Pascual v. Perry

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 483
Pascual v. Perry

ALEXA PASCUAL ET AL. v. TAMMY K. PERRY
(AC 46674)
Alvord, Cradle and Vertefeuille, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court for the defendant
on the count of her counterclaim alleging adverse possession of certain real
property. They claimed, inter alia, that the court erroneously concluded that
the defendant could tack the period of adverse possession of her predecessor
in title, V, onto her own. Held:
The trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s and V’s exclusive mainte-
nance of the disputed area was sufficient to satisfy the open and visible
use element of adverse possession was not clearly erroneous.
The trial court’s finding that V’s possession of the disputed area was hostile
was not clearly erroneous, as the court made its finding of hostile possession
after properly considering and weighing all relevant evidence before it,
including evidence allegedly demonstrating V’s permissive use.
The trial court did not err in its conclusion that the defendant was entitled
to tack V’s period of adverse possession onto her own, as evidence in the
record was sufficient to establish V’s implied intent to transfer possession
of the disputed area to the defendant.
This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ inadequately briefed claim that
the judgment of foreclosure rendered against the plaintiffs’ predecessor in
title interrupted the statutory period for adverse possession as a matter
of law.
(One judge dissenting)
Argued September 16, 2024—officially released February 4, 2025

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, seeking to quiet title to certain real
property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Hon. John W. Pickard, judge trial
referee; judgment for the defendant on the complaint
and in part on the counterclaim, from which the plain-
tiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Luis A. Medina, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Stephanie M. Weaver, for the appellee (defendant).
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Opinion

CRADLE, J. The plaintiffs, Alexa Pascual and Freiny
Francisco, appeal, following a trial to the court, from the
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Tammy
K. Perry, on the count of her counterclaim alleging
adverse possession. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that
the court erroneously concluded that (1) the defen-
dant’s and her predecessor in title’s use of the disputed
area was open and visible; (2) the defendant’s predeces-
sor in title’s possession of the disputed area was hostile;
and (3) the defendant could tack her predecessor in
title’s period of adverse possession onto her own, and,
additionally, (4) the court erred in failing to find that
the defendant’s adverse possession rights were extin-
guished by the judgment of foreclosure rendered
against the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history, are relevant to our resolution
of the claims on appeal. The parties own adjoining resi-
dential properties in a subdivision in Torrington. The
defendant owns the real property known as 53 Hartford
Avenue, and the plaintiffs own the abutting property
to the east known as 14 Albany Street.1 The defendant
purchased 53 Hartford Avenue on June 4, 2015, from
Veta Pipa, who had owned the property since June
19, 1985. The plaintiffs purchased 14 Albany Street on
October 22, 2015, from Hudson City Savings Bank, fol-
lowing a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered against
the previous owner, Arshad Tarar.2
At some point during the spring of 2020, the plaintiffs
hired a fencing company to install fencing along their
1
The defendant’s property is a corner lot with frontage on Hartford Avenue
as well as Albany Street. The eastern boundary of her property, facing
Albany Street, borders the western boundary of the plaintiffs’ property.
2
The court took judicial notice of the judgment of foreclosure, which was
rendered on October 20, 2014, with an ejectment date of January 14, 2015.
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southerly and westerly borders, and a dispute arose
between the defendant and the plaintiffs regarding the
shared boundary line between their properties. This
resulted in the plaintiffs hiring David J. Little, a licensed
land surveyor, who produced a survey which demon-
strated that an approximately 925 square foot area (the
disputed area) was within the plaintiffs’ property.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought this action against
the defendant, seeking, inter alia, to quiet title to the
disputed area in their favor. The defendant admitted
in her answer that the disputed area was within the
plaintiffs’ deeded property3 but counterclaimed, inter
alia, that she had acquired title to the disputed area by
virtue of adverse possession.
On June 21, 2023, following a trial, the court, Hon.
John W. Pickard, judge trial referee, issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it found in favor of the defen-
dant on the count of her counterclaim alleging adverse
possession. The court found that ‘‘the current line of
possession was created more than thirty-five years ago
and has remained unchanged since that time. From
June, 1985, to June, 2015, . . . Pipa believed that she
owned the disputed area . . . and used it as her own.
This care and use was to the exclusion of anyone else
including the plaintiffs and all of the other owners of
14 Albany Street since June 19, 1985. The defendant
continued to treat the disputed area in the same way
as her predecessor [in title] . . . . The defendant is
able to ‘tack’ . . . Pipa’s thirty years of exclusive use
of the disputed piece onto five more years of her own
3
The defendant also hired a licensed land surveyor, David Zygmont, who
produced a survey of the defendant’s property. Zygmont’s map showed the
deeded property line to be in the same location as Little’s map. Both maps
were admitted as full exhibits, and both surveyors, testifying as experts at
trial, indicated that their maps were based in part on a 1916 subdivision
map showing the deeded property line to be a straight line. It was undisputed
that the surveyors’ maps accurately reflected the true boundary line between
the parties’ properties.
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use. This creates an uninterrupted period of thirty-five
years of exclusive use . . . .’’ The court therefore con-
cluded that all of the elements of adverse possession
had been met. Accordingly, the court entered judgment
quieting title to the disputed area in favor of the defen-
dant. This appeal followed.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims,
we identify the legal principles relevant to an adverse
possession claim. ‘‘[T]o establish title by adverse pos-
session, the claimant must oust an owner of possession
and keep such owner out without interruption for fif-
teen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession
under a claim of right with the intent to use the property
as his [or her] own and without the consent of the
owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor
v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 581, 31 A.3d 1 (2011); see
also General Statutes § 52-575 (a). ‘‘It is sufficient if
there is an adverse possession continued uninterrupt-
edly for fifteen years whether by one or more persons.
. . . [T]he possession [however] must be connected
and continuous . . . . If one party’s period of use or
possession is insufficient to satisfy the fifteen year
requirement, that party may tack on the period of use
or possession of someone who is in privity with the
party, a relationship that may be established by showing
a transfer of possession rights.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton,
224 Conn. App. 66, 75, 312 A.3d 100, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 904, 312 A.3d 1057 (2024).
‘‘It is well established that one claiming title to real
property by adverse possession must prove by clear
and positive evidence each element of actual, open,
notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession
for the full fifteen year statutory period.’’ Mulle v.
McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 809, 927 A.2d 921, cert.
denied, 284 Conn. 907, 931 A.2d 265 (2007). ‘‘A finding
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of adverse possession is not to be made out by infer-
ence, but by clear and positive proof. . . . [C]lear and
convincing proof . . . denotes a degree of belief that
lies between the belief that is required to find the truth
or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil
action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a
criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if
evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable
belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true,
that the probability that they are true or exist is substan-
tially greater than the probability that they are false or
do not exist.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lisiewski v. Seidel, 95 Conn. App. 696,
712, 899 A.2d 59 (2006).
‘‘Despite [this] exacting standard, our scope of review
is limited. . . . Because adverse possession is a ques-
tion of fact for the trier . . . the court’s findings as to
this claim are binding upon this court unless they are
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the plead-
ings in the record as a whole. . . . We cannot retry the
facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. . . .
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed
. . . . A trial court’s findings in an adverse possession
case, if supported by sufficient evidence, are binding
on a reviewing court . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, supra,
102 Conn. App. 809. ‘‘The legal conclusions that the
court drew from those facts are subject to plenary
review.’’ Padula v. Arborio, 219 Conn. App. 432, 459–60,
296 A.3d 276, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 903, 301 A.3d 528
(2023); see also O’Connor v. Larocque, supra, 302 Conn.
573 (‘‘[I]t is the province of the trial court to find the
facts upon which [such a] claim is based. Whether those
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facts make out a case of adverse possession is a ques-
tion of law reviewable by this court.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). With these principles in mind, we
address the plaintiffs’ claims in turn.
I
We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that the court
erroneously concluded that the use of the disputed area
by the defendant and her predecessor in title was open
and visible in that the defendant failed to present evi-
dence ‘‘demonstrat[ing] intrusive acts’’ that would have
placed the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title on
notice of the adverse possession.4 We disagree.
‘‘The legal significance of the open and visible ele-
ment is not . . . an inquiry as to whether a record
owner subjectively possessed an understanding that a
claimant was attempting to claim the owner’s property
as his own. Rather, the open and visible element
requires a fact finder to examine the extent and visibility
of the claimant’s use of the record owner’s property so
as to determine whether a reasonable owner would
believe that the claimant was using that property as his
or her own.’’ Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn. App. 361,
368, 952 A.2d 73, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 944, 959 A.2d
1009 (2008).
‘‘This court previously has held . . . that a party’s
maintenance of a disputed area, including planting and
maintaining vegetation, may demonstrate an open and
visible use of that area. See, e.g., Padula v. Arborio,
supra, 219 Conn. App. 460 (plaintiffs removed soil and
grass, installed sprinkler system, laid down new sod,
4
In accordance with our Supreme Court’s precedent, we ‘‘may address
the claims in whichever order most readily addresses the matter at hand.’’
State v. Annulli, 309 Conn. 482, 492 n.6, 71 A.3d 530 (2013). Accordingly,
although not the first claim raised in the plaintiffs’ appellate brief, we address
this claim first because the relevant factual background provides context
necessary for the resolution of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims.
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dug out old tree and planted new trees, and replaced
fence, among other things, in disputed area); 98 Lords
Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords Highway, LLC,
138 Conn. App. 776, 811, 54 A.3d 232 (2012) (party made
permanent improvements on land, including cleaning
area of underbrush, cutting some trees down, planting
lawn, trees, and garden, and installing fence in disputed
area); Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., 111 Conn. App.
636, 642, 960 A.2d 1083 (2008) (plaintiffs planted and
maintained hedges and trees and maintained lawn,
among other things, in disputed area); Schlichting v.
Cotter, [supra, 109 Conn. App. 367–69] (plaintiff pruned
and removed trees, planted and maintained plants,
removed poison ivy from trees and removed sumac
from foliage, raked leaves, mowed, fertilized and main-
tained lawn, and planted, cultivated and maintained
garden, among other things, in disputed area) . . . .’’5
Viering v. Groton Long Point Assn., Inc., 223 Conn.
App. 849, 875–76, 311 A.3d 215, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
901, 312 A.3d 586 (2024).

Here, the defendant presented at trial testimony from
Joan Altschuler, Pipa’s daughter; William Jacquemin,
Pipa’s landscaper from 1993 to 2015; and Glen Burger,
5
The plaintiffs argue that the present case is distinguishable from the
cases cited in Viering v. Groton Long Point Assn., Inc., 223 Conn. App.
849, 311 A.3d 215, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 901, 312 A.3d 586 (2024), in that
each of those cases ‘‘contained . . . intrusive acts, uses and/or activities
that do not exist in this case’’ and, accordingly, assert that Pipa’s use was
not sufficiently open and visible because ‘‘[n]one of Pipa’s activities created
a permanent structure or improvement.’’ Although this court has considered
permanent alterations to disputed land as a factor demonstrating open and
visible use, we have not held that such alterations, or the lack thereof, are
dispositive in determining whether a claimant’s use of disputed land is
open and visible. Cf. Viering v. Groton Long Point Assn., Inc., supra, 876
(claimants’ use of land was not open and visible because, ‘‘[u]nlike in [cases
where maintenance of disputed area was sufficient to support such a finding],
the [claimants] in the present case did not themselves plant any of the
vegetation . . . and they did not submit any evidence to demonstrate that
they maintained the vegetation in a visible and apparent manner’’).
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who owned the property bordering the southerly bound-
ary of 53 Hartford Avenue from 1995 to 2021. The court
found each witness’ testimony to be ‘‘entirely credible’’
and, on the basis of their collective testimony, found
the following facts.
The disputed area is ‘‘bounded on the west by the
deeded boundary line between the [parties’] properties,
and on the east by two straight lines which meet at the
edge of a stockade fence.’’ The stockade fence had
been constructed on the plaintiffs’ property by Benny
Visconti, a previous owner of 14 Albany Street, prior
to Pipa’s purchase of 53 Hartford Avenue. This fence
does not extend all the way to the northerly boundary
abutting Albany Street, but, rather, it extends roughly
to the rear wall of the plaintiffs’ house, at which point
it turns eastward ‘‘so as to enclose the backyard of the
plaintiffs’ property.’’ The stockade fence also does not
extend all the way to the southerly boundary of the
plaintiffs’ property, although the court found that, ‘‘dur-
ing . . . Pipa’s ownership, the fence extended farther
south than it does at the moment, nearly to the southerly
boundary of both properties.’’ When Pipa purchased 53
Hartford Avenue in 1985, there was also a ‘‘V-shaped
split rail fence’’ located on the northern boundary of
the plaintiffs’ property, which was ‘‘actually located on
the shoulder of Albany Street but appears to be located
at the corner of both properties. The plaintiff[s]
replaced the split rail fence with [a] vinyl fence some-
time after [they] bought the property. The entire fence
is located approximately ten feet from the deeded
boundary line. The sides of the fence form a ‘V,’ which
is the corner of the disputed piece.’’
When Pipa purchased 53 Hartford Avenue in 1985,
she planted flowers within the disputed area, which
‘‘continued for the entire time of her ownership.’’6 There
6
We further note that, at trial, the defendant admitted as full exhibits,
inter alia, photographs of 53 Hartford Avenue dated 1992 and 2008, both of
which showed different flower beds purportedly located within the disputed
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was also a ‘‘grass lined drainage ditch’’ within the dis-
puted area, ‘‘intended to drain water coming from the
higher elevation of the plaintiffs’ property away from
the defendant’s house,’’ when Pipa purchased 53 Hart-
ford Avenue. Pipa, her daughter, and her landscaper
‘‘regularly removed leaves from this ditch.’’ At some
point in 2013, after experiencing water in the basement
of her home, Pipa hired a contractor to place gravel
in the drainage ditch and install a ‘‘yard drain.’’ ‘‘The
evidence is not clear about the workings of the ‘yard
drain,’ but the evidence is that there is no underground
piping involved with the gravel ditch.’’
Between 1993 and 2015, Jacquemin ‘‘mowed the lawn,
removed the leaves, and helped mulch the garden.’’
When Pipa first hired Jacquemin and showed him the
boundary lines of her property, ‘‘[h]er description
included the disputed area, and [Jacquemin] used those
boundaries of the disputed area as the limits of his
maintenance. In accordance with his instructions from
. . . Pipa, . . . Jacquemin always mowed the grass up
to [the] stockade fence and up to a line marking the
continuation of the fence in a northerly direction to the
pavement of Albany Street at the intersection of [the]
split rail fence . . . . He believed that . . . Pipa
owned the disputed area and always maintained it as
part of . . . Pipa’s land.’’ After the defendant pur-
chased the property from Pipa in 2015, she continued
to use and maintain the disputed area in the same man-
ner as Pipa and, additionally, ‘‘expanded the size of the
garden to include more of the disputed area devoted
to vegetables . . . .’’7 ‘‘Between [October, 2015] and
the spring of 2020, [the plaintiffs] never challenged the
area. When Altschuler was shown these photographs at trial, she identified
the flower beds as belonging to Pipa.
7
We note that the defendant’s expansion of the garden occurred within
the existing boundaries of the disputed area, as established by Pipa in 1985,
and thus did not enlarge the size of the disputed area.
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defendant’s maintenance and use of the disputed area.
Their inaction allowed the defendant to mow the grass,
rake the leaves, work in the garden, clean the drainage
ditch within the disputed area, and continue to treat
the disputed area as her own.’’
On the basis of the foregoing, the court concluded
that the exclusive maintenance of the disputed area by
the defendant and her predecessor in title was sufficient
to satisfy the open and visible use element of adverse
possession. After reviewing the record, we conclude
that the court properly relied on the evidence that Pipa
or her landscaper, occasionally with the help of Pipa’s
daughter or neighbor, regularly and exclusively main-
tained the disputed area from 1985 to 2015. This mainte-
nance included mowing, weed whacking, hedge trim-
ming, fertilizing, mulching, planting and maintaining
multiple flower gardens, blowing out the flower beds
biannually, fall and spring clean-ups, cleaning out the
drainage ditch, and, on at least one occasion, the
removal of tree roots within the disputed area. Burger’s
testimony highlighted the visibility of these efforts, as
he indicated that the disputed area was mowed weekly
and that Pipa could be seen regularly cleaning out the
drainage ditch as well as working in the flower beds
‘‘all the time.’’ Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s
finding with respect to the open and visible use element
of adverse possession was not clearly erroneous.
II
We next address the plaintiffs’ claim that the court
erroneously found that Pipa’s possession of the dis-
puted area was hostile.8 The plaintiffs do not contend
8
We note that the plaintiffs claim only that the court’s finding of hostile
possession was erroneous with respect to Pipa’s possession of the disputed
area and, accordingly, the plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s finding
of hostile possession with respect to the defendant’s possession of the
disputed area.
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that Pipa had express permission to use the disputed
area, but they argue that their predecessors in title,
siblings Benny Visconti and Elise Visconti, had acqui-
esced to Pipa’s use of the disputed area, thereby render-
ing such use permissive rather than hostile.9 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs claim that the court’s finding of
hostile possession was erroneous in that the court
‘‘fail[ed] to consider’’ evidence allegedly demonstrating
Pipa’s permissive use. We are not persuaded.
‘‘As a general proposition, to satisfy the hostility
requirement of adverse possession, a claimant’s posses-
sion of the disputed land, from its inception, must be
without permission, license or consent of the owner
and must continue to be so throughout the required
fifteen year period. . . . The word hostile, as employed
in the law of adverse possession, is a term of art; it
does not, despite some troublesome early cases, imply
animosity, ill will or bad faith. Nor is the claimant
required to make express declarations of adverse intent
during the possessory period. . . . Hostile possession
can be understood as possession that is opposed and
antagonistic to all other claims, and that conveys the
clear message that the possessor intends to possess the
land as his or her own.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v.
McCauley, supra, 102 Conn. App. 813–14.
‘‘To establish that the claimant used the land under
a claim of right, the intent of the possessor to use
the property as his own must be shown. . . . [P]rior
permission may undermine the existence of a claim of
right [because] use of the land by the express or implied
permission by the true owner is not adverse . . . .’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
9
The plaintiffs, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) p. 23, state
in their brief that ‘‘[t]o ‘acquiesce’ is defined as ‘to accept tacitly or passively;
to give implied consent to (an act).’ ’’
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Padula v. Arborio, supra, 219 Conn. App. 448. Where
there is no direct evidence of express permission or
an express claim of right, ‘‘the character of the [use],
whether adverse or permissive, can be determined as
an inference10 from the [circumstances] of the parties
and the nature of the [use]. . . . A trier has a wide
latitude in drawing an inference that a [use] was under
a claim of right.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Brander v. Stod-
dard, 173 Conn. App. 730, 751, 164 A.3d 889, cert.
denied, 327 Conn. 928, 171 A.3d 456 (2017).
In support of their claim, the plaintiffs highlight cer-
tain evidence presented at trial allegedly demonstrating
that Pipa’s use of the disputed area was permissive.
Specifically, they claim that, ‘‘[u]nder the circumstances
of [Benny] Visconti’s handicap,11 the fact that [the Vis-
contis] erected the stockade fence prior to Pipa’s ten-
ure, the fact that [the Viscontis] could not have built
the stockade fence on the bank, the fact that [Altschuler
testified that] Pipa was shown the iron boundary pins,
together with the friendship between [Pipa and the Vis-
contis], shows [the Viscontis’] acquiescence’’ as to
10
Although a finding of adverse possession must be made out by clear
and positive proof rather than by inference; see Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 95
Conn. App. 712; this court has clarified that this principle is more accurately
understood ‘‘to condemn only the use of presumptions to aid the proof
of essential elements of a claim of adverse possession, not inferences.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Woycik v. Woycik, 13 Conn. App. 518, 522, 537 A.2d
541 (1988). It does not mean that ‘‘facts proved to the satisfaction of the
trier which logically and reasonably lead to the establishment of other
facts—that is, inferences—may not aid in the proof of a claim of adverse
possession. . . . [It] does not require that the proof establishing the claim
be based entirely on direct evidence, as opposed to circumstantial evidence
and the logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The law
does not impose such a mental straight jacket on the trier of fact in an adverse
possession case.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 523–24. Accordingly, although
‘‘adverse possession is not to be presumed . . . [t]his does not mean . . .
that inferences may not be properly used in such cases to support a finding of
adverse possession by clear and positive proof.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 524.
11
The testimony at trial reflected that Benny had only one leg and was
confined to a wheelchair.
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Pipa’s use of the disputed area. We disagree with the
plaintiffs’ claim that the court failed to consider this
evidence, particularly where the trial court, in its memo-
randum of decision, expressly mentioned much of the
evidence that the plaintiffs claimed it failed to consider,
namely, that the stockade fence was erected prior to
Pipa’s ownership, that the fence was built along a rise
in elevation on the plaintiffs’ property, and that the
Viscontis and Pipa were friendly with each other.12
Moreover, after our review of the record, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding of hostile possession. At trial, the court was
presented with testimony that Pipa, throughout the
thirty years that she owned 53 Hartford Avenue, regu-
larly and freely used the disputed area as if it were
part of her deeded property. In addition, there was no
evidence presented that any owner of 14 Albany Street,
or anyone else, had objected to Pipa’s use of the dis-
puted area or had tried to enter or use the area them-
selves. See, e.g., Mulle v. McCauley, supra, 102 Conn.
App. 816 (concluding that finding of hostile possession
was not clearly erroneous where, despite familial rela-
tionship between parties, there was no evidence pre-
sented that anyone other than claimants had used or
maintained disputed property during prior fifty years).
The court also was presented with testimony that Jac-
quemin had never asked the owners of 14 Albany Street
for permission to work on the disputed area, as he
stated that he ‘‘had no need to’’ because Pipa had told
12
Although the court in its memorandum of decision did not specifically
mention Visconti’s physical disability or Altschuler’s testimony regarding
the boundary pins, ‘‘[w]e cannot assume that the court’s conclusions were
reached without due weight having been given to the evidence presented
and the facts found. . . . Unless the contrary appears, this court will assume
that the court acted properly’’ in that it considered all the relevant evidence
before it. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weathers, 188 Conn.
App. 600, 609 n.9, 205 A.3d 614 (2019), aff’d, 339 Conn. 187, 260 A.3d 440
(2021).
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Pascual v. Perry

him that she owned the disputed area. See Bennett v.
Bowditch, 163 Conn. App. 750, 756–57, 137 A.3d 81
(2016) (evidence of regular occupation, use, and
improvement of disputed area without requesting con-
sent or permission of record owner supported finding
of hostile possession); cf. Dowling v. Heirs of Bond,
345 Conn. 119, 157–58, 282 A.3d 1201 (2022) (evidence
that claimants sought record owner’s endorsement to
repair structure within disputed area, and lack of evi-
dence that claimants had held themselves out as exclu-
sive owners of disputed parcel, supported finding that
claimants were not acting under claim of right).
Accordingly, it appears from the record before us
that the court, rather than failing to consider evidence
allegedly demonstrating Pipa’s permissive use, made its
finding of hostile possession after properly considering
and weighing the relevant evidence before it.13 Because
there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding, we conclude that it was not clearly erroneous.14
13
The plaintiffs also argue that the court’s finding was erroneous because
there was no evidence of Pipa’s clear repudiation of the Viscontis’ permission
to use the disputed area. In so arguing, the plaintiffs rely on this court’s
decision in Brander v. Stoddard, supra, 173 Conn. App. 746, in which we
stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough possession that is originally permissive may become
hostile, it does so only if [the permission] is clearly repudiated by the
occupant. . . . Such repudiation must be shown by some clear, positive,
and unequivocal act brought home to the owner or the use will be presumed
to be permissive.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiffs’ reliance on Brander, however, is misplaced. A showing of
clear repudiation is not necessary where, as we conclude from the record
here, there was no finding that possession had ever been permissive.
14
The plaintiffs further claim that the court’s finding of adverse possession
relied on improper inferences because, they argue, there was insufficient
evidence that ‘‘Pipa’s use was open, visible, [and] without permission for
the statutory period.’’ However, as set forth in parts I and II of this opinion,
we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding
that Pipa’s use was open, visible, and without permission for the statutory
period. Moreover, as stated herein, the court was not precluded from using
any logical and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in finding that the
elements of adverse possession had been established. See footnote 10 of
this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim is without
merit. Cf. Lisiewski v. Seidel, supra, 95 Conn. App. 711–12 (concluding that
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III
The plaintiffs next claim that, because there was
insufficient evidence of Pipa’s intent to convey the dis-
puted area when she sold 53 Hartford Avenue to the
defendant, the court erred in concluding that the defen-
dant was able to tack Pipa’s thirty years of adverse
possession onto her own. We are not convinced.
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles.
‘‘If one party’s period of use or possession is insufficient
to satisfy the fifteen year requirement [for adverse pos-
session], that party may tack on the period of use or
possession of someone who is in privity with the party,
a relationship that may be established by showing a
transfer of possession rights.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, supra, 224
Conn. App. 75. ‘‘Privity of estate is not necessary, but
rather, privity of possession. . . . Doubtless the pos-
session must be connected and continuous, so that the
possession of the true owner shall not constructively
intervene between them; but such continuity and con-
nection may be effected by any conveyance agreement
or understanding which has for its object a transfer of
the rights of the possessor, or of his possession, and
is accompanied by a transfer of possession in fact. . . .
Privity of possession is defined as a continuity of actual
possession, as between prior and present occupant, the
possession of the latter succeeding the possession of
the former under deed, grant, or other transfer or by
operation of law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 76. ‘‘The question, therefore, is
[whether] a grantor intended to convey the disputed
area to the grantee, thereby establishing the continuous
connection between successive adverse claimants required
court improperly inferred that statutory period of adverse possession had
been met where record contained no evidence at all with respect to duration
of claimant’s use of disputed area).
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to find privity and tack the successive adverse uses.’’
Id., 80.
‘‘It is clear from our case law . . . that an express
conveyance of the disputed area either orally or by deed
is sufficient to establish that the grantor intended to
convey the disputed area.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id. How-
ever, this court recently held in Supronowicz v. Eaton,
supra, 224 Conn. App. 80–81, that privity also exists
where a grantor’s intent to convey the disputed area
can be established by implication. In Supronowicz, this
court explained that ‘‘the doctrine which appears gener-
ally to prevail is that a transfer in fact of adverse posses-
sion, or the adverse possession and claim of an area
not within the description of the deed or contract, will
be effective for tacking purposes though the same
appears to have occurred by implication only, by force
of the circumstances and acts of the parties, and is not
shown to have been evidenced by any declaration of
transfer or other direct words.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 82. ‘‘Implication of a transfer of
possession of the disputed area is most commonly
found in two circumstances: (1) when the disputed area
is enclosed within the deed described property or (2)
when a building or other structure stands in part on
the disputed area.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 83. Some
courts also ‘‘have analogized natural boundaries to
cases involving fences and have found an implied trans-
fer on the basis of the existence of a natural boundary.’’
Id., 85; see also id., 85–86 (reversing summary judgment
denying plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim on basis
that, where disputed area was bound by ravine and
creek, disputed area’s enclosure by natural boundaries
presented genuine issue of material fact as to whether
privity existed). ‘‘Whether an implied transfer of [a]
disputed area may be inferred from the evidence . . .
raises a question of fact . . . .’’ Id., 85–86. ‘‘The legal
conclusions that the court drew from those facts are
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Pascual v. Perry

subject to plenary review.’’ Padula v. Arborio, supra,
219 Conn. App. 459–60.
In the present case, the court concluded that the
defendant was able to tack Pipa’s period of possession
onto her own. We agree with the plaintiffs that the
record does not indicate that Pipa expressly conveyed
the disputed area to the defendant.15 On appeal, the
plaintiffs acknowledge this court’s holding in Supro-
nowicz, but they assert that intent cannot be implied
here because ‘‘there are no improvements or structures’’
within the disputed area. Even assuming this conclu-
sory assertion to be legally accurate,16 the plaintiffs do
not address whether the disputed area was enclosed
within the defendant’s deed described property, thereby
establishing Pipa’s implied intent to transfer possession
of the disputed area when she conveyed 53 Hartford
Avenue to the defendant. We note that it is not contested
that, at the time of Pipa’s conveyance to the defendant,
a portion of the disputed area was bordered by the
stockade fence.17 See Supronowicz v. Eaton, supra, 224
15
The description of the property in the defendant’s warranty deed, which
she received pursuant to her purchase of 53 Hartford Avenue, references
the 1916 subdivision map, which depicts the true boundary line between
the properties. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Additionally, the defendant
testified that she had never discussed nor had any direct communication
with Pipa herself regarding the boundary line.
16
We do not address the merits of this assertion and note only that the
plaintiffs do not offer any legal analysis regarding whether the improved
gravel drainage ditch, including the yard drain that Pipa hired a contractor
to install, constitutes a ‘‘structure’’ for purposes of implying a predecessor
in title’s intent to convey a disputed area.
17
The court further found ‘‘clear and convincing evidence that, during
. . . Pipa’s ownership, the [stockade] fence extended farther south than it
does at this moment, nearly to the southerly boundary of both properties.’’
Although the court did not expressly find that the fence extended farther
south specifically at the time of Pipa’s conveyance to the defendant on June
4, 2015, such a conclusion is supported by the testimony of Jacquemin,
whom the court found ‘‘entirely credible.’’ Specifically, Jacquemin testified
that he maintained Pipa’s lawn ‘‘all the way up [until] the house was sold’’
and that the stockade fence extended to the southern boundary of Pipa’s
property without any gaps.
We also note that, in addition to the stockade fence, there was a split rail
fence at the northern boundary of the plaintiffs’ property when Pipa con-
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Conn. App. 83 n.12 (noting majority rule that ‘‘succes-
sive adverse possessions . . . of an area not within the
description of the deed or contract but lying along and
extending up to a fence apparently marking the bound-
ary line between the land sold and neighboring land
may be tacked upon the theory of an implied delivery
of possession of such area’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We further note that, although the disputed
area was not bound by an overt natural boundary such
as a river or creek, the court found that the abutting
stockade fence is ‘‘located at the top of a small rise in
elevation,’’ and, on our review of the record, it appears
that this rise in elevation in fact abuts a substantial
portion of the disputed area’s eastern boundary.
Moreover, we reiterate that implied transference of
a disputed area occurs ‘‘by force of the circumstances
and acts of the parties . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Supronowicz v. Eaton, supra,
224 Conn. App. 82. The court found, and the record
supports, that, ‘‘[f]rom June, 1985, to June, 2015, . . .
Pipa believed that she owned the disputed area.’’
Accordingly, it is reasonable for the court to infer that
Pipa intended to transfer possession of the disputed
area to the defendant pursuant to the conveyance of
53 Hartford Avenue in June, 2015. See Supronowicz v.
Eaton, supra, 85 (suggesting that predecessors in title’s
belief that they owned disputed area at time of convey-
ance is relevant to determination of whether there was
veyed 53 Hartford Avenue to the defendant. This fence was ‘‘actually located
on the shoulder of Albany Street’’ and, therefore, did not border the disputed
area. However, this fence ‘‘appear[ed] to be located at the corner of both
properties’’ and ‘‘the sides of the fence form[ed] a ‘V,’ which is the corner
of the disputed property.’’ We note only that, although the stockade fence
did not extend to the northern boundary of Pipa’s property, the record
indicates that Pipa used her property as if it did. Specifically, the court
found that, ‘‘[i]n accordance with his instructions from . . . Pipa . . . Jac-
quemin always mowed the grass up to [the] stockade fence and up to a line
marking the continuation of the fence in a northerly direction to the pave-
ment of Albany Street at the intersection of [the] split rail fence.’’
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implied transference of disputed area). In addition, hav-
ing thoroughly reviewed the record, it appears to us
that Pipa’s actions consistently evinced her intent to
transfer possession of the disputed area to the defen-
dant pursuant to the conveyance of 53 Hartford Avenue.
Specifically, the record reflects that, although Pipa sold
the property to the defendant on June 4, 2015, Pipa had
vacated the property and moved into a nearby apart-
ment around the end of 2014. Even after Pipa left 53
Hartford Avenue, though, she continued to pay Jacque-
min to maintain the disputed area in preparation of her
selling the property, and she also returned weekly to
maintain her flower beds which were found by the court
to be within the disputed area. When Pipa subsequently
listed the property for sale, the listing included several
exterior photographs of the property which predomi-
nately featured the drainage ditch and other portions
of the disputed area.18 Additionally, pursuant to the
sale of the property, Pipa provided to the defendant a
Residential Property Condition Disclosure Report,
wherein Pipa indicated that the improved drainage
ditch, which sits entirely within the disputed area, was
part of 53 Hartford Avenue.
We emphasize that, for purposes of the tacking doc-
trine, ‘‘[w]hether privity exists in cases of implied trans-
ference is inherently a fact dependent inquiry.’’ Id., 85.
On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that
the court’s determination that the defendant could avail
herself of the tacking doctrine is legally incorrect or
factually unsupported.
IV
Finally, the plaintiffs claim on appeal that the court
erred in failing to find that the judgment of foreclosure
18
Altschuler testified that Pipa’s real estate agent had taken the photo-
graphs but that Pipa personally approved each photograph to be included
in the listing.
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rendered against the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title, as
a matter of law and fact, interrupted the statutory period
for adverse possession. The record, however, indicates
that the plaintiffs did not raise this argument before
the trial court, and, therefore, the court did not rule on
this issue. It is well established that ‘‘[o]ur appellate
courts, as a general practice, will not review claims
made for the first time on appeal. . . . [A]n appellate
court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is
not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause
our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also]
will not address issues not decided by the trial court.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
White v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610,
619–20, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014).
Moreover, we conclude that the plaintiffs, even had
they preserved this issue for appeal, have abandoned
the claim due to their failure to adequately brief the
issue. ‘‘We are not required to review issues that have
been improperly presented to this court through an
inadequate brief . . . . Analysis, rather than mere
abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid aban-
doning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.
. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to con-
sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal
principle without analyzing the relationship between
the facts of the case and the law cited.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Michael
T., 194 Conn. App. 598, 617, 222 A.3d 105 (2019), cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 982, 242 A.3d 104 (2020).
On appeal, the plaintiffs summarily assert that ‘‘[a]n
adverse possession claim can be extinguished by a judg-
ment of foreclosure provided the parcels in dispute
‘were the subject of [a] foreclosure proceeding.’ ’’ How-
ever, the case the plaintiffs quote, and the sole authority
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on which the plaintiffs rely, Wildwood Associates, Ltd.
v. Esposito, 211 Conn. 36, 557 A.2d 1241 (1989), does
not support their conclusory assertion. In Wildwood
Associates, Ltd., because the court concluded that ‘‘the
property in dispute was not included in the parcels that
were the subject of . . . [the] foreclosure proceed-
ings[s],’’ it never reached the issue of whether a judg-
ment of foreclosure could extinguish vested adverse
possession rights. Id., 47. Moreover, in the plaintiffs’
fleeting discussion of the issue in their principal brief,
they fail to explain with any specificity how the judg-
ment of foreclosure itself had any effect on the defen-
dant’s vested adverse possession rights.19 Accordingly,
because the plaintiffs fail to advance a substantive legal
or factual argument in support of this claim, we con-
clude that it is inadequately briefed. We therefore
decline to review this abandoned claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion, VERTEFEUILLE, J., concurred.

19
Rather, the cursory arguments advanced therein appear to address
whether the requisite time period for adverse possession had been met at
all. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that ‘‘[t]estimony and all evidence reveal
[that] the time for adverse possession did not begin to run until the defendant
disputed the boundary line in 2020’’ and that the court erred in finding that
‘‘the current line of possession was created more than thirty-five years ago’’
because ‘‘the record is devoid of when the statutory time should have
commenced.’’ Indeed, in their reply brief, the plaintiffs appear to reframe
their claim as such, asserting only that the court erred in ‘‘finding that
adverse possession was established before [the judgment] of foreclosure’’
rather than addressing the legal effect of the judgment itself. Even if we
were to assume that the plaintiffs adequately briefed this reframed claim,
however, we conclude that it is without merit. In parts I and II of this
opinion, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that Pipa’s use and possession of the disputed area, immediately on
her purchase of 53 Hartford Avenue in 1985, satisfied the elements of adverse
possession. Accordingly, the same evidence is inherently sufficient to sup-
port the court’s conclusion that the statutory period commenced at that time.