In re Hyrum D.

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In re Hyrum D.

IN RE HYRUM D. ET AL.*
(AC 47796)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, appealed from
the judgments of the trial court revoking the commitment of the respondent
mother’s minor children to the custody of the petitioner and returning the
children to the custody of the respondent. The petitioner claimed that the
court exceeded its statutory authority (§ 46b-129 (m)) when it sua sponte
revoked commitment of the minor children to the petitioner’s custody when
there was no motion pending before it and without providing all parties
notice and a full evidentiary hearing. Held:

The trial court, in sua sponte soliciting evidence from one party, the respon-
dent, while denying that it was holding an evidentiary hearing, and, by failing
to provide the petitioner notice that it intended to take additional evidence
on the petitioner’s own motion at a status review proceeding, effectively
prevented the petitioner from meeting her burden as to the best interests
of the children by preventing the petitioner from participating fully in the
proceeding, and this court was not persuaded that the trial court’s error
was harmless.
Argued December 10, 2024—officially released January 3, 2025**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to adjudicate the respondents’ minor children
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Middlesex, Juvenile Matters at Middletown,
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** January 3, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Hyrum D.

where the respondents entered pleas of nolo conten-
dere; thereafter, the court, Hon. Juliett L. Crawford,
judge trial referee, rendered judgments adjudicating the
minor children neglected; subsequently, the court denied
the petitioner’s motion to transfer guardianship and the
respondents’ motion to revoke commitment; thereafter,
the court vacated its order denying the respondents’
motion to revoke commitment and revoked the commit-
ment of the minor children to the custody of the peti-
tioner, from which the petitioner appealed to this court.
Reversed.
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellant (petitioner).
Karen Oliver Damboise, assistant public defender,
for the appellee (respondent mother).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, appeals from the judgments of
the trial court revoking the commitment of the minor
children, Hyrum D. and Antonio D., to the custody of
the petitioner and returning the children to the custody
of the respondent mother, Stephanie V. On appeal, the
petitioner claims that the court exceeded its statutory
authority when it sua sponte revoked commitment of
the minor children to the petitioner’s custody without
providing all parties notice and a full evidentiary hear-
ing. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgments
of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. After the respondent was arrested in connection
with an incident in which she was intoxicated on phen-
cyclidine (PCP) and alcohol while caring for Hyrum
and Antonio, the petitioner invoked a ninety-six hour
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In re Hyrum D.

hold on the children due to concerns about the respon-
dent’s mental health and substance abuse issues. The
children’s father, Danny D.,1 ‘‘was out of state at the
time.’’ The petitioner sought and obtained ex parte
orders of temporary custody for the children, which
were sustained on November 27, 2019, and subsequently
filed neglect petitions, alleging that they were being
denied proper care and attention and that they were
being permitted to live under conditions injurious to
their well-being. On December 27, 2019, the Department
of Children and Families (department) placed the chil-
dren with Yvonne F. (foster mother) in accordance with
the respondent’s request.
‘‘On January 12, 2021, [the respondent] and [Danny
D.] each entered a nolo contendere plea to the neglect
petition. The court . . . accepted each plea, adjudi-
cated the children . . . neglected, committed them to
the care and custody of [the petitioner], and ordered
updated final steps.’’ At that time, ‘‘[i]t was understood
that [the respondent’s] issues centered around sub-
stance use and mental health.’’ ‘‘By June 23, 2021, the
permanency plan was now transfer of guardianship with
a concurrent plan of permanent transfer of guardian-
ship. . . . On May 17, 2022, [the petitioner] filed [a]
motion to transfer guardianship. On February 28, 2023,
the parents filed a motion to revoke the commitment
to [the petitioner] and [to] have their children returned
to them.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The court, Hon. Juliett L. Crawford, judge trial ref-
eree, held a consolidated trial on both motions over
the course of several days, beginning on March 3, 2023,
and ending on October 16, 2023. On December 14, 2023,
the petitioner moved to open the evidence, claiming
that, ‘‘[o]n November 21, 22 and 23, [2023], the Meriden
1
Danny D. did not participate in the present appeal. Accordingly, all
references to the respondent in this opinion are to Stephanie V.
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Police Department conducted several investigations
. . . concerning [the respondent]. In the course of
those investigations, [the respondent] admitted, among
other matters, to being homeless and to having sui-
cidal intent.’’

At a hearing on January 29, 2024, the court granted
the motion to open the evidence, and the petitioner
submitted three police reports, dated November 21, 22
and 23, 2023, which were admitted as full exhibits by
agreement of the parties. The November 21, 2023 police
report stated that the respondent’s mother, Lissette R.,
reported that the respondent was causing a disturbance
at Lissette’s house, that the respondent was homeless,
and that she believed the respondent was under the
influence of PCP. The November 22, 2023 report stated
that the officer was dispatched to Lissette’s house for
a report of a domestic dispute between the respondent
and Lissette and, upon arrival, found the respondent
with a knife in her hand. The respondent told the officer
that ‘‘she wanted to kill herself and that she was plan-
ning on cutting herself.’’ As a result, the respondent was
transported to a hospital pursuant to a police request
for an emergency evaluation. Last, the November 23,
2023 police report stated that the respondent’s cousin
called the police for an emergency committal because
the respondent was sending him suicidal text messages.
When officers located the respondent, she was ‘‘very
emotional,’’ and she was taken to the hospital as an
emergency committal for further evaluation. The peti-
tioner also presented testimony from Kaylee Rugar, the
department social worker assigned to the children’s
cases, who testified that the respondent became home-
less in November, 2023, when her landlord sold the
rental property where she was living, and that the
respondent had not obtained stable housing since that
happened.
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On May 24, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision denying the petitioner’s motion to transfer
guardianship and the parents’ motion to revoke commit-
ment. As to the parents’ motion to revoke commitment,
the court concluded that (1) ‘‘the parents met their
burden of proof that the cause for commitment no
longer exists and [that] it is in the best interests of the
children to return them to the care and custody of the
[respondent],’’ and (2) the petitioner ‘‘failed to prove
that it would not be in the best interests of the children
to return them to the mother.’’ The court nonetheless
denied the parents’ motion to revoke commitment
‘‘without prejudice’’ and explained that it ‘‘retains juris-
diction over this matter, and it is thoroughly familiar
with the history and evidence in the trial.’’ Finally, the
court ordered that ‘‘[a]n on the record status review
should be scheduled within thirty days.’’
At the ensuing status review on June 20, 2024, the
respondent appeared, but her attorney was not present,
and Danny D. did not appear, but his attorney was
present. The court proceeded to explain that, when it
denied the parents’ motion without prejudice, it meant
that ‘‘any other motions can be filed without waiting
[six months]’’ as required under General Statutes § 46b-
129 (m).2 The court then discussed the police reports
from November, 2023, explaining that ‘‘there are like
gaps [in the evidence]. . . . [The police reports indi-
cate that the respondent] was transported to [a hospi-
tal]. No information on what that was about, how long
she was there, what was it, was it observation, what
were their findings. Nothing. And, so, I’m just indicating
that, although a police report is evidence, that by itself
was not sufficient, but it was enough where the court
felt that it had to pause. So, all that being said—now
the question is where we are. I don’t know if anybody
2
General Statutes § 46b-129 (m) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No [motion to
revoke a commitment] shall be filed more often than once every six months.’’
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wants to offer anything, but I’ve given you some idea
of what the court was thinking in terms of orders, but
[I] didn’t just want to simply issue the orders in case
something wasn’t like detailed enough or—but that’s
essentially where I am. . . . I guess what is pending is
really the decision to deny without prejudice.
***
‘‘I just wanted to at least give you a sense of where
the court is, and I’ll hear from you. I’ve indicated to
you what I was considering in terms of some of the
orders and how they need to be structured, if we actu-
ally need a short hearing to flush out [that] information
that I had indicated to you that the court felt should’ve
been available at the time I did grant the hearing on
the motion. . . . So, let me hear from you and, you
know, hopefully we won’t keep the staff much longer,
but that’s in terms of the next step.’’
Counsel for Danny D. stated that his client’s ‘‘position
at the time of trial was that the children should be
returned to [the respondent], and since that time, I’ve
had no contact with him. So, as far as moving forward,
I wouldn’t be able to—without him being present or
speaking with me, I’m not really in a position to request
. . . anything at this point in time.’’
The court continued the proceeding, stating: ‘‘Now,
in terms of [the respondent], the court still—I am
inclined to have [one] more short hearing scheduled
and—so that I can at least get the information because
I will reconsider my decision on the denial without
prejudice. But it was basically because I didn’t have
enough information on what happened in November.
‘‘So, you folks, especially counsel for the children—
and I realize that [the respondent’s] attorney isn’t here
and [that Danny D. also is not present] . . . . I’ve indi-
cated to you how I got to where I did and what I look
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at and so I’m telling you what I’m considering at this
point and—but there’s going to be the issue of [the
respondent’s] stability in terms of housing. I still don’t
understand the circumstances around the sale and the
eviction and what that’s about.’’
The respondent then addressed the court, explaining
that she had ‘‘moved into another place. [The depart-
ment] can come to check out my house whenever they
feel like it. I’m on probation for the incident with [Danny
D.], but he dropped the restraining order. So, I have
been in contact with him. He has not been seeing the
. . . children, but I have been at every single visit and
I’m—now that I’m back inside my—in my place, I’ve
been looking for work and I’ve been doing everything I
have to do with my probation officer and stuff like that.’’
At that point, the court said it was ‘‘ready to issue
some orders,’’ but the petitioner’s counsel interrupted
and noted that the court could not order the petitioner
to file a specific permanency plan. The following
exchange ensued:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: [T]he only issue I’ll make,
because the court was talking about November, the
department had suggested . . . at the time that the
incidents in November were important because it was
the [respondent’s] own statements . . . . And, so,
regardless of what [the hospital] might say, this is what
the [respondent] herself was saying about where she
was in life at that point in time. . . . [T]he only other
thing I will say then is if the court does set a hearing,
there’s been continued ongoing developments. The
respondent . . . has just made some representations.
There’s been additional information that, if the court
is to set a hearing, [the petitioner] needs to be clear
that all of that information comes in. For example, she’s
admitted to relapse on substance use and . . . there
have been criminal convictions since then. So, there’s
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a lot of information that, if this court is going to have
a new hearing, then it’s going to need to hear—
‘‘The Court: No, I—well, actually given what . . .
I’ve heard, I’m pretty sure that the order will not be for
a new hearing. . . . I was sort of indicating that the
information that I expected at the hearing—
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Right.
‘‘The Court: —was more than just the police report[s].
I understand that but—
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay.
‘‘The Court: —that’s actually not an issue at this point.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Oh, okay. So, Your
Honor, thank you.
‘‘The Court: Yeah. Anything else then?
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: I guess I’ll wait to hear
what the orders actually are and then—
‘‘The Court: Yep. Okay.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.’’
Without explanation or notice to the parties that it
intended to take evidence at the status review, the court
then directed the courtroom clerk to ‘‘put [the respon-
dent] under oath.’’ After the oath was administered, the
court asked the respondent about a document that the
respondent had attempted to give to the court earlier
in the proceeding. The respondent explained that the
document confirms that she still was in therapy. When
the court explained that all parties ‘‘have the right to
see it’’ and directed that the document be shared with
counsel, the petitioner’s counsel engaged in the follow-
ing exchange with the court:
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‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: While the court is giving
me an opportunity to look at this, is this now an eviden-
tiary hearing?
‘‘The Court: No. I was just going to ask—there were
a couple of things that she said and I just—because
you guys are officers of the court, but there’s some—
a couple of things that she said. I just wanted to have
her under oath. That’s all. . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: The [petitioner] . . .
has no objection to that letter coming in. . . . [T]he
. . . only suggestion is that it be interpreted in [the]
context of evidence that did come in during the trial
regarding how frequently [the respondent] had been
meeting with [the therapist]. The court does have evi-
dence from the trial—
‘‘The Court: Yeah. . . . Anything else? I actually
think now that I am ready to issue an order.’’
The court then vacated its order denying the parents’
motion to revoke commitment and granted the motion,
ordering that custody of the children be returned to the
respondent. The court also increased the respondent’s
visitation from two to three times each week, until
the order returning the children to the respondent was
facilitated, and ordered that the foster mother not be
involved with those visits. The petitioner’s counsel
expressed concern that the court had minimal informa-
tion regarding the respondent’s housing and stated that
the ‘‘court ultimately will probably need an evidentiary
hearing because, again, this court’s decision is based
on the [respondent] having no residence . . . . For the
court to learn about whether she even has a place to
live, the court’s going to have to open up the evidence
and learn that info.’’ The court stayed its order revoking
commitment until August 31, 2024, and it scheduled a
status review for August 23, 2024. At that point, the
petitioner’s counsel renewed his concerns regarding the
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nature of the status review proceeding in the following
exchange with the court:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: The evidence in the
record is [that the respondent] has no place to live.
‘‘The Court: I understand, but I also heard her say,
which is part of why I put her under oath—I didn’t want
her just saying things that she has housing, she has her
Section 8, and I believe you said that the department
would need time to check things out. . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: It can’t be that . . . the
court . . . is relying now on evidence in fashioning its
orders, yet the court has said this is not an evidentiary
hearing. For the court to rely on the [respondent’s] self-
representation about Section 8, we don’t know how big
the apartment is, is it enough to have a five year old
and nine year old in there. We don’t know these things.
‘‘The Court: I know. That’s why there’s a stay.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Your Honor . . . . This
court needs evidence in the record. If it issues an order
without evidence in the record without holding an evi-
dentiary hearing—
‘‘The Court: Look, if you want to file a motion—I
indicated to you why I issued the decision I did without
prejudice, and the main part had to do with [the motion
to open the evidence and] the last report that you sub-
mitted where everyone agreed [that] the court would
have been remiss in not at least hearing some informa-
tion on it. But in terms of what the court had before
it, I made the decision based on what the court had
before it.’’
The court adjourned shortly thereafter. This appeal
followed.
After filing this appeal, the petitioner filed a motion
to reargue in the trial court, asserting that the court was
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required to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting
a contested motion to revoke commitment. As support,
the petitioner cited In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737,
758–59, 1 A.3d 5 (2010) (holding that § 46b-129 (m)
and what is now Practice Book § 35a-14A ‘‘implicitly
mandate’’ that court hold evidentiary hearing ‘‘at least
when a motion for revocation of commitment is con-
tested’’), and In re Nasia B., 98 Conn. App. 319, 330,
908 A.2d 1090 (2006) (holding that ‘‘[w]hen the court
sua sponte revoked the child’s commitment to the peti-
tioner, it acted outside the scope of its authority’’).
The petitioner argued that the court denied her the
opportunity to present evidence that revocation was
not in the best interests of the children as of June
20, 2024.
On July 17, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the motion to reargue on the papers.
The court noted that it had reviewed In re Shanaira
C. and In re Nasia B. and reasoned that ‘‘[t]hese cases
can be distinguished from the present case, as here
a trial was held over several days, the evidence was
reopened and further evidence presented, and there
was further information provided on the record during
the status review. . . . After several days of hearings,
the court rendered a decision with the required findings.
All parties made representations and provided addi-
tional information at the in-court status review. . . .
As there were multiple days of evidence and an appeal
has been filed, there is no need to toll the period for
filing an appeal. Accordingly, the motion to reargue
. . . is denied.’’ The petitioner subsequently amended
her appeal to challenge the denial of the motion to
reargue. This court stayed the judgments revoking the
children’s commitment pending the final disposition of
the petitioner’s appeal.3
3
On July 31, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion for stay, requesting that
the trial court grant a stay of its June 20, 2024 order until the petitioner’s
appeal is decided. The trial court heard argument on the motion during the
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On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court
exceeded its statutory authority when it sua sponte
revoked commitment of the minor children when there
was no motion pending before it and without providing
all parties notice and a full evidentiary hearing.4 The
respondent contends that the court was not required
to hold an evidentiary hearing because it already had
conducted a trial on the parties’ motions and, in the
alternative, assuming arguendo that an evidentiary
hearing was required, the failure to do so was harmless
error.5 We agree with the petitioner and are not per-
suaded that the court’s error was harmless.
Whether the court exceeded its statutory authority
is a question of law subject to plenary review. See GMAT
Legal Title Trust 2014-1, U.S. Bank, National Assn. v.
Catale, 213 Conn. App. 674, 687, 278 A.3d 1057 (‘‘[t]he
proper scope of a court’s statutory authority . . . pre-
sents a question of law over which our review is ple-
nary’’), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 905, 282 A.3d 980 (2022).
Section 46b-129 (m) provides in relevant part that
the petitioner, ‘‘a parent or the child’s attorney may file
August 23, 2024 status conference and denied the motion for stay that same
day. On August 27, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion for review of that
order, and this court sua sponte stayed the judgments pending resolution
of the motion for review on August 29, 2024. On September 11, 2024, this
court granted the motion for review and ordered that the judgments be
stayed pending the final resolution of this appeal.
4
On appeal, the attorney for the minor children adopted the position and
briefs of the petitioner.
5
The respondent also contends that the petitioner’s claim is unpreserved
because it was raised for the first time in her motion to reargue. The tran-
script of the June 20, 2024 proceeding, however, belies this contention, as
the petitioner’s counsel alerted the trial court to the need for an evidentiary
hearing several times before and immediately after the court issued its
orders without notice. Thus, we conclude that the petitioner complied with
our rules of preservation, which require a party ‘‘to alert the trial court to
potential error while there is still time for the court to act.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Forestier v. Bridgeport, 223 Conn. App. 298, 313, 308
A.3d 102 (2024).
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a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding
that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that
such revocation is in the best interests of such child
or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such
child or youth. . . .’’
Our Supreme Court has determined that, although the
statute does ‘‘not expressly require an evidentiary hear-
ing, [it] implicitly mandate[s] one, at least when a motion
for revocation of commitment is contested.’’ In re Sha-
naira C., supra, 297 Conn. 759. Accordingly, when a motion
for revocation of commitment is ‘‘neither uncontested
nor the subject of undisputed facts, the court [is] requi-
red to conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . .’’ Id., 762.6
In In re Shanaira C., the petitioner moved to revoke
Shanaira C.’s commitment on the ground that reunifica-
tion with the child’s mother was in the child’s best
interest. Id., 741. The intervenor, who was the girlfriend
of the child’s father, ‘‘opposed the motion to revoke and
informed the court that she would be calling witnesses,
including her [own] mother and Shanaira’s aunt, who
6
The court reasoned that, ‘‘before the commitment may be revoked upon
motion, § 46b-129 (m) directs the court to make two findings: first, that
there no longer is cause for commitment and, second, that revoking the
commitment is in the child’s best interest. This provision carries the implica-
tion that an evidentiary hearing shall be held because it strongly suggests
that evidence must be presented by the moving party to establish facts
necessary to warrant revocation of the commitment. Indeed, a determination
of the best interest of a child frequently requires an evidentiary hearing.
. . . In the absence of a waiver of the right to a hearing by all parties who
otherwise would be entitled to participate, this approach makes eminent
good sense because the determination of a child’s best interest is generally
a fact intensive inquiry. . . . Moreover, frequently, either the facts or the
inferences to be drawn therefrom are disputed by the parties. For these
reasons, revocation hearings sometimes entail lengthy proceedings involving
multiple witnesses.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 759–60. The court further
observed that what is now Practice Book § 35a-14A, which allocates the
burdens of proof with respect to the necessary findings, ‘‘clearly indicates
that an evidentiary hearing is required because [i]t is obvious that allocations
of burdens of proof imply an evidentiary hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 761.
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was also [Shanaira’s] foster mother.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘[Although] [t]he court allowed
testimony from Shanaira’s aunt and teacher [it essen-
tially did not allow the intervenor to call or question
those or any other witnesses, including the intervenor’s
mother, who never testified. Furthermore, the court
itself examined the witnesses who did testify with little
or no input or questioning from the parties].’’ (Foot-
notes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
742. After the hearing, ‘‘the court found that revocation
of the commitment was in Shanaira’s best interest and
granted sole custody of Shanaira to the respondent
mother.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This
court affirmed the judgment, and our Supreme Court
granted the intervenor certification to appeal. Id., 743.
On appeal, the intervenor claimed that the trial court
improperly denied her the right to call and cross-exam-
ine witnesses and otherwise to participate fully at the
hearing on the petitioner’s motion to revoke Shanaira’s
commitment pursuant to § 46b-129 (m). Id., 740. Our
Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘the intervenor did not
receive the hearing to which she was entitled. . . .
[T]he intervenor, who opposed the revocation of com-
mitment, bore the burden of proving that revocation
was not in Shanaira’s best interest. Only if the interve-
nor had been afforded the opportunity to present evi-
dence and to examine witnesses would she have had
any meaningful possibility of meeting this burden.
Although the intervenor was not precluded from partici-
pating in the hearing entirely, the limitations that the
trial court improperly placed on that participation were
significant and deprived her of a genuine opportunity
to present her case.’’ Id., 762. The court rejected the
petitioner’s harmless error contention because ‘‘the
intervenor was unable to call and question witnesses
whose testimony might have caused the court to reach
a different conclusion with respect to Shanaira’s best
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In re Hyrum D.

interest. . . . In addition, the intervenor was barred
from cross-examining witnesses who had been called
by other parties, and we simply do not know how such
cross-examination might have affected the court’s ulti-
mate decision . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 762–63.
The same reasoning applies in the present case, in
which the court sua sponte solicited evidence from one
party while denying that it was holding an evidentiary
hearing. By failing to provide the petitioner notice that
it intended to take additional evidence on its own
motion at the status review proceeding and by then
denying that it was holding an evidentiary hearing, the
court effectively prevented the petitioner from meeting
her burden as to the best interests of the children. Thus,
as in In re Shanaira C., the limitations that the court’s
ad hoc procedure placed on the petitioner’s ability to
participate meaningfully in the evidentiary hearing
‘‘were significant and deprived [the petitioner] of a gen-
uine opportunity to present her case.’’ Id., 762. More-
over, the court was required to consider the children’s
best interests as of June 20, 2024, when it revoked the
children’s commitment. See id., 763 (‘‘the focus of the
new dispositional hearing must be on [the child’s] status
and her best interest at the time of that hearing’’). The
court, however, denied that it even was required to hold
an evidentiary hearing in that regard. Accordingly, we
conclude that the court’s truncated evidentiary hearing
prevented the petitioner from participating fully in the
June 20, 2024 proceeding, and we are not persuaded
that the court’s error was harmless.
The court’s actions also were in clear contravention
of this court’s holding in In re Nasia B., supra, 98 Conn.
App. 319. In that case, after the petitioner rested her
case-in-chief at the termination of parental rights trial,
the trial court granted the respondents’ oral motion to
dismiss the petition for failure to make out a prima
facie case. Id., 322. Immediately thereafter, ‘‘the court
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In re Hyrum D.

stated that it had reviewed and considered the perma-
nency plan for termination of parental rights and adop-
tion and found, for the reasons stated with respect to
the motion to dismiss, that the plan was not in the best
interest of the child. . . . The court ordered the parties
to return to court the following day to determine the
steps to be taken to continue reunification.
‘‘[The next day], following colloquy with counsel and
the court’s questioning of the department supervisor
on the case, the court rendered judgment revoking the
child’s commitment on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented during the trial on the petition to terminate
parental rights. The court ordered that the child’s com-
mitment to the petitioner be opened and that the depart-
ment provide modified protective supervision until
. . . the child would be returned to the respondent
mother’s custody.’’ Id., 327–28.
The petitioner appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the
court ‘‘failed to abide by the provisions of § 46b-129
(m) . . . when it sua sponte opened the judgment and
revoked the child’s commitment.’’ Id., 327. This court
agreed, reasoning that, because ‘‘neither the parties nor
the foster mother had notice that the court was going
to open and revoke the child’s commitment’’; id., 330;
the court ‘‘acted outside the scope of its authority pursu-
ant to § 46b-129 (m) and ([p]), which are intended to
provide for the orderly administration of justice, protect
the due process rights of the petitioner, the respondents
and the foster mother, and to protect the best interest
of the child.’’ Id.
Although the respondent argues, and the trial court
concluded, that the present case is distinguishable from
In re Nasia B. ‘‘because a motion to revoke was filed
in this matter and the trial court heard testimony and
received evidence over six days regarding whether
cause for commitment no longer existed,’’ she ignores
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In re Hyrum D.

that the trial court already had denied that motion on
the basis of the evidence in the record as of January
29, 2024. As a result, when the court sua sponte revoked
commitment at the June 20, 2024 status review without
notifying the parties of its intention to do so, the parties
did not have ‘‘notice that the court was going to open
and revoke the [children’s] commitment’’; In re Nasia
B., supra, 98 Conn. App. 330; and, therefore, they did
not have ‘‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare to appear
and be heard’’ in that regard. Id., 329. Consequently,
because the court improperly held a truncated eviden-
tiary hearing at which it took evidence only from the
respondent without providing the parties notice and a
reasonable opportunity to be heard on the contested
issue, In re Nasia B. dictates that the judgments revok-
ing the children’s commitment to the petitioner must
be reversed.
The judgments revoking the children’s commitment
are reversed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.