State v. Trice

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State v. Trice

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHIFE TRICE
(AC 46683)
Elgo, Moll and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a bench trial, of the crime of robbery in the second
degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court
improperly failed to conduct an independent inquiry into his competence
to understand the proceedings and to assist his counsel in his defense. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a compe-
tency hearing, as the court’s observations of the defendant did not lead it
to believe that his conduct rose to the level of substantial evidence of mental
impairment and, thus, the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court’s
failure to conduct a competency hearing violated his due process right to
a fair trial failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233).

The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, as the
trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended
to steal the victim’s car and represented to the victim that he had a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument, which he put to the back of the victim’s
head and threatened to use if the victim did not comply with his order to
get on the ground.

The trial court did not, as the defendant claimed, clearly and conclusively
deny him his constitutional right to represent himself during a pretrial
hearing, the court having instead continued the hearing to resolve its concern
about his competence, and the defendant thereafter waived his right to self-
representation when, after his counsel withdrew, he acquiesced to being
represented by a different attorney and did not reassert his request to
represent himself, and the defendant’s contention that the court’s alleged
error was structural, thereby requiring the reversal of his conviction, did
not contradict this court’s conclusion that he waived his right to repre-
sent himself.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it properly determined
that defense counsel opened the door to the admission of hearsay testimony
from a police officer regarding an out-of-court statement by the victim
describing the robbery suspects, as defense counsel’s implication on cross-
examination of the officer that the police did not have an adequate descrip-
tion of the robber could have left the court, as the fact finder, with the false
impression that the police did not have a more specific description of the
robber, and the officer’s testimony served to remove any unfair prejudice
that might have otherwise ensued from defense counsel’s inquiry.
Argued March 13—officially released September 16, 2025
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State v. Trice

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defen-
dant, in the first part, with the crimes of robbery in the
second degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in
the second degree, and, in the second part, with being
a persistent felony offender, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Baldini, J., denied the defendant’s motion for
new counsel; thereafter, the court, K. Doyle, J., granted
the motion to withdraw filed by the defendant’s counsel;
subsequently, the first part of the information was tried
to the court, Schuman, J.; thereafter, the court, Schu-
man, J., denied the defendant’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal; finding of guilty of robbery in the second
degree; subsequently, the defendant was presented to
the court, Schuman, J., on a plea of guilty to the second
part of the information; judgment of guilty in accor-
dance with the finding and the plea, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Abigail H. Mason, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Alexander A. Kambanis, deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L.
Walcott, state’s attorney, and Robert Diaz, supervisory
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Shife Trice, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial
to the court, of robbery in the second degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B). On appeal,
the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly failed
to conduct, sua sponte, an independent inquiry into his
competence, (2) there was insufficient evidence pre-
sented at trial to support his conviction, (3) the court
violated his constitutional right to self-representation,
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State v. Trice

and (4) the court abused its discretion by admitting a
certain hearsay statement into evidence. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the trial court reasonably
could have found, and procedural history are relevant
to the resolution of this appeal. On September 30, 2020,
at approximately 3:48 a.m., the victim, Anthony West,
parked his car in a parking lot on Sigourney Street in
Hartford, down the street from his apartment. As the
victim was exiting his car, the defendant approached
him, put a facsimile firearm to the back of his head,
and told him to get on the ground. The victim could
feel that the object was metal and that it felt like a gun.
The victim was scared that he was going to get killed,
so he complied with the defendant’s commands and
laid on the ground. He left his phone, wallet, and keys
in the car. The defendant and V,1 a juvenile who was
with the defendant, ‘‘jumped in [the car] and took off.’’
The victim went to a neighbor’s house and used the
neighbor’s phone to call 911. Officer Steven McCullough
of the Hartford Police Department responded to the
victim’s location on Sigourney Street. The victim told
McCullough that two individuals were involved, but he
could not identify them. The victim provided a general
description of both individuals to McCullough, includ-
ing that they were both males wearing hoods and medi-
cal masks.
Meanwhile, Officer Nathan McOuat of the Hartford
Police Department drove around the area looking for
the victim’s car. At 3:59 a.m., approximately ten or
eleven minutes after the officers had received the vic-
tim’s call, McOuat located the victim’s car on Sargeant
Street, which was two or three blocks away from the
victim’s location on Sigourney Street. McOuat angled
1
Because V was a juvenile at the time of his involvement in this incident,
we decline to identify him by his full name.
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State v. Trice

his police cruiser in front of the victim’s car, which was
parked on the curb line of the road. Because a weapon
reportedly was used when the car was taken, McOuat
waited, with his gun drawn and pointed at the car, until
other officers could arrive to assist him. As McOuat
gave verbal commands to the occupants of the vehicle,
he could hear the engine of the car revving.
McCullough left the victim’s location to assist
McOuat. The defendant, who was in the driver’s seat
of the victim’s car, complied with McCullough’s order
to exit the car. McCullough patted the defendant down
and found a facsimile firearm and the victim’s wallet
inside the defendant’s pockets. V, who had been in
the front passenger seat, was found with a backpack
containing two large knives with steel blades. McCul-
lough observed that both the defendant and V were
wearing dark-colored, hooded sweatshirts and medical
masks, and that V was wearing gloves.
The defendant was arrested and charged in a substi-
tute information with robbery in the second degree in
violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B), and conspiracy to
commit robbery in the second degree in violation of
§ 53a-135 (a) (1) (B) and General Statutes § 53a-48 (a).
The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and elected
a trial to the court. The trial took place over the course
of five days in January and February, 2023. The court,
Schuman, J., found the defendant guilty of robbery in
the second degree and not guilty of conspiracy to com-
mit robbery in the second degree. Thereafter, the defen-
dant pleaded guilty to being a persistent felony offender
pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40 (g), which the
state had charged in a separate part B information, and
the court rendered judgment accordingly, imposing a
total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration
followed by five years of special parole. This appeal
followed.
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State v. Trice

I
We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial
court improperly failed to conduct, sua sponte, an inde-
pendent inquiry into his competence. The defendant
acknowledges that his claim is unpreserved and seeks
review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,
239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel
R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim
of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitu-
tional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote
omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see
also In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 781 (modifying
third prong of Golding).
The state concedes that the defendant has met the
first two Golding prongs in that the record is adequate
to permit review and that his claim is of constitutional
magnitude. We therefore proceed to a consideration of
the third prong, namely, whether the alleged constitu-
tional violation exists and deprived the defendant of a
fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Paulino, 127 Conn. App. 51,
61, 12 A.3d 628 (2011). We conclude that the defendant
has not satisfied the third prong of Golding.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At a pretrial
hearing on April 8, 2021, the court, Baldini, J.,
addressed a plea offer that had been extended by the
state, pursuant to which the defendant would receive
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a total effective sentence of eight years of incarceration
followed by five years of special parole if he pleaded
guilty to charges of robbery in the first degree and
conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The
state had charged the defendant with these offenses in
a substitute information filed on March 11, 2021.2
Discussion ensued between the trial court and the
defendant after he indicated that he wanted to reject
the offer, fire his attorney, Dennis P. McMahon, and
represent himself.3 During these discussions, the defen-
dant asked the court about the charges against him.
The following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Defendant]: . . . May I please get acknowledg-
ment about my alleged criminal offenses I’m being
charged with right now?
‘‘The Court: I’m not really sure . . . what you mean.
I just told you that the state has charged you with
robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree.
‘‘[The Defendant]: So, I’m being charged with that
right now?
‘‘The Court: Yes. So, it sounds like . . . there’s also
some other stuff. So, this is what we’re going to do, sir.
I’m going to continue your case to allow you to have
another conversation with your attorney, and then I’m
also going to just make sure . . . I’m going to ask Attor-
ney McMahon in those subsequent conversations that
I anticipate you’re having, if there’s any conversations
that you have that lead you to think that maybe this
defendant doesn’t understand the proceedings against
2
The substitute information that was the operative information at the
time of the defendant’s trial, charging him with robbery in the second degree
and conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, was not filed until
January 24, 2023.
3
These discussions are addressed in further detail in part III of this opin-
ion.
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State v. Trice

him or assisting in his defense that you’ll bring that to
the court’s attention. It’s not apparent to me at this
point, but it could be something that might require fur-
ther discussion in the future, okay.’’
McMahon agreed to proceed in the manner outlined
by the court; however, the defendant responded: ‘‘But
I don’t understand what I’m being charged with right
now.’’ The defendant listed the statutory provisions that
the state had alleged he violated in the original informa-
tion and stated his belief that he had not been charged
with robbery in the first degree.4 He also stated that
he did not understand how he could be charged with
robbery in the first degree if he did not ‘‘reach the
criteria’’ of that offense.
The court responded: ‘‘[W]e’re going to move this to
May [13, 2021] at 10:30 [a.m.]. And so, what I want is
to make sure we have some clarity on . . . it seems
like you have some questions with regard to the charges.
And I’m going to give you a chance to speak with Attor-
ney McMahon because it sounds like, from the ques-
tions you’re asking, that that is necessary.’’ The defen-
dant again expressed that he did not understand how
he was being charged with robbery in the first degree
given the offenses that he had been charged with in
the original information. The following colloquy then
ensued:
‘‘The Court: Okay. So, we’re going to have an opportu-
nity for you to speak with your attorney. At this point,
4
In the original information, filed on October 1, 2020, the state charged the
defendant with violating General Statutes § 53a-136a, which the information
described as ‘‘robbery by carjacking’’; carrying a dangerous weapon in viola-
tion of General Statutes § 53-206; and risk of injury to a child in violation
of General Statutes § 53-21. Notably, § 53a-136a is not a separate crime but,
rather, a sentence enhancement provision for a robbery of an occupied
motor vehicle. See State v. Edwards, 100 Conn. App. 565, 596–97, 918 A.2d
1008, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 926 A.2d 666 (2007), and cert. denied, 282
Conn. 929, 926 A.2d 667 (2007); see also State v. Orlando F., 233 Conn. App.
1, 9 n.10, 338 A.3d 379, cert. denied, Conn. , A.3d (2025).
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we’re not focused on what we had intended to do today.
There are some issues that have come up. Certainly,
we can discuss them further on May 13th. The state
can change the charges to substitute an information,
okay. And that was what I understood to be part of the
plea agreement. If the plea agreement is something that
the defendant doesn’t wish, the state can proceed on
the initially filed charges. So, that is something that
we’ll discuss on that May 13th date at 10:30 a.m. Okay?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Will you please say that again? So,
the state can change the charges at any given time.
‘‘The Court: Well, what we intended to do, from what
I understand, is, there was a plea agreement. The state
made an offer to resolve your case. And the offer con-
templated pleas to the charges that I mentioned. So,
since you’re not making a decision today, we don’t have
to address that issue. So, Attorney McMahon, you can
talk to [the prosecutor] about what the intended charges
are, what the plea agreement is. You can have a conver-
sation with your client. We’ll go back on the record on
May 13th at 10:30 a.m.’’
At the hearing on May 13, 2021, the trial court permit-
ted the defendant to read a written statement he had
prepared, in which he challenged the state’s ability to
charge him with robbery in the first degree by way of
its substitute information. Specifically, the defendant
argued: ‘‘The prosecutor is illegally subject to on my
original accused criminal offense of [General Statutes
§] 53a-136a and [General Statutes §] 53-206 and . . .
[General Statutes § 53-21] to new criminal offenses of
[§] 53a-134 (a), robbery, first degree, firearm threaten-
ing, [§] 53a-134 (a) (4), conspiracy to commit robbery,
first degree, firearm threat. That clearly deprives me of
my due process cause under the fourteenth amendment
and the federal constitution and violates my Supreme
Court and Appellate Court laws of Connecticut. I refer
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to case law [State v. Dash, 242 Conn. 143, 150, 698 A.2d
297 (1997)] and [State v. Edwards, 100 Conn. App. 565,
568, 918 A.2d 1008, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 926
A.2d 666 (2007), and cert. denied, 282 Conn. 929, 926
A.2d 667 (2007)]. Both case law specifically indicate [§]
53a-136a is not a separate offense or shall be imposed
as a prosecution as a separate offense or replaced as
a separate criminal offense because this statutory sec-
tion is a sentence enhancement provision rather than
a separate offense, and the purpose of [§] 53a-136a . . .
is not to create a separate offense or to impose criminal
liability on the legislature fail to do so. So, with that
being said, Your Honor, I’d like for you to look into
that, if you can, on recess or something like that and
back to me as soon as possible. Thank you for your
time.’’
The trial court responded: ‘‘Okay. Thank you. So, I
certainly, when somebody cites case law, I want to
make sure that I understand what’s being argued. So,
at this point, I’ve listened to the cases that you’ve cited
and the things that you said, and I’m concerned that
maybe there might be some issues that would prevent
you from understanding what’s happening here or your
ability to assist in your defense, but I’m not sure. I don’t
know whether Attorney McMahon has anything that he
wants to weigh in at this time, but I do want to respond
to what you were saying, Mr. Trice. But before I do, I
want to hear from your attorney.’’
McMahon responded: ‘‘Yeah, Your Honor, I don’t
share that position. I just think he’s against the offer.
That’s how I feel.’’ The court then explained to the
defendant that one of the cases he had cited in support
of his argument involved a statutory provision with
which the defendant was not being charged. No other
concerns were raised regarding the defendant’s compe-
tence throughout the remaining pretrial proceedings or
at trial.
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The following legal principles guide our analysis of
this claim. ‘‘Because the conviction of an accused per-
son while he is legally incompetent violates due pro-
cess; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836,
15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966); a trial court must be vigilant
to the possibility that a competency evaluation may be
required in the case of a defendant who . . . engages
in conduct during the trial [or pretrial proceedings] that
calls his competency into question.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 522–23,
973 A.2d 627 (2009). ‘‘[General Statutes §] 54-56d estab-
lishes the procedural requirements for competency
determinations. A court may undertake a competency
examination upon a motion by the defendant or the
state and in some circumstances must evaluate the
defendant’s competency sua sponte.’’ State v. Johnson,
253 Conn. 1, 22, 751 A.2d 298 (2000); see also General
Statutes § 54-56d (c) (‘‘[i]f, at any time during a criminal
proceeding, it appears that the defendant is not compe-
tent, counsel for the defendant or for the state, or the
court, on its own motion, may request an examination
to determine the defendant’s competency’’). Pursuant
to § 54-56d (a), ‘‘a defendant is not competent if the
defendant is unable to understand the proceedings
against him or her or to assist in his or her own defense.’’
‘‘[A]s a matter of due process, the trial court is
required to conduct an independent inquiry into the
defendant’s competence whenever [the court becomes
aware of] substantial evidence of mental impairment.
. . . Substantial evidence is a term of art. Evidence
encompasses all information properly before the court.
. . . Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable
doubt about the defendant’s competency.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, supra, 292
Conn. 523. ‘‘In determining whether a defendant’s com-
petence has been sufficiently called into doubt so as
to necessitate a hearing on the matter, the United States
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State v. Trice

Supreme Court has cautioned that there is no single
approach or factor that is most important in establishing
competency or lack thereof. . . . [E]vidence of a
defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand
trial are all relevant in determining whether further
inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be suffi-
cient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs
which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry
to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often
a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations
and subtle nuances are implicated. That they are diffi-
cult to evaluate is suggested by the varying opinions
trained psychiatrists can entertain on the same facts.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Dort, 315 Conn. 151, 163, 106 A.3d 277 (2014).
We review the trial court’s determination of whether
to conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s competence
under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Paulino,
supra, 127 Conn. App. 61. We note that the trial judge
‘‘is in a particularly advantageous position to observe
a defendant’s conduct during a trial and has a unique
opportunity to assess a defendant’s competency. A trial
court’s opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defen-
dant is highly significant.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 523–24. In
addition, although a defendant whose competence has
been challenged may not be personally canvassed
through the questioning of his or her attorney; State v.
Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 182; ‘‘a trial court is entitled
to consider trial counsel’s assertions that his client is
competent.’’ State v. Paulino, supra, 65.
On appeal, the defendant cites several instances dur-
ing the pretrial proceedings that he claims should have
prompted the trial court to order a competency hearing:
(1) he ‘‘interject[ed] in court consistently after his first
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State v. Trice

appearance, making requests for a speedy trial and
claiming to have problems with his attorney’’; (2) he
filed motions on his own behalf despite being repre-
sented by counsel; (3) he ‘‘raise[d] the problem that he
[did] not understand what the charges [were] against
him at each court date leading up to his waiver of the
jury trial’’; and (4) he stated that he did not understand
the prosecutor’s ability to amend the charges against
him. The defendant contends that, because the trial
court did not conduct an inquiry into his competence,
he involuntarily and unknowingly rejected multiple plea
offers, pleaded not guilty, waived his right to a jury
trial, and chose to testify.5 We disagree.
Although the trial court expressed some initial con-
cern regarding the defendant’s competence, it is appar-
ent from our review of the record that the court did
not believe that the defendant’s conduct rose to the
level of substantial evidence of mental impairment. At
the pretrial hearing on April 8, 2021, after the defendant
questioned what he was being charged with, the court
asked McMahon to bring to the court’s attention any
concerns he had about whether the defendant under-
stood the proceedings or was able to assist in his
defense. In doing so, however, the court stated: ‘‘It’s
not apparent to me at this point, but it could be some-
thing that might require further discussion in the future,
5
As noted in part III of this opinion, the state made two separate plea
offers to the defendant: (1) an offer discussed at hearings on April 8, May
13 and June 24, 2021, under which he would receive a sentence of eight
years of incarceration followed by five years of special parole if he pleaded
guilty to the charges of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree; and (2) an offer discussed at a hearing on
September 2, 2022, under which he would receive a sentence of five years
of incarceration followed by ten years of special parole if he pleaded guilty
to larceny in the first degree.
The defendant waived his right to a jury trial on November 9, 2022,
after the court, Gold, J., canvassed him to ensure that he was knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving that right. The defendant also was
canvassed by the court, Schuman, J., on his decision to testify immediately
before taking the witness stand on January 25, 2023.
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State v. Trice

okay.’’ (Emphasis added.) Similarly, at the hearing on
May 13, 2021, after the defendant argued that the state’s
filing of a substitute information violated his right to
due process, the court stated in relevant part: ‘‘I’m con-
cerned that maybe there might be some issues that
would prevent you from understanding what’s happen-
ing here or your ability to assist in your defense, but
I’m not sure.’’ (Emphasis added.) While the court appro-
priately expressed its uncertainty, the court’s observa-
tions of the defendant’s conduct did not sufficiently
call into doubt the defendant’s competence so as to
necessitate a hearing on the matter.
Moreover, the trial court’s initial concern subse-
quently was dispelled by McMahon’s assertion that he
did not ‘‘share that position’’ regarding the court’s
uncertainty about the defendant’s competence and that
he believed the defendant was ‘‘just . . . against the
offer.’’ The court reasonably took McMahon’s opinion
into account. See State v. Paulino, supra, 127 Conn.
App. 65 (‘‘a trial court is entitled to consider trial coun-
sel’s assertions that his client is competent’’); see also
State v. Burgos, 170 Conn. App. 501, 530, 155 A.3d 246
(‘‘a failure by defense counsel to indicate that the defen-
dant had any difficulty in comprehending the nature
of the proceedings or in assisting in his own defense
provides substantial evidence of the defendant’s compe-
tence’’), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 907, 156 A.3d 538 (2017).
In addition, our review of the record reflects that
the defendant’s proclaimed misunderstanding of the
charges against him was not indicative of diminished
mental capacity but, rather, related to his disagreement
with the state’s ability to file different charges against
him in a substitute information. Further, the defendant’s
opposition to the state’s filing of a substitute informa-
tion was based on an apparent misunderstanding of the
law. ‘‘[A] lack of legal expertise is not indicative of
incompetence.’’ State v. Paulino, supra, 127 Conn. App.
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State v. Trice

66; see also State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 524 (court
was not required to order competency evaluation where
‘‘conduct reflect[ed] more on the defendant’s lack of
legal experience and expertise than it [did] on his men-
tal condition’’); State v. Jeremy D., 149 Conn. App. 583,
591, 90 A.3d 979 (‘‘a lack of understanding or mere
confusion concerning criminal proceedings does not
amount to mental incompetence’’), cert. denied, 312
Conn. 913, 93 A.3d 596 (2014). Similarly, many of the
defendant’s interjections in court throughout the pre-
trial proceedings, including his repeated requests for a
speedy trial and his filing of motions on his own behalf,
appear from the record to be based on his dissatisfac-
tion with McMahon; see part III of this opinion; rather
than reflecting evidence of mental impairment.
Finally, the defendant’s behavior must be viewed in
light of the other parts of the record that reflect his
ability to follow court rules and procedures during the
remainder of the trial. See State v. Connor, supra, 292
Conn. 524 (‘‘to the extent that [certain] examples of the
defendant’s conduct might be viewed as suggestive of
a diminished mental capacity, they must be considered
in the light of other evidence indicating that the defen-
dant was, in fact, competent, including evidence of his
ability to follow court rules and procedures and the
trial court’s directives’’). Other parts of the record,
including the defendant’s own testimony and the com-
ments from both the trial court and the prosecutor, who
had the opportunity to view the defendant’s behavior
in person, reflect that the defendant understood the
proceedings and was able to assist in his defense. At
the conclusion of trial, after making its guilty finding,
the court noted that ‘‘[the defendant] has behaved him-
self very well in court throughout this entire trial and
has been very respectful to the court.’’ Similarly, when
the prosecutor spoke at the defendant’s sentencing, he
stated: ‘‘I want to put on the record that [the defendant]
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as a young man has shown himself to be and has the
capability to be a very articulate and well-behaved gen-
tleman. He has been nothing but polite during his entire
proceedings. He has actually been polite before the
court has come out and engaging in conversations about
random things. I say that because he has a lot of poten-
tial.’’ Consistent with its earlier observation, the court
remarked that ‘‘[t]he defendant is an articulate person
who has the ability to become a productive citizen. Up
until today, when he spoke out of time,6 he’s been very
polite and well behaved in court . . . .’’ (Footnote
added.)
Accordingly, we conclude that, in the absence of sub-
stantial evidence of mental impairment, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an
independent inquiry into the defendant’s competence.
Accordingly, the defendant has failed to prove that his
constitutional due process right to a fair trial was vio-
lated, and his claim fails to meet the third prong of
Golding.
II
Next, we address the defendant’s claim that the evi-
dence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction of robbery in the second degree. We are not
persuaded.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
the relevant legal principles. ‘‘When reviewing suffi-
ciency of the evidence claims, this court applies a two
part test. . . . First, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,
6
The defendant interrupted the prosecutor’s sentencing remarks on a
single occasion to object to what he perceived as ‘‘false information.’’ After
the court explained to the defendant that he needed to object through his
attorney and that he would have his own opportunity to speak subsequently
in the proceeding, the defendant responded that he understood and he did
not interrupt further.
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we determine whether upon the facts so construed and
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact
finder] reasonably could have concluded that the cumu-
lative force of the evidence established guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . . When this inquiry involves
circumstantial evidence, [i]t is not one fact, but the
cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which estab-
lishes guilt . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. King, 350 Conn. 303, 314–
15, 324 A.3d 81 (2024). ‘‘[W]e do not ask whether there
is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support
a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
supports the [fact finder’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 315.
‘‘In order for a [fact finder] to find a defendant guilty
of robbery in the second degree, it would have to find
that in the course of committing a larceny, the defen-
dant used or threatened the immediate use of physical
force on another person for the purpose of compelling
the owner of such property to deliver up the property
and in the course of the commission of the crime or of
the immediate flight therefrom displayed or threatened
the use of what he represented by his words or conduct
to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hall-
George, 203 Conn. App. 219, 227, 247 A.3d 659, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 934, 248 A.3d 709 (2021); see General
Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B).7
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. At trial on the first part of
7
General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person
is guilty of robbery in the second degree when such person (1) commits
robbery, as defined in section 53a-133, and . . . (B) in the course of the
commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, such person or
another participant in the crime displays or threatens the use of what such
person represents by such person’s words or conduct to be a deadly weapon
or a dangerous instrument . . . .’’
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the operative information, the state presented testi-
mony from the victim, McCullough, and McOuat. In
addition, the state entered into evidence footage from
McOuat’s body camera (body camera), the facsimile
firearm that had been found on the defendant, a map
depicting the area of Hartford where the robbery took
place and where the victim’s car was recovered, and a
photograph of the defendant that was taken at the time
of his arrest.
At the conclusion of the state’s case, defense counsel
moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court
denied. The defense then presented its case, during
which the defendant testified on his own behalf. At the
outset, the defendant denied stealing the victim’s car.
He admitted to being in the driver’s seat of the car when
he encountered the police and having the facsimile fire-
arm that the officers recovered, but he denied having
the victim’s wallet on him. According to the defendant’s
version of events, V had been the one who initially took
the car, the defendant had no reason to believe that it
was stolen, and V had given him the firearm when they
were in the car. After the defendant completed his testi-
mony, the defense rested its case. The defendant subse-
quently renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal,
which the court again denied.
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court, Schuman,
J., found the defendant guilty of robbery in the second
degree. In its oral decision, the court made certain fac-
tual findings and identified the evidentiary basis for its
guilty finding, stating in relevant part: ‘‘[T]here’s no
question that a robbery of the victim . . . occurred.
And it was robbery in the second degree because the
suspect threatened to use what . . . by his conduct,
he represented to be a deadly weapon. The victim felt
a . . . metal object that felt like a gun in the back of
his head.
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‘‘I’ve examined the gun myself and . . . although it’s
a facsimile gun, it does have the feel of a real gun. And
there was thus, sufficient evidence that the suspect
threatened by his conduct . . . to use a deadly weapon.
So, the question here, in this trial, was primarily whether
it was the defendant who committed the crime. Here is
the evidence that I find proves that it was the defendant:

‘‘First and foremost, the defendant is found driving
the victim’s car only about ten to eleven minutes after
the crime within three blocks of the crime. It’s true that
there was enough time for someone else to steal the
car and leave it in the area of where the defendant then
entered it and started driving, but this is a most unlikely
scenario at 4 a.m. . . . And there is no evidence to
support this other theory. Further, the distance traveled
by the car, once it is stolen, is a distance that is certainly
possible to drive during the ten minutes before it is
found . . . before the car is found on the side of the
street. Second, even if I don’t consider other evidence
. . . that tends to describe the suspects, we do know,
without dispute, that the victim felt that there were two
people involved in a crime. And there were two people,
in fact, stopped by the police ten to eleven minutes
later. This tends to show that the defendant, because
he was with someone else, was one of the robbers
and matched at least that minimal description of the
suspects. Third, the defendant is found in possession
of a metal gun. It turns out to be a facsimile gun. That
is consistent with the victim’s description of an item,
of an object that felt like a firearm. Fourth, and critically,
the victim’s wallet is found on the defendant’s person.
We know that because Officer McCullough testified to
it, and I have closely examined the [body camera foot-
age] . . . . [T]he video tends to corroborate and sup-
port the officer’s testimony in court that the wallet was
found on the defendant’s person.
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‘‘So, in sum, the defendant is found driving the vic-
tim’s car, in the vicinity of the robbery, about ten
minutes after the robbery, with another person, as
described by the victim, in possession of a metal cap
gun, that’s consistent with the victim’s description of
an object that was put in the back of his head, and
critically, with the victim’s wallet on his person.
‘‘The likelihood that all these events are just a coinci-
dence seems to the court to be . . . infinitesimal and
minute. Now, the defendant did testify to a different
version of events. And I’ve considered that. . . . The
defendant’s testimony as to why he was found in the
driver’s seat of a stolen car with a gun similar in respect
to the object placed in the . . . back of the victim’s
head was incredible and unbelievable. At times, I also
found the defendant’s testimony evasive . . . . So, the
defendant’s testimony did nothing to weaken the state’s
case. And, in fact, because of its incredulity, tends to
strengthen it. In conclusion, I find that the state has
proven robbery in the second degree beyond a reason-
able doubt. It is true that there is . . . more that the
police could have done in this case . . . [b]ut there is
sufficient evidence here because of all the circumstan-
tial evidence to prove count one, robbery in the second
degree, beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that (1) he intended to commit a lar-
ceny, and (2) he used or threatened the immediate use
of physical force to carry out the larceny and displayed
or threatened the use of what was represented by words
or conduct to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instru-
ment. We address each of these arguments in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the state failed to
establish that he intended to commit a larceny. More
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specifically, he argues that ‘‘the state did not offer any
direct evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator
who stole the victim’s car in this case,’’ and, therefore,
the trial court was ‘‘forced to speculate about whether
evidence at trial established the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ We are not persuaded.
The state presented the following evidence at trial
to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator
who stole the victim’s car. McOuat testified that he
discovered the victim’s vehicle on Sargeant Street,
which was in the vicinity of where the robbery took
place on Sigourney Street,8 only ten minutes after the
robbery had occurred. McCullough testified that he
arrived to assist McOuat shortly thereafter, and both
officers testified that they observed the defendant in
the driver’s seat of the victim’s vehicle.
In addition, McCullough testified that he discovered
the victim’s wallet and a facsimile firearm in the defen-
dant’s pockets during a patdown. McOuat testified that
he was present when McCullough recovered both of
those items, and McOuat’s body camera recorded the
officers’ observations of these items after the patdown
had occurred. McCullough described the facsimile fire-
arm as ‘‘like a little pistol, a metal pistol,’’ which fit the
description of the object that was put to the back of
the victim’s head during the robbery. During the victim’s
testimony, he confirmed that the object was metal and
that it felt ‘‘like a firearm,’’ and he recalled telling offi-
cers that it ‘‘felt like a gun but not a real gun.’’
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court
reasonably could have concluded, as it did, that the
defendant was the individual who stole the victim’s car.
In addition, because ‘‘[t]he [fact finder] may infer that
8
McCullough explained that Sargeant Street was two or three blocks away
from Sigourney Street, which was consistent with the map that the state
had introduced into evidence.
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a defendant intended the natural consequences of his
actions’’; State v. Stephenson, 207 Conn. App. 154, 180,
263 A.3d 101 (2021), cert. denied, 342 Conn. 912, 272
A.3d 198 (2022); see also, e.g., State v. Papandrea, 120
Conn. App. 224, 230, 991 A.2d 617 (2010), aff’d, 302
Conn. 340, 26 A.3d 75 (2011); the court reasonably could
have inferred that the defendant possessed the requisite
intent to find him guilty of robbery in the second degree.
Although the defendant points out the lack of direct
evidence of the defendant’s identity based on the vic-
tim’s testimony at trial that he was unable to identify
the perpetrator,9 the cumulative force of the foregoing
circumstantial evidence is more than sufficient to fulfill
the state’s burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘‘[I]t does not diminish the
probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole
or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than
direct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Ramsey, 352 Conn. 210, 232, 336 A.3d 455 (2025); see
also State v. Hinton, 352 Conn. 183, 194, 336 A.3d 62
(2025) (‘‘[w]e do not draw a distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force
is concerned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In addition, we reject the defendant’s attempt to dis-
count McCullough’s testimony that he discovered the
victim’s wallet on the defendant. The defendant high-
lights testimony from McCullough that he was unable
to recognize the defendant in court on the day of trial10
and the fact that McCullough did not document in his
9
At trial, the following colloquy took place between the prosecutor and
the victim:
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: When that happened, did you . . . were you able to
see the individual?
‘‘[The Victim]: No. I could not . . . I can’t identify him, so.’’
10
When the prosecutor asked McCullough: ‘‘Do you see the person in
court today . . . who you pulled out of the car,’’ he responded: ‘‘Honestly
. . . he had his head covered in a mask . . . a medical mask on . . . and
it’s been three years. I couldn’t possibly recall his exact identity.’’
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police report that he found the wallet on the defendant.
Regardless of that evidence, however, McCullough spe-
cifically testified that he recovered the victim’s wallet
from one of the defendant’s pockets during his patdown
of the defendant,11 and McOuat’s testimony and body
camera footage corroborated McCullough’s version of
events. The trial court, as the fact finder in this case,
found McCullough’s testimony credible, and we will not
disturb this credibility determination on appeal. See,
e.g., State v. Shin, 193 Conn. App. 348, 359, 219 A.3d
432 (‘‘[b]ecause it is the sole province of the trier of
fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, it is not our
role to second-guess such credibility determinations’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 333
Conn. 943, 219 A.3d 374 (2019).
Moreover, to the extent the defendant argues that
there was no evidence that he, as opposed to V, had
been the perpetrator who stole the victim’s car, we
disagree.12 The testimony from McCullough and McOuat
established that the defendant—not V—was found in
the driver’s seat of the victim’s stolen car with the
victim’s wallet and a facsimile firearm in his pockets.
Although there was evidence that V was found with a
backpack containing two large knives with steel blades,
11
Specifically, after McCullough testified about finding the facsimile fire-
arm on the defendant, the following colloquy took place between the prose-
cutor and McCullough:
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you recover anything else on [the defendant]?
‘‘[McCullough]: [The victim’s] wallet was in . . . one of his pockets, also.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: [The victim’s] wallet was in [the defendant’s] pocket?
‘‘[McCullough]: Yes, sir.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: How did you know it was [the victim’s] wallet?
‘‘[McCullough]: We went to go identify the driver, to find out who he
was, and when we opened the wallet, [the victim’s identification] was right
there, so.’’
12
In support of this argument, the defendant references his own testimony
that V had stated he was going to ask the victim for a ride and that, a couple
of minutes later, V drove up in the victim’s car. The court, however, found
the defendant’s testimony ‘‘incredible and unbelievable.’’
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the evidence also demonstrated that the defendant was
the one found with a facsimile firearm. The court rea-
sonably found that that firearm—not the knives found
with V—fit the victim’s description of the object that
had been put to the back of his head. At trial, the victim
responded in the affirmative when the prosecutor asked
if the object felt ‘‘like a firearm.’’ In addition, the victim
testified: ‘‘I recall telling [the officers] that . . . I don’t
think it was a real gun.’’ Similarly, he responded in the
affirmative when the prosecutor asked whether he told
the officers that it ‘‘felt like a gun but not a real gun.’’
Accordingly, on the basis of this evidence, the trial court
reasonably concluded that the defendant, rather than
V, was the individual who stole the victim’s car.
In addition, although the trial court did not explicitly
rely on such evidence in support of its decision, McCul-
lough testified that the victim provided a physical
description to differentiate between the two suspects.
Specifically, McCullough testified that the victim had
‘‘described the one as fat and one as skinny,’’ and ‘‘[h]e
described the one with the weapon as a . . . fat per-
son.’’13 McCullough further testified that, on the basis
of his own observations, he would describe V as ‘‘slim’’
and the defendant as ‘‘[h]eavier set than [V].’’14 This
13
Although the defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court’s
admission of McCullough’s testimony as to the victim’s description of the
suspects; see part IV of this opinion; ‘‘[e]stablished case law commands us
to review claims of evidentiary insufficiency in light of all of the evidence
[adduced at trial].’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Waters, 214 Conn. App. 294, 302, 280 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022); see also id. (‘‘even improperly admitted
evidence may be considered . . . since [c]laims of evidentiary insufficiency
in criminal cases are always addressed independently of claims of eviden-
tiary error’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Ervin B., 202 Conn.
App. 1, 9 n.6, 243 A.3d 799 (2020) (‘‘[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence . . . we consider all evidence admitted at trial’’ (emphasis in origi-
nal)).
14
During his testimony, the defendant acknowledged that V is thinner
than he is.
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evidence further supports the court’s conclusion that
the defendant, rather than V, had been the individual
who approached the victim, put a firearm to the back
of his head, and stole his car.
B
The defendant next argues that the state ‘‘did not offer
any evidence that the defendant used or threatened
the immediate use of physical force, nor displayed or
threatened the use of what was represented by words
or conduct to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instru-
ment.’’
Section 53a-135 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A per-
son is guilty of robbery in the second degree when such
person (1) commits robbery, as defined in section 53a-
133, and . . . (B) in the course of the commission of
the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, such person
. . . displays or threatens the use of what such person
represents by such person’s words or conduct to be a
deadly weapon15 or a dangerous instrument16 . . . .’’
(Footnotes added.)
To be convicted of robbery in the second degree, a
defendant need not actually have been armed with a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. See State v.
Hall-George, supra, 203 Conn. App. 230. Instead, ‘‘a
defendant need only represent by his words or conduct
that he is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous
15
General Statutes § 53a-3 (6) defines ‘‘[d]eadly weapon’’ in relevant part
as ‘‘any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be
discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon,
or metal knuckles. . . .’’
Although § 53a-3 (6) has been amended since the events at issue; see
Public Acts 2025, No. 25-29, § 8; that amendment is not relevant to this
appeal. We therefore refer to the current revision of § 53a-3 (6).
16
General Statutes § 53a-3 (7) defines ‘‘[d]angerous instrument’’ in relevant
part as ‘‘any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances
in which it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is capable of
causing death or serious physical injury . . . .’’
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instrument.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. Even in cases
involving a conviction of robbery in the first degree
under General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), which ‘‘con-
tains language almost identical to the language of § 53a-
135 (a) (1) (B)17 . . . a defendant need not have an
operable firearm; in fact, he need not even have a gun.
He need only represent by his words or conduct that
he is so armed.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 229–30; see also
State v. Bell, 93 Conn. App. 650, 670–71, 891 A.2d 9
(defendant held object under jacket that ‘‘ ‘looked like
a gun’ ’’), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 933, 896 A.2d 101
(2006); State v. Ingram, 43 Conn. App. 801, 807, 687 A.2d
1279 (1996) (toy gun seized from defendant’s apartment
was similar to that displayed during robbery), cert.
denied, 240 Conn. 908, 689 A.2d 472 (1997); State v.
Arena, 33 Conn. App. 468, 471, 636 A.2d 398 (1994)
(defendant held object inside bag that ‘‘looked like a
gun’’), aff’d, 235 Conn. 67, 663 A.2d 972 (1995).
The state presented the following evidence at trial
to establish that the defendant had used or threatened
the immediate use of physical force and displayed or
threatened the use of what he represented by his words
or conduct to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instru-
ment. The victim testified: ‘‘I was getting out of my car,
and somebody came behind me and stuck something
in the back of my head and told me to get down.’’ He
testified that ‘‘[t]hey told me to get on the ground,’’ and
he laid on the ground. He further testified that ‘‘[they]
told me to do a lot of commands and stuff like that,’’
but he did not remember the details of those commands.
The victim explained that, when the person put the
17
In Hall-George, this court explained: ‘‘The difference between the two
statutes is that § 53a-135 (a) (1) (B) covers the display or threatened use
of deadly weapons and dangerous instruments, as opposed to only the
display or threatened use of firearms.’’ State v. Hall-George, supra, 203 Conn.
App. 229.
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object to the back of his head, he felt ‘‘scared’’ because
‘‘[he] didn’t want to get killed.’’
During his direct examination, the victim initially tes-
tified that he did not know what object was put to the
back of his head. Immediately thereafter, however, the
prosecutor asked: ‘‘[D]o you recall if it felt like a firearm
or not, by the way, or no?’’ The victim responded:
‘‘Yeah.’’ When the prosecutor asked: ‘‘[D]o you recall
. . . did it feel like one or not?’’ the victim responded:
‘‘Yes, it did.’’
On cross-examination, the victim again indicated that
he did not know what the object was, as he did not
turn around to see what was there, but he confirmed
that the object ‘‘felt metal.’’ On redirect examination,
the victim testified that he did not recall telling the
police that it was a metal object, explaining: ‘‘I don’t
recall what I told [the officer] that night because it’s
been so long ago.’’ When the prosecutor asked: ‘‘Do
you recall telling the officers that . . . you knew that
it wasn’t a real gun?,’’ the victim responded: ‘‘I recall
telling them that . . . I don’t think it was a real gun.’’
When the prosecutor similarly asked: ‘‘Do you remem-
ber telling them . . . that it felt like a gun but not a
real gun?,’’ the victim responded: ‘‘Yes.’’ On recross
examination, the victim answered in the affirmative that
he did not ‘‘actually see the object,’’ that he did not
know what it was, and that he ‘‘just felt something that
felt like metal.’’
In addition, as set forth in part II A of this opinion,
the state presented testimony from McCullough and
McOuat that the defendant was found in the driver’s seat
of the victim’s car only ten minutes after the incident
occurred with a facsimile firearm in his pocket. McCul-
lough explained that the facsimile firearm was ‘‘like a
little pistol, a little metal pistol.’’ He also described it
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as ‘‘a heavy metal toy pistol,’’ and ‘‘a cap gun or cap
pistol . . . toy gun.’’

On the basis of this evidence, the trial court reason-
ably could conclude, as it did, that the defendant threat-
ened the use of what he represented by his words or
conduct to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instru-
ment, i.e., a gun, by putting a facsimile firearm to the
back of the victim’s head and ordering him to get on
the ground, immediately prior to stealing his car.

The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]here is no evidence
to show a nexus connecting the metal object that the
[victim] felt on the back of his head to the facsimile
firearm found on the defendant’s person.’’ We disagree.
The victim’s testimony that the object was metal was
consistent with McCullough’s testimony describing the
facsimile firearm found on the defendant as being metal,
specifically, ‘‘like a little pistol, a metal pistol,’’ and ‘‘a
heavy metal toy pistol.’’ (Emphasis added.) In addition,
although the defendant attempts to highlight the vic-
tim’s testimony that he did not know what the object
was,18 the victim responded in the affirmative when the
prosecutor asked if the object felt ‘‘like a firearm’’ and
confirmed that he told officers that it ‘‘felt like a gun
but not a real gun . . . .’’ Given the similarities in the
descriptions of the items, the trial court reasonably
could conclude that there was a sufficient nexus
between the facsimile firearm found on the defendant’s
18
To the extent that the victim provided conflicting testimony in this
regard, ‘‘[i]t was within the province of the court to resolve this inconsistent
testimony.’’ Delena v. Grachitorena, 216 Conn. App. 225, 233, 283 A.3d 1090
(2022); see also State v. Meehan, 260 Conn. 372, 381, 796 A.2d 1191 (2002)
(‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that evidentiary inconsistencies are for the jury to resolve,
and it is within the province of the jury to believe all or only part of a
witness’ testimony’’); Hospital Media Network, LLC v. Henderson, 209 Conn.
App. 395, 430, 268 A.3d 657 (2021) (‘‘a trier of fact is free to credit one
version of events over the other, even from the same witnesses’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 916, 274 A.3d 867 (2022).
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person and the object put to the back of the victim’s
head during the robbery.
In addition, we reject the defendant’s suggestion that
the evidence was insufficient because the victim did
not see or directly observe the object put to the back
of his head. Although the victim did not see the object,
he could feel that the object felt ‘‘like a firearm . . . .’’
To the extent that the defendant attempts to highlight
the victim’s testimony that he told the police that the
object did not feel like a ‘‘real gun,’’ we emphasize that
the victim also testified that he felt ‘‘scared’’ because
‘‘[he] didn’t want to get killed.’’
Moreover, although the defendant’s command to the
victim to ‘‘get on the ground’’ did not in and of itself
express a threat of physical force or express that the
defendant was armed with a firearm, that statement
must be taken together with the defendant’s conduct in
putting the facsimile firearm to the back of the victim’s
head. See State v. Hall-George, supra, 203 Conn. App.
231 (describing cases in which ‘‘[t]he defendants’ con-
duct and words . . . were sufficient for the juries to
reasonably infer that the defendants wanted the victims
to think that they had firearms’’ (emphasis in original)).
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the trial
court reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant represented that he had a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument, i.e., a fire-
arm, and that, by putting it to the back of the victim’s
head and ordering him to get on the ground, the defen-
dant threatened, by his conduct, to use that firearm if
the victim did not comply. Accordingly, the evidence
was sufficient for the court to find the defendant guilty
of robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-
135 (a) (1) (B).
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III
The defendant next claims that the trial court
deprived him of his right to self-representation when
it failed to canvass him regarding the waiver of his right
to counsel after he had made a clear and unequivocal
request to represent himself and, further, that the
court’s failure to canvass him amounts to structural
error. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the defen-
dant’s first court appearance in the present case, on
October 1, 2020, the court appointed the Office of the
Public Defender to represent the defendant. On Decem-
ber 7, 2020, McMahon filed an appearance in lieu of the
Office of the Public Defender to serve as the defendant’s
assigned counsel.
The defendant claims that he asserted his right to
self-representation in court during the pretrial hearing
on April 8, 2021. On that date, the trial court, Baldini,
J., held a virtual hearing to address a plea offer that
had been extended by the state. After the court recited
the state’s plea offer on the record, the following collo-
quy took place:
‘‘The Court: . . . Attorney McMahon, did you get a
chance to talk to your client about that offer?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Okay. And Mr. Trice, did you have enough
time to speak with your attorney about that offer?
‘‘[The Defendant]: I did . . . I would like to speak
to the court alone. . . .
‘‘The Court: Okay. So, what I want to do is . . . you
said that you want to say something. Before you say
something, I always tell people that, if you say some-
thing, that it could be used against you. So, if you start
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talking about the case, those are all things that could
be used against you. Do you understand that?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: And did . . . you want to say anything
to your client, Attorney McMahon?
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. Just for the
record, and he knows this, I think very strongly he
should not discuss the case in any way, shape, or form.
Obviously, whether or not he pleads is totally up to
him. I would advise him not to say anything. Having
said that, he has the right to address the court if he so
desires. . . .
‘‘The Court: All right. Mr. Trice . . . what I want to
know is whether or not you wish to accept or reject
that offer?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Your Honor, I reject. And I would
like to speak upon my behalf . . . I want to represent
myself, and I want to fire my attorney, Mr. McMahon.
‘‘The Court: Okay. So, there’s a couple of things that
are going on that you just indicated. So, here’s where
we’re at. You got the offer that was extended to you,
right?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: Okay. Did you have enough time to talk
to your attorney about that offer?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Not at all. I tried to address the
situation. And I did research upon myself . . . upon
the alleged criminal offense I’m being charged with.
And it seems like he’s my prosecutor against me. So, I
tried to talk . . . go over multiple times with him on
different occasions about my innocence and he never
. . . he never came to me, and we discussed these
about my innocence. . . .
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‘‘The Court: . . . [Y]our attorney doesn’t have the
burden of proving your innocence. The state has the
burden of proving your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
which is the highest legal standard, okay? So, there’s
no requirement that your innocence be proven. Your
attorney can provide defenses. Your attorney can’t cre-
ate facts. The facts are what they are. The evidence is
what it is. And what I just want to make sure is, this
is a big decision. So, the fact that . . . a lot of times,
people come into court on the day when it’s accept or
reject and they express that they’re not happy with their
attorney, but what they’re really not happy with is the
offer. And so, I want to make sure that your attorney
is somebody who has appeared in front of this court
multiple times, so I am familiar with him and the work
that he does. Unfortunately, defense attorneys some-
times have the difficult job of conveying bad news to
defendants. In this situation, any offer that involves
incarceration I would imagine is not good news, okay.
But that’s the state’s offer to you to resolve your case,
and what I’m hearing is that you believe that you are
innocent of this charge, and you have the choice on
whether or not you wish to plead guilty. So, if you don’t
want to plead guilty, your attorney can’t make that
decision for you. Your attorney can advise you of your
options. Can tell you what the evidence is. Can tell you
what information he knows about the case, and he can
recommend to you whether or not you should take the
case to trial, whether you should enter a plea to a
charge. I will say that your attorney has been a pretty
strong advocate for you. . . . So, I understand that
you’ve made certain representations today. . . .

‘‘You mentioned something about firing your attor-
ney. You have assigned counsel. So, just reminding you
that, if you have an assigned attorney, you are not con-
stitutionally allowed to have an attorney that you like,
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but you are constitutionally entitled to have an attorney
that is effective, who can represent you.
‘‘The other issue that you brought up was represent-
ing yourself, okay. There are tremendous risks when
someone represents themselves because, a lot of times,
you will have a mindset. There are things that you think
that you want to tell a judge or tell a jury, but there
are rules, there are evidentiary rules that it takes years
for many people to understand. . . . So, if you don’t
know what those rules are and you can’t effectively
present your case, and you represent yourself, you
could put yourself in a hugely bad position if your case
goes to trial.
‘‘So, I’m just trying to tell you all those things so there
are things that you can think about, and you don’t have
to make a decision today, but it is important for you
to understand all of those things because representing
yourself . . . you’re not kind of separating your emo-
tions from the logic that is necessary. Some people can
do it. Most people can’t, and it’s very difficult. A judge
can’t help you out. A judge has to always remain right
in the middle, neutral. So, if you’re asking a judge, can
I do this? Can this get admitted into evidence? The
judge can’t help you. So, I want you to think about all
of those things. Would you like to have some more time
to consider everything that I said today?
‘‘[The Defendant]: I understand everything you said
today, but I would like to speak on my defense, if you
don’t mind.
‘‘The Court: Well, the one thing that we’re going to
do today is, we’re addressing the [plea offer]. So, we’re
not going to try the case, okay. That’s the thing, it’s
like, remember your attorney was correct in saying,
you know, I advise you not to say anything. Because
today we’re not . . . we’re not deciding . . . your
guilt or your innocence. . . . All we’re trying to figure
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out is whether or not you have made a decision to
accept or reject the offer. And maybe you haven’t, and
maybe you want more time. That’s really all we’re going
to do today.
‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, Your Honor, my attorney
. . . [McMahon] make me fear for my life very, very
bad. Like, I want to speak upon my behalf in my defense,
if you don’t mind, please.
‘‘The Court: Okay. So . . . just one moment. So,
when you say that you want to speak in your defense,
it sounds like you want to talk about your case. And
. . . keep in mind, and this is where it makes me really
concerned about any efforts that you might want to
have to represent yourself because you want to tell
your story, right? But, in telling your story, you could
say something that you might think is good for you but,
in reality, the state might be listening to what you say
and might write that down or might ask for a copy of
the transcript and use that against you if the case goes
to trial, okay. Just remember, you do not have to prove
that you’re innocent. It’s their job. So, a lot of times,
the reasons why a defense attorney just like Attorney
McMahon would say . . . don’t say anything. . . .
[L]et them sustain their burden, their job. Their burden
of proof, which is the highest standard, beyond a reason-
able doubt. So, if you want to go and start talking about
your case, of course, you could do that, but, in fact,
you could actually be helping the state with their case,
and that’s something that sometimes people don’t real-
ize that. . . . And let me also remind you that, some-
times when your attorney talks to you about your case
and strategy, you might not agree with it, but his experi-
ence, the number of cases that he’s handled here in
this court alone are many. He does a lot of work
throughout the state, but he appears here regularly.
So, he has some experience with these kinds of cases.
Sometimes, you might not agree with his strategy, but
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that’s not a reason in and of itself to allow you to get
a new lawyer or be allowed summarily to represent
yourself. So, I just want you to know that, too. . . . I
told you a lot of things today. So, I’m thinking that
maybe we pick another time for you to come back and
address your case. . . . I think that’s probably . . . a
better strategy.’’
After the defendant asked the trial court about his
charges; see part I of this opinion; he expressed that
he thought McMahon was ‘‘illegally obtaining evidence
against [him]’’ and that McMahon was ‘‘going up against
[him]’’ because McMahon ‘‘want[ed] [him] to cop out to
robbery in the first degree [and] conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree.’’
The defendant subsequently stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I
do not want Mr. McMahon representing me no more.’’
The court responded: ‘‘Okay. Well, I haven’t had the
opportunity to address the issue. I have not been satis-
fied with what has been presented. I am going to ask
you . . . we can address that on the next court date
because this is the first time. So, if you refuse to talk
to your attorney, there’s no guarantee that you’re going
to get a new attorney. I went through, I believe in detail
today, what I believe to be the options that you have,
what the obligations are with your attorney, the risks of
self-representation. I believe we can adequately address
any issues that you have on the next court date. But I
do, given what you presented today . . . I am not going
to discuss that issue because it wasn’t one that we
intended to address today. So, May 13th, 10:30. Happy
to address anything on that date.’’
At the start of the next court date, on May 13, 2021,
the trial court stated: ‘‘We last spoke on the record on
April 8, 2021. And we had some conversations on that
date. There is an existing offer to resolve [the defen-
dant’s] matter. And the matter was continued to today
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for additional discussions. So, can we have an update
on where things stand?’’
McMahon responded: ‘‘Yes, Your Honor. My client’s
advised me that he does wish to reject the offer.’’ The
court recited the terms of the plea offer and asked
the defendant whether he had received that offer, the
defendant responded: ‘‘I was told that by my attorney,
Your Honor. And last time I was in court, I spoke about
me and my attorney always having difficulty between
him representing me in a court of law. So, I would like
to know if I could read for the record what I wrote
down, and thank you.’’ After additional discussion, in
which the defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with
McMahon, the trial court permitted the defendant to
read his written statement challenging the state’s ability
to charge him with robbery in the first degree by way
of its substitute information. As explained in part I of
this opinion, the court expressed its concern that
‘‘maybe there might be some issues’’ with the defen-
dant’s ability to understand the proceedings or to assist
in his defense, given his reliance on inapplicable case
law, and McMahon stated that he did not ‘‘share that
position’’ regarding the court’s uncertainty about the
defendant’s competence.
The court then stated in relevant part: ‘‘I want to
make sure that you understand what’s going on here.
And I want to make sure that I understand that, if you
don’t want to accept the offer, that that’s what your
decision is and that you’ve had enough time to evaluate
it. So, can you respond to that, please?’’ The defendant
responded: ‘‘Your Honor, I do not have enough time at
all.’’ The court told the defendant that it would give
him more time to talk to his attorney and to consider
the plea offer, and explained to the defendant that it was
ultimately his decision whether he wanted to accept
the plea offer. When the court asked the defendant
whether he understood, he responded: ‘‘Yes.’’
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After additional discussion with the trial court, the
defendant asked: ‘‘Your Honor, have you ever approved
upon me getting new counsel?’’ The court explained to
the defendant, among other things, that asking for a
new attorney was ‘‘not so simple’’ and that ‘‘there’s
nothing that I’ve heard from you or from your attorney
that raises the question that your attorney is not doing
what he’s supposed to be doing on your behalf.’’ The
court told the defendant, ‘‘we will talk about it on the
next [court] date,’’ which it then scheduled for June
24, 2021.
The defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for
a speedy trial, which was dated June 1, 2021. In the
substance of that motion, the defendant requested, inter
alia, a ‘‘motion to dismiss counsel’’ and a ‘‘motion to
[appoint] a new counsel,’’ to take place before a
speedy trial.
The court addressed the defendant’s motion at the
hearing on June 24, 2021. The court explained to the
defendant that it could not act on the motion for a
speedy trial that the defendant had filed in a self-repre-
sented capacity unless McMahon adopted that motion
because ‘‘hybrid representation’’ is not permitted pursu-
ant to State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 382, 385, 497
A.2d 408 (1985). After the court addressed the state’s
plea offer that had been discussed at the April 8 and
May 13, 2021 hearings, and the defendant confirmed that
he was rejecting that offer, the court asked McMahon
whether he was adopting the defendant’s motion for a
speedy trial. McMahon responded: ‘‘I am not. He does
not want me as his lawyer.’’
The defendant expressed concerns he had with
McMahon’s representation of him, stating, inter alia, ‘‘I
feel like he’s not with me; he don’t represent me at all,’’
and, ‘‘I’m not understanding how I’m being charged with
robbery, or I will go to trial with robbery, and, like, I
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fear for my life right now because Mr. McMahon, he
don’t help me at all, and I’m not understanding . . . .’’
After additional discussions between the trial court,
the defendant, and McMahon, the defendant asked the
court whether it was denying his motion for a new
attorney. The court recognized the defendant’s ‘‘wish
to have another attorney represent [him]’’ and stated
that it would ‘‘entertain this as a motion for a change
of counsel in [the defendant’s] matter.’’ The court found
that there was not good cause to dismiss McMahon as
the defendant’s counsel because, inter alia, there had
not been a breakdown in the communication so severe
that McMahon’s ability to represent the defendant was
impaired. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for new counsel.
Subsequently, however, on June 6, 2022, McMahon
filed a motion to withdraw his appearance on the
ground that the attorney-client relationship had broken
down. The court addressed McMahon’s motion to with-
draw at a hearing on September 2, 2022. After the defen-
dant rejected another plea offer from the state, McMa-
hon addressed the court: ‘‘Well, Your Honor, the other
thing is that he no longer wants me as his lawyer. He’s
made it clear for the past two or three months that he
either wants to go pro se or he wants to proceed with
another standby counsel. It was my understanding with
him that this [plea deal] would resolve the entire matter.
He wanted to go forward with me. Obviously, now with
this change, I assume that he wants me to withdraw
from the case because he’s been asking for this for a
while.’’ After confirming with both McMahon and the
defendant that the attorney-client relationship had bro-
ken down, the court granted McMahon’s motion to with-
draw his appearance.
The trial court then told the defendant, ‘‘I’ve got to
figure out who your lawyer’s going to be,’’ and explained
that it was going to set a new court date and that he
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probably would be assigned another special public
defender.19 The defendant responded, ‘‘Yes, Your
Honor,’’ and the court directed an attorney from the
Office of the Public Defender to assign a new special
public defender for the defendant.
On September 7, 2022, Attorney Jennifer M. Buyske
filed an appearance in lieu of McMahon as the defen-
dant’s assigned counsel. Thereafter, the defendant did
not voice any dissatisfaction with his representation
and did not express any desire to represent himself.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the defendant’s claim that the trial court violated his
right to self-representation. ‘‘The sixth amendment to
the United States constitution provides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. The sixth amendment right to counsel is made
applicable to state prosecutions through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. . . . In Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court
concluded that the sixth amendment [also] embodies
a right to self-representation and that a defendant in a
state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed
without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Ghant, 212 Conn. App. 662, 676–77, 276 A.3d
1004, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 901, 282 A.3d 465 (2022).
‘‘Article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut
19
Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘[W]e’ll have to get the [Office of the]
Public Defender involved to see if there’s another standby counsel, and we
will have to get a new date to see if he qualifies for a special public defender
and standby counsel, and then we can see where the case is heading, to
either canvass him or what the representation is going to be. At the point, this
will be excludable time until we figure out what the proper representation
is going to be. So, I’m going to give you a new court date, Mr. Trice, so you
can meet . . . we’ll probably get you a new special public defender, and
then you can talk with that lawyer to see where the case is heading. Okay?’’
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also guarantees the right to self-representation by pro-
viding: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel
. . . .’ ’’ State v. Shashaty, 251 Conn. 768, 771 n.3, 742
A.2d 786 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1094, 120 S. Ct.
1734, 146 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2000).

‘‘It is well established that [t]he right to counsel and
the right to self-representation present mutually exclu-
sive alternatives. A criminal defendant has a constitu-
tionally protected interest in each, but since the two
rights cannot be exercised simultaneously, a defendant
must choose between them. When the right to have
competent counsel ceases as the result of a sufficient
waiver, the right of self-representation begins. . . . Put
another way, a defendant properly exercises his right
to self-representation by knowingly and intelligently
waiving his right to representation by counsel. . . .

‘‘State and federal courts consistently have discussed
the right to self-representation in terms of invoking or
asserting it . . . and have concluded that there can be
no infringement of the right to self-representation in
the absence of a defendant’s proper assertion of that
right. . . . The threshold requirement that the defen-
dant clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to pro-
ceed [as a self-represented party] is one of many safe-
guards of the fundamental right to counsel. . . .
Accordingly, [t]he constitutional right of self-represen-
tation depends . . . upon its invocation by the defen-
dant in a clear and unequivocal manner. . . . In the
absence of a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right
to self-representation, a trial court has no independent
obligation to inquire into the defendant’s interest in
representing himself . . . . Conversely, once there has
been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a
court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to Practice
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Book § 44-3], on the record, to inform the defendant
20

of the risks of self-representation and to permit him to
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel. . . . The inquiry mandated by . . . § 44-3 is
designed to ensure the knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel that constitutionally is required.’’ (Citation
omitted; footnote in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Ghant, supra, 212 Conn. App. 677–78.
Conversely, ‘‘[w]hen a defendant’s assertion of the
right to self-representation is not clear and unequivocal,
recognition of the right becomes a matter entrusted to
the exercise of discretion by the trial court. . . . In the
exercise of that discretion, the trial court must weigh
into the balance its obligation to indulge in every reason-
able presumption against waiver of the right to coun-
sel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pas-
chal, 207 Conn. App. 328, 335, 262 A.3d 893, cert. denied,
340 Conn. 902, 263 A.3d 387 (2021), cert. denied,
U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1395, 212 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2022).
On appeal, the defendant claims that he clearly and
unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation
at the April 8, 2021 pretrial hearing when he stated, ‘‘I
would like to speak upon my behalf . . . I want to
represent myself and I want to fire my attorney, Mr.
McMahon.’’ The defendant further claims that, despite
20
‘‘ ‘Practice Book § 44-3 provides: A defendant shall be permitted to waive
the right to counsel and shall be permitted to represent himself or herself
at any stage of the proceedings, either prior to or following the appointment
of counsel. A waiver will be accepted only after the judicial authority makes
a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:
‘‘ ‘(1) Has been clearly advised of the right to the assistance of counsel,
including the right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled;
‘‘ ‘(2) Possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the conse-
quences of the decision to represent oneself;
‘‘ ‘(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range
of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad
understanding of the case; and
‘‘ ‘(4) Has been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.’ ’’ State v. Ghant, supra, 212 Conn. App. 678 n.3.
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State v. Trice

this clear and unequivocal invocation, the trial court
failed to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Practice Book
§ 44-3, thereby violating his right to self-representation
under the sixth amendment to the United States consti-
tution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu-
tion.21 The state argues that the defendant did not make
a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself,
and, in the alternative, even if he did make a clear and
unequivocal request to represent himself, the court did
not clearly and conclusively deny his request, and the
defendant subsequently waived his right to self-repre-
sentation by accepting the appointment of replacement
counsel. We conclude that, even if we assume, without
deciding, that the defendant’s statement at the April 8,
2021 hearing constituted a clear and unequivocal
request to represent himself, the court did not clearly
and conclusively deny that request and the defendant
subsequently waived his right to self-representation.
‘‘Although a court is required to conduct a canvass
pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3, once a defendant
has clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-
representation; see State v. Paschal, supra, 207 Conn.
App. 334; our Supreme Court explained in State v. Bras-
well, 318 Conn. 815, 842 n.8, 123 A.3d 835 (2015), that
there may be some circumstances in which a defendant
asserts his right to self-representation but subsequently
waives that right before a court clearly and conclusively
denies his request. The court in Braswell explained:
‘[If] a trial court has not clearly and conclusively denied
a defendant’s request to represent himself, the defen-
dant may subsequently waive such a request. But, [if]
21
Although the defendant refers in his appellate brief to the right to self-
representation afforded under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu-
tion, he has not provided an independent analysis of his state constitutional
claim in accordance with State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d
1225 (1992). Therefore, we limit our review of the defendant’s claim to his
right to self-representation under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State
v. Ghant, supra, 212 Conn. App. 664 n.1.
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State v. Trice

a court has clearly and conclusively denied the request,
the defendant does not waive his right to self-represen-
tation by subsequently acquiescing in being represented
by counsel or by failing to reassert that right.’ Id., 843–
44.’’ State v. Ghant, supra, 212 Conn. App. 679–80; see
also United States v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 271 (2d Cir.
2012) (‘‘even after the right to proceed pro se has been
clearly and unequivocally asserted, the right may be
waived through conduct indicating that one is vacillat-
ing on the issue or has abandoned one’s request alto-
gether’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 1113, 133 S. Ct. 917, 184 L. Ed. 2d
704 (2013).
‘‘The court in Braswell made clear that ‘[t]his does
not mean, however, that, after a defendant’s clear and
unequivocal request to represent himself, a trial court
may simply ignore such a request and proceed to a
critical stage of the proceedings, and thereby avoid
any error simply because it did not make a clear and
conclusive ruling on the defendant’s request. . . .
[O]nce a defendant has clearly and unequivocally
invoked his right to self-representation, the trial court
is obligated to conduct a canvass in accordance with
Practice Book § 44-3 to determine if his waiver of coun-
sel is knowingly and intelligently made. Our decision
in this case does not alter that obligation. Instead, it
suggests there may be some instances in which a defen-
dant asserts and subsequently waives his right to self-
representation before a court clearly and conclusively
rules on the defendant’s request. In such instances, it
is possible that there are circumstances in which the
trial court’s delay in ruling on the request would not
constitute error.’ [State v. Braswell, supra, 318 Conn.
842 n.8].
‘‘Our Supreme Court explained its reasoning behind
this rule: ‘Although a defendant does not have to reas-
sert his right to self-representation once it has been
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clearly denied by the court . . . we have never held
that there is no obligation to renew such claim [if] the
court does not address it. It seems to us that there is
a significant difference between a defendant who
waives or forfeits his right to self-representation after
a clear ruling and one who waives or forfeits the right
when there has been no such ruling. In the former
situation, it is likely that the waiver or forfeiture is
precipitated by the denial. . . . In the latter situation,
contrarily, there has been no court action that would
suggest that the reassertion of one’s right would be
futile.’ . . . Id., 841 n.8.’’ State v. Ghant, supra, 212
Conn. App. 680–81.
In the present case, the defendant acknowledges that
the trial court did not explicitly rule on his purported
request to represent himself. Nevertheless, he argues
that the court, in effect, clearly and conclusively denied
his request because ‘‘[t]he court’s repeated instructions
that he needed to continue to work with his defense
attorney caused the defendant to believe that a further
request would be anything more than futile.’’ We dis-
agree.
It is clear from the record that the matter of the
defendant’s representation was still open for discus-
sion. See State v. Paschal, supra, 207 Conn. App. 338
(defendant’s request to represent himself was not con-
clusively denied where it was ‘‘clear from the record
that both the defendant and the court considered the
matter of the defendant’s representation still open for
discussion’’); see also Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 38
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 892, 121 S. Ct. 218, 148
L. Ed. 2d 155 (2000). At the conclusion of the hearing
on April 8, 2021, the defendant stated, ‘‘I do not want
[McMahon] representing me no more,’’ and the court
responded in relevant part, ‘‘[w]ell, I haven’t had the
opportunity to address the issue . . . we can address
that on the next court date . . . .’’ In addition, the court
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explicitly referenced the issue of self-representation
and stated, again, that it could address any issues on
the next court date. Specifically, the court told the
defendant: ‘‘[I]f you refuse to talk to your attorney,
there’s no guarantee that you’re going to get a new
attorney. I went through, I believe in detail today, what
I believe to be the options that you have, what the
obligations are with your attorney, the risks of self-
representation. I believe we can adequately address
any issues that you have on the next court date. But
I do, given what you presented today . . . I am not
going to discuss that issue because it wasn’t one that we
intended to address today. So, May 13th, 10:30. Happy
to address anything on that date. Okay?’’22 (Emphasis
added.) Because the court did not rule on the defen-
dant’s request to represent himself at the April 8, 2021
hearing and, instead, made clear that ‘‘the question of
self-representation was left open for possible further
discussion’’; Wilson v. Walker, supra, 204 F.3d 38; we
conclude that the defendant’s request was not clearly
and conclusively denied.
Moreover, the trial court did not ‘‘simply ignore [the
defendant’s] request and proceed to a critical stage of
the proceedings’’; State v. Braswell, supra, 318 Conn.
842 n.8; as the defendant suggests. Instead, the court
acknowledged the defendant’s request, which was
made directly after the defendant stated that he wanted
to reject the state’s plea offer, and expressed concern
that the defendant may be having an emotional reaction
to his dissatisfaction with his counsel’s advice during
the plea negotiation process.23 See State v. Paschal, 207
22
The trial court also stated, more broadly, that ‘‘we’re going to have an
opportunity for you to speak with your attorney. At this point, we’re not
focused on what we had intended to do today. There are some issues that
have come up. Certainly, we can discuss them further on May 13th.’’
(Emphasis added.)
23
As set forth previously, the trial court told the defendant, in relevant
part, that, ‘‘a lot of times, people come into court on the day when it’s accept
or reject and they express that they’re not happy with their attorney, but
what they’re really not happy with is the offer.’’
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Conn. App. 335 (in considering whether reference to
self-representation was clear and unequivocal request,
court may consider ‘‘whether a request is the result
of an emotional outburst’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
After additional discussion between the trial court
and the defendant, during which the defendant stated
that he did not know or understand the charges against
him, the court expressed that it had some possible con-
cerns with the defendant’s competence. The court con-
tinued the matter for additional discussions to take
place between the defendant and McMahon, and the
court asked McMahon to bring to the court’s attention
any concerns he had from those discussions about the
defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings or to
assist in his defense.24
Given the trial court’s potential concern about the
defendant’s competence25—along with its duty to
ensure that any waiver of the defendant’s right to coun-
sel would be knowingly and intelligently made—the
court reasonably declined to conduct a canvass of the
defendant at the April 8, 2021 hearing and, instead,
continued the matter in an abundance of caution to
24
Specifically, the trial court stated: ‘‘I’m going to continue your case to
allow you to have another conversation with your attorney, and then I’m
also going to just make sure . . . I’m going to ask Attorney McMahon in
those subsequent conversations that I anticipate you’re having, if there’s
any conversations that you have that lead you to think that maybe this
defendant doesn’t understand the proceedings against him or assisting in
his defense that you’ll bring that to the court’s attention. It’s not apparent
to me at this point, but it could be something that might require further
discussion in the future, okay.’’ (Emphasis added.)
25
As we explained in part I of this opinion, the record does not reflect
substantial evidence of mental impairment. The trial court, however, was
reasonably cautious given the defendant’s statements that he did not know
or understand the charges against him, particularly in light the more stringent
standard for competence applied in the context of self-representation. See
State v. J.M.F., 170 Conn. App. 120, 163 n.14, 154 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 325
Conn. 912, 159 A.3d 230 (2017).
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provide time to resolve that concern. As we set forth
in more detail in part I of this opinion, continuing the
matter enabled the court to obtain McMahon’s opinion,
after additional discussions with the defendant, that
he did not share the court’s concern. In addition, the
defendant’s statements at the May 13, 2021 hearing con-
firmed that his remarks about not understanding the
charges against him reflected more on his lack of legal
experience than it did on his mental condition. Accord-
ingly, although a court typically must canvass a defen-
dant in accordance with Practice Book § 44-3 after he
makes a clear and unequivocal request to represent
himself; see State v. Bush, 325 Conn. 272, 318, 157 A.3d
586 (2017); the court’s decision not to do so under the
particular circumstances of the present case did not,
in and of itself, amount to a denial of the defendant’s
right to self-representation. See United States v.
Barnes, supra, 693 F.3d 274 (court declined to rule on
defendant’s request to represent himself until there had
been competency evaluation, and, after competency
evaluation, there was no further mention of self-repre-
sentation request); see also State v. Ghant, supra, 212
Conn. App. 686 (court acknowledged but did not rule on
defendant’s request to represent himself and continued
matter based on concern about talking to defendant
about his request without his attorney present); State
v. Paschal, supra, 207 Conn. App. 338 (court denied
without prejudice defendant’s request to represent him-
self and continued matter to afford defendant’s counsel
opportunity to obtain video from state in accordance
with defendant’s expressed goals).

In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not
clearly and conclusively deny the defendant’s request
to represent himself, we must next consider whether
the defendant reasserted his right to self-representation
after the April 8, 2021 hearing. The defendant argues
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that he subsequently attempted to proceed pro se by
filing motions on his own behalf. We are not persuaded.

Although the defendant filed a pro se motion for a
speedy trial on June 1, 2021, the filing of that motion
in a self-represented capacity did not reflect the defen-
dant’s desire to represent himself given that it included
a ‘‘motion to [appoint] a new counsel.’’ Both this court
and our Supreme Court have repeatedly held that ‘‘[t]he
right to counsel and the right to self-representation
present mutually exclusive alternatives.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Joseph A., 336 Conn.
247, 254, 245 A.3d 785 (2020); State v. Paschal, supra,
207 Conn. App. 333. Indeed, after the April 8, 2021 hear-
ing, the defendant repeatedly expressed a desire for a
different attorney, rather than a desire to represent
himself, as reflected (1) at the May 13, 2021 hearing
when he asked the trial court: ‘‘Your Honor, have you
ever approved upon me getting new counsel?’’; (2) in
his June 1, 2021 motion, when he requested that a
‘‘motion to dismiss counsel’’ and a ‘‘motion to [appoint]
a new counsel’’ be considered before his speedy trial;
and (3) at the June 24, 2021 hearing, when he asked
the court whether it was denying his ‘‘motion for a new
attorney . . . .’’ In addition, although the court initially
denied the defendant’s request for new counsel, the
defendant acquiesced to being represented by a differ-
ent attorney after the court granted McMahon’s motion
to withdraw his appearance on September 2, 2022. The
defendant did not subsequently voice any dissatisfac-
tion with his replacement counsel and did not express
any desire to represent himself. The defendant, there-
fore, waived his right to self-representation. See State
v. Ghant, supra, 212 Conn. App. 688 (defendant waived
right to self-representation when he ‘‘acquiesced to
being represented by counsel’’ at subsequent hearings);
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see also Wilson v. Walker, supra, 204 F.3d 39 (high-
lighting defendant’s apparent cooperation with replace-
ment counsel and failure to voice any dissatisfaction
after original counsel’s withdrawal from case).
Finally, we note that the defendant’s assertion that
the trial court’s alleged error is structural and subject
to automatic reversal does not contradict our conclu-
sion that the defendant waived his right to represent
himself.26 Although neither the United States Supreme
Court nor our Supreme Court has expressly addressed
the issue of waiver in the context of a claim of structural
error, several federal circuit courts of appeals have
concluded that a party may waive a structural error.
See, e.g., United States v. Pancholi, Docket No. 24-1127,
2025 WL 2218478, *10 (6th Cir. August 5, 2025) (‘‘the
fact that the violation would constitute structural error
does not mean that a defendant cannot waive the under-
lying right’’); Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F.3d 930, 934 (7th
Cir. 2019) (‘‘the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is
that it is not subject to harmless-error review . . . but
such errors can still be waived’’ (citation omitted));
Wilson v. Walker, supra, 204 F.3d 37–38 (concluding that
defendant’s ‘‘failure to reassert his desire to proceed
pro se constituted a waiver of his previously asserted
[s]ixth [a]mendment right,’’ despite recognition that ‘‘a
court’s denial of the right to self-representation is not
subject to harmless error analysis, and requires auto-
matic reversal of a criminal conviction’’); see also Z.
Henderson, ‘‘A Comprehensive Consideration of the
Structural-Error Doctrine,’’ 85 Mo. L. Rev. 965, 1008–10
(2020) (discussing rationale behind courts’ application
of waiver doctrine in context of claims of structural
error).
26
Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘the improper denial of the right
to self-representation is a structural error, requiring a new trial.’’ State v.
Petteway, 351 Conn. 682, 692, 332 A.3d 196 (2025); see also State v. Braswell,
supra, 318 Conn. 846–47; State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 23, 44 A.3d 794 (2012).
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In sum, even if we assume that the defendant clearly
and unequivocally requested to represent himself on
April 8, 2021, the trial court did not conclusively deny
that request. During the remainder of the proceedings,
the defendant did not clearly and unequivocally reassert
the right to self-representation. Accordingly, the defen-
dant waived his right to represent himself.
IV
Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly admitted into evidence certain hearsay
statements. Specifically, he argues that the court abused
its discretion in allowing testimony from McCullough
regarding the victim’s out-of-court statement describing
the suspects as ‘‘fat’’ and ‘‘skinny.’’ We conclude that
the defense opened the door to the challenged testi-
mony and, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the state to elicit that testimony.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. At trial, the state sought to
elicit testimony from McCullough regarding the differ-
ences in the physical appearances of the defendant and
V. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked: ‘‘Was
there a difference in body size between the two individu-
als?’’ McCullough responded: ‘‘The way that [the victim]
identified them, yes, very much so.’’ The prosecutor
followed up, asking: ‘‘When you physically saw the two
individuals, was there a difference in body type, by
the way?’’ (Emphasis added.) McCullough responded,
‘‘[y]es, sir.’’ When the prosecutor asked what the differ-
ence in the body types was, McCullough began to
respond with the description that the victim had pro-
vided to the police on the night of the incident, rather
than his own observations. The court sustained defense
counsel’s subsequent objections to the testimony on
the basis of hearsay and because the testimony was
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not responsive to the question posed. Finally, the prose-
cutor asked: ‘‘Without . . . telling us what [the victim]
said the difference between the body types was, did
you observe the difference in the body types between
the two individuals?’’ McCullough responded, ‘‘[y]es,’’
explaining that ‘‘[o]ne was heavier set than the other,’’
and the defendant was the heavier set individual.
On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to
elicit testimony from McCullough about the alleged lack
of detail that the police had about the identity of the
suspects. The following colloquy took place:
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Now, in this specific case, [the
victim] was the only person who was at the scene of
the robbery; right?
‘‘[McCullough]: Yes.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. He’s the one that called
9-1-1.
‘‘[McCullough]: Yes, ma’am.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He didn’t know who the rob-
ber was.
‘‘[McCullough]: No, ma’am.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He didn’t provide a lot of descrip-
tion.
‘‘[McCullough]: We had a general description.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Of the car, right?
‘‘[McCullough]: And of the people that took the car.
‘‘[Defense Counsel]: So, you’re saying that he gave
details about the individual who took the car.
‘‘[McCullough]: Very generic details.’’
Defense counsel continued to question McCullough
about alleged inadequacies in the police investigation,
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such as the failure to locate any surveillance footage,
the failure to speak to anyone in the neighborhood
about the incident, and the failure to conduct a showup
identification procedure. In addition, defense counsel
sought to highlight that V was found with gloves on
and had a backpack with two ‘‘[r]eal’’ knives in it.
The prosecutor attempted to address these alleged
inadequacies on redirect examination. For instance, the
prosecutor elicited testimony from McCullough about
how he did not speak to anyone in the neighborhood
because the incident had happened at approximately
3:48 a.m., no one else was on the street in the victim’s
location at that time, and he did not see any lights
on in the victim’s apartment building. In addition, the
following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor
and McCullough:
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Counsel specifically asked you the
question . . . and when she started her questioning on
that, and she phrased it, ‘you didn’t have a description
of the individuals.’ Do you recall that question?
‘‘[McCullough]: . . . [S]ort of. Yes, sir.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Did you have a description
of the individuals?
‘‘[McCullough]: . . . [A] vague one, yes, sir.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: When you say a ‘vague one,’ what
was the general description you had?
‘‘[McCullough]: . . . [T]wo males with medical
masks with hoods covering their heads, and dark cloth-
ing.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay.
‘‘[McCullough]: . . . [A]nd the physical descrip-
tion, also.
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‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did you have a description of the
individual who put the object to [the victim’s] head, by
the way? . . . Did you have a description of them?
‘‘[McCullough]: A basic description, yes.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: What was that basic description?

‘‘[McCullough]: He described the one as fat and one
as skinny. And the one with the—’’

Before McCullough could finish his response, defense
counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor
argued to the trial court that defense counsel had
opened the door to this inquiry during her questioning
of McCullough on cross-examination. Specifically, the
prosecutor argued: ‘‘Counsel had opened the door
regarding when she specifically asked it . . . that indi-
cating that the officer did not have a description. I
believe that she’s opened the door to that, that I have
a right to ask the officer whether in fact he had a
description.’’

The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, stating:
‘‘I think that’s . . . a fair point. I’ll allow it. The door’s
been opened.’’ The prosecutor then asked McCullough:
‘‘What was the, again, the general description that you
had of the individual that had the object [on the victim]
versus the other individual?’’ McCullough responded:
‘‘[H]e described the one with the weapon as a . . . fat
person.’’ McCullough further testified that, on the basis
of his own observations of the defendant and V, he
would describe V as ‘‘slim’’ and the defendant as ‘‘[h]eav-
ier set than [V].’’

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court
improperly admitted McCullough’s testimony as to the
victim’s statement describing the suspects because
‘‘[the] statement is hearsay within hearsay [for] which
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there are no exceptions.’’27 The defendant contends that
the court abused its discretion in concluding that
defense counsel had opened the door to the admission
of this testimony. Specifically, the defendant contends
that the court’s ruling was based on an ‘‘incorrect recol-
lection’’ of defense counsel’s cross-examination28 and
that ‘‘[d]oor-opening describes a principle of relevance
. . . not a hearsay exception.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The following legal principles and standard of review
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘Generally,
a party who delves into a particular subject during the
examination of a witness cannot object if the opposing
party later questions the witness on the same subject.
. . . The party who initiates discussion on the issue is
said to have opened the door to rebuttal by the opposing
party. Even though the rebuttal evidence would ordi-
narily be inadmissible on other grounds, the court may,
in its discretion, allow it where the party initiating
inquiry has made unfair use of the evidence. . . . This
rule operates to prevent a defendant from successfully
excluding inadmissible prosecution evidence and then
selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for his
own advantage, without allowing the prosecution to
place the evidence in its proper context. . . . The doc-
trine of opening the door cannot, of course, be sub-
verted into a rule for injection of prejudice. . . . The
trial court must carefully consider whether the circum-
stances of the case warrant further inquiry into the
subject matter, and should permit it only to the extent
necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might
otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. . . .
Thus, in making its determination, the trial court should
27
The defendant describes the statement as ‘‘hearsay within hearsay’’
because the victim’s statement was relayed to McCullough through a dis-
patch officer.
28
The defendant does not explain how the trial court’s recollection of
defense counsel’s cross-examination was incorrect.
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balance the harm to the state in restricting the inquiry
with the prejudice suffered by the defendant in allowing
the rebuttal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Brown, 309 Conn. 469, 479, 72 A.3d 48 (2013); see
also State v. Paulino, 223 Conn. 461, 467, 613 A.2d 720
(1992); State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 13–14, 509 A.2d
493 (1986).
‘‘We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s
determination that a party has opened the door to other-
wise inadmissible rebuttal evidence.’’ State v. Brown,
supra, 309 Conn. 479–80. ‘‘Generally, a trial court abuses
its discretion when the court could have chosen differ-
ent alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily
as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper
or irrelevant factors. . . . When this court reviews a
decision of the trial court for abuse of discretion, the
question is not whether any one of us, had we been
sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised our dis-
cretion differently. . . . Rather, our inquiry is limited
to whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. . . . Accordingly, the abuse of discretion
standard reflects the context specific nature of eviden-
tiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by
the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe]
the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise
and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the
potential benefits and harms accompanying the admis-
sion of particular evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Frazier, 181 Conn. App. 1, 23, 185 A.3d
621, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 938, 184 A.3d 268 (2018).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting McCullough’s testimony as to
the victim’s statement because the court properly deter-
mined that defense counsel had opened the door to the
admission of that evidence. In the present case, after
the court excluded the testimony about the victim’s
statement during the state’s direct examination of
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McCullough, defense counsel, during cross-examina-
tion, delved into the subject of what information the
police had about the suspects’ identities. After eliciting
testimony that the victim was the only person who was
at the scene of the robbery and that he did not know
who the robber was, defense counsel implied that the
police did not have an adequate description of the rob-
ber by stating that the victim ‘‘didn’t provide a lot of
description.’’ When McCullough responded that he did
have a ‘‘general description,’’ defense counsel contin-
ued to imply that the police did not have a description
of the individual who had robbed the victim by stating,
‘‘[o]f the car, right?’’ Although McCullough clarified that
he did, in fact, have a description of the individuals
who took the victim’s car, he further testified that he
had only ‘‘[v]ery generic details.’’
Defense counsel’s inquiry and McCullough’s answer
could have left the trial court, as the fact finder, with
the false impression that the police did not have a more
specific description of the individual who had robbed
the victim. See State v. Frazier, supra, 181 Conn. App.
25 (cross-examination opened door to challenged testi-
mony where defense counsel’s inquiry and witness’
response reasonably could have left jury with false
impression). In addition, defense counsel’s subsequent
inquiry about how V was wearing gloves and had knives
in his backpack implied that V, rather than the defen-
dant, had robbed the victim.
The state’s follow-up on redirect examination and
the admission of the victim’s statement through McCul-
lough’s testimony served to remove any unfair prejudice
that might have otherwise ensued from defense coun-
sel’s inquiry on cross-examination. The state’s follow-
up demonstrated that the police had a more specific
physical description of the individuals who were
involved in the robbery and that, from that information,
they could determine that the defendant, rather than
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V, had been the individual who put a weapon to the
back of the victim’s head. As both this court and our
Supreme Court have observed, ‘‘[t]he defendant cannot
reap the benefits of inquiry into one subject and expect
the state’s questioning within the same scope to be held
impermissible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Frazier, supra, 181 Conn. App. 25; see also
State v. Brown, supra, 309 Conn. 482.
Accordingly, even though McCullough’s testimony
would otherwise have been inadmissible under the rule
against hearsay, as the court ruled during the prosecu-
tor’s direct examination, defense counsel’s inquiry
opened the door to the admission of such evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Colon, 71 Conn. App. 217, 234, 800
A.2d 1268 (rejecting defendant’s argument ‘‘that the
doctrine on opening the door is not a recognized hear-
say exception,’’ and concluding, instead, that hearsay
testimony was properly admitted after defendant
opened door to such evidence), cert. denied, 261 Conn.
934, 806 A.2d 1067 (2002); see also State v. Brown,
supra, 309 Conn. 479 (pursuant to doctrine on opening
door, court may permit rebuttal evidence ‘‘[e]ven
though the rebuttal evidence would ordinarily be inad-
missible on other grounds’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to
rebut the evidence adduced by defense counsel regard-
ing the victim’s statement describing the suspects.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.