Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

FRANCESCA PELC v. SOUTHINGTON DENTAL
ASSOCIATES, P.C., ET AL.
(AC 46781)
Moll, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The law firm L Co. appealed from the judgment of the Compensation Review
Board affirming the decision of the administrative law judge denying L Co.’s
motions to dismiss and to stay proceedings in an attorney’s fee dispute. In
2016, L Co., which had represented the claimant in the underlying workers’
compensation claim from 2007 to 2018, had an arrangement approved by
the workers’ compensation commissioner by which the employer’s workers’
compensation insurer would send the claimant’s weekly benefits checks,
and any other workers’ compensation benefits to which she was entitled,
to L Co. so that L Co. could deduct an attorney’s fee from the checks. In
2018, the claimant dismissed L Co. and retained the law firm W Co. In 2019,
as part of a full and final settlement of the underlying workers’ compensation
claim, the workers’ compensation commissioner approved a lump sum attor-
ney’s fee, which he ordered W Co. to hold in escrow pending an agreement
on the allocation of the fee between L Co. and W Co. On appeal, L Co.
claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the administrative
law judge’s conclusion that L Co., with regard to the 2016 arrangement,
lacked an enforceable award of attorney’s fees pursuant to statute (§ 31-
327 (a)). Held:

This court dismissed the appeal as nonjusticiable for lack of ripeness with
respect to L Co.’s claim that the board improperly affirmed the administrative
law judge’s conclusion that the statute (§ 1-84b (b)) governing certain activi-
ties of public officials or state employees after leaving office or employment
could not serve as a basis for denying W Co.’s claim for attorney’s fees
because, as W Co.’s receipt of some portion of the attorney’s fee held in
escrow may never interfere with L Co.’s cognizable legal interest in its own
fee, any injury to L Co. resulting from a determination regarding W Co.’s
entitlement to a fee was purely hypothetical.

The board did not improperly reject L Co.’s contention that the 2016 fee
approval constituted an award of attorney’s fees subject to enforcement in
the Superior Court pursuant to § 31-327 (a) because the transfer of funds
contemplated by the 2016 fee approval flowed directly from the claimant
to her attorneys and was not a fee to be paid by an employer or insurer,
as required by § 31-327 (a).

L Co.’s claim that the administrative law judge’s authority to modify the
2016 fee approval was limited by statute (§ 31-315) was unavailing, as § 31-
315 does not address attorney’s fees and the proposition found no support
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.
in the unambiguous statutory text of or in this court’s case law interpreting
§ 31-327 (b), which gives administrative law judges broad power over attor-
ney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases.

L Co.’s claim that the entire Workers’ Compensation Commission should
have disqualified itself from the present case was foreclosed by the doctrine
of necessity, as this court has held that the adjudication of fee disputes
between successive counsel concerning their representation of a claimant
before the commission rests squarely within the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion and disqualification of the entire commission would destroy the only
tribunal in which relief could be had.

The board did not improperly overlook the administrative law judge’s alleged
violation of L Co.’s due process right to be heard because, even assuming
arguendo that the administrative law judge’s decision to mark all of the
parties’ exhibits for identification only and to base his ruling solely on the
items of which he had taken administrative notice violated due process,
any error was harmless.
Argued January 13—officially released May 6, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the administrative law
judge for the Eighth District denying the motions to
dismiss and to stay proceedings filed by the Law Offices
of Levine & Levine, brought to the Compensation
Review Board, which affirmed the administrative law
judge’s decision, from which the Law Offices of
Levine & Levine appealed to this court. Appeal dis-
missed in part; affirmed.
Jennifer B. Levine, with whom was Harvey L.
Levine, for the appellant (Law Offices of Levine &
Levine).
Michael A. Lanza, with whom was John B. Canta-
rella and, on the brief, Wesley W. Horton, for the appel-
lee (Walker, Feigenbaum & Cantarella Law Group,
LLC).
Opinion

CLARK, J. In this attorney’s fees dispute, the appel-
lant, the Law Offices of Levine & Levine, appeals from
the decision of the Compensation Review Board
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

(board), which affirmed the decision of the administra-
tive law judge1 denying the appellant’s motions to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for a
stay of proceedings, and continuing a formal hearing
to take evidence on the question of how to allocate an
escrowed attorney’s fee between the appellant and the
appellee, Walker, Feigenbaum & Cantarella Law Group,
LLC.2 On appeal, the appellant argues that (1) the board
improperly affirmed the administrative law judge’s con-
clusion that an alleged violation of General Statutes § 1-
84b (b)3 could not serve as a basis for denying the
appellee quantum meruit recovery of a portion of the
escrowed attorney’s fee; (2) the board improperly
affirmed the administrative law judge’s conclusion that
the appellant lacked an enforceable award of attorney’s
1
The administrative adjudicators for the Workers’ Compensation Commis-
sion (commission) became known as administrative law judges, rather than
their former title of workers’ compensation commissioners, in 2021. See
Public Acts 2021, No. 21-18, § 1 (P.A. 21-18). Because this appeal includes
decisions rendered both before and after October 1, 2021, which was the
effective date of P.A. 21-18, we refer to the commission’s administrative
adjudicators by their title at the time of the applicable decisions. See Gardner
v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 351 Conn. 488, 490 n.1, 331
A.3d 1203 (2025).
2
‘‘General Statutes § 31-301b provides that [a]ny party aggrieved by the
decision of the Compensation Review Board upon any question or questions
of law arising in the proceedings may appeal the decision of the Compensa-
tion Review Board to the Appellate Court, whether or not the decision is
a final decision within the meaning of section 4-183 or a final judgment
within the meaning of section 52-263. Our appellate courts expressly have
recognized that the final judgment requirement does not apply to appeals
taken from the board.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Britto v. Bimbo
Foods, Inc., 217 Conn. App. 134, 136 n.3, 287 A.3d 1140 (2022), cert. denied,
346 Conn. 921, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023).
3
General Statutes § 1-84b (b) provides: ‘‘No former executive branch or
quasi-public agency public official or state employee shall, for one year after
leaving state service, represent anyone, other than the state, for compensa-
tion before the department, agency, board, commission, council or office
in which he served at the time of his termination of service, concerning any
matter in which the state has a substantial interest. The provisions of this
subsection shall not apply to an attorney who is a former employee of the
Division of Criminal Justice, with respect to any representation in a matter
under the jurisdiction of a court.’’
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fees pursuant to General Statutes § 31-327 (a);4 (3) the
entire Workers’ Compensation Commission (commis-
sion) should have disqualified itself from hearing these
proceedings; and (4) the board overlooked the adminis-
trative law judge’s alleged violation of the appellant’s
right to be heard and concomitant violation of the appel-
lant’s due process rights. We dismiss the appeal as to
the appellant’s first claim and affirm the decision of the
board in all other respects.
The following facts, as found by the administrative
law judge or as otherwise undisputed in the record,
and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The
claimant, Francesca Pelc, sustained injuries to her
knees, ankles, and back in the course of her employ-
ment with Southington Dental Associates, P.C. By
agreement, October 24, 2006, was deemed the date of
injury for the claimant’s compensable claim. Beginning
in September, 2007, and continuing until May, 2018,
the appellant represented the claimant in proceedings
before the commission and attended thirty-nine infor-
mal or preformal hearings.5 These hearings were held
4
General Statutes § 31-327 provides: ‘‘(a) Whenever any fees or expenses
are, under the provisions of this chapter, to be paid by the employer or
insurer and not by the employee, the administrative law judge may make
an award directly in favor of the person entitled to the fees or expenses,
which award shall be filed in court, shall be subject to appeal and shall be
enforceable by execution as in other cases. The award may be combined
with an award for compensation in favor of or against the injured employee
or the dependent or dependents of a deceased employee or may be the
subject of an award covering only the fees and expenses.
‘‘(b) All fees of attorneys, physicians, podiatrists or other persons for
services under this chapter shall be subject to the approval of the administra-
tive law judge.’’
5
‘‘The informal hearing is ordinarily a [fifteen]-minute session at which
interested parties meet with a workers’ compensation commissioner in an
attempt to resolve issues. Traditionally, the informal hearing is the backbone
of a workers’ compensation system. . . . The informal hearing serves to
bring light to any unresolved issue concerning workers’ compensation. . . .
The informal hearing . . . is triggered upon failure to reach an agreement.’’
R. Carter et al., 19 Connecticut Practice Series: Workers’ Compensation
(2024) § 20 Introduction, pp. 745–46.
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before various commissioners in the sixth district,
including then Commissioner Ernie Walker.
By January, 2016, the claimant had been collecting
benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-307,6 on a
weekly basis, for approximately seven years. By letter
dated December 28, 2015, the claimant instructed her
employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, The Hart-
ford, to send her weekly benefit checks—as well as
any other workers’ compensation benefits to which she
might be entitled, including lump sum benefits—to the
appellant so that the appellant could deduct a fee from
her checks. An informal hearing was held on January
28, 2016, before Commissioner Nancy Salerno, who
approved this arrangement and orally directed The
Hartford to comply (2016 fee approval). In her notes
from that hearing, Salerno wrote in relevant part: ‘‘[The
‘‘A preformal hearing may be held when issues have not been resolved at
one or more informal hearings. . . . [T]he [commission] utilizes [preformal
hearings] to facilitate the settlement of claims and preparation of a claim
for trial at the [f]ormal hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pagan
v. Carey Wiping Materials Corp., 144 Conn. App. 413, 416 n.7, 73 A.3d 784,
cert. denied, 310 Conn. 925, 77 A.3d 142 (2013); see also 19 R. Carter et al.,
supra, § 20.5, pp. 753–54.
6
General Statutes § 31-307 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If any injury for
which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results
in total incapacity to work, the injured employee shall be paid a weekly
compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the injured employee’s aver-
age weekly earnings as of the date of the injury . . . . No employee entitled
to compensation under this section shall receive less than twenty per cent
of the maximum weekly compensation rate, as provided in section 31-309,
provided the minimum payment shall not exceed seventy-five per cent of
the employee’s average weekly wage, as determined under section 31-310,
and the compensation shall not continue longer than the period of total
incapacity. . . .
‘‘(c) The following injuries of any person shall be considered as causing
total incapacity and compensation shall be paid accordingly: (1) Total and
permanent loss of sight of both eyes, or the reduction to one-tenth or less
of normal vision; (2) the loss of both feet at or above the ankle; (3) the loss
of both hands at or above the wrist; (4) the loss of one foot at or above
the ankle and one hand at or above the wrist; (5) any injury resulting in
permanent and complete paralysis of the legs or arms or of one leg and one
arm; (6) any injury resulting in incurable imbecility or mental illness. . . .’’
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claimant] has been on [temporary total]7 for [seven
years] plus [and] continues to receive [temporary total]
[with] [cost of living adjustments].8 [The claimant]
agrees to have [the appellant] receive her weekly [tem-
porary total] check [and] take a fee. (See attached let-
ter) I approve same.’’ (Footnotes added.)
Walker retired from the commission on April 1, 2018.
On May 29, 2018, the claimant filed a notice of appear-
ance in lieu of the appellant, indicating that she would
be representing herself. That same day, the appellant
filed a request for an emergency informal hearing
regarding the ‘‘administration of permanent [temporary
total] benefits & legal fees in lieu of new [notice of
appearance].’’ Subsequently, on June 14, 2018, Attorney
John Cantarella filed an appearance with the commis-
sion on the claimant’s behalf, in lieu of her May 29,
2018 self-represented appearance. In his appearance,
Cantarella identified his law firm as ‘‘Walker, Feigen-
baum & Cantarella,’’ i.e., the appellee. Both Cantarella
and Walker are principals of the appellee.
By letter dated June 14, 2018—the same day that he
entered an appearance on the claimant’s behalf before
the commission—Cantarella advised The Hartford of
his representation of the claimant and requested that
the adjuster send 20 percent of the claimant’s weekly
benefit check directly to the appellant and the
7
‘‘There are two types of workers’ compensation disability in Connecticut
for which benefits may be awarded: total incapacity and partial incapacity.
. . . Within total incapacity there are two categories: temporary total inca-
pacity and permanent total incapacity. Temporary total incapacity applies
to an employee . . . who is unable to seek any type of employment because
of disability. Total permanent incapacity refers to an employee who is totally
incapacitated and receives an additional benefit based on the permanent
loss of a body part. This is in contrast to partial disability, where the employee
is able to find alternative employment but experiences a wage loss as a
result of the disability.’’ (Citation omitted.) Laliberte v. United Security,
Inc., 261 Conn. 181, 182 n.1, 801 A.2d 783 (2002).
8
See General Statutes § 31-307a (c).
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remaining 80 percent directly to the claimant at her
home address. An informal hearing was held before
Salerno on June 28, 2018. In her notes from that hearing,
Salerno wrote in relevant part: ‘‘Effective approxi-
mately 2-3 weeks ago, [the claimant] has a new [attor-
ney]—John Cantarella Firm. . . . [O]ngoing [tempo-
rary total] [to be paid] as follows: [20 percent] to prior
[attorney] Levine directly [and] [80 percent] to [the
claimant’s] new [attorney] Cantarella who will in turn
forward to [the claimant] directly. Note—[Cantarella]
is not taking a fee off [the claimant’s] [temporary total]
benefits at this time.’’ At a subsequent informal hearing
on July 20, 2018, Commissioner John Mastropietro
issued an order that read in relevant part: ‘‘The claimant
is currently receiving weekly [temporary total] checks,
80 percent of said amount weekly is to be paid to the
claimant directly and 20 percent of said weekly amount
to be paid directly to the [appellant].’’
By letter dated April 17, 2019, Cantarella informed
the appellant that the parties to the claimant’s workers’
compensation case had reached a tentative settlement
agreement and asked the appellant to ‘‘[p]lease inform
me of your costs [i]n this matter.’’ The appellant then
wrote a letter to the commission, dated April 26, 2019,
requesting that a formal hearing be held before the
approval of any settlement in order ‘‘to disclose to [the]
[c]ommission all the facts which are necessary to deter-
mine if a settlement [would be] in [the claimant’s] best
interests.’’ In this letter, the appellant expressed con-
cern that because, in its view, the claimant was pres-
ently ‘‘well provided for’’ as a result of its efforts on
her behalf, ‘‘the wrong settlement more likely than not
. . . would soon leave her dependent upon [s]tate aid.’’
The appellant further requested that, as part of any
settlement, the commission order the appellee to put
the attorney’s fee in escrow until the commission could
render a decision regarding the allocation of that fee.
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On June 6, 2019, Commissioner William Watson III
approved a full and final settlement of the claimant’s
case, the total value of which was $1,037,570. Watson
concurrently approved a total attorney’s fee of $185,247,
which he ordered Cantarella to hold in escrow pending
an agreement on the allocation of the fee with the appel-
lant or, in the absence of such an agreement, litigation
thereof. The attorney’s fee was placed in escrow. In
the ensuing months, various informal and preformal
hearings were held before the commission, and the
issue of the allocation of the approved fee was twice
scheduled for a formal hearing in the sixth district,
only to be postponed. The appellant also filed several
motions. Among these motions was a motion dated
January 22, 2020, to disqualify Watson ‘‘and all commis-
sioners with an appearance of conflict of interest and
bias,’’ in which the appellant requested that the case
be transferred to the Superior Court. Watson did not
disqualify himself but ordered the case transferred to
the eighth district, where he did not sit. Pending this
transfer, the appellant and the appellee were ordered
to file affidavits of fees and expenses, and they did so.
On April 30, 2020, a preformal hearing was held before
Administrative Law Judge David Schoolcraft (adminis-
trative law judge) in the eighth district. The parties
agreed from the outset that no resolution could be
reached and that a formal hearing was necessary to
determine the allocation of the escrowed fee. The appel-
lant stated its position that the commission lacked juris-
diction to address the allocation of the fee but
expressed a desire for a formal hearing in order to
create a record for appeal. The parties agreed that the
administrative law judge would preside over the formal
hearing. On June 17, 2020, the principals of the appel-
lant, Harvey Levine and Jennifer Levine, filed a civil
action in the Superior Court (civil action) asserting
various claims against the claimant; the appellee and
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

its named principals; and the Law Office of Kevin C.
Ferry, LLC, and its named principal. See generally
Levine v. Pelc, Superior Court, judicial district of New
Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
On February 3, 2021, the appellant filed with the
commission a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and a motion to stay all proceedings.
In these motions, the appellant argued that the 2016
fee approval constituted an award of fees and expenses
under § 31-327 (a). The appellant further stated that it
was seeking enforcement of this ‘‘award’’ in the civil
action, wherein it had asserted, inter alia, a claim of
breach of contract against the claimant, and that the
Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction over such
enforcement. The appellant argued that, because it
sought satisfaction of damages in the civil action from
the escrowed fee, the commission could not allocate
the fee without impairing its rights.
The appellant also asserted in its motions that an
award of attorney’s fees to the appellee for work per-
formed on the claimant’s case during Walker’s first year
of retirement from the commission was contrary to
public policy as expressed in § 1-84b (b).9 At the same
9
The appellant’s motion to dismiss also alleged that Walker had violated
General Statutes § 1-84 (b) and (c). Section 1-84 provides in relevant part:
‘‘(b) No public official or state employee shall accept other employment
which will either impair his independence of judgment as to his official
duties or employment or require him, or induce him, to disclose confidential
information acquired by him in the course of and by reason of his official
duties.
‘‘(c) No public official or state employee shall wilfully and knowingly
disclose, for financial gain, to any other person, confidential information
acquired by him in the course of and by reason of his official duties or
employment and no public official or state employee shall use his public
office or position or any confidential information received through his hold-
ing such public office or position to obtain financial gain for himself, his
spouse, child, child’s spouse, parent, brother or sister or a business with
which he is associated. . . .’’
On appeal, the appellant does not make any claims pertaining to alleged
violations of § 1-84 (b) or (c) by Walker.
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time, the appellant contended that the commission
lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Walker had
violated § 1-84b (b) because ‘‘it would be a direct con-
flict of interest for the commission to enter any opinions
that directly [address] the public policy concerns of
recently retired workers’ compensation commissioners
practicing before the [commission] for financial gain
within one year of their retirement’’ and because ‘‘there
is an inherent or built-in bias from the entire panel
of workers’ compensation commissioners against [the
appellant] as evidenced in the public policy concerns
intrinsically expressed in [General Statutes] §§ 1-84 (b),
1-84 (c)10 and 1-84b (b) along with evidence of bias
against [the appellant] that has thus far been directed
at [the appellant] in this case . . . .’’ The claimant and
the appellee filed objections to these motions, and the
commission deferred ruling on the motions until a for-
mal hearing could be held. The formal hearing was
initially scheduled for March, 2021, but was postponed
until June, 2021, at the appellant’s request.
On May 25, 2021, at the request of all defendants, the
court overseeing the civil action, Farley, J., entered a
stay of proceedings in the civil action pending resolu-
tion of this matter before the commission. That stay has
been extended several times as this case has proceeded
through the administrative appeal process and before
this court; most recently, on November 12, 2024, the
court, Knox, J., ordered that the civil action be stayed
until May 19, 2025.
On June 10, 2021, the appellant filed with the commis-
sion a motion to bifurcate, requesting that at the upcom-
ing formal hearing the administrative law judge address
the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by the
pending motions to dismiss and for a stay and defer
ruling on the substantive question of how to allocate
10
See footnote 9 of this opinion.
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

the attorney’s fees between the parties. The administra-
tive law judge deferred ruling on the motion to bifurcate
until the formal hearing. The formal hearing, which was
held remotely, began on June 23, 2021. The administra-
tive law judge began the hearing by taking administra-
tive notice of forty-three items in the commission file.
The administrative law judge then began to mark vari-
ous exhibits proffered by the parties but subsequently
concluded that he could not effectively determine what
evidence would be material until he could identify the
issues subject to litigation before the commission. He
thus suspended marking exhibits pending a ruling on
the appellant’s motions and designated all exhibits prof-
fered by the parties—including those that had pre-
viously been marked as full—as being for identification
only. The administrative law judge did not rule on the
appellant’s motions to dismiss and for a stay of proceed-
ings during the June 23, 2021 formal hearing.
On June 28, 2021, in a letter to the parties, the adminis-
trative law judge requested supplemental briefing on
the following issues: (1) ‘‘Would a § 1-84b (b) violation,
if it occurred, be material to the distribution of fees
in this forum? Put another way: if the [appellee] was
disqualified from representing [the claimant] under § 1-
84b (b), would that mean no portion of the escrowed
fee could be awarded to [Cantarella] by a commis-
sioner?’’ (2) ‘‘Assuming determination of whether there
was a violation of § 1-84b (b) were necessary before
allocation of fees, is that a factual question that can be
determined by a workers’ compensation commissioner,
for the limited purposes presented in this case?’’ And (3)
‘‘[d]id the undertaking of representation by Cantarella
violate § 1-84b (b)?’’ The appellee filed its supplemental
brief on August 6, 2021, and the appellant filed its sup-
plemental brief on September 9, 2021.
On November 3, 2021, the administrative law judge
issued a memorandum of decision denying both the
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

motion to dismiss and the motion for a stay. The admin-
istrative law judge determined that the appellant’s argu-
ment that the commission lacked jurisdiction to allocate
the attorney’s fee ran afoul of Frantzen v. Davenport
Electric, 179 Conn. App. 846, 181 A.3d 578, cert. denied,
328 Conn. 928, 182 A.3d 637 (2018), in which this court
held that the commission has jurisdiction to resolve fee
disputes between successive counsel concerning their
representation of a claimant before the commission.
See id., 855. The administrative law judge concluded
that ‘‘the allocation of approved contingency fees
between sequential counsel is a task that lies solely
within the jurisdiction of this commission and is a
responsibility that can neither be evaded nor farmed
out.’’
With respect to the appellant’s argument that the 2016
fee approval constituted an award of fees and expenses
under § 31-327 (a), the administrative law judge con-
cluded that (1) the 2016 fee approval did not constitute
an ‘‘award’’ of attorney’s fees that could be enforced
in the Superior Court, but only an ‘‘authorization’’ to
take a fee that was ‘‘subject to change at any time’’; (2)
even if the 2016 fee approval had been an ‘‘award’’ of
attorney’s fees, it would not be subject to enforcement
pursuant to § 31-327 (a) because that statute applies
only to awards of attorney’s fees and expenses to ‘‘be
paid by the employer or insurer and not by the
employee,’’ whereas the fee deducted by the appellant
represented an obligation owed by the claimant to the
appellant; and (3) nothing in Salerno’s notes or Mastro-
pietro’s 2018 order permitted the appellant to take fees
from anything other than the claimant’s weekly benefit
checks, which had stopped once Watson approved a
full and final settlement of the case in 2019. (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The administrative law judge also rejected the appel-
lant’s argument pertaining to § 1-84b (b). In doing so,
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

he made two key conclusions. First, he agreed with the
appellant that the commission lacked jurisdiction to
determine whether Walker had violated § 1-84b (b), but
not, as the appellant had argued, because of a conflict
of interest and bias on the part of the commission. The
administrative law judge, instead, based his conclusion
on General Statutes § 1-82, which, he explained, ‘‘sets
out a comprehensive procedure’’ for adjudicating
alleged violations of § 1-84b (b), ‘‘involving, inter alia,
investigation by the ethics enforcement officer of the
Office of State Ethics, a trial before the Citizen’s Ethics
Advisory Board . . . and various rules protecting the
due process rights of the respondent.’’ The administra-
tive law judge reasoned that this statutory scheme con-
fers jurisdiction on the Citizen’s Ethics Advisory Board
and the Office of State Ethics—not the commission
or the Superior Court—to adjudicate violations of § 1-
84b (b).
Second, the administrative law judge concluded that
he could allocate the escrowed attorney’s fee between
the appellant and the appellee, notwithstanding the
appellant’s allegation of a § 1-84b (b) violation over
which the commission lacked jurisdiction, because
‘‘such an allegation would be immaterial to this commis-
sion’s allocation of the awarded fee.’’ The appellant had
cited Parnoff v. Yuille, 163 Conn. App. 273, 136 A.3d
48, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 902, 138 A.3d 280 (2016)—
in which this court held that an attorney who was barred
from contract recovery under a fee agreement because
of the agreement’s failure to comply with General Stat-
utes § 52-251c, a fee cap statute, could not recover
under a theory of quantum meruit—to support its posi-
tion that there was a ‘‘public policy against using quan-
tum meruit by one who has unclean hands,’’ but the
administrative law judge concluded that Parnoff was
distinguishable from the present case. In particular, he
explained that allowing recovery in Parnoff would ‘‘not
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just have violated a public policy, it would have violated
the legislative policy behind § 52-251c’’—to ‘‘protect
plaintiffs from overreaching attorneys’’—‘‘and would
have done so to the detriment of the very person the
statute was designed to protect.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) He also reasoned
that, unlike in the Superior Court, where Parnoff had
arisen and where judges lack ‘‘primary oversight author-
ity’’ over attorney’s fees, ‘‘[t]he power and duty to pro-
tect claimants against overreaching attorneys is
expressly conferred on the judges of this commission
by statute . . . .’’ He then concluded that the claimant
could not be said to be affected by any violation of § 1-
84b because, when Watson had approved a final fee of
$185,247 in 2019, he had ‘‘protected [the claimant’s]
rights and forever liquidated her obligations under any
fee agreement,’’ rendering ‘‘the contents of the fee
agreement between [the claimant] and [the appellee] a
moot point . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) He deter-
mined that the appellant was seeking to interfere with
the appellee’s collection of a fee, not in order to protect
the claimant or to protect the ethical integrity of the
state or commission, but simply to protect its own pecu-
niary interests.

The administrative law judge further concluded that
there was ‘‘no basis for disqualification of this entire
commission simply because of Walker’s past member-
ship’’ and rejected various allegations made by the
appellant that the administrative law judge had manipu-
lated the proceedings in favor of the appellee and other-
wise shown personal bias against the appellant. He also
determined that the claimant lacked standing to partici-
pate in proceedings regarding the fee allocation because
once the $185,247 attorney’s fee had been deposited
into escrow, the claimant’s obligation for attorney’s fees
had been ‘‘fully satisfied’’ and she could have no further
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exposure for payment of attorney’s fees to either the
appellant or the appellee.
The appellant filed a lengthy motion to correct, which
was denied save for three scrivener’s errors. The appel-
lant then appealed to the board, which affirmed the
administrative law judge’s decision. The board rejected
on their merits four claims of error made by the appel-
lant, namely, that (1) the administrative law judge had
violated the appellant’s right to due process and funda-
mental fairness by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing
to establish ‘‘critical jurisdictional facts’’; (2) the com-
mission lacked subject matter jurisdiction ‘‘to enforce
an approved attorney’s fee pursuant to § 31-327 (a) or
to modify the attorney’s fee approved pursuant to § 31-
327 (b) on January 28, 2016’’; (3) the appellant’s experi-
ence of bias from the commission necessitated removal
of the fee dispute from that forum; and (4) the adminis-
trative law judge had erred in denying the motion to
correct. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board
further declined to review the appellant’s claims of error
pertaining to alleged violations of § 1-84b (b) because
it agreed with the administrative law judge’s conclusion
that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
violations of that statute. This appeal followed.
Following oral argument before this court, we
ordered the parties to submit two rounds of supplemen-
tal memoranda addressing the following issues: (1)
whether the appellant has standing to contest the appel-
lee’s entitlement to recover a portion of the escrowed
attorney’s fee on the basis of an alleged violation of
§ 1-84b (b); and (2) whether the appellant’s claim that
the appellee should be disentitled to recovery of a por-
tion of the escrowed fee on the basis of an alleged
violation of § 1-84b (b) should be dismissed as nonjusti-
ciable on ripeness grounds, in light of the fact that the
administrative law judge has not yet decided the fee
allocation on the merits. The parties filed supplemental
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memoranda in accordance with these orders. We now
turn to the merits of the appellant’s claims. Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as neces-
sary.
I
The appellant first claims that the board ‘‘improperly
affirm[ed] the [administrative law judge’s] holding that
the expressions of public policy embodied in § 1-84b
(b) cannot serve as a basis for denying the [appellee’s
claim for] quantum meruit recovery of its attorney’s
fees’’ and urges us to conclude that the appellee’s
alleged violation of the statute disentitles it to any por-
tion of the escrowed fee. The appellee argues in
response that this claim is inadequately briefed because
the appellant has not addressed the jurisdictional con-
clusion that was the basis of the board’s affirmance
but, rather, has focused only on ‘‘the substantive issue
of § 1-84[b] (b)’s applicability to this case.’’ We do not
address the merits of these respective arguments
because we conclude that the appellant’s claim is not
ripe for adjudication by this court.
‘‘[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines,
namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political
question doctrine, that implicate a court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a par-
ticular matter. . . . Justiciability requires (1) that there
be an actual controversy between or among the parties
to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties
be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be
capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . .
and (4) that the determination of the controversy will
result in practical relief to the complainant. . . .
‘‘A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . [B]ecause an
issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law,
our appellate review [of this question] is plenary. . . .
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‘‘[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements . . . . Accordingly, in determining
whether a case is ripe, a [reviewing] court must be
satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some
event that has not and indeed may never transpire.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 111 Conn. App. 80, 82–83, 957
A.2d 536 (2008).
‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the ques-
tion of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses
the basic competency of the court, can be raised by
any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any
time. . . . [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on
its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction
to hear. . . . Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by
waiver or by consent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn. App. 641, 643, 955 A.2d
620, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 417 (2008).
Therefore, although both parties have taken the posi-
tion that the appellant’s claim as to § 1-84b (b) is ripe for
adjudication, we retain an independent duty to assess
whether the claim is justiciable, affording due consider-
ation to the parties’ arguments.
Our analysis is guided by this court’s holding in Miller
v. Maurer, 189 Conn. App. 769, 208 A.3d 1249, appeal
dismissed, 190 Conn. App. 904, 208 A.3d 702 (2019). In
Miller, the plaintiff attorney brought an interpleader
action to determine the proper distribution of settle-
ment proceeds among herself, her client, and predeces-
sor counsel. Id., 770–71. The trial court rendered judg-
ment awarding the plaintiff 15 percent of the gross
recovery; her predecessor counsel an equitable lien on
the settlement proceeds and quantum meruit recovery;
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and the client the remainder. Id., 773–74. On appeal,
the plaintiff claimed that the court improperly deter-
mined (1) that she was entitled to 15 percent of the
settlement proceeds and (2) that her predecessor coun-
sel was entitled to any portion of the settlement pro-
ceeds. Id., 771. This court first concluded that the
court’s finding that the plaintiff was entitled to 15 per-
cent of the proceeds was not clearly erroneous. Id.,
776. It then concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing
to contest her predecessor counsel’s entitlement to a
portion of the settlement proceeds and dismissed the
appeal with respect to that claim. Id., 779. This court
reasoned that, because the trial court had properly con-
cluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 15 percent of
the proceeds, ‘‘the court’s determinations regarding the
distribution of the remaining 85 percent of the settle-
ment proceeds cannot be said to adversely affect any
cognizable legal interest of the plaintiff. Even if the
plaintiff’s claim was successful, any reduction in the
amount of [predecessor counsel’s] recovery would
inure to the benefit of [the client], and not to the plain-
tiff.’’ Id.
We read Miller to stand for the proposition that an
attorney who seeks to contest successor counsel’s enti-
tlement to recover a portion of an escrowed fee can
make out a colorable claim of injury from a judicial
determination that successor counsel is entitled to
some portion of that fee only when she can establish
that that determination somehow interferes with her
own cognizable legal interest, namely, the fee that she
is properly determined to be due following a full pro-
ceeding on the merits of the fee allocation. In the pres-
ent case, because the fee allocation has not yet
occurred, the contours of the appellant’s interest—that
is, what it is due for its services—are not clear, nor
is it clear how, if at all, the appellee’s entitlement or
disentitlement to recovery of a portion of the escrowed
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fee might affect that interest. For us to conclude, at
this preliminary stage, that the appellant has or has not
suffered an actual injury as a result of the administrative
law judge’s refusal to disqualify the appellee from recov-
ery would thus require us to make assumptions in the
absence of a fully developed record.11
11
In its supplemental brief on standing, the appellant attempts to distin-
guish Miller from the present case in several ways. None is convincing.
First, the appellant argues that, ‘‘unlike Miller, there is no ruling as to
the allocation of attorney’s fees in this case, and there remains the possibility
that the distribution of the attorney’s fee award to the appellee will adversely
affect the appellant’s cognizable legal interest . . . .’’ Any potential injury
to the appellant, however, is merely a possibility at this stage and contingent
on events that may not occur, and, therefore, it only bolsters our conclusion
that the appellant’s claim is not yet ripe.
Second, the appellant claims that, because the administrative law judge
concluded that the claimant lacked standing to participate in the fee alloca-
tion, and because rule 5.4 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
the sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers, no portion of the escrowed fee
can revert to the claimant in the event that the administrative law judge
enters a ruling disentitling the appellee to recovery; ergo, any share of the
fee to which the appellee is disentitled must go to the appellant. The merits
of the administrative law judge’s ruling regarding the claimant’s standing
are not before us in this appeal, and we express no view on it. Further, the
appellant provides no authority for the proposition that rule 5.4 (a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits the reversion of a fee to the client
who originally owed it when a lawyer is found wrongfully to have procured
that fee.
Finally, the appellant claims that, unlike Miller, in which the trial court
found ‘‘no evidence of misconduct or professional negligence’’ by anyone
in predecessor counsel’s law firm; (internal quotation marks omitted) Miller
v. Maurer, supra, 189 Conn. App. 771; ‘‘[n]o such similar finding can reason-
ably be made regarding the appellee.’’ Any such distinction between Miller
and the present case would be a distinction without a difference, as the
presence or absence of unethical conduct by predecessor counsel had no
bearing on the standing analysis in Miller. See Miller v. Maurer, supra, 776–
79.
We further note that, throughout its supplemental brief on standing, the
appellant asserts that it has been injured by what it characterizes as the
‘‘deprivation of a fair and impartial tribunal in violation of [its] right to due
process,’’ stemming from the administrative law judge’s alleged financial
interest in the outcome of the case and his alleged relationship with Walker.
We have not questioned the appellant’s standing to assert a claim challenging
the fairness of the tribunal or the alleged deprivation of its due process
rights; we resolve similar claims on their merits later in this opinion.
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We are unpersuaded by the appellant’s arguments to
the contrary. The appellant claims that ‘‘the damage
to [it] is [already] complete’’ because, in its view, the
appellee has ‘‘successfully argued . . . that the liquida-
tion of [the claimant’s benefits] into a lump sum extin-
guished the appellant’s earned contingency fee’’ and,
in doing so, has taken advantage of the commission’s
alleged institutional bias in favor of the appellee—a
bias that, the appellant argues, violates its due process
rights and that § 1-84b (b) was designed to prevent.
This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the issue
at bar. As we discuss in parts II, III, and IV of this
opinion, the appellant also has claimed on appeal that
(1) the 2016 fee approval constituted a nonmodifiable
award of fees under § 31-327 (a); (2) the entire commis-
sion suffered from a disqualifying conflict of interest;
and (3) the appellant was deprived of due process in
proceedings before the commission. The question on
which we asked the parties to submit supplemental
briefing was not whether those claims were justicia-
ble—indeed, we resolve those claims on their merits
in this opinion. Instead, we specifically asked the parties
to address the ripeness of the appellant’s claim that the
appellee should be barred from recovering a share of
the fee on the basis of an alleged § 1-84b (b) violation.
The appellant’s argument therefore responds to a ques-
tion that we did not raise.
The appellant also contends that we must resolve the
question of whether § 1-84b (b) disentitles the appellee
from recovery before the fee allocation can proceed on
the merits because if we conclude that the appellee has
no entitlement to any portion of the award there can
be no controversy between the parties and, thus, the
commission will lack jurisdiction. There are multiple
problems with this argument. First, the argument pre-
sumes that the appellant’s claim pertaining to § 1-84b
(b) is justiciable. Second, the argument is self-defeating;
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if a conclusion that the appellee was disentitled to
recovery under § 1-84b (b) divested the tribunal of juris-
diction over the fee allocation, it is unclear (and the
appellant does not attempt to explain) how the tribunal
would nonetheless have jurisdiction to order the
entirety of the escrowed fee paid over to the appellant,
as the appellant wishes. Third, the appellant has cited
no authority for the proposition that, when an appellate
tribunal hearing a fee dispute determines that one party
is not entitled to any fee, the trial court (or, here, the
commission) thereby loses jurisdiction over the dis-
pute. Indeed, if that were so, once this court determined
in Parnoff v. Yuille, supra, 163 Conn. App. 273, that
the plaintiff attorney was not entitled to recover under
quantum meruit, it would have reversed the judgment
of the trial court with direction to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, instead of affirming the
judgment.12
The appellee, for its part, contends that the appel-
lant’s claim is ripe because the appellant’s claimed
12
We also reject as unavailing certain related claims made in the appellant’s
supplemental brief on ripeness. The appellant claims that ‘‘a conflicted
[administrative law judge’s] allocation of [attorney’s] fees to [the appellee]
who has yet to establish entitlement to those fees does not further judicial
economy as the entire process would be a futile exercise if the claims of
misconduct were later found to be valid.’’ This argument begs the question.
The appellant will be able, in any future appeal from the fee allocation, to
assert that the appellee should be disentitled to recovery due to an alleged
§ 1-84b (b) violation only if it can establish an injury from the administrative
law judge’s allocation of a portion of the fee to the appellee—the very
question on which it is premature for us to pass at this stage. To the
extent that the appellant contends that we should consider the merits of
disqualifying the entire commission on the basis of an alleged conflict of
interest, we do so—and reject the appellant’s claim—in part III of this opin-
ion.
We further reject the appellant’s argument that ‘‘[a]llocating the fees before
reaching the merits of disqualification is inconsistent with [our Supreme
Court’s precedent holding that] the denial of a motion to disqualify a commis-
sioner for bias is appealable to the board.’’ We reach the merits of whether
the commission should be disqualified in part III of this opinion, and this
argument therefore rests on a faulty premise.
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injury—the allocation of some portion of the fee to
the appellee—is guaranteed to occur. We decline the
appellee’s invitation to speculate as to how the adminis-
trative law judge will ultimately decide the merits of
the fee dispute. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Randall,
125 Conn. App. 31, 33, 6 A.3d 175 (2010) (role of appel-
late tribunal ‘‘is not to guess at possibilities, but to
review claims based on a complete factual record’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if we were
to assume that the appellee is guaranteed to receive a
portion of the fee, however, that could only qualify as
an actual injury to the appellant if the appellee’s receipt
of some portion of the fee interfered with the appellant’s
cognizable legal interest in its own fee. Cf., e.g., Perez
v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 387–88,
163 A.3d 597 (2017) (explaining that retroactive applica-
tion of parole provisions eliminating earned risk reduc-
tion credit from calculation of parole eligibility date
and allowing Board of Pardons and Paroles to forgo
hearing ‘‘would not create an actual injury to the peti-
tioner’’ if ‘‘the [Board of Pardons and Paroles] decides
to hold a hearing or the petitioner does not have any
earned risk reduction credit remaining’’). Because that
may never occur, any injury to the appellant resulting
from any determination regarding the appellee’s entitle-
ment to a fee is purely hypothetical. We therefore con-
clude that this claim is nonjusticiable on ripeness
grounds and dismiss the appeal as to this claim.
II
The appellant next claims that the board improperly
rejected its contention that the 2016 fee approval consti-
tuted an ‘‘award’’ of attorney’s fees that was subject to
enforcement in the Superior Court pursuant to § 31-327
(a). The appellant further asserts, in connection with
this claim, that the commission lacks the authority to
modify, interpret, or extinguish the 2016 fee approval
in any manner because, ‘‘after the appeal period to
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challenge the 2016 fee [approval] expired, it became a
binding award that was not subject to later modification
or interpretation under [General Statutes] § 31-315.’’13
We disagree.14
The appellant presented these arguments to the
board. The board concluded, as had the administrative
law judge, that ‘‘§ 31-327 (a) does not apply to just any
award of fees or expenses. Rather, it applies only to
awards of such fees or expenses to be paid by the
13
General Statutes § 31-315 provides: ‘‘Any award of, or voluntary agree-
ment concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter
or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the
provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification in accordance
with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either
party or, in the case of a transfer under section 31-349, upon request of the
custodian of the Second Injury Fund, whenever it appears to the administra-
tive law judge, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an
injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure
of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed,
or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change
of such agreement, award or transfer in order properly to carry out the
spirit of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall also have the same
power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open
and modify a judgment of such court. The administrative law judge shall
retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary
agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation
period applicable to the injury in question.’’
14
The appellant presents its argument that § 31-315 does not permit the
modification of the 2016 fee approval as a subordinate argument in further-
ance of its claim that the board improperly concluded that the 2016 fee
approval did not constitute an ‘‘award’’ pursuant to § 31-327 (a). We are not
convinced, however, that our resolution of the latter claim on the basis we
set forth herein would obviate the need to address the appellant’s argument
that the 2016 fee approval is nonmodifiable. The clear implication of this
nonmodifiability argument appears to be that, even if the appellant cannot
seek enforcement of the 2016 fee approval in the Superior Court under § 31-
327 (a), and even if jurisdiction lies with the commission to allocate the
escrowed fee, the administrative law judge would nonetheless be power-
less—in the course of making that allocation—to do anything that might
arguably impair what the appellant sees as its rights under the 2016 fee
approval. We therefore address the appellant’s nonmodifiability argument
because it is likely to arise in further proceedings before the administrative
law judge.
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employer or insurer and not by the employee. . . . In
the present matter, the transfer of funds contemplated
by both the 2016 fee [approval] and the 2019 fee
approval flowed directly from the claimant to her attor-
neys. Thus, even if the [administrative law judge] had
chosen to construe the 2016 fee [approval] as an award,
it would still not be subject to enforcement in the Supe-
rior Court pursuant to § 31-327 (a) because that subsec-
tion only pertains to awards of fees or expenses paid
by the employer or insurer and not by the employee.
. . . Given that the condition precedent for the invoca-
tion of § 31-327 (a) was not met, we affirm the [adminis-
trative law judge’s] finding that under the circumstances
of this matter, the 2016 fee [approval] did not constitute
an award subject to enforcement in the Superior Court
pursuant to § 31-327 (a).’’ (Emphasis in original; foot-
note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In a
footnote, the board stated: ‘‘In light of our affirmance
of the administrative law judge’s conclusion that the
2016 fee [approval] did not constitute an award, final
or otherwise, we decline to address the appellant’s argu-
ments relative to whether the [administrative law
judge’s] actions constituted an erroneous modification
(or interpretation) of an award pursuant to . . .
§ 31-315.’’
‘‘It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive,
we accord great weight to the construction given to the
workers’ compensation statutes by the [administrative
law judge] and [the] board. . . . A state agency is not
entitled, however, to special deference when its deter-
mination of a question of law has not previously been
subject to judicial scrutiny. . . . [W]hen . . . [a work-
ers’ compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory
construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial
scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the
administrative decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Kinsey v. World PAC, 152 Conn. App. 116,
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123, 98 A.3d 66 (2014). The parties do not argue that
either the applicability of § 31-327 (a) to an administra-
tive law judge’s order authorizing a claimant’s attorney
to deduct a fee from a claimant’s periodic benefit pay-
ments or the implications of § 31-315 for the modifiabil-
ity of such an order are questions that have previously
been subjected to judicial scrutiny or to the commis-
sion’s time-tested interpretation. We therefore exercise
plenary review over the board’s decision. See, e.g., Schi-
ano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21, 34, 792
A.2d 835 (2002). Because the appellant’s argument per-
taining to § 31-315 presents a question of law, and our
review is plenary, we review that argument even though
the board declined to address it. See, e.g., Harrigan v.
Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 214 Conn. App. 787,
798 n.4, 282 A.3d 495, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 964, 285
A.3d 388 (2022).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that
meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to con-
sider the text of the statute itself and its relationship
to other statutes. If, after examining such text and con-
sidering such relationship, the meaning of such text is
plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean-
ing of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test
to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when
read in context, is susceptible to more than one reason-
able interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Commis-
sion, 222 Conn. App. 17, 48, 304 A.3d 481 (2023), cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 936, 306 A.3d 1072 (2024). ‘‘Because
[e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is presumed to
have meaning . . . [a statute] must be construed, if
possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be
superfluous, void or insignificant.’’ (Internal quotation
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marks omitted.) Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc.,
296 Conn. 426, 433, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010). ‘‘It is axiomatic
that [w]e must interpret the statute so that it does not
lead to absurd or unworkable results.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Wilkins v. Connecticut Child-
birth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709, 723, 104 A.3d
671 (2014). In the context of workers’ compensation
appeals, we are mindful that the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, General Statutes § 21-275 et seq., ‘‘is a remedial
statute that should be construed generously to accom-
plish its purpose. . . . The purposes of the act itself
are best served by allowing the remedial legislation a
reasonable sphere of operation considering [its] pur-
poses. . . . In appeals arising under workers’ compen-
sation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or
lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial pur-
pose of the act.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp.,
252 Conn. 215, 220–21, 752 A.2d 1069 (2000).
Section 31-327 (a) provides in relevant part that,
‘‘[w]henever any fees or expenses are, under the provi-
sions of this chapter, to be paid by the employer or
insurer and not by the employee, the administrative law
judge may make an award directly in favor of the person
entitled to the fees or expenses, which award shall be
filed in court, shall be subject to appeal and shall be
enforceable by execution as in other cases. . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) On its face, the statute authorizes
administrative law judges to render an enforceable
‘‘award’’ of attorney’s fees when the employer or insurer
is liable for those fees but expressly does not authorize
the entry of such an ‘‘award’’ when an employee—such
as the claimant in the present case—is liable. Other
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act specify
various circumstances in which an employer or insurer
may be held liable for the payment of attorney’s fees,
as § 31-327 (a) contemplates. See, e.g., General Statutes
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§ 31-290a (b) (prevailing employee in proceeding before
commission alleging, inter alia, retaliation for filing
workers’ compensation claim shall be awarded reason-
able attorney’s fees); General Statutes § 31-300 (admin-
istrative law judge may allow claimant reasonable attor-
ney’s fees when employer or insurer has unreasonably
contested liability, when adjustments or payments of
compensation have been unduly delayed, or where pay-
ments have been discontinued or reduced without
proper notice and approval of administrative law
judge). We are satisfied that the language of § 31-327
(a) is clear and unambiguous in this regard and that it
does not produce absurd or unworkable results. Nor
does the appellant argue to the contrary. We therefore
do not consider extratextual evidence of the statute’s
meaning.
The appellant contends that this clear statutory lan-
guage does not place the 2016 fee approval outside the
purview of § 31-327 (a) because the 2016 fee approval
required The Hartford—an insurer—to send the claim-
ant’s weekly check directly to the appellant so that the
appellant could deduct a fee. As both the administrative
law judge and the board recognized, however, the fee
in question was owed by the claimant and was deducted
from her benefit check. The claimant’s liability for attor-
ney’s fees did not transfer to The Hartford simply
because the commission directed The Hartford to take
steps to administratively facilitate the claimant’s com-
pliance with her obligation. Even if The Hartford can
be said, as the appellant argues, to have been ‘‘directly
implicate[d]’’ in the payment of the fee, § 31-327 (a)
does not give rise to an enforceable award when an
insurer is merely ‘‘implicated’’ in the payment of a fee—
it does so when the fee is to be paid by an employer
or insurer, and not by an employee. Because, as the
board aptly concluded, ‘‘the transfer of funds contem-
plated by . . . the 2016 fee [approval] . . . flowed
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directly from the claimant to her attorneys,’’ the 2016
fee approval did not constitute an award of attorney’s
fees enforceable in the Superior Court pursuant to § 31-
327 (a).15
We now turn to the appellant’s argument that the
2016 fee approval may not be modified, interpreted, or
extinguished. Specifically, the appellant contends that
§ 31-315—which sets forth the circumstances under
which an administrative law judge may modify an award
of, or voluntary agreement concerning, ‘‘compensa-
tion’’—limits the administrative law judge’s authority
to modify the 2016 fee approval. In support of this
assertion, the appellant points to our Supreme Court’s
statement in Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 707
A.2d 725 (1998), that, ‘‘[a]lthough the commission may
modify awards under certain circumstances, its power
to do so is strictly limited by statute.’’ Id., 15. The appel-
lant further argues that, because our Supreme Court in
Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., supra, 260 Conn.
21, interpreted the term ‘‘compensation,’’ as used in
§ 31-315 and elsewhere in the workers’ compensation
statutes, to exclude attorney’s fees; see id., 37–41; the
administrative law judge has no authority to modify or
interpret the 2016 fee approval in any manner. The
appellant therefore contends that, ‘‘after the appeal
period to challenge the 2016 fee [approval] expired, it
became a binding award that was not subject to later
modification or interpretation under § 31-315.’’
15
The appellant makes other arguments in support of its claim that the
2016 fee approval constituted an award of attorney’s fees enforceable in
the Superior Court pursuant to § 31-327 (a). In particular, the appellant
argues that its ‘‘approved attorney’s fee award . . . comes under the juris-
diction of § 31-327 (a)’’ because it ‘‘is both quantifiable and vested’’ and that
‘‘the 2016 fee approval solidified [the appellant’s] earned contingency fee
. . . .’’ Because our conclusion that the 2016 fee approval contemplated a
transfer of funds from the claimant to the appellant is dispositive of the
appellant’s contention that the 2016 fee approval constituted an award under
§ 31-327 (a), we need not address these subordinate arguments.
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We are not persuaded. The appellant’s argument rests
on the premise that § 31-315—a statute that, as the
appellant admits, does not address attorney’s fees—
provides the only conceivable statutory authority under
which the administrative law judge could take any
action that might somehow interfere with the 2016 fee
approval. This premise is unsound. In particular, § 31-
327 (b) provides that ‘‘[a]ll fees of attorneys . . . for
services under this chapter shall be subject to the
approval of the administrative law judge.’’ Section 31-
327 (b), on its face, appears to be a much more obvious
source than § 31-315 of an administrative law judge’s
authority, during the life of a workers’ compensation
claim, to revisit prior orders ratifying fee arrangements
between claimants and their counsel. The appellant
makes no attempt to reconcile its position with the
broad power over attorney’s fees that § 31-327 (b) con-
fers.
The appellant’s argument is foreclosed by the plain
text of § 31-327 (b) and binding precedent. Section 31-
327 (b) provides that ‘‘[a]ll’’ attorney’s fees are subject
to the administrative law judge’s approval. This court
repeatedly has declined to ‘‘read into th[is] unambigu-
ous statute an exception to the word ‘all.’ ’’ Frantzen
v. Davenport Electric, supra, 179 Conn. App. 853; see
also Prioli v. State Library, 64 Conn. App. 301, 309,
780 A.2d 172 (citing with approval board decision con-
cluding that ‘‘[i]t would be inconsistent with both the
clear meaning of those definitions and the humanitarian
purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act in general
to read § 31-327 (b) as limiting the authority of commis-
sioners to oversee attorney’s fees’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 917, 782 A.2d
1246 (2001). Were we to adopt the appellant’s reasoning,
however, we would be doing just that. According to
the appellant, once an administrative law judge has
exercised authority under § 31-327 (b) to approve a
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fee arrangement during the life of an open workers’
compensation case, the administrative law judge is
divested of authority either to approve later fee arrange-
ments or to render final fee allocations between succes-
sive counsel, unless he or she first determines that those
arrangements or allocations will not somehow ‘‘mod-
ify,’’ ‘‘interpret,’’ or ‘‘extinguish’’ the original arrange-
ment that he or she approved. This proposition finds
no support in the unambiguous statutory text or in this
court’s case law interpreting § 31-327 (b); indeed, it runs
directly contrary to both.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the appellant’s
claims that the 2016 fee approval constituted an award
of attorney’s fees under § 31-327 (a) and that the admin-
istrative law judge lacks the authority to modify, inter-
pret, or extinguish the 2016 fee approval in any manner.
III
The appellant next claims that the entire commission
improperly refused to disqualify itself from hearing this
matter. In support of this claim, the appellant—relying
on our Supreme Court’s decision in Low v. Madison,
135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948)—argues that ‘‘the com-
mission’s decision over whether to enforce the public
policy expressed in [§ 1-84b (b)]’’ by denying the appel-
lee recovery of a portion of the escrowed fee implicated
the ‘‘personal and pecuniary interest[s]’’ of every admin-
istrative law judge on the commission, giving rise to a
conflict of interest on the part of the commission as a
whole. We are not persuaded.
When presented with the appellant’s claim that the
entire commission should be disqualified, the adminis-
trative law judge concluded in relevant part that such
an outcome would contravene our Supreme Court’s
holding in Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 170 Conn.
520, 368 A.2d 125 (1976). In particular, the administra-
tive law judge reasoned: ‘‘As our Supreme Court has
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noted, [d]isqualification must yield to necessity where
to disqualify would destroy the only tribunal in which
relief could be had and thus preclude determination of
the issue. . . . In the matter before me, the Superior
Court is waiting for a decision from this commission.
If this commission has jurisdiction, it must act. The
issues before me now, and those that will be before me
if I hear the case on the merits, are questions of fact
and law. All parties and counsel stand on equal footing.
Some commissioner must hear this matter.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) The board agreed, explaining that ‘‘we are
aware of no other tribunal which has the jurisdiction
to hear this matter, as it falls well within the province
of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and the Superior
Court has stayed its proceedings pending a decision by
this commission.’’
The following legal principles are relevant to our
review of the appellant’s claim. In Low v. Madison,
supra, 135 Conn. 1, our Supreme Court declared that
‘‘the appearance of impropriety created by a public
official’s16 participation in a matter in which he has a
16
We are unaware of any case in which this court or our Supreme Court
has applied the disqualification standard set forth in Low to administrative
law judges within the commission. However, although Low is typically cited
in cases involving attempts to disqualify members of planning or zoning
boards; see, e.g., Stocker v. Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446, 453–54, 226 A.2d
514 (1967) (collecting cases); our Supreme Court has held that the policy
underlying Low ‘‘is not limited to a single category of public officer but
applies to all public officials.’’ Housing Authority v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247,
251, 320 A.2d 820, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043, 94 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 2d
335 (1973). ‘‘Three essential characteristics differentiate a public office from
private employment: (1) an authority conferred by law; (2) a fixed term of
office; and (3) the power to exercise some portion of the sovereign functions
of government.’’ Id. Administrative law judges within the commission appear
to satisfy all three criteria. See, e.g., General Statutes § 31-278 (setting forth
powers and duties of administrative law judges); General Statutes § 31-276
(a) (providing that administrative law judges shall serve for term of five
years); see also Nelson v. State, 99 Conn. App. 808, 813, 916 A.2d 74 (2007)
(‘‘the legislature, by creating the workers’ compensation commission and
the board, has entrusted to them the primary responsibility of determining
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pecuniary or personal interest is sufficient to require
disqualification. . . . This prophylactic rule serves the
salutary purposes of promoting public confidence in
the fairness of the decision-making process and pre-
venting the public official from placing himself in a
position where he might be tempted to breach the public
trust bestowed upon him. . . . The test is not whether
the personal interest does conflict but whether it rea-
sonably might conflict.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrowski v.
Norwich Free Academy, 199 Conn. 231, 241, 506 A.2d
139, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802, 107 S. Ct. 42, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 5 (1986). ‘‘The decision as to whether a particular
interest is sufficient to disqualify is necessarily a factual
one and depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.’’ Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn.
App. 548, 553, 717 A.2d 850, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 940,
723 A.2d 318 (1998), and cert. denied, 247 Conn. 940,
723 A.2d 318 (1998). ‘‘Therefore, our prior cases have
implicitly required a litigant to show the existence of
a fact or set of facts that might reasonably be viewed
as having an improper influence on the public official.’’
Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc. v. Water Pollution
Control Authority, 192 Conn. 638, 650, 474 A.2d 752,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932, 105 S. Ct. 328, 83 L. Ed. 2d
265 (1984).

Even when an adjudicator would otherwise be dis-
qualified, however, our Supreme Court has held that
‘‘[d]isqualification must yield to necessity where to dis-
qualify would destroy the only tribunal in which relief
could be had and thus preclude determination of the
issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dacey v.
Connecticut Bar Assn., supra, 170 Conn. 524. This rule,
workers’ compensation claims’’). We therefore conclude that the standard
for disqualification in Low applies to administrative law judges within the
commission.
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known as the ‘‘doctrine of necessity,’’ applies in admin-
istrative tribunals as well as courts. See Clisham v.
Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 375,
613 A.2d 254 (1992). This court has found the doctrine
of necessity applicable to cases in which a party seeks
the disqualification of an entire tribunal and has
endorsed the ‘‘maxim of law to the effect that where
all [judges] are disqualified, none are disqualified.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fuller, 56
Conn. App. 592, 630, 744 A.2d 931, cert. denied, 252
Conn. 949, 748 A.2d 298, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911, 121
S. Ct. 262, 148 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2000); see also 48A C.J.S.,
Judges § 235 (2024) (‘‘The rule of necessity applies with
particular force where all judges are arguably disquali-
fied. In short, where all are disqualified, none are dis-
qualified. Therefore, where a particular conflict of inter-
est in a case applies equally to all state court judges,
the justices are not disqualified for such conflict under
the rule of necessity.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)).
The appellant’s claim that the entire commission
should have disqualified itself is foreclosed by the doc-
trine of necessity. We are aware of no forum, and the
appellant has identified none, in which the fee dispute
between the appellant and the appellee properly could
be resolved if the entire commission were to be disquali-
fied. This court has held that the adjudication of fee
disputes between successive counsel concerning their
representation of a claimant before the commission
rests squarely within the jurisdiction of the commission
and that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not per-
mit attorneys to resolve such disputes via a civil action
in the Superior Court, with its attendant right to a jury
trial.17 See Frantzen v. Davenport Electric, supra, 179
Conn. App. 855–56 (‘‘Abrogation of the common-law
17
We note, moreover, that for the reasons we have set forth in part II of
this opinion, the 2016 fee approval does not constitute an award subject to
enforcement in the Superior Court under § 31-327 (a).
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tort action, with its attendant right to jury trial, is the
necessary result of an effective administrative remedy
. . . [and] a jury trial on the subordinate issue of attor-
ney’s fees would partly defeat the purpose of the Work-
ers’ Compensation Act. As stated in a slightly different
context more than one hundred years ago: If the [a]ct
permits each cause to be appealed and tried de novo
in the Superior Court, its objects will be defeated
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)). Although the commission’s governing stat-
utes allow for the designation of other administrative
law judges to hear cases when one is disqualified; see
General Statutes §§ 31-278 and 31-280 (b); the conflict
of interest asserted by the appellant would apply equally
to all administrative law judges within the commission,
rendering this statutory remedy futile. Because disquali-
fication of the entire commission would ‘‘destroy the
only tribunal in which relief could be had’’ on this fee
dispute under our workers’ compensation scheme;
(internal quotation marks omitted) Dacey v. Connecti-
cut Bar Assn., supra, 170 Conn. 524; the appellant’s
claim fails.
IV
Finally, the appellant claims that the board improp-
erly overlooked the administrative law judge’s violation
of its due process right to be heard. We disagree.
In broad strokes, the appellant’s argument proceeds
as follows. The administrative law judge’s denial of
the appellant’s motions to dismiss and for a stay of
proceedings hinged on his resolution of certain ‘‘critical
factual disputes,’’ namely: (1) whether the claimant was
receiving permanent total incapacity benefits or tempo-
rary total incapacity benefits at the time of the 2016
fee approval; see footnote 7 of this opinion; and (2)
whether the entire commission should have been dis-
qualified because every administrative law judge on the
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commission had a personal interest in how the question
of Walker’s entitlement to recover a portion of the fee
would be resolved. In resolving these disputes, the
administrative law judge refused to hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the parties would have the opportunity
to introduce exhibits of their own and, instead, relied
on his own ‘‘handpicked evidentiary record’’—i.e., the
forty-three items of which he took administrative notice
during the June 23, 2021 hearing. Therefore, the appel-
lant was deprived of its right to be heard in a meaningful
manner on the jurisdictional issues it raised in its
motions to dismiss and for a stay of proceedings.
Some additional procedural history is necessary to
understand the appellant’s claim. Among the various
exhibits that the parties sought to introduce at the June
23, 2021 hearing was a copy of the claimant’s February
16, 2018 benefit check from The Hartford that referred
to her benefits as ‘‘[p]ermanent [t]otal [d]isability,’’ as
well as a copy of a December 28, 2015 contingency fee
agreement between the claimant and the appellant that
referred to the claimant as ‘‘a permanent tt.’’ As the
administrative law judge was marking the appellee’s
exhibits during the June 23, 2021 hearing, the appellant’s
counsel inquired of the appellee’s counsel as to the
relevance of two pages of one of the appellee’s proffered
exhibits, which included the aforementioned February
16, 2018 benefit check. The following colloquy ensued:
‘‘[The Administrative Law Judge]: All right. It’s a fair
point. What’s the purpose of the offer?
‘‘[The Appellee’s Counsel]: Just to demonstrate the
ongoing preservation of the fees consistent with the
order. I can get that through testimony if necessary.
I’m just trying to make it—
‘‘[The Administrative Law Judge]: Look—
‘‘[The Appellee’s Counsel]: Essentially, I’m trying to
establish that the [appellant] continue[s] to be paid [its]
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20 percent fee off the [permanent total] benefits through
the time of the settlement approval. If we agree on that,
then there’s no point to these.
‘‘[The Administrative Law Judge]: Okay. Is there any
disagreement about that, Attorney Levine?
‘‘[The Appellant’s Counsel]: No. That she was being
paid permanent total disability, and that the payments
continued up until the date of the stipulation, I have
no problem. I will agree to that.
‘‘[The Administrative Law Judge]: Well then, perhaps
the check, the check does, well—the check indicate[s]
permanent and total disability. If you don’t want these
in—I don’t frankly know that it makes—
‘‘[The Appellant’s Counsel]: I have no problem know-
ing that that’s the relevance.
‘‘[The Administrative Law Judge]: Okay. Without
objection, then, full exhibit J.’’
As we previously have explained, later in the June
23, 2021 hearing the administrative law judge deter-
mined that he could not determine which exhibits
would be material until he could identify the issues that
were properly subject to litigation before the commis-
sion. He therefore suspended the marking of exhibits
and designated all exhibits proffered by the parties as
being for identification only, including those that had
previously been marked as full. As such, the record on
which the administrative law judge relied in ruling on
the appellant’s motions to dismiss and for a stay of
proceedings contained the forty-three items of which
he had taken administrative notice but did not contain
any of the parties’ proffered exhibits.
By letter dated June 28, 2021, the administrative law
judge requested supplemental briefing from the parties
on certain legal issues pertaining to § 1-84b (b). In its
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brief submitted in response to this letter, the appellant
asserted—citing the colloquy between counsel and the
administrative law judge, as well as the appellee’s prof-
fered exhibit containing the February 16, 2018 benefit
check—that ‘‘[i]t is undisputed that [the claimant] was
being paid permanent total disability benefits at least
since [Salerno] approved [the appellant’s] 20 percent
fee of [the claimant’s] weekly indemnity benefits on
January 28, 2016.’’ The appellant also appeared to take
the position that the allegedly ‘‘permanent’’ character
of the claimant’s benefits at the time of the 2016 fee
approval was relevant—for reasons that it did not
clearly specify—to the 2016 fee approval’s status as an
‘‘award’’ subject to enforcement in the Superior Court
under § 31-327 (a).
In his memorandum of decision, the administrative
law judge addressed certain statements that the appel-
lant had made in its brief, including its claim that it
was ‘‘undisputed’’ that the claimant had been receiving
permanent total incapacity benefits since the 2016 fee
approval. The administrative law judge wrote: ‘‘It is
undisputed that the [appellant] was getting 20 percent
of [the claimant’s] weekly total incapacity checks until
the point of settlement; that was stipulated by the par-
ties on the record and will be so found on that basis.
As for the assertion that the claimant was on ‘permanent
total disability,’ however, that is not something of which
I could take notice because there is no award in the
file to which I might refer. (Indeed . . . the contempo-
raneous references at the time were to temporary total
incapacity.)’’ Elsewhere in his memorandum of deci-
sion, the administrative law judge referred to the claim-
ant’s benefits at the time of the 2016 fee approval as
‘‘temporary total disability’’ payments.
On appeal to the board, the appellant argued that ‘‘the
foundation of the [administrative law judge’s] rulings
is premised on his jurisdictional factual finding that
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[the 2016 fee approval] was based on the claimant’s
entitlement to temporary total disability benefits rather
than permanent total disability benefits.’’ It further con-
tended that the administrative law judge had deprived
it of due process and fundamental fairness because this
‘‘jurisdictional factual finding’’ was ‘‘derived from [the
administrative law judge’s] own creation of the eviden-
tiary record, whereby he chose which facts he would
consider by way of administrative notice and did so
with the express exclusion of the parties’ ability to
present evidence or cross-examine adverse witnesses.’’
The board rejected this claim. It concluded that the
transcript of the June 23, 2021 hearing ‘‘provides no
basis for the inference that had either of the parties
sought the submission of additional exhibits into the
record for the [administrative law judge’s] administra-
tive notice, such a request would have been automati-
cally denied’’ and that ‘‘the administrative law judge’s
decisions in this matter relative to the admission of
exhibits were consistent with the powers afforded him
by [General Statutes] §§ 31-278 and 31-298.’’18
Before this court, the appellant reiterates the claim
that it made to the board and further asserts that the
18
General Statutes § 31-278 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each administrative
law judge shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to summon
and examine under oath such witnesses, and may direct the production of,
and examine or cause to be produced or examined, such books, records,
vouchers, memoranda, documents, letters, contracts or other papers in
relation to any matter at issue as he may find proper, and shall have the
same powers in reference thereto as are vested in magistrates taking deposi-
tions and shall have the power to order depositions pursuant to section 52-
148. . . .’’
General Statutes § 31-298 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In all cases and
hearings under the provisions of this chapter, the administrative law judge
shall proceed, so far as possible, in accordance with the rules of equity. He
shall not be bound by the ordinary common law or statutory rules of evidence
or procedure, but shall make inquiry, through oral testimony, deposition
testimony or written and printed records, in a manner that is best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out the provisions
and intent of this chapter. . . .’’
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administrative law judge’s alleged due process violation
also tainted his ruling on the question of whether the
commission should be disqualified.19 The appellant’s
lengthy explanation of how the nature of the claimant’s
benefits as of the 2016 fee approval—permanent total
incapacity versus temporary total incapacity—is rele-
vant to the issue of the commission’s jurisdiction is not
a model of clarity. Indeed, it is not entirely clear if the
appellant is itself advancing this relevancy argument or
is merely ascribing such reasoning to the board and the
administrative law judge. What is clear is that—in the
appellant’s view—the question of whether the claim-
ant’s benefits at the time of the 2016 fee approval were
temporary total incapacity benefits, or permanent total
incapacity benefits, is (and/or was regarded by the com-
mission as) legally relevant to the question of whether
the 2016 fee approval constituted an award of attorney’s
fees subject to enforcement in the Superior Court pursu-
ant to § 31-327 (a).20
19
Although the appellant did not raise this latter portion of its claim in
its operative brief to the board, we exercise our discretion to review it. We
do so because (1) the record is adequate for review, in that there is no need
for additional proceedings or fact-finding to determine the merits of the
claim; (2) the parties have had an opportunity to be heard on the issue,
because the appellant raised this claim in its principal appellate brief and
the appellee responded to the appellant’s arguments in its own brief; and
(3) for the reasons we set forth in this part IV, the appellant cannot prevail
on this claim, and thus our consideration of the claim would not prejudice
the appellee. See, e.g., Kinity v. US Bancorp, 212 Conn. App. 791, 812–14,
277 A.3d 200 (2022); see also Northrup v. Witkowski, 332 Conn. 158, 186
n.20, 210 A.3d 29 (2019) (considering abandoned claim where plaintiffs who
had raised claim could not prevail and defendants had briefed claim).
20
Specifically, the appellant states in its principal appellate brief: ‘‘Here,
the underlying, albeit limited, evidence supports the undeniable conclusion
that the [2016 fee approval] constituted an enforceable award under § 31-
327 (a). At the time of the 2016 fee approval, the appellant had a fully
earned contingency fee. Significantly, the payment of the appellant’s earned
attorney’s fee continues after his discharge with two additional commis-
sioner orders enforcing this entitlement. The payments improperly cease
upon the commissioner’s award of the stipulation. The [board’s] disavowal
of the appellant’s earned contingency fee is achieved by . . . mischaracter-
izing the claimant’s indemnity benefit as temporary total absent any evidence
to support that finding . . . .’’
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The following legal principles are relevant to our
review of the appellant’s claim. ‘‘When issues of fact are
necessary to the determination of a court’s jurisdiction,
due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held,
in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.’’ Standard
Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503
(1983). ‘‘Whether a party was deprived of his due pro-
cess rights is a question of law to which appellate courts
grant plenary review. . . . The fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.
. . . The hearing must be at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner. . . . [T]hese principles require
that a [party] have . . . an effective opportunity to
defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally. . . .
Matters of procedure in compensation cases which do
not affect prejudicially the rights of parties, will not
avail upon appeal. Unless such rights be thus affected,
the form of procedure before the [administrative law
judge] is exclusively for his determination. It is only
when the rights of parties are prejudicially affected that
we will consider on appeal matters of procedure before
the [administrative law judge].’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Mikucka v. St.
Lucian’s Residence, Inc., 183 Conn. App. 147, 160–61,
191 A.3d 1083 (2018).

In the present case, even if we assume arguendo that
the administrative law judge’s decision to mark all of
the parties’ exhibits for identification only and to base
his ruling solely on the items of which he had taken
administrative notice violated due process, any error
was harmless. See, e.g., Turrell v. Dept. of Mental
Health & Addiction Services, 144 Conn. App. 834, 844,
73 A.3d 872, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 930, 78 A.3d 857
(2013). As we have explained, the administrative law
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42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

judge’s conclusion that the appellant lacked an enforce-
able award of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 31-327 (a)
did not rise or fall with his characterization of the claim-
ant’s benefits as temporary total incapacity benefits
versus permanent total incapacity benefits. He set forth
multiple independent bases for his conclusion, includ-
ing his determination—which the appellant has not per-
suasively challenged, and which we have affirmed in
part II of this opinion—that § 31-327 (a) applies to
awards against an employer or insurer, whereas the
2016 fee approval concerned an obligation owed by the
claimant to the appellant.
With respect to the appellant’s contention that the
administrative law judge’s alleged due process violation
tainted his determination that there was no basis for
disqualifying the entire commission, we note at the out-
set that the only specific piece of evidence relevant to
disqualification that the appellant claims was improp-
erly excluded—the notice of appearance entered by
Cantarella before the commission on June 14, 2018—
was in fact administratively noticed by the administra-
tive law judge and described in his findings of fact.
There is no indication from the record that the adminis-
trative law judge disregarded Walker’s status as a princi-
pal of the appellee or Walker’s former employment with
the commission. To the contrary, at one point in his
memorandum of decision the administrative law judge
stated that ‘‘the connection between Walker and Cantar-
ella is at the very heart of what we have been addressing’’;
at another point, he stated that ‘‘[the fact] [t]hat [Walker
and I] were once members of the same commission is
well known to all counsel in this case, including Attor-
ney Levine, who practiced before the both of us.’’ More-
over, to the extent that the appellant improperly was
prevented from entering any other evidence relevant
to the question of whether the entire commission should
have been disqualified, the appellant could not have
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Pelc v. Southington Dental Associates, P.C.

prevailed on this claim in any event because—as the
administrative law judge concluded, and as we discuss
in part III of this opinion—it is foreclosed by the doc-
trine of necessity. The appellant has not offered any
convincing argument to the contrary. The appellant’s
claim is therefore unavailing.
The appeal is dismissed as nonjusticiable on ripeness
grounds with respect to the appellant’s claim that the
Compensation Review Board improperly affirmed the
administrative law judge’s conclusion that an alleged
violation of § 1-84b (b) could not serve as a basis for
denying the appellee quantum meruit recovery of a por-
tion of the escrowed attorney’s fee; the decision of the
Compensation Review Board is affirmed in all other
respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.