Faryniarz v. Ramirez

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

JOSEPH FARYNIARZ v. JOSE E. RAMIREZ ET AL.
(AC 47509)
Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff judgment creditor appealed from the trial court’s judgment
granting the defendant judgment debtor’s motion to exempt from execution
certain accounts at a financial institution containing retirement funds. The
plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in crediting as prima facie
evidence a form containing false information that had been executed by
the defendant. Held:
This court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the plaintiff having failed to file his appeal within the seven day appeal
period set forth in the statute (§ 52-367b (i)) governing orders determining
issues raised by a claim of exemption with respect to accounts held by
financial institutions.
Argued May 21—officially released July 29, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and
tried to the court, Stevens, J.; judgment for the plaintiff;
thereafter, the court, J. Welch, J., granted the named
defendant’s motion for exemption from execution, and
the plaintiff appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Robert J. Sullivan, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was
Edward T. Murnane, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jonathan J. Klein, for the appellee (named defen-
dant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Joseph Faryniarz, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court granting the applica-
tion for exemption from execution filed by the defen-
dant Jose E. Ramirez1 pursuant to General Statutes
In the present action, the plaintiff originally named as defendants Jose
1

E. Ramirez, JR Chem, LLC, and JR Chemical, Inc. Only Ramirez, however,
is participating in this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, therefore, we
refer solely to Ramirez as the defendant.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

§§ 52-321a and 52-352b (13).3 On appeal, the plaintiff
2

claims that the court erred (1) as a legal matter, in
interpreting General Statutes § 52-367b (f) (1)4 as creat-
ing a presumption, shifting to a judgment creditor (i.e.,
the plaintiff) the burden of disproving a judgment debt-
or’s (i.e., the defendant’s) claim that accounts at a finan-
cial institution consist of exempt retirement funds and
(2) as a factual matter, in connection with the judgment
2
General Statutes § 52-321a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) . . . [A]ny
interest in or amounts payable to a participant or beneficiary from the
following shall be exempt from the claims of all creditors of such participant
or beneficiary: (A) Any trust, custodial account, annuity or insurance con-
tract established as part of a Keogh plan or a retirement plan established
by a corporation which is qualified under Section 401, 403, 404 or 409 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal
revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended; (B) any
individual retirement account which is qualified under Section 408 of said
internal revenue code to the extent funded, including income and apprecia-
tion, (i) as a roll-over from a qualified retirement plan, as provided in
subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, pursuant to Section 402 (a) (5), 403
(a) or 408 (d) (3) of said internal revenue code, or (ii) by annual contributions
which do not exceed the maximum annual limits set forth in Section 219
(b) of said internal revenue code, determined without regard to any reduction
or limitation for active participants required by Section 219 (g) of said
internal revenue code; (C) (i) any simple retirement account established
and funded pursuant to Section 408 (p) of said internal revenue code, (ii)
any simple plan established and funded pursuant to Section 401 (k) (11) of
said internal revenue code, [or] (iii) any Roth IRA established and funded
pursuant to Section 408A of said internal revenue code . . . .’’
3
General Statutes § 52-352b (13) provides that ‘‘[a]ny assets or interests
of an exemptioner in, or payments received by the exemptioner from, a
plan or arrangement described in section 52-321a’’ are exempt from any
form of process or court order for the purpose of debt collection.
4
General Statutes § 52-367b (f) (1) provides: ‘‘Upon receipt of an exemp-
tion claim form or a secured party claim notice, the clerk of the court shall
enter the appearance of the judgment debtor or such secured party with
the address set forth in the exemption claim form or secured party claim
notice. The clerk shall forthwith send file-stamped copies of the exemption
claim form or secured party claim notice to the judgment creditor and
judgment debtor with a notice stating that the disputed funds are being held
for forty-five days from the date the exemption claim form or secured party
claim notice was received by the financial institution or until a court order
is entered regarding the disposition of the funds, whichever occurs earlier,
and the clerk shall promptly schedule the matter for a hearing. The claim
of exemption filed by such judgment debtor shall be prima facie evidence
at such hearing of the existence of the exemption.’’
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

debtor’s claim that certain accounts contained exempt
retirement funds, in crediting as prima facie evidence
a form containing false information that had been exe-
cuted by the defendant. We do not reach the merits of
the plaintiff’s claims, however, because this appeal was
not filed within the seven day appeal period provided
by § 52-367b (i),5 and, accordingly, we dismiss this
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. On October 28, 2016, the plain-
tiff commenced the underlying action against the defen-
dant. In his complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims for,
inter alia, breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrich-
ment, fraud, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq. On March 1, 2017, the defendant filed the
operative answer and special defenses, to which the
plaintiff filed a reply on March 31, 2017.
The court, Stevens, J., bifurcated the liability and
damages phases of the trial. On May 15 and 16, 2018,
the court heard evidence as to liability. The court admit-
ted into evidence several exhibits in full and heard
testimony from several witnesses. With respect to liabil-
ity, the court issued a memorandum of decision on
February 25, 2019, wherein it found in favor of the
plaintiff on his breach of contract (relating to a royalty
and licensing payments contract), fraudulent represen-
tation, and CUTPA claims. On December 24, 2019, fol-
lowing additional evidence on the issue of damages,
General Statutes § 52-367b (i) provides that, following a hearing on a
5

claim of exemption, ‘‘[t]he court . . . shall enter an order determining the
issues raised by the claim of exemption and claim by a secured party of a
prior perfected security interest in such deposit account. The clerk of the
court shall forthwith send a copy of such order to the financial institution.
Such order shall be deemed to be a final judgment for the purposes of
appeal. No appeal shall be taken except within seven days of the rendering
of the order. The order of the court may be implemented during such seven-
day period, unless stayed by the court.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

the court issued a memorandum of decision awarding
$908,224 in damages to the plaintiff.
On June 9, 2022, the defendant filed a claim for
exemption from execution, pursuant to §§ 52-321a and
52-352b (13), with respect to two of his accounts that
were held by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. (Merrill Lynch).6 The two accounts at issue ended
in 2336 and 9L40. On August 10, 2022, the plaintiff filed
an objection to the defendant’s claim of exemption. On
September 21, 2023, and January 30, 2024, the court, J.
Welch, J., heard argument from the parties’ respective
counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether the accounts held by Merrill Lynch were
retirement accounts that were exempt from execution.
Thereafter, the plaintiff and the defendant filed supple-
mental briefs.
On March 8, 2024, the court rendered its order grant-
ing the defendant’s claim of exemption. Specifically,
the court held ‘‘(1) that the restricted accounts with
account numbers ending in 2336 [and] 9L40 are exempt
accounts pursuant to §§ 52-352b (13) and 52-321a; (2)
that the funds in those accounts are exempt funds; and
(3) that there is insufficient evidence to rebut the prima
facie evidence that the claimed exemption exists that
is afforded by [the aforementioned] statutes.’’
On April 1, 2024, the plaintiff filed this appeal. On
May 7, 2025, prior to oral argument, we ordered, sua
sponte, the parties ‘‘to file supplemental memoranda of
no more than 1500 words on or before May 19, 2025,
addressing whether the plaintiff’s appeal from the trial
6
The defendant also indicated on the exemption claim form that certain
accounts held by Merrill Lynch were exempt from execution pursuant to
§ 52-352b (7), which provides that ‘‘[w]orkers’ compensation, Social Security,
veterans and unemployment benefits’’ are exempt from any form of process
or court order for the purpose of debt collection. The defendant subsequently
withdrew his claim under § 52-352b (7).
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

court’s granting of the defendant’s exemption from exe-
cution should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the appeal was not filed within the
seven day appeal period set forth in . . . § 52-367b (i).
See, e.g., Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc.,
226 Conn. 757, 767, [628 A.2d 1303] (1993) (seven day
time limit to appeal set forth in General Statutes § 52-
278l is jurisdictional).’’
On May 19, 2025, both parties submitted supplemen-
tal briefs in accordance with our order. In the plaintiff’s
supplemental brief, he argues that this court does not
lack subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the seven
day appeal period set forth in § 52-367b does not apply
to the present case, and (2) even if it were to apply, the
present case is distinguishable from Ambroise because,
contrary to § 52-278l, § 52-367b does not clearly mani-
fest an intent to make the stated time constraint manda-
tory and not waivable.7 In his supplemental brief, the
defendant relies on Ambroise in arguing that this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the language
of § 52-367b (i) is ‘‘clear and emphatic,’’ and, therefore,
the time limit therein was likewise intended to be sub-
ject matter jurisdictional.
As a threshold matter, we observe that the appeal
period set forth in § 52-367b (i) applies in the present
case. Section 52-367b (i) provides: ‘‘The court, after a
hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (f) of this
section, shall enter an order determining the issues
raised by the claim of exemption and claim by a secured
party of a prior perfected security interest in such
deposit account. The clerk of the court shall forthwith
send a copy of such order to the financial institution.
7
The plaintiff also contends that the seven day appeal period set forth
in § 52-367b violates his right to due process under the Connecticut constitu-
tion and the United States constitution. We decline to address this claim,
however, as it is inadequately briefed. See Spinnato v. Boyd, 231 Conn.
App. 460, 480–81, 333 A.3d 818 (2025).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

Such order shall be deemed to be a final judgment for
the purposes of appeal. No appeal shall be taken except
within seven days of the rendering of the order. The
order of the court may be implemented during such
seven-day period, unless stayed by the court.’’ The plain-
tiff makes no meaningful attempt to explain why this
statutory provision does not apply, and his cursory sug-
gestion that it does not apply warrants no discussion.

The crux of the issue before us is whether the appeal
period set forth in § 52-367b (i) is subject matter juris-
dictional. Our analysis is largely guided by Ambroise
v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra, 226 Conn.
757, in which our Supreme Court held that certain statu-
tory time limits on the right to appeal are subject matter
jurisdictional. Id., 767. Ambroise concerned § 52-278l,
which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]n order . . .
granting or denying a prejudgment remedy following a
hearing . . . shall be deemed a final judgment for pur-
poses of appeal. . . . No such appeal shall be taken
except within seven days of the rendering of the order
from which the appeal is to be taken. . . .’’ See
Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra,
758. The court in Ambroise stated that ‘‘the proper
analysis of a statutory time limitation on the right to
appeal devolves into a question of statutory construc-
tion: did the legislature, in imposing the time limitation,
intend to impose a subject matter jurisdictional require-
ment on the right to appeal? We approach this question
according to well established principles of statutory
construction designed to further our fundamental
objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the appar-
ent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern
that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself,
to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter. . . .

‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court
to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong. . . . Furthermore,
taking into account the established principle that every
presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction
. . . we require a strong showing of a legislative intent
to create a time limitation that, in the event of noncom-
pliance, acts as a subject matter jurisdictional bar.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 764–65.

The court ultimately held that ‘‘[t]he failure to take
an appeal within the time constraints of § 52-278l results
in an absence of subject matter jurisdiction that cannot
be waived by the parties or by the court’’ and, accord-
ingly, dismissed the subject appeal. Id., 767. In coming
to this conclusion, the court emphasized, inter alia, that
the language of § 52-278l is ‘‘clear and emphatic’’ and
‘‘contains a statutory time period for taking an appeal
with regard to a statutory remedy that has no common
law counterpart.’’ Id., 765–66. The court also noted that
‘‘the manifest purpose of § 52-278l (b) is to permit the
parties to know within a very brief period of time
whether the order is final or is going to be challenged
on appeal,’’ and ‘‘[a] holding that the time period is
discretionary and therefore can be waived would under-
mine that legislative purpose.’’ Id., 767.

Relying on Ambroise, this court previously has deter-
mined that other statutes employing language similar
to § 52-278l also impose jurisdictional time constraints
on an appeal. See, e.g., Burke Construction, Inc. v.
Smith, 41 Conn. App. 737, 742, 677 A.2d 15 (1996) (hold-
ing that seven day appeal period in General Statutes
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

§ 49-35c (b) is mandatory and failure to appeal within
8

that period strips this court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion); Srager v. Koenig, 36 Conn. App. 469, 471, 651
A.2d 752 (1994) (holding that failure to appeal within
seven day appeal period set forth in General Statutes
§ 52-325c (b)9 deprives this court of subject matter juris-
diction because, inter alia, ‘‘[t]he language of § 52-325c
(b) is clear and is virtually the same as the language of
§ 52-278l (b), which the Supreme Court held to impose
such a jurisdictional requirement’’).
In the present case, § 52-367b (i) has virtually the
same language as the statutes at issue in Ambroise,
Burke Construction, Inc., and Srager. See footnotes 5,
8 and 9 of this opinion. Moreover, the seven day appeal
period set forth in § 52-367b (i) is written in ‘‘clear and
emphatic’’ terms and governs an appeal with regard to a
statutory remedy that has no common-law counterpart.
See Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., supra,
226 Conn. 765. We also note that, as was the case in
Ambroise, a holding in the present case that the time
period is discretionary and therefore can be waived
would undermine the legislative purpose that is appar-
ent from the legislature’s inclusion of a very brief appeal
period in § 52-367b (i). See id., 767. Thus, the legislature,
in imposing the time limitation set forth in § 52-367b
(i), manifested an intent to impose a subject matter
jurisdictional requirement on the right to appeal.
We conclude that, pursuant to § 52-367b (i), the plain-
tiff had seven days from the rendering of the court’s
March 8, 2024 order to appeal to this court and, there-
fore, the plaintiff’s appeal on April 1, 2024, was not
8
General Statutes § 49-35c (b) pertains to orders on applications to reduce
or discharge mechanic’s liens and provides in relevant part: ‘‘No appeal may
be taken from the order except within seven days thereof. . . .’’
9
General Statutes § 52-325c (b) pertains to orders on applications to
discharge notices of lis pendens and provides in relevant part: ‘‘No appeal
shall be taken from such order except within seven days thereof. . . .’’
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Faryniarz v. Ramirez

timely filed. Accordingly, we lack subject matter juris-
diction over the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.