Mathews v. Mathews

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Mathews v. Mathews

WALDEN H. MATHEWS v. SUSAN M. MATHEWS
(AC 47372)
Elgo, Moll and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis-
solved, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his postdissolu-
tion motion for contempt and granting the defendant’s postdissolution
motion for contempt. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied
his motion because the defendant prevented him from retrieving certain of
his property from the marital residence and wilfully violated court orders
by disposing of that property. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s postdisso-
lution motion for contempt with respect to his claim that the defendant
violated the court’s order to provide him access to the marital residence to
retrieve his personal property, as the court’s property distribution orders
were ambiguous as to whether the property at issue belonged to the plaintiff,
and the record demonstrated that a dispute existed between the parties as
to the ownership of that property.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s postdisso-
lution motion for contempt with respect to his claim that the defendant
violated the court’s property distribution orders, as the court reasonably
could have found, on the basis of the evidence adduced at the evidentiary
hearing on the motion, that the defendant did not wilfully violate the court’s
orders when she disposed of the property at issue for no value after having
offered the plaintiff the opportunity to retrieve that property.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s
postdissolution motion for contempt, as evidence in the record substantiated
the court’s finding that the plaintiff wilfully ignored the court’s escrow order
requiring him to pay $15,000 to the defendant’s counsel on or before a
specified date.

Argued February 19—officially released May 13, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, and tried to the court, Heller,
J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting cer-
tain other relief; thereafter, the court, Vizcarrondo, J.,
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Mathews v. Mathews

rendered judgment granting the defendant’s postjudg-
ment motion for contempt and denying the plaintiff’s
postjudgment motion for contempt, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Walden H. Mathews, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. In this postdissolution matter, the self-repre-
sented plaintiff, Walden H. Mathews, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court granting the motion for con-
tempt filed by the defendant, Susan M. Mathews, and
denying the motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
(1) denied his motion for contempt regarding the dispo-
sition of personal property located in the basement of
the marital residence and (2) granted the defendant’s
motion for contempt regarding a court order that obli-
gated him to escrow $15,000 with the defendant’s coun-
sel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following undisputed facts.
The parties married in 1990, and three children were
born of the marriage. Following the subsequent break-
down of the marriage, the plaintiff commenced a disso-
lution action in 2017. In response, the defendant filed
an answer and a cross complaint, and an eight day
trial followed. On March 20, 2020, the court rendered
judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, finding that
it had broken down irretrievably.
As part of the judgment of dissolution, the court made
numerous factual findings and entered various orders.
The court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had not
paid alimony to the defendant during the pendency of
the dissolution action and awarded the defendant lump
sum alimony in the amount of $90,000. With respect to
that award, the court ordered the plaintiff to make three
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payments of $30,000 to the defendant on or before April
15, May 15 and June 15, 2020.1
The court also found that the marital estate contained
two properties. The court found that the plaintiff had
inherited a cottage on a lake in Acton, Maine years
earlier, which had a fair market value of $450,000. In
its property distribution orders, the court awarded the
plaintiff ‘‘ownership of the Maine property, free and
clear of any claim by the defendant.’’
With respect to the parties’ marital residence on Cove
Avenue in Norwalk, the court found that it was an
‘‘antique Victorian home’’ that had undergone various
renovations which, at the time of trial, had not been
completed. In light of those ‘‘unfinished interior renova-
tions,’’ the court found that the property had a fair
market value of $675,000. The court also found that the
property was encumbered by a $290,000 mortgage. The
court ordered the sale of the Cove Avenue property
and stated in relevant part that ‘‘the sale proceeds shall
first be applied to pay in full the following: the mortgage,
real estate commissions, and other normal and custom-
ary closing costs. The remaining sale proceeds shall be
paid to the defendant.’’
As the court noted, the parties ‘‘agreed that it will
cost approximately $30,000 to complete the repairs and
improvements to the [Cove Avenue] property . . .
before [it] can be sold. Each party has also agreed to
contribute $15,000 toward the cost of the repairs and
improvements [required] to enhance its marketability.’’
1
When the plaintiff failed to make the alimony payment due on April 15,
2020, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for contempt on April 27,
2020. While that motion was pending, the plaintiff filed an appeal challenging
the propriety of the court’s March 20, 2020 judgment of dissolution. This
court dismissed that appeal as untimely on September 16, 2020. On Septem-
ber 21, 2020, the plaintiff paid his alimony obligation to the defendant in
full. In light of that payment, the court denied the defendant’s April 27, 2020
motion for contempt. That motion for contempt is not at issue in this appeal.
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The court thus ordered each party to ‘‘send $15,000 to
counsel for the defendant . . . to be held in escrow
pending the work on the Cove Avenue property.’’ The
court awarded the defendant ‘‘exclusive possession of
the Cove Avenue property until the closing of the sale
of the property’’ and further ordered that ‘‘[t]he parties
shall agree upon reasonable dates and times for the
plaintiff to have access to the Cove Avenue property
to remove his personal property.’’
In its property distribution orders, the court awarded
each of the parties certain property.2 With respect to
personal property generally, the court stated in relevant
part: ‘‘Each party is awarded his or her own clothing,
jewelry, and personal items such as photographs,
books, and memorabilia. . . . The parties shall divide
all . . . other personal property in the Cove Avenue
property to their mutual satisfaction on or before April
15, 2020. This date may be extended to and including
the closing date of the sale of the Cove Avenue property
in the event that the listing broker recommends that
certain furniture and furnishings remain in the Cove
Avenue property to facilitate its sale. If the parties are
not able to agree on the disposition of specific items,
those items shall be sold at fair market value on or
before the closing date. . . . [T]he net proceeds of such
sale shall be shared equally between the parties.’’
(Emphasis added.)
On October 29, 2020, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment
motion for contempt, in which he alleged, inter alia, that
the defendant had not allowed him to retrieve ‘‘tools
and other belongings situated in the basement of the
Cove Avenue property’’ when he visited the property
on September 11, 2020. One week later, the defendant
2
For example, the court awarded the plaintiff ‘‘the contents of the Maine
property’’ and awarded the defendant a Boston Whaler boat and trailer ‘‘free
and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.’’
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filed a motion for contempt that was predicated, in part,
on the plaintiff’s failure to make the $15,000 escrow
payment to her legal counsel for repairs to the Cove
Avenue property, as ordered by the court.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the parties’
respective motions for contempt on February 7, 2023.3
The court thereafter issued separate orders on those
motions on June 7, 2023. With respect to the defendant’s
motion for contempt, the court found that the order
requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s counsel
$15,000 on or before April 15, 2020, for home repairs
to the Cove Avenue property was clear and unambigu-
ous. The court further found that the plaintiff had not
complied with that order, stating in relevant part:
‘‘There is no dispute that the requisite funds were not
tendered to [the defendant’s counsel]. The plaintiff testi-
fied that he instead paid the defendant $8000 directly,
rather than through counsel, as ordered.’’ The court
thus concluded that the defendant had demonstrated
wilful noncompliance on the part of the plaintiff and
ordered further proceedings ‘‘to properly determine (1)
the cost of repairs actually expended by the defendant,
(2) the attorney’s fees expended in prosecuting the
defendant’s motion, and (3) the appropriateness of stat-
utory interest on any loss amount.’’
In its separate order on the plaintiff’s motion for
contempt, the court found that the order in question
was ‘‘not clear and unambiguous as to what constituted
the plaintiff’s personal property.’’ The court further
3
On April 5, 2023, the plaintiff filed what he titled a ‘‘supplemental motion
for contempt,’’ to which he appended copies of email communications
between the parties and a detailed list of what he characterized as ‘‘personal
belongings not retrieved’’ from the Cove Avenue property and their pur-
ported values. None of those documents was offered or admitted into evi-
dence at the February 7, 2023 evidentiary hearing, and there is no indication
in the court’s June 7, 2023 orders that the court considered them in any
manner in acting on the parties’ motions for contempt.
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found that the plaintiff had not established wilful non-
compliance on the part of the defendant and denied
the motion for contempt. The plaintiff thereafter filed
motions for reconsideration of both contempt rulings,
which the court denied, and this appeal followed.4
As a preliminary matter, we note certain principles
relevant to this appeal. ‘‘[C]ivil contempt is committed
when a person violates an order of court which requires
that person in specific and definite language to do or
refrain from doing an act or series of acts. . . . To
constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party has
merely violated a court order; the violation must be
wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an
order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the
alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful
noncompliance with that directive. . . . The question
of whether the underlying order is clear and unambigu-
ous is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . .
If we answer that question affirmatively, we then review
the trial court’s determination that the violation was
wilful under the abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Puff
v. Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 364–66, 222 A.3d 493 (2020); see
also Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 336, 915 A.2d 790
(2007) (‘‘the abuse of discretion standard applies to a
trial court’s decision on a motion for contempt’’).
I
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly denied his motion for contempt. His claim is two-
fold in nature. The plaintiff first alleges that the defen-
dant improperly precluded him from retrieving tools
4
The defendant appeared, but has not participated, in this appeal. Because
she did not file an appellate brief, we ordered that the appeal shall be
considered on the basis of the plaintiff’s brief, oral argument, and the record.
See, e.g., Ammar I. v. Evelyn W., 227 Conn. App. 827, 830 n.2, 323 A.3d
1111 (2024).
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and other equipment that belonged to him from the
basement of the Cove Avenue property. He then argues
that the defendant wilfully violated the court’s property
distribution orders by disposing of that property. We
disagree with both contentions.

A

We begin with the question of whether the tools and
equipment in the basement of the Cove Avenue property
constitute personal property awarded to the plaintiff
under the terms of the dissolution judgement. In that
judgment, the court ordered in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he
parties shall agree upon reasonable dates and times for
the plaintiff to have access to the Cove Avenue property
to remove his personal property.’’ At the same time,
the court’s orders regarding personal property are
ambiguous as to whether the tools and equipment at
issue were, in fact, the personal property of the plaintiff.
Although the court specifically awarded the plaintiff
other property; see footnote 2 of this opinion; it made
no mention of tools or equipment located in the base-
ment of the Cove Avenue property.

Moreover, the court’s property distribution orders
expressly contemplate the sale of any items of personal
property located in the Cove Avenue property that the
parties could not amicably divide. The court ordered:
‘‘Each party is awarded his or her own clothing, jewelry,
and personal items such as photographs, books, and
memorabilia. . . . The parties shall divide all . . .
other personal property in the Cove Avenue property
to their mutual satisfaction . . . . If the parties are not
able to agree on the disposition of specific items, those
items shall be sold at fair market value on or before
the closing date. . . . [T]he net proceeds of such sale
shall be shared equally between the parties.’’
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At the February 7, 2023 evidentiary hearing, the defen-
dant testified that the tools and equipment in the base-
ment ‘‘were purchased with joint funds’’ during the par-
ties’ marriage and opined that ‘‘that machinery was
jointly owned.’’ For that reason, the defendant testified
that she told the plaintiff that ‘‘he could retrieve all of his
personal belongings’’ from the Cove Avenue property
on September 11, 2020, and that, ‘‘after he retrieved his
personal belongings,’’ the parties then ‘‘could go into
the basement and discuss’’ how the tools ‘‘would be
disposed of.’’ In its order on the plaintiff’s motion for
contempt, the court credited the defendant’s testimony
and found that she ‘‘reasonably believed that the items
in the basement, particularly valuable tools, were not
the plaintiff’s ‘personal property,’ but marital assets in
which she had at least some financial interest.’’ More-
over, the record indicates, and the plaintiff does not
dispute, that the defendant allowed the plaintiff to
retrieve other personal belongings from his office in
the Cove Avenue property over the course of several
hours on September 11, 2020, as well as a toolbox from
the basement that had belonged to his father. In light
of that evidence, the court found that the defendant’s
‘‘objection to surrendering’’ the tools and equipment in
the basement had been asserted in good faith.
We conclude that the court’s property distribution
orders are ambiguous as to whether the tools and equip-
ment at issue were, in fact, the personal property of
the plaintiff. Moreover, the record demonstrates that a
dispute existed between the parties as to ownership of
the tools and equipment in question. For that reason,
the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant violated
the court’s order to provide him access to the Cove
Avenue property to remove ‘‘his personal property’’ is
unavailing.
B
The plaintiff also claims that the defendant wilfully
violated the court’s orders by disposing of the tools
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and equipment from the basement of the Cove Avenue
property. We do not agree.
In its property distribution orders, the court specifi-
cally contemplated the scenario in which the parties
could not agree on the division of personal property
located in the marital residence and ordered as follows:
‘‘The parties shall divide all . . . other personal prop-
erty in the Cove Avenue property to their mutual satis-
faction . . . . If the parties are not able to agree on
the disposition of specific items, those items shall be
sold at fair market value on or before the closing date.
. . . [T]he net proceeds of such sale shall be shared
equally between the parties.’’ Because the parties did
not reach an agreement on how to divide the tools
and equipment in the basement of the Cove Avenue
property, they were required, pursuant to the clear and
unambiguous language of that order, to sell those items
at fair market value and share the proceeds equally.
Accordingly, the first prong of the legal standard that
governs our review of a contempt ruling is satisfied. See
In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).
The question, then, is whether the court abused its
discretion in concluding that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished wilful noncompliance on the part of the defen-
dant with respect to that order. In considering that
question, we are mindful that ‘‘[a] court may not find
a person in contempt without considering the circum-
stances surrounding the violation to determine whether
such violation was wilful. . . . [A] contempt finding is
not automatic and depends on the facts and circum-
stances underlying it. . . . [I]t is well settled that the
inability of [a] defendant to obey an order of the court,
without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge
of contempt . . . . The contemnor must establish that
he cannot comply, or was unable to do so. . . . It is
[then] within the sound discretion of the court to deny
a claim of contempt when there is an adequate factual
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basis to explain the failure.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Scalora v. Scalora, 189 Conn. App. 703, 727,
209 A.3d 1 (2019).
In denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the
court made a number of factual findings relevant to the
plaintiff’s claim. The court found that ‘‘the defendant
reasonably believed that the items in the basement . . .
were not the plaintiff’s ‘personal property,’ but marital
assets in which she had at least some financial interest.’’
The court further found that the defendant had asserted
a good faith objection to surrendering the tools and
equipment in the basement when the plaintiff visited
the Cove Avenue property on September 11, 2020.
Following the filing of the plaintiff’s October 29, 2020
motion for contempt, the tools and equipment at issue
remained on the Cove Avenue property. The court
found that, in the fall of 2021, as the Cove Avenue
property ‘‘was being prepared for sale, the defendant
invited the plaintiff to retrieve the tools [and other
equipment from the basement]. She testified credibly
that she had by that point abandoned any claim to
the disputed items and simply wanted them removed.’’
Those factual findings are supported by the evidence
in the record and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous.
See, e.g., Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn. 457, 464,
165 A.3d 1124 (2017). Moreover, we cannot disturb the
court’s credibility determination with respect to the
defendant’s testimony. See, e.g., N. R. v. M. P., 227
Conn. App. 698, 730, 323 A.3d 1142 (2024) (appellate
courts must defer to trier of fact’s assessment of credi-
bility). At the February 7, 2023 evidentiary hearing, the
plaintiff acknowledged that the defendant had offered
him the opportunity to retrieve the tools and equipment
in the basement in the fall of 2021 and testified that he
declined to do so.
In addition, the court found that the tools and equip-
ment ‘‘were ultimately disposed of in October, 2021, by
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workmen clearing out the basement’’ in preparation
for the sale of the Cove Avenue property and that the
defendant ‘‘obtained no value for them.’’ Those findings,
too, are substantiated by the defendant’s testimony at
the evidentiary hearing, which the court, as trier of fact,
was entitled to credit.5 See, e.g., Kammili v. Kammili,
197 Conn. App. 656, 672, 232 A.3d 102 (‘‘the [trial] court,
as the trier of fact and thus the sole arbiter of credibility,
[is] free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the
testimony offered by either party’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 947, 238 A.3d
18 (2020).
In reviewing a court’s contempt ruling, ‘‘[t]his court
will not disturb the trial court’s orders unless it has
5
At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant testified that, in the fall of
2021, she told the plaintiff that ‘‘he could . . . keep everything if he just
wanted to come and move it out, and just leave the basement clean, and
he declined my request. He said that he no longer wanted anything, and so
I don’t see how he can be claiming . . . any money from me because I did
give him [the] opportunity to come and get his things [from the basement].’’
In response, the court noted that the property distribution orders required
the parties to sell any disputed items from the Cove Avenue property and
inquired as to whether the tools and equipment in the basement had been
sold. The defendant then testified: ‘‘[W]hen [the plaintiff] said that he didn’t
want any of the equipment, I contacted . . . a contractor who recently
moved in across the street . . . . I asked him to come over to evaluate the
equipment and the value of the equipment. And to see if he was interested
or anybody in . . . his industry would be interested in purchasing the equip-
ment. He went over all of the tools [in the basement] and he said that they
were so outdated that there was really no value to them. . . . [A]fter speak-
ing to some of his colleagues [he confirmed] that they weren’t really worth
very much. He said . . . that the best I could do was to actually trade the
work of . . . removing them from the house for payment to just removing
them from the house. So, actually, I didn’t make any money. I didn’t sell
them. I didn’t make any money from them. If I had made money, I would
have shared it with [the plaintiff]. But . . . I did offer this to [the plaintiff]
to come and take it all away if you wanted first. I offered him to first to
take it all away and just have it. Just take it, take it all out and to just leave
[the] basement broom clean, that’s all I asked and [the plaintiff] declined,
so that’s what I did. I found somebody to take all of the equipment out of
the house, and leave the basement broom clean, and I did not make one
dime from any of that.’’
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abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reason-
able basis in fact. . . . It is within the province of the
trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences
from the evidence presented. . . . [E]very reasonable
presumption will be given in favor of the trial court’s
ruling, and [n]othing short of a conviction that the
action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear
abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brody v. Brody,
145 Conn. App. 654, 662, 77 A.3d 156 (2013). Applying
that deferential standard of review, we conclude that
the court reasonably could have found, on the basis of
the evidence adduced at the February 7, 2023 hearing,
that the defendant did not wilfully violate the court’s
property distribution orders when she disposed of the
tools and equipment in the basement for no value in
the fall of 2021. Accordingly, the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for con-
tempt.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s November 4, 2020 motion for
contempt regarding a court order that obligated him
to escrow $15,000 with the defendant’s counsel.6 We
disagree.
6
The plaintiff alternatively argues that the court improperly granted the
motion for contempt because the defendant ‘‘has unclean hands.’’ In his
April 6, 2021 objection to the defendant’s motion for contempt, the plaintiff
alleged, in a single sentence, that, ‘‘[a]s of September 25, 2020, the defendant
had not funded her share of the ‘escrow,’ and so the ‘clean hands’ doctrine
applies.’’ The court never ruled on that objection and neither the doctrine
of unclean hands nor the issue of the defendant’s compliance with the
escrow order were raised at the February 7, 2023 evidentiary hearing on
the defendant’s motion for contempt. The court likewise did not address
the issue of unclean hands or make any factual findings with respect thereto
in its June 7, 2023 order granting the defendant’s motion for contempt. The
plaintiff thereafter did not seek an articulation of that judgment, rendering
the record inadequate for review. See Rissolo v. Betts Island Oyster Farms,
LLC, 117 Conn. App. 344, 359, 979 A.2d 534 (2009) (record was inadequate
to review special defense of unclean hands ‘‘[b]ecause the court’s [ruling]
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In its March 20, 2020 judgment of dissolution, the
court found that the Cove Avenue property had various
unfinished renovations. The court also noted that the
parties had ‘‘agreed that it will cost approximately
$30,000 to complete the repairs and improvements to
the [Cove Avenue] property . . . before [it] can be
sold. Each party has also agreed to contribute $15,000
toward the cost of the repairs and improvements
[required] to enhance its marketability.’’ The court thus
ordered that, ‘‘[o]n or before April 15, 2020, the plaintiff
and the defendant shall each send $15,000 to counsel
for the defendant . . . to be held in escrow pending
the work on the Cove Avenue property.’’
That court order clearly and unambiguously required
the plaintiff to tender payment of $15,000 to the defen-
dant’s counsel on or before April 15, 2020. It is undis-
puted that the plaintiff did not do so. At the February
7, 2023 evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff testified that
he had declined to make any payment to the defendant’s
counsel because he believed that the court’s escrow
order was improper, arguing that the defendant’s coun-
sel did not qualify as an escrow agent under Connecticut
law.7 At that hearing, the following colloquy occurred
between the court and the plaintiff:
is devoid of any findings or analysis on the issue, and because the petitioner
did not seek an articulation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). We there-
fore decline to review that ancillary contention.
7
At the February 7, 2023 hearing, the plaintiff testified that, in his view,
‘‘there [is] a jurisdiction problem with [the escrow] order as written, and
it’s seeded in [contract] law. And the actual definition of escrow, and escrow
agreement, and a bona fide escrow agent for which [the defendant’s counsel]
does not qualify according to the terms of those laws.’’
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff elaborated on the basis of his objection
to the court’s escrow order, stating in relevant part: ‘‘[The escrow order]
did not adequately define the responsibilities of the escrow agent, and thus
did not adequately protect his interest in making sure that the escrowed
funds were actually spent on the repair of the [Cove Avenue property]. . . .
[The escrow order] does not require the escrow agent to maintain any
records regarding (1) how much money she has received from the parties,
or (2) how much money the defendant has actually spent on repairs and
improvements for the property. Nor does the [escrow order] require the
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‘‘The Court: [Y]ou didn’t have—you simply disagreed
with the [propriety of the escrow] order, correct, you
didn’t have a misunderstanding as to what it meant?
‘‘[The Plaintiff]: [T]hat is correct. I believe that [the
trial court lacked] the authority to force me into what
is effectively a private contract with someone under
terms that I had no control over.’’
The plaintiff also testified that his claim that the trial
court lacked authority to enter the escrow order ‘‘was
part of . . . the appeal that [he] filed in July of 2020.’’
The record indicates that this court dismissed that
appeal in September, 2020. Following that dismissal, the
plaintiff did not make the payment required pursuant
to the court’s escrow order, as he did with respect to
the court’s alimony order. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
Instead, the plaintiff paid $8000 to the defendant
directly after she filed her November 4, 2020 motion
for contempt and declined to make further payment
unless the defendant presented him with invoices for
the repair work performed on the Cove Avenue prop-
erty.8
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the evi-
dence in the record substantiates the court’s finding
escrow agent to show such records to the plaintiff upon request, or at any
time. . . . In addition, the March 20 order does not include any instructions
to the escrow agent regarding whether, or when, she is required to return
any excess funds to the plaintiff. The consequences of this omission are
obvious: the escrow agent, who is the defendant’s attorney . . . could sim-
ply retain any excess funds immediately, causing substantial harm to the
plaintiff.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff also asserted, without citation
to any legal authority, that ‘‘Connecticut law [does not] recognize an escrow
agreement in which a party both deposits and receives the same asset as
a valid escrow agreement.’’
8
Although the plaintiff filed a motion to modify the escrow order in March,
2021, he withdrew that motion prior to the hearing on the defendant’s
motion for contempt. Moreover, in that motion, the plaintiff did not raise
any objection regarding the propriety of the escrow order or the legality of
the defendant’s counsel acting as an escrow agent; he simply requested that
the escrow order be amended to prevent him from ‘‘losing any unspent
funds.’’
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Mathews v. Mathews

that the plaintiff wilfully ignored the court’s escrow
order that required him to pay $15,000 to the defendant’s
counsel on or before April 15, 2020. The court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s
motion for contempt.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.