R. G.-R. v. S. R.

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
R. G.-R. v. S. R.

R. G.-R. v. S. R.*
(AC 45572)
Alvord, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis-
solved, appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court
resolving several postjudgment motions. On May 26, 2022, the trial court
granted, inter alia, the defendant’s motion to modify custody of the
parties’ minor child. After the plaintiff filed her appeal from the May
26, 2022 order, the trial court vacated its order of custody, and returned
the minor child to the plaintiff. Subsequently, on October 26, 2022, the
trial court awarded the defendant sole legal and physical custody of the
minor child and ordered the plaintiff to have no contact with the minor
child until further order of the court. The plaintiff amended her appeal
to include the trial court’s October 26, 2022 order. While this appeal
was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify the October 26,
2022 ‘‘custody and parenting time orders.’’ The trial court granted the
plaintiff’s motion to modify as to parenting time only, leaving the custody
portion of the order unchanged. The plaintiff did not amend her appeal
to include the August 1, 2023 order. Held:
1. The plaintiff’s challenges to the May 26 and October 26, 2022 custody
and parenting orders were rendered moot because the orders were
superseded by the custody and parenting order of August 1, 2023, and,
accordingly, there was no practical relief this court could afford the
plaintiff: despite the plaintiff’s claims to the contrary, the August 1, 2023
order addressed both parenting time and legal custody of the minor
child; moreover, the plaintiff’s claim that the collateral consequences
exception to the mootness doctrine applied, in that her reputation and
livelihood would be threatened if those orders were left intact, was
belied by the fact that the May 26, 2022 order was sealed by the trial
court on the day it was issued, thus, the plaintiff failed to meet her
burden of demonstrating that there was a reasonable possibility that
prejudicial consequences would occur if the May 26 and October 26,
2022 judgments were left intact; furthermore, the plaintiff failed to dem-
onstrate that her claim was reviewable under the capable of repetition,
yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine as she failed to

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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R. G.-R. v. S. R.
argue that there was a reasonable likelihood that the question presented
in this case would arise again.
2. The trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motions for contempt
alleging that the plaintiff wilfully violated court orders that required the
parties to engage in family counseling with the minor child, as there
was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s findings
that the plaintiff repeatedly refused to do so, and this court was not
left with the conviction that a mistake has been made.
3. This court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s
motion for contempt alleging that the defendant violated the provision
of the dissolution judgment that required him to pay the minor child’s
private school tuition through high school, as the trial court’s denial
was based on the mistaken belief that the dissolution judgment did not
contain such a provision; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and
the case was remanded for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s motion.

Argued March 13—officially released July 9, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford, where the court, Prestley, J., rendered
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation
agreement; thereafter, the court, Nastri, J., issued an
order of temporary custody of the minor child to the
Commissioner of Children and Families, granted the
motions for contempt filed by the defendant and the
guardian ad litem, and denied the plaintiff’s motion
for contempt, and the plaintiff appealed to this court;
subsequently, the court, Moukawsher, J., awarded the
defendant sole legal and physical custody of the minor
child; thereafter, the court, Moukawsher, J., denied the
plaintiff permission to file a motion for reconsideration,
and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal. Appeal dis-
missed in part; reversed in part; further proceedings.

Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom was Meaghan E.
Collins, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Richard A. Rochlin, for the appellee (defendant).
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R. G.-R. v. S. R.

Opinion

CRADLE, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the plaintiff, R. G.-R., appeals from the judgments of
the trial court awarding the defendant, S. R., sole legal
and physical custody of their minor child. On appeal,
the plaintiff challenges postjudgment orders made by
the court on May 26 and October 26, 2022. As to the
May 26, 2022 judgment, the plaintiff claims that the
court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to mod-
ify custody and motions for contempt filed by the defen-
dant and the guardian ad litem, and denying a motion
for contempt that she filed. As to the October 26, 2022
judgment, she claims that her constitutional right to
procedural due process was violated when the court
modified custody without affording her notice and a
hearing and that the court failed to base the modifica-
tion on the best interest of the minor child or a substan-
tial change in circumstances. We dismiss as moot the
plaintiff’s appeal from the May 26, 2022 judgment,
except the portions of the appeal that challenge the
court’s contempt rulings, which we affirm in part and
reverse in part. We also dismiss as moot the plaintiff’s
appeal from the October 26, 2022 judgment.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The parties’ marriage was
dissolved on January 7, 2013. Pursuant to that judgment,
the parties would share joint legal and physical custody
of the minor child.
Beginning in June, 2016, the plaintiff began to levy
accusations against the defendant claiming, inter alia,
sexual abuse by him of the minor child.1 These allega-
tions prompted the involvement of the police, the
The parties’ parenting conflicts began before this time and the procedural
1

history set forth herein is representative of the tumultuous history of this
case. Indeed, the parties’ filings became so prolific that the court issued an
order pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g) requiring that they request leave
to file motions with the court. Even with that order in place, there have
been more than four hundred docket entries in this case since the date of
dissolution.
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Department of Children and Families (department) and
the court. Although the plaintiff’s allegations ultimately
were unsubstantiated by the department, the ensuing
investigations of those allegations contributed to the
alienation of the minor child from his father. In May,
2017, the court ordered reunification therapy between
the defendant and the minor child.
On May 22, 2018, the parties agreed to have a clinical
psychologist perform a comprehensive custody evalua-
tion and to sign all necessary releases and to cooperate
with the designated psychologist. On May 25, 2018, the
court, Simón, J., appointed Stephen Humphrey, PhD,
a clinical psychologist, to perform that custody evalua-
tion. As a result of that evaluation, Humphrey opined,
inter alia, that the plaintiff’s ‘‘vehement and intense
antipathy toward [the defendant] . . . is the primary
cause of [the minor child’s] fierce and unequivocal
rejection of his father.’’
In March, 2019, after almost three full years had
elapsed without the defendant seeing the minor child,
the court, Simon, J., again ordered reunification ther-
apy for the defendant and the minor child. At that time,
the court warned that it would strongly consider remov-
ing the minor child from the plaintiff’s custody if she
did not fully cooperate with the reunification therapy.
In October, 2019, the parties filed competing applica-
tions for an emergency ex parte order of custody of
the minor child, which were both denied. They also both
filed motions for modification seeking sole custody of
the minor child. Also in October, 2019, the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant from having the child
continue with therapy. In November, 2019, the defen-
dant moved to hold the plaintiff in contempt for failing
to bring the child to therapy.
On May 26, 2022, after seventeen days of trial, the
court, Nastri, J., issued a memorandum of decision,
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wherein it decided several of the parties’ pending
motions.2 The court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff
‘‘hates [the defendant] with every fiber of her being.
She has done everything in her power to prevent [the
minor child] from having any relationship with his
father. She has manipulated the court, [the department],
therapists, medical providers and the police by twisting
facts, telling half-truths, making threats and withholding
key information, all in her single-minded effort to pre-
vent [the defendant] from having a relationship with
his son. She has also treated clear and unambiguous
court orders as suggestions, completely ignoring them
when it suited her purpose.’’ The court explained: ‘‘[The
minor child] has a fundamental right to have a relation-
ship with his father. He will never have that relationship
or even a chance to have it, as long as he is in [the
plaintiff’s] custody. It is in [the minor child’s] best inter-
est for him to be in an environment in which [the plain-
tiff] does not have the opportunity to manipulate him
or thwart his relationship with his father.’’ The court
concluded that the minor child was in ‘‘immediate physi-
cal danger from his surroundings’’ and that ‘‘[c]ontinua-
tion in [the plaintiff’s] home is contrary to [his] welfare.’’
The court heard the following motions: The plaintiff’s October 8, 2019
2

ex parte application for custody (docket entry #388.05) and motion for
modification (docket entry #388.07), the defendant’s October 10, 2019 ex
parte application for custody (docket entry #389.00) and motion to modify
custody (docket entry #390.00), the plaintiff’s October 25, 2019 motion for
order (docket entry #392.00), the defendant’s November 19, 2019 motion
for contempt (docket entry #399.00), the guardian ad litem’s December 5,
2019 and January 7, 2020 motions for contempt (docket entries #403.00 and
#406.00), the plaintiff’s September 2, 2020 ex parte application for custody
(docket entry #418.00), the defendant’s September 14, 2020 motion to modify
(docket entry #420.00) and December 18, 2020 motion for contempt (docket
entry #430.00), the plaintiff’s May 12, 2021 motion for contempt and sanctions
(docket entries #433.00 and #433.01), the defendant’s May 24, 2021 ex parte
application for custody (docket entry #439.00) and the plaintiff’s October
21, 2021 motion to expedite (docket entry #455.00).
The court’s rulings on many of these motions are not relevant to this
appeal. Those that are relevant to this appeal are discussed herein.
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Because the minor child had not been with the defen-
dant in nearly six years, the court found that it would
not be in his best interest to suddenly be placed in the
defendant’s custody and, accordingly, issued an order
of temporary custody placing the minor child in the
care and custody of the Commissioner of Children and
Families (commissioner). The court also granted two
motions for contempt filed by the defendant, finding
that the plaintiff wilfully violated a clear and unambigu-
ous order as to each motion, but declined to impose
sanctions as to either contempt finding. The court also
granted two motions for contempt filed against the
plaintiff by the minor child’s guardian ad litem. The
court declined to impose sanctions as to one of those
motions, but, as to the other, ordered the plaintiff to
pay her portion of the guardian ad litem’s fees. The
court also denied a motion for contempt filed by the
plaintiff.3 The plaintiff appealed from that May 26, 2022
judgment.
On July 25, 2022, the juvenile court, Taylor, J.,
vacated the May 26, 2022 order placing the minor child
in the custody of the commissioner, finding that he
was not at imminent risk of physical harm. The court
returned the matter to the appropriate court for fur-
ther action.
On July 28, 2022, the defendant filed an application
for an emergency ex parte order and a motion to modify
custody seeking sole custody of the minor child. On that
same day, the court, Nastri, J., granted the defendant’s
application for an emergency ex parte order and
ordered that he would have ‘‘sole legal custody’’ and
that the plaintiff would not have visitation. The plaintiff
was granted permission to file an emergency motion
to vacate that order.
3
The bases of the motions for contempt and the court’s findings will be
discussed more fully subsequently in this opinion.
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On August 10, 2022, the court, Moukawsher, J., held a
hearing on the emergency motions and issued a decision
the next day, wherein it found that there was no basis
for an emergency order granting sole custody to the
defendant and vacated the ex parte order effective
August 20, 2022, when the child would be returned to
the plaintiff.
On August 18, 2022, the court, Moukawsher, J., held
a hearing on the issue of where the minor child would
attend secondary school. Following the hearing, the
court issued a decision wherein it ‘‘rescind[ed] its order
that [the child] be returned to [the plaintiff]’’ and
ordered that the child would attend boarding school
in Rhode Island and would remain in the defendant’s
custody until leaving for school. The court ordered that
the plaintiff would have no contact with the minor child
for the first five weeks of school and that the defendant
would have sole legal custody of the minor child during
that period. The court also ordered that the defendant
not contact the minor child for those five weeks, but
that the minor child could ‘‘communicate about what
he needs with [the defendant] or with the [guardian ad
litem] and they may respond.’’ The court indicated that
the orders were temporary and a ‘‘test of both parents.’’
The court advised: ‘‘The court will soon issue other
orders to help this along. The parties will need a plan
for what happens after the first five weeks at school.
The court will enter new orders in the coming weeks.
In the meantime, it will be watching as best it can
through the [guardian ad litem]. Any party sabotaging
[the minor child’s] launch into life will have the court
to answer to. Its next orders will be shaped by it.’’
On October 19, 2022, the court, Moukawsher, J.,
ordered the plaintiff to file a proposal regarding reunifi-
cation therapy and ordered the defendant to file a
response. The plaintiff filed her proposal on October
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25, 2022, in which she asserted that reunification ther-
apy was unnecessary and asked for ‘‘equal parenting
time during parents’ weekend and beyond, and legal
custody of [the minor child].’’ She further alleged that
‘‘reunification therapy is not required or appropriate
and should not be a prerequisite in the reunification of
the child and his mother, whom he has not seen in
nearly three months. The plaintiff again requests this
court appoint an attorney for the minor child or at least
a guardian ad litem who will speak with the child as
instructed and convey the thoughts and wishes to the
court of the person who is the subject of this proceeding
([the minor child]), and to otherwise meet the duties
of a [guardian ad litem]. As this proceeding is supposed
to be about [the minor child], his voice—which has
been improperly silenced—is essential to proceed fur-
ther. The child told the [guardian ad litem] he misses
his mother. This court should grant equal parenting
time to the mother, if not more, during the upcoming
parents’ weekend and beyond.’’

On the next day, October 26, 2022, the court, Mou-
kawsher, J., determined that the plaintiff’s proposal
was made in bad faith. The court explained: ‘‘By inviting
proposed orders about custody and visitation, the court
gave [the plaintiff] a chance to show that she is not still
playing a ceaseless and cynical game with the court in
which her goal remains to frustrate [the defendant’s]
attempt to reunify with [the minor child]. She rejected
that chance with her latest filing dated October 25, 2022.
[The plaintiff’s] filing suggests [that] the court wanted
her to engage in therapy to reunify her with [the minor
child]. She and her counsel know that is not true. The
only question discussed, expressly and in detail, has
been her participating in the therapy intended to reunify
[the minor child] with [the defendant].’’ (Emphasis in
original.) The court awarded the defendant sole legal
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and physical custody of the child, ordered that the plain-
tiff may have no contact with the minor child until
further order of the court, and ordered the defendant to
continue with reunification therapy and that the parties
would each be responsible for one half of the reunifica-
tion therapist’s charges. After being denied leave to file
a motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff amended her
appeal to challenge the October 26, 2022 judgment.
On June 26, 2023, while this appeal was pending, the
plaintiff filed a motion to modify the court’s October 26,
2022 ‘‘custody and parenting time orders.’’4 On August
1, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing, the court granted
the plaintiff’s motion as to parenting time only and
indicated that ‘‘[a]ll other orders remain in place
unchanged.’’
On December 15, 2023, the plaintiff filed a request
for leave to file a motion to modify the court’s August
1, 2023 order pertaining to the legal custody of the
minor child, requesting that the court order that the
parties share joint legal custody. The court denied her
request for leave to file the motion.
We begin by addressing the issue of whether the
August 1, 2023 judgment rendered moot the plaintiff’s
appeal of the May 26 and October 26, 2022 custody and
parenting orders. ‘‘Mootness implicates [the] court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold mat-
ter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general
rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an
essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the
province of appellate courts to decide moot questions,
disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from
the determination of which no practical relief can fol-
low. . . . Because mootness implicates subject matter
jurisdiction, it presents a question of law over which
4
The court appointed a new guardian ad litem for the purposes of the
plaintiff’s motion to modify only.
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our review is plenary. . . . Mootness presents a cir-
cumstance wherein the issue before the court has been
resolved or had lost its significance because of a change
in the condition or affairs between the parties. . . . A
case is moot when due to intervening circumstances
a controversy between the parties no longer exists.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barber v. Barber,
193 Conn. App. 190, 220–21, 219 A.3d 378 (2019).
Here, the orders relating to custody and parenting
time entered on May 26 and October 26, 2022, were
superseded by the August 1, 2023 orders pertaining to
custody and parenting time. Accordingly, there is no
practical relief we can afford the plaintiff in her appeal
of those earlier orders. The plaintiff nevertheless argues
that her challenge to the custody and parenting time
orders entered on May 26 and October 26, 2022, were
not rendered moot by the August 1, 2023 orders. First,
she contends that the August 1, 2023 orders address
only parenting time,5 not legal custody of the minor
child. We disagree. In her motion to modify, the plaintiff
sought modification of the court’s October 26, 2022
‘‘custody and parenting time orders.’’ In stating that it
was modifying parenting time only, the court seemingly
acknowledged that the plaintiff was seeking a modifica-
tion also of legal custody at that time and implicitly
denied that requested relief. Indeed, in the motion to
modify that the plaintiff sought leave to file on Decem-
ber 13, 2023, the plaintiff alleged that there was a sub-
stantial change in circumstances since the last court
order granting sole legal custody to the defendant in
that, inter alia, the parenting schedule between the par-
ties and the child had been successful and without
significant conflict. From this allegation, it is clear that
the plaintiff considered the most recent order awarding
sole legal custody of the minor child to the defendant
5
The plaintiff concedes that she is not challenging the court’s order regard-
ing parenting time.
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R. G.-R. v. S. R.

as the August 1, 2023 order, when the court implicitly
denied her motion to modify as to legal custody. See
J. Y. v. M. R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 662, 283 A.3d 520
(2022) (interim custody and visitation orders became
inoperative following issuance of subsequent orders
wherein court ‘‘ ‘reiterat[ed]’ ’’ them or left them
‘‘ ‘largely unchanged’ ’’ and challenge to those interim
orders therefore was moot and proper recourse was to
challenge later orders). Insofar as the plaintiff chal-
lenges the court’s legal custody order, her redress was
to challenge the propriety of the August 1, 2023 order,
which she has not done.
The plaintiff also argues that the July 31, 2023 hearing
on her motion to modify ‘‘did not rectify the lack of a
hearing in October, 2022.’’ Even if we were to conclude
that the court violated the plaintiff’s right to due process
without affording her a hearing before awarding the
defendant sole custody of the minor child on October
26, 2022, that would not change the fact that the October
26, 2022 orders were superseded by the August 1, 2023
orders, and without a proper challenge to the August
1, 2023 orders, there is no practical relief that we may
afford the plaintiff on her challenge to the October 26,
2022 judgment.
The plaintiff also contends that the ‘‘collateral conse-
quences’’ exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
‘‘[T]o invoke successfully the collateral consequences
doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reason-
able possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences
will occur. Accordingly, the litigant must establish these
consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need
not demonstrate that these consequences are more
probable than not.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Putman v. Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162, 169, 900 A.2d 1256
(2006). The plaintiff argues that, ‘‘[i]f the underlying
decisions are left intact, the findings and stigma from
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the decisions would threaten her reputation and liveli-
hood.’’ The plaintiff’s argument in this regard is belied
by the fact that the May 26, 2022 order was sealed by
the court on the day it was issued.6 On that basis, the
plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating that
there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial conse-
quences will occur if the May 26 and October 26, 2022
judgments are left intact.

Finally, the plaintiff argues that, even if her claim is
moot, it is subject to appellate review under the ‘‘capa-
ble of repetition, yet evading review’’ exception to the
mootness doctrine. ‘‘[F]or an otherwise moot question
to qualify for review under the ‘capable of repetition,
yet evading review’ exception, it must meet three
requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect
of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of
a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood
that the substantial majority of cases raising a question
about its validity will become moot before appellate
litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a
reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the
pending case will arise again in the future, and that
it will affect either the same complaining party or a
reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can
be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must
have some public importance. Unless all three require-
ments are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot.’’
Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382–83, 660 A.2d 323
(1995).
6
To the extent the plaintiff argues that her professional reputation may
be harmed if the judgments at issue are allowed to stand because she shares
a professional relationship with the department, the department has been
involved with this family since 2016 when the plaintiff alleged the ultimately
unsubstantiated allegations of sexual assault of the minor child by the
defendant. We further note that the department investigated the plaintiff for
emotional or psychological abuse of the minor child. Thus, the department
is intimately aware of this family’s history.
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
R. G.-R. v. S. R.

Focusing on the second prong of the exception, the
analysis ‘‘entails two separate inquiries: (1) whether the
question presented will recur at all; and (2) whether
the interests of the people likely to be affected by the
question presented are adequately represented in the
current litigation. A requirement of the likelihood that
a question will recur is an integral component of the
capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine. In
the absence of the possibility of such repetition, there
would be no justification for reaching the issue, as a
decision would neither provide relief in the present
case nor prospectively resolve cases anticipated in the
future. . . . The second prong does not provide an
exception to the mootness doctrine when it is merely
possible that a question could recur, but rather there
must be a reasonable likelihood that the question pre-
sented in the pending case will arise again in the future
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) J. Y. v. M. R., supra, 215
Conn. App. 663.
As to the second prong of the exception, the plaintiff’s
argument is limited to asserting that ‘‘the same could
happen to other parties in family courts.’’ The plaintiff
has not identified ‘‘the same’’ to which she is referring,
and she entirely has failed to argue that there is a reason-
able likelihood that the question presented in this case
will arise again during the pendency of the limited
period of time until this child reaches the age of major-
ity. Accordingly, she cannot demonstrate that her claim
is reviewable under the capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review exception.
Although the plaintiff’s challenges to the custody and
parenting orders of the May 26 and October 26, 2022
judgments are moot, her challenges to the contempt
findings of the court on May 26, 2022, are not moot
because ‘‘the fact that a trial court has made a finding
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of contempt may well affect a later court’s determina-
tion of the penalty to be imposed after a future finding
of contempt.’’ Keller v. Keller, 158 Conn. App. 538, 543,
119 A.3d 1213 (2015), appeal dismissed, 323 Conn. 398,
147 A.3d 146 (2016). We therefore turn to the plaintiff’s
challenges to the court’s contempt determinations.
We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘First, we
must resolve the threshold question of whether the
underlying order constituted a court order that was
sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a
judgment of contempt. . . . This is a legal inquiry sub-
ject to de novo review. . . . Second, if we conclude
that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear
and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing
to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a
review of the trial court’s determination of whether the
violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute
or misunderstanding.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id., 545. ‘‘We review the court’s
factual findings in the context of a motion for contempt
to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. A
factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not sup-
ported by any evidence in the record or when there is
evidence to support it, but the reviewing court is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kirwan v. Kirwan, 187 Conn. App. 375, 393–94, 202
A.3d 458 (2019).
The plaintiff first challenges the court’s judgments
granting two motions for contempt filed by the defen-
dant. Both of those motions—the first filed on Novem-
ber 19, 2019, and the other filed on December 10, 2020—
allege that the plaintiff wilfully violated court orders
that required the parties to engage in family counseling
with the minor child in furtherance of reunification of
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the minor child and the defendant.7 The court found,
as to both motions, that the plaintiff wilfully violated
clear and unambiguous orders of the court. The plaintiff
argues that the court’s factual findings were clearly
erroneous in that the plaintiff did comply with the
court’s orders or, alternatively, had reasonable grounds
not to comply. She contends that ‘‘a legitimate basis
existed for any reunification issues that arose, as the
issues were caused either by the defendant or by cir-
cumstances beyond either [party’s] control, and not by
the plaintiff.’’ She further contends that ‘‘[t]he record
shows that the plaintiff did not thwart reunification,
but rather complied with the court’s orders, and the
delays that did occur were not caused by the plaintiff.’’
This claim is unavailing. The orders pertaining to reuni-
fication therapy, which have been entered numerous
times beginning as early as 2017, have been clear and
unambiguous in requiring both parties to participate
in reunification therapy and cooperate fully with the
therapy provider. The record is replete with evidence
that the plaintiff repeatedly refused to do so, including
evidence that she wilfully refused to comply with the
court’s March 11, 2019 and November 9, 2020 orders
pertaining to reunification of the minor child and the
defendant. To the extent that there may be evidence in
the record that might support a different conclusion,
that does not render the court’s finding erroneous.
Because there is evidence in the record to support the
court’s findings and we are not left with the conviction
7
Specifically, in the November 19, 2019 motion for contempt, the defen-
dant alleged that the plaintiff wilfully failed to comply with the court’s March
11, 2019 orders that the parties participate in family intervention counseling
to reunify the defendant and the minor child and that they follow all recom-
mendations made by the therapist. In the December 10, 2020 motion for
contempt, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff refused to take the minor
child to therapy and thereby wilfully violated the court’s November 9, 2020
order that the parties reengage the previous therapist and ensure that the
minor child attends all therapy sessions and that the parties participate in
the therapy at the therapist’s direction.
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that a mistake has been made, we conclude that the
court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and,
therefore, that the court did not err in granting the
defendant’s motions for contempt.
The plaintiff also challenges the court’s judgments
granting two motions for contempt filed by the guardian
ad litem—one filed on December 5, 2019, in which the
guardian ad litem alleged that the plaintiff wilfully vio-
lated the court’s order that the parties pay the fees of
the guardian ad litem or arrange a payment plan for
those fees, and the other filed on January 7, 2020, in
which the guardian ad litem alleged that the plaintiff
wilfully failed to comply with a subpoena requiring the
plaintiff to produce certain documents. The plaintiff
argues on appeal that ‘‘the court did not have the author-
ity or jurisdiction to grant the motions’’ for contempt
filed by the guardian ad litem because ‘‘[guardians ad
litem] do not have authority to file motions, particularly
motions for contempt about subpoena compliance.’’
Because the plaintiff has not cited any legal authority to
support this argument, we deem this claim inadequately
briefed and we decline to review it. See Pryor v. Pryor,
162 Conn. App. 451, 458, 133 A.3d 463 (2016).
Finally, the plaintiff challenges the court’s denial of
her motion for contempt, filed on May 12, 2021, in which
she alleged that the defendant violated the provision
of the dissolution judgment that required him to pay
for the cost of the minor child’s private school tuition
through high school. The plaintiff argues on appeal, and
the defendant seems to agree, as do we, that the court
erroneously found that the plaintiff misrepresented the
terms of the dissolution judgment in her motion. The
judgment does, in fact, provide that the defendant shall
‘‘pay for [the] cost of private schooling though gradua-
tion from high school.’’ Because the court’s denial of
the plaintiff’s motion for contempt was based upon its
mistaken belief that the dissolution judgment did not
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require the defendant to pay the cost of private school
for the minor child through graduation from high
school,8 the judgment must be reversed and remanded
for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s May 12, 2021
motion for contempt.9
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the plaintiff’s
claims regarding the custody and parenting orders
entered on May 26 and October 26, 2022; the judgment
denying the plaintiff’s May 12, 2021 motion for contempt
is reversed and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings; the judgments are affirmed in all other
respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

8
We reject the plaintiff’s contention that the court’s erroneous finding in
this regard undermined its other findings and rulings.
9
We emphasize that the scope of the remand is limited to the issue of
whether the defendant wilfully violated the provision of the dissolution
judgment requiring him to pay for the cost of private school for the minor
child until he graduates from high school.