April 10, 2023, the defendant also filed a motion for summary judgment
on collateral estoppel and res judicata grounds. In response, the plaintiff
argued, inter alia, that motions for summary judgment ‘‘are procedurally
improper in the context of a probate appeal . . . .’’ In its September 15,
2023 order on that motion, the court first noted that ‘‘[t]he crux of the
plaintiff’s argument is that summary judgment is not permitted in an appeal
from probate. There is a split of authority in the Superior Court on this
issue as noted by the respective parties. This split of authority is well framed
. . . in the recent decision of Watson v. Trustees of the Eleanor Watson
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was time barred, as it was not filed within the thirty
day limitation period of § 45a-186 (b). In support of that
motion, the defendant filed a sworn affidavit dated April
4, 2023, in which he averred that, ‘‘[b]eginning in 2015,
[the] [p]laintiff began a series of filings in the Greenwich
Probate Court, which were heavily litigated.’’ The defen-
dant then stated that ‘‘[a]ttached to this [a]ffidavit are
exhibits which contain true and correct copies of cer-
tain filings’’ and ‘‘certain [d]ecrees entered by the Pro-
bate Court . . . .’’ Those exhibits included copies of
the January, 2019 decree, the September, 2019 decree,
the November, 2021 decree, and the final accounting
decree. In addition, the defendant filed a memorandum
of law in support of his motion to dismiss, in which he
conceded that the plaintiff’s ‘‘appeal of the November,
2021 decree was technically commenced within the
thirty day appeal period proscribed in . . . § 45a-186.’’
In his June 26, 2023 objection to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff averred that ‘‘the instant
appeal does not seek to overturn or otherwise challenge
decrees from 2019’’; that ‘‘the subject of the instant
probate appeal is a November, 2021 decree’’; and that
‘‘[t]he [November], 2021 decree, which has been
appealed by the plaintiff, was a decree denying the
plaintiff’s motion for payment, which sought reimburse-
ment from the trust of legal fees incurred by the plaintiff
in connection with the underlying probate dispute and
the defendant’s actions as trustee, and motion for sur-
charge, which sought to have . . . legal fees paid by
the defendant out of trust assets reclassified as distribu-
tions to the defendant rather than trust expenses.’’
The court heard argument on the defendant’s motion
to dismiss on July 10, 2023. In its September 15, 2023
Irrevocable Trust, [Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2023 WL 5543151, *2 (Conn.
Super. August 21, 2023)].’’ The court then expressly adopted the reasoning
of that decision and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The propriety of that
determination is not at issue in this appeal.
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order, the court denied the motion, stating in relevant
part: ‘‘The court heard argument on the record related
to this motion to dismiss . . . . At that time, [the par-
ties] were provided the opportunity to fully state their
arguments on the motion. . . . As the [defendant] con-
cedes in [his] argument and filings, the appeal is timely
[as] to the [November, 2021 decree] and was filed within
thirty (30) days, on December 28, 2021. Also, as the
defendant concedes, this action is not an attempt to
resurrect claims of prior orders of the Probate Court
that were not timely appealed. As such, pursuant to
. . . § 45a-186 (b), the court finds that the appeal [of
the November, 2021 decree] is timely and that the court
has jurisdiction over this appeal . . . .’’
On April 26, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation with
the court titled ‘‘The Parties’ Joint Proposed Findings
of Fact.’’ That stipulation contained thirty paragraphs
and specified, among other things, that ‘‘[n]o appeal
was taken of the January, 2019 decree,’’ that ‘‘[n]o
appeal was taken of the September, 2019 decree,’’ and
that ‘‘[n]o appeal was taken of the final accounting
decree.’’
A two day trial was held in the spring of 2024, at
which the plaintiff and the defendant testified, and
twenty-three exhibits were admitted into evidence. The
parties thereafter submitted posttrial briefs.
In its October 2, 2024 memorandum of decision, the
court emphasized that, although the Probate Court
removed the defendant as trustee in the January, 2019
decree, the Probate Court did not find, in either the
January, 2019 decree or the November, 2021 decree,
that the defendant ‘‘engaged in financial malfeasance,
fraud or bad faith, or that he breached any of his fidu-
ciary duties’’ to the trust. The Superior Court then con-
cluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter-
tain the plaintiff’s motion for payment of attorney’s fees
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In re Probate Appeal of Barbera

that he incurred while pursuing the defendant’s removal
as trustee. The court also found that the plaintiff had
not appealed the final accounting decree, in which the
Probate Court approved the final accounting filed by
the successor trustee. Lastly, the court concluded that
the plaintiff’s petition to surcharge the defendant for
expenses paid out of trust assets in defending the
motion to remove him as trustee was barred by both
the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine
of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the appeal, and this appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, we note that ‘‘[a]n appeal
from a Probate Court to the Superior Court is not an
ordinary civil action. . . . When entertaining an appeal
from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior
Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate.
. . . In ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court
exercises the powers, not of a constitutional court of
general or common law jurisdiction, but of a Probate
Court.’’ (Citations omitted.) Kerin v. Stangle, 209 Conn.
260, 263–64, 550 A.2d 1069 (1988); see also In re Probate
Appeal of Buckingham, 197 Conn. App. 373, 374, 231
A.3d 1261 (2020) (Superior Court ‘‘assumes the status
of a statutory Probate Court of limited jurisdiction’’
when hearing probate appeals). Moreover, in cases in
which no record was made of the proceedings before
the Probate Court, ‘‘the Superior Court [is] required to
undertake a de novo review of the Probate Court’s
decision.’’5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salce v.
Cardello, 348 Conn. 90, 104, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023); see
also Kerin v. Stangle, supra, 264 (function of Superior
Court in appeals from order or decree of Probate Court
‘‘is to take jurisdiction of the order or decree appealed
from and to try that issue de novo’’).
5
It is undisputed that no record was made of the Probate Court proceed-
ings in the present case.
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I
We first consider the plaintiff’s contention that the
Superior Court improperly concluded that it lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to entertain his motion for pay-
ment of attorney’s fees that he incurred for the benefit
of the trust and its beneficiaries in securing the defen-
dant’s removal as trustee.6 That claim is unavailing.
6
We are mindful that our Supreme Court has distinguished a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction from its statutory authority to act. See, e.g.,
Hepburn v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827, 838, 312 A.3d 1 (2024); Amodio v. Amodio,
247 Conn. 724, 727–28, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999). At the same time, ‘‘the distinc-
tion between challenges to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and
challenges to the exercise of its statutory authority is not always clear’’; In
re Matthew F., 297 Conn. 673, 702, 4 A.3d 248 (2010) (Rogers, C. J., concur-
ring); and often ‘‘has proven illusory in practice.’’ In re Jose B., 303 Conn.
569, 580, 34 A.3d 975 (2012); see also Tremont Public Advisors, LLC v.
Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 333 Conn. 672, 692–93 n.11, 217
A.3d 953 (2019) (distinction between trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
and its statutory authority ‘‘has caused ongoing confusion in our courts’’);
Cantoni v. Xerox Corp., 251 Conn. 153, 162, 740 A.2d 796 (1999) (noting
‘‘the recurrent difficulty of distinguishing’’ between challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction and statutory authority).
That difficulty is compounded in the context of probate appeals, as the
jurisdiction of such courts is circumscribed and constrained by statute. See,
e.g., In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 214, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002) (‘‘It is well
established that courts of probate are statutory tribunals that have no com-
mon-law jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, [courts of probate] can exercise
only such powers as are conferred on them by statute. . . . They have
jurisdiction only when the facts exist on which the legislature has condi-
tioned the exercise of their power. . . . [A] court which exercises a limited
and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so
under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed
by the enabling legislation. . . . Ordinarily, therefore, whether a Probate
Court has jurisdiction to enter a given order depends upon the interpretation
of a statute.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Irre-
spective of the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and statutory
authority, our Supreme Court has continued to use jurisdictional nomencla-
ture when discussing the authority of a Probate Court to adjudicate a plain-
tiff’s claim. See, e.g., Solon v. Slater, 345 Conn. 794, 828, 287 A.3d 574 (2023);
Hynes v. Jones, 331 Conn. 385, 392, 204 A.3d 1128 (2019); In re Henrry P.
B.-P., 327 Conn. 312, 324, 173 A.3d 928 (2017); In re Michaela Lee R., 253
Conn. 570, 583, 756 A.2d 214 (2000); cf. Rutherford v. Slagle, 352 Conn.
27, 45, 334 A.3d 988 (2025) (noting that ‘‘the legislature has expanded the
jurisdiction of the probate courts’’ through statutory enactment); Potter v.
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In re Probate Appeal of Barbera

As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[c]ourts of
probate are statutory tribunals that have no common-
law jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, [they] can exercise
only such powers as are conferred on them by statute.
. . . They have jurisdiction only when the facts exist
on which the legislature has conditioned the exercise
of their power. . . . [A] court [that] exercises a limited
and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act
unless it does so under the precise circumstances and
in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling
legislation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hynes
v. Jones, 331 Conn. 385, 392, 204 A.3d 1128 (2019). The
issue in this case is whether our General Statutes grant
the Probate Court authority to exercise jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s motion for payment of $242,287 in attor-
ney’s fees that he incurred in pursuing the defendant’s
removal as trustee. That issue presents a question of
statutory interpretation, over which our review is ple-
nary. See id.
‘‘In matters of statutory interpretation, we are guided
by General Statutes § 1-2z, which directs us first to
consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship
to other statutes. If, after examining such text and con-
sidering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
ing of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Health Body World Supply,
Inc. v. Wang, 353 Conn. 296, 313, 342 A.3d 987 (2025).
A
In resolving the interpretive question before us, we
do not write on a blank slate but are guided by the
precedent of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., New
Alcorn, 140 Conn. 96, 100, 99 A.2d 97 (1953) (‘‘[i]t is, of course, elementary
that courts of probate are strictly statutory tribunals’’).
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England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
sion, 308 Conn. 180, 186, 61 A.3d 505 (2013). In Palmer
v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 160 Conn. 415,
416–17, 279 A.2d 726 (1971), the plaintiff beneficiaries
sought to recover ‘‘damages for expenses incurred in
benefiting a trust’’ and attorney’s fees specifically. In
that case, the efforts of the plaintiffs ‘‘resulted in sub-
stantial benefits to the estate in that approximately
$85,000 of increased value was realized for the estate.’’
Id., 419. Because their actions benefited the trust, the
plaintiffs alleged that ‘‘equitable principles apply; that
those principles permit the recovery of their expenses;
[and] that the recovery can be from the trust fund bene-
fited . . . .’’ Id., 420. Our Supreme Court agreed, stat-
ing: ‘‘The principle of reimbursing a party for expenses
which he has incurred in benefiting a trust fund of
which he is a beneficiary is . . . recognized in Con-
necticut. . . . It thus seems to be evident that the rule
of equity, and of trusts, through which the plaintiffs
seek to recover, does indeed exist. It is, in fact, widely
recognized. . . . To allow recovery in a situation such
as that in the present case is equitable, and to deny
recovery in such a situation would be unjust. We find,
therefore, that the action brought by the plaintiffs is
equitable in nature and one for which a remedy clearly
lies.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 421–23.
Our Supreme Court then turned its attention to the
question of precisely which court in this state ‘‘had
jurisdiction over this matter.’’ Id., 427. The court first
noted that the plaintiffs’ claim was ‘‘an overall claim
for services incurred in benefiting’’ the trust and that
the ‘‘expenses claimed were the aggregate of all of the
expenses incurred in benefiting the trust . . . .’’ Id.,
427–28. The court then explained that the right to
recover such expenses originated not in the General
Statutes, ‘‘but rather, in general equitable doctrines
. . . .’’ Id., 428. For that reason, our Supreme Court
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held that ‘‘the Probate Court, and the Superior Court
sitting in review as a court of probate, cannot order
the payment of such expenses.’’ Id. It continued: ‘‘The
court of probate has no common-law jurisdiction. . . .
It may only act as authorized by statute. . . . The Supe-
rior Court, sitting in review of the Probate Court, may
not exercise powers beyond those of the Probate
Court.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id.
In addition, our Supreme Court observed that ‘‘[a]
court of probate is unable to award damages. . . . It
would, therefore, be inappropriate to allow a court to
entertain an action in which it is without the power to
grant the relief requested.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 430.
The court emphasized that ‘‘the Probate Court lacks
essential powers necessary to handle independent equi-
table actions, clearly supporting the position that it may
not assume jurisdiction in such cases. . . . [W]e should
not imbue a court with jurisdiction where its own limita-
tions prevent it from going forward.’’ Id. The court thus
concluded that it was ‘‘clear that . . . the Probate
Court has no jurisdiction over a matter of this sort. The
claimant, however . . . is not without a remedy. His
recourse is through courts of ordinary jurisdiction. . . .
The only appropriate remedy would . . . be in a court
of general jurisdiction . . . . We, therefore, hold that
the Probate Court may not entertain an equitable claim
against a trust fund in an independent action. The only
manner in which to test the validity of an equitable
claim which has been disallowed by a trustee is through
independent action in an appropriate court of general
jurisdiction.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 431–33.
In his November 25, 2020 motion for payment filed
with the Probate Court, which was admitted into evi-
dence as an exhibit before the Superior Court, the plain-
tiff relied on Palmer for the proposition that, where
services have been rendered by a beneficiary for the
benefit of the trust as a whole, the attorney’s fees
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expended by that beneficiary are recoverable from the
trust. See id., 423–24. In so doing, the plaintiff over-
looked the fact that our Supreme Court in Palmer held
that a court of general jurisdiction was the only ‘‘appro-
priate court in which to bring [an action to recover
attorney’s fees incurred to the benefit of a trust], and it
[could] properly assum[e] jurisdiction over the subject
matter.’’7 Id., 433. Bound by that precedent, we conclude
that, absent express statutory authorization, the Pro-
bate Court, and the Superior Court when acting on a
probate appeal, lacks jurisdiction to entertain an equita-
ble claim for attorney’s fees incurred by a beneficiary
for the benefit of a trust.
B
In its memorandum of decision, the court also noted
that the plaintiff had not identified ‘‘any statute [that]
provides the Probate Court with jurisdiction to order
a trustee to reimburse a party who has expended funds
arguably to the benefit [of] the trust.’’ The record sub-
stantiates that determination. The plaintiff did not cite
a single statute in the November 25, 2020 motion for
payment that he filed with the Probate Court. He like-
wise cited no statute in support of his claim for reim-
bursement of attorney’s fees in his operative complaint
in his probate appeal, at trial, or in his July 17, 2024
posttrial brief filed with the Superior Court.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff cites three stat-
utes that, he claims, authorize the Probate Court to
entertain his motion for payment of attorney’s fees.8 The
7
Although the Superior Court in the present case expressly relied on
Palmer in its October 2, 2024 memorandum of decision, the plaintiff has
provided no citation to, or discussion of, that precedent in his appellate brief.
8
We recognize that the plaintiff did not raise the applicability of those
statutes before either the Probate Court or the Superior Court. Because it
implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s motion
for payment, we nevertheless consider that contention. See, e.g., Perez-
Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 506, 43 A.3d 69 (2012) (‘‘[b]ecause
the defendants’ claim implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
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first, General Statutes § 45a-110 (c), has no application
here. By its plain language, § 45a-110 (c) pertains to ‘‘the
fees and expenses provided for by [General Statutes §§]
45a-106a, 45a-108a and 45a-109’’—which include filing
fees, registration fees, accounting fees, recording fees,
and copying fees—and authorizes the court to ‘‘order
the fiduciary of an estate to reimburse a party for any
such fees and expenses if the court determines that
reimbursement is equitable.’’ General Statutes § 45a-
110 (c). Attorney’s fees are not within the ambit of
§ 45a-110 (c), and the plaintiff has provided no authority
indicating otherwise.
The plaintiff also cites General Statutes §§ 45a-98 (a)
(6) and 45a-175 (g). Those statutes both pertain to the
Probate Court’s authority over accountings by fiduciar-
ies. The plaintiff correctly notes that § 45a-98 (a) (6)
authorizes the Probate Court, ‘‘to the extent provided
for in [§] 45a-175, [to] call executors, administrators,
[and] trustees . . . to account concerning the estates
entrusted to their charge . . . .’’ Section 45a-175, in
turn, confers jurisdiction on the Probate Court over the
interim and final accountings of fiduciaries. On appeal,
the plaintiff relies specifically on § 45a-175 (g), which
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the allowance of [an
accounting], the court shall determine the rights of the
fiduciaries or the agent under a power of attorney ren-
dering the account and of the parties interested in the
account, including the relief authorized under [Gen-
eral Statutes §] 1-350p, subject to appeal as in other
cases. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Section 1-350p is part of the Connecticut Uniform
Power of Attorney Act (act), General Statutes § 1-350
et seq.9 It provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]n agent
we conclude that it is reviewable even though the defendants have raised
it for the first time on appeal’’).
9
‘‘A power of attorney is an instrument in writing whereby one person,
as principal, appoints another as his agent and confers the authority to
perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the principal.’’
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that violates [the act] is liable to the principal or the
principal’s successors in interest for the amount
required to . . . [r]eimburse the principal or the princi-
pal’s successors in interest for the reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs paid on the agent’s behalf.’’ General Stat-
utes § 1-350p. The question before this court is whether,
considered together, §§ 1-350p and 45a-175 (g) author-
ized the Probate Court to grant the plaintiff’s November
25, 2020 motion for payment of $242,287 in attorney’s
fees that he incurred for the benefit of the trust and
his fellow beneficiaries in securing the defendant’s
removal as trustee.
In resolving that question of statutory interpretation,
we note that the term ‘‘agent,’’ as used in § 1-350p, is
specifically defined by the act as ‘‘a person granted
authority to act for a principal under a power of attor-
ney, whether denominated an agent, attorney in fact,
or otherwise. Agent includes an original agent, coagent,
successor agent and a person to which an agent’s
authority is delegated.’’ General Statutes § 1-350a (1).
By its plain language, that term does not include trust-
ees generally. The act also defines the term ‘‘ ‘[p]rinci-
pal’ ’’ as ‘‘an individual who grants authority to an agent
in a power of attorney.’’ General Statutes § 1-350a (9).
By its plain language, that term does not include testa-
tors unless they have granted authority to an agent
through a power of attorney.
In the present case, the plaintiff has not argued in
his appellate brief or at oral argument before this court
that the testator granted the defendant authority to act
on her behalf pursuant to a power of attorney. No power
of attorney document was presented into evidence, and
the Superior Court made no finding to that effect. In
In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 881 (3d Cir. 1984). A
power of attorney constitutes a ‘‘formal contract of agency’’ and creates a
principal-agent relationship for which principles of agency law apply. Long
v. Schull, 184 Conn. 252, 256, 439 A.2d 975 (1981).
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the absence of such a determination, we cannot say
that the testator qualified as a principal or that the
defendant qualified as an agent under § 1-350p.
In addition, we reiterate that § 1-350p provides in
relevant part that, when a violation of the act is estab-
lished, an agent may be liable to reimburse ‘‘the princi-
pal or the principal’s successors in interest for the rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and costs paid on the agent’s
behalf.’’ (Emphasis added.) Here, the plaintiff’s claim
is that he incurred significant attorney’s fees for the
benefit of the trust and his fellow beneficiaries, as the
court expressly found in its memorandum of decision.
Moreover, as the parties stipulated in their April 26,
2024 joint proposed findings of fact, those attorney’s
fees were paid on behalf of the trust and its beneficiaries
in an effort to remove the defendant as trustee. That
stipulation and the corresponding factual findings of
the Superior Court leave no doubt that the plaintiff’s
attorney’s fees were not incurred for the benefit of the
defendant but, rather, for the benefit of the trust and
its beneficiaries. For those reasons, the relief provided
in § 1-350p is unavailable to the plaintiff under the par-
ticular facts of this case.
Even if we were to conclude otherwise, the plaintiff
still could not prevail. As we have noted, §§ 45a-98 (a)
(6) and 45a-175 confer on the Probate Court the author-
ity to act on the accountings of a fiduciary and provide
relief related thereto. A necessary prerequisite to that
relief is ‘‘the allowance of any such account’’ filed by
a fiduciary. General Statutes § 45a-175 (g). Fatal to the
plaintiff’s claim is the fact that his motion for payment
of attorney’s fees was not premised upon any account-
ing filed by the defendant.10 Rather, his motion for pay-
ment was predicated on his June, 2018 petition to have
10
In the April 26, 2024 stipulation filed with the court, the plaintiff acknowl-
edged that the Probate Court issued the January, 2019 decree and the Septem-
ber, 2019 decree regarding accountings filed by the defendant and that he
did not take an appeal of either decree. The Probate Court also issued the
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the defendant removed as trustee and his ability to
recover attorney’s fees incurred on behalf of the trust
pursuant to Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust
Co., supra, 160 Conn. 421–23, which recognized that
an equitable claim for attorney’s fees exists when a
beneficiary incurs such fees.11 Because his motion for
payment was predicated on his efforts to remove the
defendant as trustee and his entitlement to equitable
relief pursuant to Palmer, rather than statutory relief
related to an accounting before the Probate Court, we
conclude that §§ 45a-98 (a) (6) and 45a-175 (g) are inap-
plicable on the facts of the present case. A court of
general jurisdiction, and not the Probate Court, pos-
sesses jurisdiction over such equitable claims. See id.,
431–33. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly con-
cluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this
probate appeal to entertain the plaintiff’s motion for
payment of attorney’s fees that he incurred for the bene-
fit of the trust and its beneficiaries in securing the
defendant’s removal as trustee.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the Superior Court erro-
neously concluded that he did not appeal from the final
accounting decree. We disagree.
final accounting decree on November 29, 2021, in which it approved the
final accounting filed by the successor trustee. As discussed more fully in
part II of this opinion, the Superior Court found that no appeal was taken
from the final accounting decree.
11
In his November 25, 2020 motion for payment, the plaintiff quoted
Palmer v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., supra, 160 Conn. 423, for
the proposition that ‘‘where services have been rendered by a beneficiary,
and if [they were] for the benefit of the trust estate as a whole, costs and
fees will be allowed out of the trust fund’’ and that, ‘‘[w]here the services
protect a common fund, it is liable for costs and expenses, including counsel
fees incurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff then argued:
‘‘In June of 2018, the [plaintiff] petitioned [the Probate Court] to remove
[the defendant] after discovering evidence of [his] long-standing financial
malfeasance and misuse of the trust’s assets. The [plaintiff’s] efforts on
behalf of the trust to have [the defendant] removed by [the Probate Court]
succeeded on January 9, 2019 . . . . The reimbursement of [$242,287 in
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At the outset, we note the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘In appeals in which the [Superior Court] has
ruled on a probate appeal de novo, we treat our scope
of review as we would with any other Superior Court
proceeding. . . . When the court has made factual find-
ings, we defer to those findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore
v. Bryant-Mitchell, 234 Conn. App. 378, 387–88, 344
A.3d 222 (2025). In determining whether a finding of
fact is clearly erroneous, ‘‘every reasonable presump-
tion must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slack v. Greene,
294 Conn. 418, 427, 984 A.2d 734 (2009).

On November 29, 2021, the Probate Court issued two
separate decrees. In the first, the November, 2021
decree, the Probate Court denied the plaintiff’s Novem-
ber 25, 2020 motion for payment of attorney’s fees and
his November 25, 2020 petition to surcharge the defen-
dant for $344,074.08 in attorney’s fees that were paid
with trust assets as part of his defense against the action
to remove him as trustee. In the second decree issued
on November 29, 2021, the final accounting decree, the
Probate Court approved the final accounting filed by
the successor trustee on August 28, 2020. It is undis-
puted that the plaintiff filed a timely appeal of the
November, 2021 decree. The question is whether the
Superior Court’s finding that he did not appeal the final
accounting decree is clearly erroneous.
attorney’s fees] is fair and equitable because if the [plaintiff] had not success-
fully pursued the removal of [the defendant] as trustee, [he] would have
continued to misuse funds . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
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To resolve that question, the pleadings of the parties
require close examination. See, e.g., MJM Landscaping,
Inc. v. Lorant, 268 Conn. 429, 436, 845 A.2d 382 (2004)
(‘‘[a] finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is
clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings
in the whole record’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). The record indicates that the plaintiff commenced
this probate appeal in the Superior Court on December
28, 2021. In his complaint, the plaintiff stated that he
was appealing a singular decree, ‘‘dated November 29,
2021,’’ and, thereafter, identified only one decree of
the Probate Court—the November, 2021 decree. The
plaintiff averred that, in that decree, the Probate Court
had denied his motion for payment and his petition to
surcharge. The plaintiff then alleged, in his ‘‘reason
for appeal,’’12 that the Probate Court had ‘‘erroneously
reached certain factual conclusions’’ in that decree.
Notably, the plaintiff’s complaint contains no reference
to the final accounting decree or the substance thereof.
Moreover, although the plaintiff attached a copy of the
November, 2021 decree as an exhibit to that complaint,
as required by § 45a-186 (c),13 he did not include a copy
of the final accounting decree in that pleading.14
The record also indicates that, on April 10, 2023,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
probate appeal. In that motion, the defendant specifi-
cally alleged that the appeal was moot because,
although the plaintiff had appealed the November, 2021
decree, he had ‘‘failed to appeal a separate decree by
the Probate Court approving the final accounting.’’ In
support of that motion, the defendant filed a sworn
12
General Statutes § 45a-186 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The complaint
shall state the reasons for the appeal. . . .’’
13
General Statutes § 45a-186 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A copy of the
order, denial or decree appealed from shall be attached to the complaint.’’
14
Although the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the final accounting
decree to his complaint, he did append a copy of the final page of that decree,
which consisted solely of the certificate of mailing to interested parties.
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affidavit dated April 4, 2023, to which he appended ‘‘true
and correct copies’’ of the January, 2019 decree, the
September, 2019 decree, the November, 2021 decree,
and the final accounting decree.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss on June 26, 2023. In that pleading,
the plaintiff averred that ‘‘the subject of the instant
probate appeal is a November, 2021 decree’’ and that
‘‘[t]he [November], 2021 decree, which has been
appealed by the plaintiff, was a decree denying the
plaintiff’s motion for payment, which sought reimburse-
ment from the trust of legal fees incurred by the plaintiff
in connection with the underlying probate dispute and
the defendant’s actions as trustee, and motion for sur-
charge, which sought to have . . . legal fees paid by
the defendant out of trust assets reclassified as distribu-
tions to the defendant rather than trust expenses.’’ After
hearing argument from the parties, the court denied
the motion to dismiss, stating in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he
appeal is timely [as] to the [November, 2021 decree]
and was filed within thirty (30) days, on December 28,
2021. Also, as the defendant concedes, this action is
not an attempt to resurrect claims of prior orders of
the Probate Court that were not timely appealed.’’
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Septem-
ber 20, 2023, that is identical to the original complaint
in all respects material to this appeal.15 As he did in his
15
In his amended complaint, the plaintiff began by stating that he was
appealing a singular decree, ‘‘dated November 29, 2021,’’ and thereafter
identified only one decree of the Probate Court—the November, 2021 decree.
In describing that decree, the plaintiff first noted that he had ‘‘sought an
order from the Probate Court to surcharge [the defendant] for expenditures
made from the trust funds . . . and for reimbursement for expenditures
the plaintiff made for the benefit of the trust and his fellow beneficiaries.’’
The plaintiff then alleged that, in the decree that was the subject of this
appeal, the Probate Court denied both his motion for payment and his
petition to surcharge. He further alleged that the court made erroneous
determinations in that decree.
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original complaint, the plaintiff attached a copy of the
November, 2021 decree to his amended complaint in
accordance with § 45a-186 (c).16
Prior to trial, the defendant filed four motions in
limine, including one to preclude certain evidence that
he claimed was barred by the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. The plaintiff filed a written
objection to that motion on April 25, 2024. In that plead-
ing, the plaintiff again averred that he ‘‘is appealing the
November 29, 2021 decree, which denied his . . . peti-
tion to surcharge and motion for payment.’’
On April 26, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation with
the court titled ‘‘The Parties’ Joint Proposed Findings
of Fact.’’ Paragraph 28 of that stipulation provides: ‘‘No
appeal was taken of the final accounting decree.’’
A two day trial was held on April 30 and May 2, 2024.
On the first day of trial, the court heard argument from
the parties on the four motions in limine filed by the
defendant. At the outset, the court noted that ‘‘there
was a final accounting . . . submitted, [it] was
approved’’ and ‘‘there was no appeal from the [final
accounting] decree.’’ In response, the plaintiff’s counsel
stated: ‘‘Correct, Your Honor. Yes. I agree with that. No
appeal being taken from the final [accounting] decree
. . . .’’ The court then noted that, in the November,
2021 decree, the Probate Court had denied the plaintiff’s
motion for payment and petition to surcharge and
stated, ‘‘That’s the decision you’re appealing?’’ The
plaintiff’s counsel replied, ‘‘That’s correct, Your Honor.’’
After the defendant’s counsel clarified that the Probate
Court had issued two separate decrees on November
29, 2021, the following colloquy ensued:
16
As with his original complaint, the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the
final accounting decree to his amended complaint but did append a copy
of the final page of that decree, which consisted solely of the certificate of
mailing to interested parties.
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‘‘The Court: . . . [Y]ou’re appealing both those
decrees in this action?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, we appealed
the—I’m not sure which one is the first November 29,
but we appealed the—
‘‘The Court: The failure to surcharge—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Yes. . . .
‘‘The Court: So, you did not appeal the final account
[ing decree]?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor.’’
After the court heard argument from the defendant’s
counsel on the motion in limine before it, another collo-
quy followed regarding precisely which decree had been
appealed by the plaintiff:
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: . . . The appeal is of the
November 29, 2021 decree. . . .
‘‘The Court: Only one of the decrees?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Right, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: That’s what you told me before.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct. It’s only one of
the decrees, correct.
‘‘The Court: The decree about the surcharge and
the—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct. Yes. There was
no appeal of the decree granting the final accounting.’’
When the defendant’s counsel later remarked that
there was a separate decree issued on November 29,
2021, regarding the final accounting ‘‘that was not
appealed,’’ the plaintiff’s counsel abruptly changed
course, stating: ‘‘I hate to go backwards but I stand
corrected. It does appear to me that the complaint did
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include [an appeal of] both decrees, both the final
account[ing] decree as well as the [November, 2021
decree].’’ In response, the defendant’s counsel stated:
‘‘We’ve proceeded the whole case, Your Honor—this is
a claim that’s brand new, not just to this morning but
to today. We’ve proceeded this whole time that there’s
one single decree being appealed, and that was the
[November, 2021] decree denying the two petitions. And
I don’t agree with that characterization that [the final
accounting] decree was attached to the original com-
plaint.’’
The court then reserved judgment on the defendant’s
motions in limine and turned its attention to the pro-
posed findings of fact that the parties had filed. At that
time, the plaintiff’s counsel stated, with respect to the
stipulation in paragraph 28 that ‘‘[n]o appeal was taken
of the final accounting decree,’’ that he ‘‘may want to
change position on that.’’ In response, the court
explained that, although it would not adopt paragraph
28 as a proposed finding of fact, it ‘‘may well make that
determination’’ itself. In its memorandum of decision,
the court did exactly that and found that ‘‘the plaintiff
did not appeal’’ the final accounting decree.
We conclude that the Superior Court’s finding is not
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and pleadings
in the whole record. See MJM Landscaping, Inc. v.
Lorant, supra, 268 Conn. 436. In the plaintiff’s original
complaint, his September 20, 2023 amended complaint,
his June 26, 2023 objection to the defendant’s motion
to dismiss, and his April 25, 2024 objection to the defen-
dant’s motion in limine, the plaintiff made clear that
this probate appeal concerned only the November, 2021
decree. In addition, the plaintiff entered into a stipula-
tion of facts with the defendant, which was filed with
the court on April 26, 2024, in which they averred that
‘‘[n]o appeal was taken of the final accounting decree.’’
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It is axiomatic that ‘‘[t]he parties are bound by their
pleadings.’’ American Express Bank, FSB v. Rutkow-
ski, 174 Conn. App. 472, 476 n.5, 166 A.3d 908 (2017).
‘‘Connecticut is a fact pleading jurisdiction. . . . Plead-
ings have an essential purpose in the judicial process.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn. App. 511, 528, 955 A.2d 667
(2008). ‘‘Pleadings are intended to limit the issues to
be decided at the trial of a case and [are] calculated to
prevent surprise. . . . [The] purpose of pleadings is to
frame, present, define, and narrow the issues, and to
form the foundation of, and to limit, the proof to be
submitted on the trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake
Park Assn., Inc., 93 Conn. App. 759, 768, 890 A.2d 645
(2006). Accordingly, ‘‘[f]actual allegations contained in
pleadings upon which the case is tried are considered
judicial admissions and hence irrefutable as long as
they remain in the case. . . . An admission in [a] plead-
ing dispenses with proof, and is equivalent to proof.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v.
Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 792, 936 A.2d 625 (2007); see
also King v. Spencer, 115 Conn. 201, 204, 161 A. 103
(1932) (‘‘[a] judicial admission dispenses with the pro-
duction of evidence by the opposing party as to the
fact admitted, and is conclusive upon the party making
it’’); Howat v. Passaretti, 11 Conn. App. 518, 525, 528
A.2d 834 (1987) (‘‘[j]udicial admissions may be
expressed in different forms, such as a formal pleading
. . . or a written stipulation’’ (citations omitted)).
There is no indication whatsoever in any of the plead-
ings that the plaintiff filed with the court from the com-
mencement of his probate appeal in the Superior Court
in December, 2021, to the first day of trial on April 30,
2024, that the propriety of the final accounting decree
was at issue. To the contrary, the plaintiff steadfastly
maintained in those pleadings that this appeal pertained
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solely to the propriety of the Probate Court’s decision
to deny his motion for payment and his petition to
surcharge, as articulated in the November, 2021 decree.
‘‘The principle that a plaintiff may rely only [on] what
he has alleged is basic. . . . It is fundamental in our
law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to
the allegations [in the] complaint. . . . A complaint
must fairly put the defendant on notice of the claims
. . . against him. . . . The purpose of the complaint
is to limit the issues to be decided at the trial of a case
and is calculated to prevent surprise. . . . Only those
issues raised by the [plaintiff] in the latest complaint
can be tried . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) White v. Mazda Motor of America,
Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 621, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014); see also
Lundberg v. Kovacs, 172 Conn. 229, 233, 374 A.2d 201
(1977) (‘‘[f]acts found but not averred cannot be made
the basis for a recovery’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619, 634, 882
A.2d 98 (Superior Court ‘‘is not permitted to decide
issues outside of those raised in the pleadings’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924,
888 A.2d 92 (2005), and cert. denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888
A.2d 92 (2005). In his original complaint, his September
20, 2023 amended complaint, his June 26, 2023 objection
to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, his April 25, 2024
objection to the defendant’s motion in limine, and the
April 26, 2024 stipulation that he entered into with the
defendant, the plaintiff averred that this probate appeal
pertained only to the propriety of the November, 2021
decree. The court and the defendant were entitled to
rely on those affirmations. See, e.g., Connecticut
National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 549, 606 A.2d
684 (1992) (party ‘‘had a right, in preparing its case for
trial, to rely on the factual allegations contained in [the
opposing party’s] pleadings’’); Lesser v. Altnacraig Con-
valescent Home, Inc., 144 Conn. 488, 491–92, 133 A.2d
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908 (1957) (‘‘[i]t is imperative that the court and oppos-
ing counsel be able to rely on the statement of issues
as set forth in the pleadings’’).
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court’s deter-
mination that he did not appeal the final accounting
decree is clearly erroneous in light of his inclusion of
the certificate of mailing page from the final accounting
decree as an exhibit to his complaint. Pursuant to § 45a-
186 (c), when a party commences a probate appeal,
‘‘[a] copy of the order, denial or decree appealed from
shall be attached to the complaint.’’ The record plainly
indicates that the final judgment decree itself was not
attached to either the plaintiff’s original complaint or
his September 20, 2023 amended complaint. Because
he did attach the certificate of mailing page from that
decree, the plaintiff asserts, in conclusory fashion, that
‘‘enough of the [final accounting decree] was attached
. . . such that the [Superior] Court decision should be
reversed . . . .’’ The plaintiff has provided no legal
authority or analysis of that assertion, rendering it inad-
equately briefed. See Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642,
689, 295 A.3d 75 (2023).
Even if we were to conclude that the filing of a certifi-
cate of mailing page without the accompanying probate
decree suffices for purposes of § 45a-186 (c), it never-
theless remains that the plaintiff raised no allegation
in either his original complaint or his September 20,
2023 amended complaint regarding the propriety of the
final accounting decree in any respect. Rather, the only
issue raised in those pleadings was the propriety of
the Probate Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for
payment and his petition to surcharge, as the plaintiff
affirmed in both his June 26, 2023 objection to the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and his April 25, 2024
objection to the defendant’s motion in limine. For all
of those reasons, we conclude that the Superior Court’s
determination that the plaintiff did not appeal the final
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accounting decree is not clearly erroneous in light of
the evidence and pleadings in the record before us.17
III
The plaintiff claims that the Superior Court errone-
ously found that the final accounting of the successor
trustee incorporated expenditures itemized in a prior
accounting filed by the defendant one year earlier. We
do not agree.
The plaintiff’s claim is reviewed pursuant to the
clearly erroneous standard. See Moore v. Bryant-Mitch-
ell, supra, 234 Conn. App. 387–88. In determining whether
a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, ‘‘every reasonable
presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s
ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slack v.
Greene, supra, 294 Conn. 427.
The following undisputed facts are relevant to this
claim. On August 16, 2019, the defendant filed the
August, 2019 accounting for the period of May 1, 2015,
through January 9, 2019. That August, 2019 accounting
was admitted into evidence as an exhibit at trial before
the Superior Court. Schedule B-2 of that accounting,
which specifies various expenses of the trust, includes
$407,327.53 in attorney’s fees paid to the defendant’s
counsel from May 22, 2015, to August 31, 2018. The
August, 2019 accounting indicates that the trust had
17
To the extent that the plaintiff contends that the trial transcripts contain
evidence that he intended to appeal the final accounting decree, he is mis-
taken. Those transcripts contain no testimony from any witness as to the
scope of the pleadings or the issue of whether the final accounting decree
had been appealed. The only statements from those transcripts referenced
by the plaintiff in his appellate brief are unsworn ones made by his attorney,
which do not constitute evidence. See Cologne v. Westfarms Associates,
197 Conn. 141, 153, 496 A.2d 476 (1985) (‘‘representations of the plaintiffs’
counsel are not ‘evidence’ and certainly not ‘proof’ ’’); Olson v. Olson, 71
Conn. App. 826, 830, 804 A.2d 851 (2002) (‘‘[r]epresentations made by counsel
are not evidence in the record upon which we can rely’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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a total of $3,718,146.05 in property on hand, interest
received, and other income received. After deducting
a total of $730,912.54 in ‘‘administrative expenses’’ spec-
ified in Schedule B-2, which included the aforemen-
tioned attorney’s fees, the August, 2019 accounting con-
cluded that $2,987,233.51 in assets were ‘‘remaining as
of January 9, 2019 . . . .’’ In the September, 2019
decree, the Probate Court indicated that, at that time,
the August, 2019 accounting would be ‘‘held for informa-
tional purposes only . . . .’’
It is undisputed that the successor trustee filed a final
accounting on August 28, 2020. On November 29, 2021,
the Probate Court issued the final accounting decree,
in which it approved that final accounting.
The successor trustee’s August 28, 2020 final account-
ing was admitted into evidence as an exhibit at trial
before the Superior Court. After certifying that copies
had been provided to all interested parties, that final
accounting specifies certain ‘‘charges’’ of the trust. It
begins by referencing the ‘‘[a]mount on [h]and as shown
in . . . [a]ccount on [f]ile, Schedule A-1.’’ It then identi-
fies that amount as $2,987,233.51—the exact figure set
forth in the August, 2019 accounting as the amount on
hand as of January 9, 2019. Three pages later, Schedule
A-1 of the final accounting similarly specifies a total of
$2,987,233.51 on hand as of January 9, 2019.
Those exhibits substantiate the Superior Court’s find-
ing that the August, 2019 accounting served as the basis
of, and was incorporated into, the final accounting sub-
mitted by the successor trustee and approved by the
Probate Court. Because the August, 2019 accounting
deducted $407,327.53 in legal expenses paid to the
defendant’s counsel in determining that $2,987,233.51 in
assets remained as of January 9, 2019, and the successor
trustee adopted that ‘‘[a]ccount on [f]ile’’ in his final
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accounting, those expenses necessarily were incorpo-
rated into the successor trustee’s final accounting. For
that reason, the Superior Court found that, ‘‘when the
Probate Court approved the final account, it approved
not only the expenditures and income specifically item-
ized by the successor trustee, but also the expenditures
and income itemized in the August, 2019 accounting
. . . .’’ Indulging every reasonable presumption in favor
of the Superior Court’s ruling, as our standard of review
requires, we conclude that the court’s finding was not
clearly erroneous.
IV
The plaintiff also contends that the Superior Court
improperly concluded that his petition to surcharge was
barred by the statute of limitations contained in § 45a-
186 (b).18 We disagree.
Whether a party’s claim is barred by a statute of
limitations is a question of law over which our review
is plenary. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, Lon-
don v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 407–408, 957 A.2d
836 (2008); Sean O’Kane A.I.A. Architect, P.C. v. Puljic,
148 Conn. App. 728, 734, 87 A.3d 1124 (2014). Section
45a-186 (b) sets forth the applicable limitation periods
for probate appeals and provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any
person aggrieved by an order, denial or decree of a
Probate Court may appeal therefrom to the Superior
Court. An appeal from a matter heard under any provi-
sion of section 45a-593, 45a-594, 45a-595 or 45a-597,
sections 45a-644 to 45a-677, inclusive, sections 45a-690
to 45a-703, inclusive, or section 45a-705a, shall be filed
not later than forty-five days after the date on which
the Probate Court sent the order, denial or decree.
18
In its memorandum of decision, the Superior Court alternatively con-
cluded that the plaintiff’s petition to surcharge was barred by the doctrine
of collateral estoppel. Because we conclude that the court properly deter-
mined that the petition was time barred, we need not address that issue.
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Except as provided in sections 45a-187 and 45a-188, an
appeal from an order, denial or decree in any other
matter shall be filed on or before the thirtieth day after
the date on which the Probate Court sent the order,
denial or decree. . . .’’ The thirty day appeal period of
§ 45a-186 (b) applies in the present case.
In his petition to surcharge, the plaintiff sought to
surcharge the defendant for $344,074.08 in attorney’s
fees that were paid to the defendant’s counsel with
trust assets. As discussed in part III of this opinion,
that expenditure was incorporated into the successor
trustee’s final accounting, which the Probate Court
approved in the final accounting decree. Because the
plaintiff did not appeal the final accounting decree to
the Superior Court within thirty days, the court properly
concluded that it was time barred pursuant to § 45a-
186 (b).19
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

19
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff also contests the Superior Court’s
finding that the defendant’s acquisitions of the trust interests of other benefi-
ciaries were not ‘‘other than arm’s length, mutually agreeable financial trans-
actions . . . .’’ In light of our conclusion that the Superior Court lacked
jurisdiction over his motion for payment and that his petition to surcharge
is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we do not consider that
claim of factual error.