Walton v. Walton

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Walton v. Walton

ROBERT S. WALTON IV v. DEEPA B. WALTON
(AC 45791)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and finding her in contempt for
various violations of the court’s automatic orders and pendente lite
orders. During the pendency of the underlying action, the defendant
executed a separation agreement with her employer and, approximately
two weeks later, the parties signed a pendente lite agreement that pro-
vided, inter alia, that the defendant would pay the first mortgage on the
marital residence and automobile insurance premiums. The defendant
subsequently withdrew almost $80,000 from her retirement accounts,
which was not fully accounted for at the time of trial, and received
more than $70,000 from her parents, which she used to pay off her
personal credit card debt. The defendant also removed the plaintiff as an
insured from the parties’ automobile insurance policies and an umbrella
policy covering the parties’ vehicles and the marital residence, which
were in place at the time the dissolution action was commenced. The
defendant stopped making the monthly mortgage payments, and she
sought and obtained a deferral of the mortgage payments in the amount
of $87,961.45 without the written consent of the plaintiff or an order of
the court. Two days before the final day of trial, the trial court denied
the defendant’s request for production of an appraisal of the marital
residence completed by an independent appraiser, C, retained by the
plaintiff. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleging that the defendant
violated the automatic orders when she removed the plaintiff as an
insured under the parties’ insurance policies: this court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the automatic orders did not clearly and
unambiguously pertain to the umbrella policy, as the umbrella policy
was, in substance, a policy that covered the parties’ automobiles and
marital residence; moreover, the trial court did not credit the defendant’s
testimony that she did not intend to remove the plaintiff from the automo-
bile policies at issue but that she did so accidentally, nor was it required
to do so.
2. This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding the defendant in contempt for failing to pay the mortgage on
the marital residence: the defendant entered the pendente lite stipulation
assuming the responsibility of the mortgage payment with knowledge of
her employment situation, she clearly knew that deferring the payments
would increase the amount of marital debt, and she impermissibly
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Walton v. Walton
resorted to self-help to avoid paying the mortgage on the marital resi-
dence as ordered by the trial court; moreover, even if the defendant
believed that the deferral excused her from paying the mortgage, a good
faith dispute does not preclude a finding of wilfulness; furthermore, the
funds that the defendant withdrew from her retirement accounts and
that she received from her parents could have been used to pay the
mortgage on the marital residence, but she chose not to do so.
3. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleging that she violated
the automatic orders when she withdrew funds from her retirement
accounts: although the defendant testified that she made the withdrawals
from her retirement accounts in order to pay necessary bills, her claim
of necessity was undermined by the availability of the funds that she
received from her parents, which she could have put toward uses other
than paying off individual credit card debt, and the defendant’s argument
that the court erred by not considering the exception to the automatic
order prohibiting the disposition of marital funds during the pendency
of the dissolution action for the payment of household expenses was
therefore unavailing; moreover, because the trial court determined that
the defendant’s violation of the automatic orders was wilful, this court
could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by finding
the defendant in contempt for withdrawing funds from her retirement
accounts.
4. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
awarded the plaintiff his entire federal pension without assigning a value
to it or recognizing that it had value and that it did not properly consider
and weigh the pension’s value when formulating its property distribution
orders: neither party presented evidence as to the value of the plaintiff’s
pension in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, and it is not the
function of the court to make calculations of that sort to fill evidentiary
gaps; moreover, the defendant’s claim that the court failed to consider
the pension was without merit, as the court clearly classified and
weighed it as a marital asset when it expressly ordered that the plaintiff
retain his entire federal pension, and there was nothing in the record
to suggest that the court did not consider the value of the pension when
it divided the parties’ assets.
5. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
denied her request for production of the appraisal prepared by C; on
appeal, the defendant failed to challenge the basis of the trial court’s
ruling, namely, that the appraisal was not subject to disclosure under
the rule of practice (§ 13-4 (f)) because the plaintiff had not disclosed
C as an expert witness, he was not seeking to introduce the appraisal
into evidence, and the defendant had not shown any exceptional circum-
stance indicating that it was impracticable for her to obtain the facts
or opinions contained in the appraisal by other means.
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Walton v. Walton
6. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly
distributed the parties’ property in a disproportionate and inequitable
manner: because the court specified in its memorandum of decision
that it considered the criteria set forth in the statute (§ 46b-81) governing
property distribution in marital dissolution actions and the evidence
before it, it was presumed to have properly performed its duty in distrib-
uting the marital estate, and, given the entire mosaic of the court’s
judgment, the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the
division of the marital estate; moreover, although the defendant argued
that she did not receive any of the parties’ retirement funds, the defen-
dant ignored the fact that she did, in fact, receive a large portion of
her retirement funds when she unilaterally withdrew funds from her
retirement accounts, and it was not improper or inequitable for the
court to strive to offset the defendant’s earlier withdrawals; furthermore,
the court reasonably exercised its discretion in ordering that the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the marital residence be split equally in light of the
funds initially provided by the plaintiff for the purchase of the marital
home and the defendant’s unilateral decision to defer a significant
amount of mortgage payments; additionally, the defendant’s argument
that the court inequitably ordered her to pay the remaining debt on the
parties’ two joint credit card accounts was unavailing, as the plaintiff’s
payments toward the accounts pursuant to the pendente lite orders
significantly reduced the parties’ joint debt.
Argued April 22—officially released August 13, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk, where the plaintiff filed
motions for contempt; thereafter, the case was tried to
the court, Kowalski, J.; judgment granting the plaintiff’s
motions for contempt and dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was
Meaghan E. Collins, for the appellant (defendant).
Adam J. Teller, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The defendant, Deepa B. Walton, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her mar-
riage to the plaintiff, Robert S. Walton IV. On appeal,
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Walton v. Walton

the defendant claims that the court improperly (1)
found her in contempt for various alleged violations of
the court’s automatic and/or pendente lite orders, (2)
awarded the plaintiff his entire federal pension without
assigning a value to it, (3) denied her request for produc-
tion of an appraisal completed by an appraiser retained
by the plaintiff, and (4) distributed the parties’ property
in a disproportionate and inequitable manner. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our review of the
claims on appeal. The parties were married in 2003 and
three children were born of the marriage.1 On October
9, 2019, the plaintiff filed the present dissolution action
against the defendant. Along with the writ, summons
and complaint, the defendant also was served with the
automatic orders in accordance with Practice Book
§ 25-5 (service of automatic orders is ‘‘made with ser-
vice of process of a complaint for dissolution of mar-
riage’’).2
1
The parties entered into a parenting plan governing the care and custody
of the minor children. The care and custody of the minor children is not at
issue on appeal.
2
Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following automatic
orders shall apply to both parties, with service of the automatic orders to
be made with service of process of a complaint for dissolution of marriage
. . . . The automatic orders shall be effective with regard to the plaintiff
. . . upon the signing of the complaint . . . and with regard to the defen-
dant . . . upon service and shall remain in place during the pendency of
the action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by further order of a
judicial authority upon motion of either of the parties:
***
‘‘(b) In all cases involving a marriage . . . whether or not there are chil-
dren:
‘‘(1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, exchange, assign, remove, or in any
way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an
order of a judicial authority, any property, except in the usual course of
business or for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable
attorney’s fees in connection with this action.
***
‘‘(6) Neither party shall cause the other party to be removed from any
medical, hospital and dental insurance coverage, and each party shall main-
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Walton v. Walton

On December 16, 2019, the parties signed a pendente
lite agreement, which was entered as an order of the
court, providing, inter alia, that the plaintiff would make
the monthly payments due on six credit card accounts,
two of which were joint accounts, and the defendant
would pay the first and second mortgages on the marital
residence, in addition to various other expenses associ-
ated with the marital residence, automobile insurance,
taxes, registration and life insurance premiums.
During the pendency of the action, the parties filed
various motions for contempt alleging violations of the
automatic orders and/or pendente lite orders. Those
motions, as discussed more fully herein, were reserved
until the time of trial. The action was tried to the court
on December 1 and 2, 2021, and April 13, 2022. The
court heard testimony from both parties and numerous
exhibits were introduced into evidence. The parties
both presented expert testimony as to the value of the
marital residence. The parties also submitted evidence
on five outstanding motions for contempt filed by both
parties.3
On September 6, 2022, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision rendering judgment dissolving the par-
ties’ marriage. The court also granted three motions for
tain the existing medical, hospital and dental insurance coverage in full
force and effect.
***
‘‘(d) The automatic orders of a judicial authority as enumerated above
shall be set forth immediately following the party’s requested relief in any
complaint for dissolution of marriage . . . and shall set forth the following
language in bold letters:
’’Failure to obey these orders may be punishable by contempt of
court. If you object to or seek modification of these orders during
the pendency of the action, you have the right to a hearing before a
judge within a reasonable time.
‘‘The clerk shall not accept for filing any complaint for dissolution of
marriage . . . that does not comply with this subsection.’’ (Emphasis in
original.)
3
As indicated herein, this appeal involves only three of the motions for
contempt filed by the plaintiff. Neither party challenges the court’s rulings
on the other two contempt motions.
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contempt filed by the plaintiff that are at issue in this
appeal, finding, inter alia, that the defendant wilfully
violated the clear and unambiguous automatic orders
and/or pendente lite orders by removing the plaintiff
as an insured from automobile insurance policies and
an umbrella policy covering the parties’ vehicles and
the marital residence, failing to pay the mortgages on
the marital residence and withdrawing funds from her
retirement accounts. The court indicated that it would
take the defendant’s contumacious actions into account
when fashioning its financial orders. As to the distribu-
tion of marital property, the court ordered, inter alia,
that the marital residence be listed for sale by October
1, 2022, and that the proceeds from that sale be split
equally by the parties. The court ordered that the plain-
tiff retain 100 percent of his retirement accounts and
awarded the plaintiff the funds remaining in the defen-
dant’s retirement accounts. The court further ordered
that each party retain title and interest to his or her
sole checking accounts, brokerage accounts and funds
held in escrow, as reflected on their most recent finan-
cial affidavits. The court ordered that the parties would
be solely liable for the debts and liabilities listed on
their respective financial affidavits, except that the
defendant would be responsible for paying the balances
on the parties’ joint credit card accounts. This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
I
We begin with the defendant’s claims concerning the
trial court’s granting of three motions for contempt
filed by the plaintiff, alleging violations of the automatic
orders and/or pendente lite orders.4 The following legal
principles are applicable to our consideration of the
4
For ease of discussion, we address the defendant’s claims in a different
order than they are presented in her appellate brief.
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defendant’s claims. ‘‘Contempt is a disobedience to the
rules and orders of a court which has power to punish
for such an offense. . . . [C]ivil contempt is committed
when a person violates an order of court which requires
that person in specific and definite language to do or
refrain from doing an act or series of acts. . . . In part
because the contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . .
such punishment should not rest upon implication or
conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order]
declaring . . . rights should be clear, or imposing bur-
dens [should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the
parties may not be misled thereby. . . . To constitute
contempt, it is not enough that a party has merely vio-
lated a court order; the violation must be wilful. . . .
It is the burden of the party seeking an order of con-
tempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both
a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged con-
temnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompli-
ance with that directive. . . . The question of whether
the underlying order is clear and unambiguous is a legal
inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . If we answer
that question affirmatively, we then review the trial
court’s determination that the violation was wilful
under the abuse of discretion standard.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Wethington v. Wethington, 223
Conn. App. 715, 723, 309 A.3d 356 (2024).
In considering the defendant’s claims, we also are
mindful that ‘‘[a] party to a court proceeding must obey
the court’s orders unless and until they are modified
or rescinded, and may not engage in self-help by dis-
obeying a court order to achieve the party’s desired
end. . . . The principle against self-help often applies
in situations in which previously compliant parties
stopped complying with court orders after changes in
circumstances rendered the orders unclear without first
seeking judicial clarification or modification. . . .
[A]lthough contempt is particularly harsh, a good faith
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dispute or legitimate misunderstanding does not pre-
clude a finding of wilfulness as a predicate to a judgment
of contempt.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Birkhold v. Birkhold, 343 Conn. 786,
813, 276 A.3d 414 (2022).
Here, the court found, as a preliminary matter, that
the automatic orders and the pendente lite orders were
clear and unambiguous and that the parties had notice
of those orders. The court further found that both par-
ties are attorneys, and the defendant testified that she
read and understood the automatic orders after being
served with them on October 4, 2019. With the foregoing
in mind, we address the defendant’s challenges to each
of the court’s contempt findings in turn.
A
On January 30, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt alleging that the defendant violated the auto-
matic orders when she removed the plaintiff as an
insured under the parties’ automobile insurance poli-
cies and an umbrella policy covering the parties’ vehi-
cles and the marital residence, which were in place at
the time this action was commenced. In addressing the
plaintiff’s motion, the court first noted that the auto-
matic orders provide, in part, that ‘‘each party shall
maintain the existing life insurance, automobile insur-
ance, homeowners or renters insurance policies in full
force and effect.’’ The court found that ‘‘[t]he defendant
testified that, on November 1, 2019, she called the par-
ties’ insurance carrier in an effort to reduce the cost
of the insurance premiums. The defendant removed the
plaintiff from those policies. Following that call, some
coverage was terminated, including automobile cover-
age on the Land Rover then being driven by the plaintiff,
the jointly owned Mercedes automobile, and the plain-
tiff’s interest in an umbrella policy. After the filing of the
present motion, the defendant reinstated the coverage.
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Walton v. Walton

The plaintiff has established by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the auto-
matic orders by terminating the plaintiff’s insurance
coverage; however, the plaintiff failed to establish the
amount of damages suffered as a result. Indeed, the
defendant testified that the plaintiff withdrew $200 from
a joint bank account and unilaterally withheld $600 in
child support payments to make himself whole for the
losses he may have suffered.’’
On appeal, the defendant argues that the automatic
orders were not clear and unambiguous in that they do
not specifically mention umbrella insurance. Although
the policy at issue is titled an umbrella policy, it is, in
substance, a policy that covers the parties’ automobiles
and marital residence. We therefore reject the defen-
dant’s argument that the automatic orders did not
clearly and unambiguously pertain to the umbrella pol-
icy.
The defendant also argues that she did not intend to
remove the plaintiff from the automobile policies at
issue but that she did so accidentally when she tried
to reduce the umbrella coverage. The trial court appar-
ently did not credit the defendant’s testimony in this
regard, nor was it required to do so. See Delena v.
Grachitorena, 216 Conn. App. 225, 231, 283 A.3d 1090
(2022) (‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier of
fact to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the defen-
dant’s challenge to the court’s finding of contempt for
removing the plaintiff from the insurance policies at
issue fails.
B
On August 21, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for
contempt alleging that the defendant failed to pay the
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Walton v. Walton

mortgage on the marital residence as required by the
December 16, 2019 pendente lite orders.5 In addressing
this motion, the trial court found that ‘‘[t]he defendant
testified that she stopped making the monthly mortgage
payments in May, 2020, and the evidence establishes
that the defendant sought and obtained a deferral of
the mortgage payments in the amount of $87,961.45
without the written consent of the plaintiff or an order
of the court. The defendant filed no motion to modify
[the pendente lite orders] but testified that she sought
and obtained the deferral because she was unemployed
and having a difficult time finding employment. Specifi-
cally, the defendant testified that she lost her job in
December, 2019, which led to a period of unemploy-
ment.

‘‘In reality, the defendant’s last day at work was
November 15, 2019, and she executed a separation
agreement with her employer at the time on December
3, 2019.6 This chronology is relevant because on Decem-
ber 16, 2019, when the parties presented their pendente
lite stipulation . . . to the court for approval, the
defendant did not disclose to the court or to the plaintiff
the status of her employment, yet she made the decision
to assume the financial obligations listed in the stipula-
tion, which was made an order of the court . . . with
full knowledge of her employment [situation]. There is
no evidence before the court that the defendant has
paid down any portion of the $87,961.45 deferral
amount; rather, that deferral amount must be paid off
5
As noted herein, the pendente lite orders required the defendant to pay
the first and second mortgages on the marital residence. The record reflects
that the motion for contempt pertained only to the first mortgage. Therefore,
any reference to the mortgage in this context refers to the first mortgage
on the marital residence.
6
‘‘The defendant also testified that part of the reason she lost her job in
December, 2019, was due to ‘impending COVID.’ The court does not find
this testimony credible.’’
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Walton v. Walton

as a balloon payment at the end of the mortgage term
or earlier payoff.
‘‘The court sympathizes with the difficult financial
circumstances facing the defendant in the spring and
summer of 2020. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence that the defen-
dant wilfully violated the order of the court . . . when
she deferred the mortgage payments that she was
required to make during the pendency of this action.
The court will take this reduction into account when
fashioning its financial orders in the judgment.’’ (Foot-
note in original.)
On appeal, the defendant argues that she did not
violate the order that she pay the mortgage on the
marital residence because no payments were due in
that she had them deferred. The defendant’s argument
is belied by the language of the order, which provides
only that the defendant shall pay the mortgage on the
marital residence, not that she could unilaterally enter
into an agreement to defer those payments. To begin,
we emphasize the court’s finding that the defendant
entered the pendente lite stipulation assuming the
responsibility of the mortgage payment with knowledge
of her employment situation. Moreover, as the trial
court found, the defendant clearly knew, as an attorney,
the effect of deferring the payments, which was to
increase the amount of marital debt. If she was having
difficulty paying the mortgage, the proper recourse
would have been to seek judicial clarification or modifi-
cation. For instance, the defendant could have moved
to modify the pendente lite order or could have sought
approval of the deferral agreement, but she did not do
so. Instead, she impermissibly resorted to self-help to
avoid paying the mortgage on the marital residence as
ordered by the court. Additionally, as stated herein,
even if the defendant believed that the deferral excused
her from paying the mortgage, a good faith dispute does
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not preclude a finding of wilfulness. See Birkhold v.
Birkhold, supra, 343 Conn. 813.
The defendant further contends that ‘‘[the court’s]
findings seem to suggest that [she] has a justified inabil-
ity to comply with the financial orders on income
alone.’’ The court’s finding that the defendant wilfully
violated the pendente lite orders belies the defendant’s
contention. As discussed subsequently, while this
action was pending, the defendant withdrew almost
$80,000 from her retirement accounts and she received
more than $70,000 from her parents, which she could
have used to pay the mortgage on the marital residence,
but she chose not to do so.7 Therefore, we cannot con-
clude that the court abused its discretion in finding the
7
On August 21, 2020, the plaintiff also filed a motion for contempt, pen-
dente lite, in which he alleged that the defendant violated the automatic
orders when she paid off $86,142.39 of her personal credit card debt using
funds given to her by her parents during the pendency of this action. Although
the court did not find the defendant in contempt for using the funds from
her parents to pay her personal credit card debt, and the plaintiff has not
challenged that ruling on appeal, the court’s findings that those funds were
available to her to pay other expenses in accordance with the automatic
orders and pendente lite orders give context to certain of its other rulings.
Specifically, in addressing this motion for contempt, the court found: ‘‘The
defendant’s November 22, 2019 financial affidavit (#104.00) lists a total of
$55,376 in individual credit card and tax debt. The defendant’s August 6,
2020 financial affidavit (#129.00) lists zero in individual credit card and tax
debt. At trial, the defendant testified that, during the pendency of this action,
her parents gave her funds in excess of $70,000 that she used [to pay] off
certain personal credit card debt. The defendant testified that those funds
were a gift from her parents, which she has no expectation of repaying
and that she has communicated that to her parents. The court finds the
defendant’s testimony on this issue to be credible and further finds that the
plaintiff has failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a wilful
violation of the automatic orders on the part of the defendant by using the
funds gifted to her by her parents to pay off her individual credit card and
other debt.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
The court further found that ‘‘[t]he defendant testified as to six different
credit card balances, totaling $70,144.63, that were paid using funds from
her parents. The defendant also testified that between December, 2019,
and January, 2021, her parents made her monthly credit card payments on
her behalf.’’
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Walton v. Walton

defendant in contempt for failing to pay the mortgage
on the marital residence.
C
Also on August 21, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion
for contempt alleging that the defendant violated the
automatic orders when she withdrew funds from her
retirement accounts. In addressing this motion, the
court first noted that ‘‘[t]he automatic orders provide, in
part, that ‘[n]either party shall sell, transfer, exchange,
assign, remove, or in any way dispose of, without the
consent of the other party in writing, or an order of a
judicial authority, any property, except in the usual
course of business or for customary and usual house-
hold expenses or for reasonable attorney’s fees in con-
nection with this action.’ ’’ The court found that ‘‘[t]he
defendant’s financial affidavit . . . filed November 22,
2019, reflects a $42,619 value for the defendant’s Roth
IRA and a $44,812 value for the defendant’s 401 (k).
Both accounts had a combined total of $87,431. When
the defendant filed her next financial affidavit . . . on
August 6, 2020, however, the Roth IRA had a zero bal-
ance and the 401 (k) had a balance of $15,000. The
defendant’s most recent financial affidavit . . .
reflects values of $1000 for the Roth IRA and $30,000
for the 401 (k). The defendant’s federal tax returns
indicate that she took early IRA withdrawals of $39,459
in 2019 and $39,000 in 2020.
‘‘The defendant does not dispute that she made the
foregoing withdrawals from her retirement accounts
without the written consent of the plaintiff or an order
of the court but testified that she had to do so in order
to pay necessary bills. The court need not repeat its
findings with respect to the chronology of the defen-
dant’s unemployment, or that the defendant’s parents
paid off more than $70,000 in the defendant’s personal
credit card debt during the pendency of this action, but
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suffice it to say that the availability of that $70,000,
which the defendant could have put toward uses other
than paying off individual credit card debt, undermines
her claim of necessity.
‘‘The plaintiff has established by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant wilfully violated the auto-
matic orders by withdrawing $78,459 from her retire-
ment accounts during the pendency of this action,
which has also reduced the assets available for division
between the parties. The court will take this reduction
into account when fashioning its financial orders in the
judgment.’’
On appeal, the defendant argues that the court failed
to take into account the exception to the automatic
order prohibiting the disposition of marital property
during the pendency of the dissolution action, namely,
that the order prohibits disposition ‘‘except in the usual
course of business or for customary and usual house-
hold expenses or for reasonable attorney’s fees in con-
nection with this action.’’ The defendant contends that
the court erred in finding her in contempt because she
used the funds that she withdrew for usual household
expenses and attorney’s fees. Although the defendant
testified that she needed to withdraw those funds from
her retirement accounts, the court rejected ‘‘her claim
of necessity’’ on the ground that she could have used
the $70,000 that she received from her parents to pay
those expenses instead of using that money to pay off
her personal credit card debt. The defendant’s argument
that the court erred by not considering the exception
to the disposition of marital funds for the payment of
household expenses is unavailing.
The defendant also cursorily contends that ‘‘the plain-
tiff failed to prove wilfulness in light of the court’s
findings about the defendant’s financial difficulties.’’ As
stated herein, this interpretation of the court’s findings
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is unpersuasive considering the court’s determination
that the defendant’s violation of the automatic orders
was wilful. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the
court abused its discretion by finding the defendant in
contempt for withdrawing funds from her retirement
accounts.
II
As to the distribution of marital property, the defen-
dant first claims that the court improperly awarded the
plaintiff his entire federal pension without assigning a
value to it. She further argues that, ‘‘[e]ven if the court
could not specifically value the pension, it failed to
recognize that it had value and did not properly consider
and weigh the pension’s value when formulating its
property distribution orders.’’ We are not persuaded.
‘‘We review financial awards in dissolution actions
under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . In order
to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion,
we must find that the court either incorrectly applied
the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . .
In determining whether a trial court has abused its
broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we
allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the
correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ingles v. Ingles, 216 Conn. App. 782, 794–95,
286 A.3d 908 (2022).
‘‘It is well settled that pension benefits constitute
property subject to equitable distribution under [Gen-
eral Statutes] § 46b-81.8 . . . Pension benefits consti-
tute a form of deferred compensation for services ren-
dered. . . . Pension benefits are widely recognized as
8
General Statutes § 46b-81 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) At the time of
entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation
pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign
to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse. The court
may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may
order the sale of such real property, without any act by either spouse, when
in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into
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among the most valuable assets that parties have when
a marriage ends. . . . Nevertheless, there is no set for-
mula that a court must follow when dividing the parties’
assets, including pension benefits.’’ (Citations omitted;
footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 803–804.
Our Supreme Court has noted that, ‘‘although not
expressly required by statute, a trial court, when utiliz-
ing a method to ascertain the value of a pension, should
reach that value on the record.’’ Krafick v. Krafick, 234
Conn. 783, 804, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). Our Supreme Court
also has recognized that ‘‘[t]he court need not, however,
assign specific values to the parties’ assets.’’
Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 531, 752
A.2d 978 (1998). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that, ‘‘when neither party in a dissolution proceeding
chooses to introduce detailed information as to the
value of a given asset, neither party may later complain
that it is not satisfied with the court’s valuation of that
asset.’’ Id., 535. ‘‘If the parties fail to [provide the court
with the approximate value of each asset], the equitable
nature of the proceedings precludes them from later
seeking to have the financial orders overturned on the
basis that the court had before it too little information
as to the value of the assets distributed.’’ Id., 536.
Here, the defendant cannot assert that the court
improperly failed to assign a specific value to the plain-
tiff’s federal pension given the scant evidence of valua-

effect. . . .
‘‘(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned,
the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall
consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, educa-
tion, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.’’
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tion presented by the parties.9 On the plaintiff’s Novem-
ber 29, 2021 financial affidavit, the plaintiff did not list
a value associated with his federal pension but noted
a gross monthly benefit at age 58.7 of $2847.10 Despite
the defendant’s contention in her brief to this court
that the plaintiff’s federal pension ‘‘is likely the most
valuable asset of the marriage,’’ the defendant made no
inquiry into its value at trial, nor did she ask the court
in her written proposed orders to award any portion
of it to her. Indeed, neither party presented evidence
as to the value of the plaintiff’s pension, in the form
of expert testimony or otherwise, and ‘‘[i]t is not the
function of the court to make calculations of that sort
to fill evidentiary gaps.’’ Mongillo v. Mongillo, 69 Conn.
App. 472, 481, 794 A.2d 1054, cert. denied, 261 Conn.
928, 806 A.2d 1065 (2002).
The defendant nevertheless argues that, ‘‘[e]ven if a
precise valuation was not possible, the error came from
the court not considering and weighing the pension’s
clear significance.’’ She contends that ‘‘the court failed
to sufficiently recognize that the pension had meaning-
ful value and weigh that in its property distribution.’’
At oral argument before this court, her counsel reiter-
ated that the court erred by not stating that the plaintiff’s
pension had ‘‘significant value.’’ We are not persuaded.
9
The defendant’s counsel conceded at oral argument before this court
that the trial court was not required to assign a specific value to the plain-
tiff’s pension.
10
The plaintiff testified that ‘‘the pension is . . . an estimate of what I
will get when I . . . retire. . . . [W]e attempted to have the agency extrapo-
late what that value may be as of the date listed on the affidavit, which was
a very difficult number to get them to do actually . . . [because] they usually
don’t tell you what your pension will be if you’re forty-three years old and
if you retire at age fifty-five and what can we somehow extrapolate your
pension would be per month and some date in the future. They really don’t
do that. There’s no statement that they provide for you to do this. But I,
after a lot of research, found a technician who is able to contact someone,
who was able to do it, and it was a long process. . . . So, it’s not a number
that is, was easily obtainable.’’
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First, the defendant’s claim that the court failed to
consider the pension is without merit. In expressly
ordering that the plaintiff retain his entire federal pen-
sion, the court classified and weighed it as a marital
asset and then divided the marital assets in accordance
with its broad discretion under § 46b-81.11 Second, there
is nothing in the record to suggest that the court did
not consider the value of the pension. The plaintiff
testified as to the current projection of the amount he
would receive upon retirement and the record does not
reflect that the court disregarded this evidence when
it divided the parties’ assets. In sum, the defendant has
not demonstrated any error by the court, and we will
not presume one. Consequently, the defendant’s claim
that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff his
entire federal pension without assigning a value to it
is unavailing.
III
The defendant also challenges the court’s finding as
to the value of the marital residence. Specifically, the
defendant argues that the court improperly denied her
request for production of an appraisal of the marital
residence, prepared by a certified appraiser at the
behest of the plaintiff in the middle of trial, on the
ground that it was protected from disclosure pursuant
to Practice Book § 13-4 (f). We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our consideration of this claim. On June 11,
11
In support of her argument that the court improperly failed to weigh
the plaintiff’s pension in fashioning its financial orders, the defendant relies
on Dinunzio v. Dinunzio, 180 Conn. App. 64, 182 A.3d 706, cert. denied,
328 Conn. 930, 182 A.3d 1193 (2018). The present case is easily distinguish-
able from Dinunzio, in which this court reversed the judgment of the trial
court on the ground that it improperly classified the plaintiff’s pension in
that case only as a source of income and not as property subject to equitable
distribution. Id., 75. Here, the trial court clearly treated the plaintiff’s pension
as property subject to distribution and expressly awarded it to the plaintiff.
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2021, the plaintiff filed a disclosure of expert witness
pursuant to Practice Book § 13-412 stating his intention
to introduce at trial the testimony of James B. Hoffman,
who would testify, on the basis of his ‘‘[k]nowledge of
the neighborhood of the real property and analysis of
the sales prices of comparable properties whose sales
closed in the past year,’’ that the fair market value of
the marital residence as of June 9, 2021, was $1,500,000.
On June 18, 2021, the defendant filed a disclosure of
expert witness pursuant to Practice Book § 13-4 stating
her intention to introduce at trial the testimony of James
J. Tooher, who would testify, on the basis of his exper-
tise as a senior residential appraiser, that the fair market
value of the marital residence as of June 9, 2021, was
$1,160,000.
On November 30, 2021, the defendant filed a motion
in limine seeking to preclude the testimony of Hoffman
on the ground that ‘‘he is not an expert and [his testi-
mony is] irrelevant for trial purposes and will not pro-
vide competent evidence on which the court can rely.’’
12
Practice Book § 13-4, titled ‘‘Experts,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A
party shall disclose each person who may be called by that party to testify
as an expert witness at trial . . . .
‘‘(b) A party shall file with the court and serve upon counsel a disclosure
of expert witnesses which identifies the name, address and employer of
each person who may be called by that party to testify as an expert witness
at trial, whether through live testimony or by deposition. In addition, the
disclosure shall include the following information:
‘‘(1) . . . [T]he field of expertise and the subject matter on which the
witness is expected to offer expert testimony; the expert opinions to which
the witness is expected to testify; [and] the substance of the grounds for
each such expert opinion . . . .
‘‘(3) . . . [T]he party disclosing an expert witness shall, upon the request
of an opposing party, produce to all other parties all materials obtained,
created and/or relied upon by the expert in connection with his or her
opinions in the case within fourteen days prior to that expert’s deposi-
tion . . . .
‘‘(c) (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority upon motion,
a party may take the deposition of any expert witness disclosed pursuant
to subsection (b) of this section . . . .’’
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The defendant argued, inter alia, that Hoffman was not
a qualified expert because he is a real estate broker,
not a licensed appraiser. The court heard argument of
the parties on the first day of trial, after which it denied
the defendant’s motion, explaining that, although it was
‘‘not convinced that [Hoffman’s testimony was] going
to be that helpful,’’ his qualifications would pertain to
the weight that the court would afford his testimony,
not its admissibility. Due to illness, Hoffman was not
available to testify in December, but Tooher testified
on the second day of trial, December 2, 2021.13
On January 24, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion seek-
ing access to the marital residence to permit an
appraiser that he had retained to perform an appraisal
of the property. In his motion, the plaintiff indicated that
he had ‘‘engaged an independent real estate appraiser
in lieu of the previously planned expert on the real
estate value because the court’s trial schedule created
the opportunity and the court expressed some skepti-
cism about the weight to be given the witness.’’ The
plaintiff indicated that the independent appraiser, Ste-
phen Correll, ‘‘would provide the written report within
seven days [and] [t]his time frame would provide an
opportunity for the defendant’s counsel to depose [Cor-
rell] if she chooses to do so.’’ The court granted the
plaintiff’s motion.
On April 11, 2022, the defendant filed with the court
a notice of service upon the plaintiff of a request to
produce at the next trial date the appraisal completed
by Correll. On April 13, 2022, the parties and counsel
appeared before the court for the third and final day
of trial. At the beginning of the proceedings that day,
counsel for the defendant indicated to the court that
she had sent to counsel for the plaintiff a request for
13
The third and final day of trial originally was scheduled for December
3, 2021, but was rescheduled for April 13, 2022.
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a copy of Correll’s appraisal.14 Counsel for the plaintiff
stated that he objected to the defendant’s request for
production in that the appraisal was not subject to
disclosure under Practice Book § 13-4 (f)15 because he
had not disclosed Correll as an expert witness and was
not seeking to introduce the appraisal into evidence,
and the defendant had not shown any exceptional cir-
cumstance indicating that it was impracticable for her
to obtain the facts or opinions contained in the appraisal
by other means. After confirming with the plaintiff’s
counsel that it was not his intention to call Correll
as an expert witness or introduce the appraisal into
14
Counsel for the defendant addressed the court as follows: ‘‘I have one
preliminary discovery request, Your Honor, if I may. . . . I filed a request
to produce on or about February 16th upon plaintiff’s counsel, requesting
an apprais[al] or any valuations reached predicated on Stephen Correll’s
inspection of the home. The court will remember in January of 2022, [the]
plaintiff urgently requested from the court that [Correll] inspect the exterior
and interior of the home. My client, of course, obliged the court order by
two o’clock that day. . . . And we would like receipt of that—of Mr. Cor-
rell’s valuation and have requested it.’’
After counsel for the plaintiff indicated his objection based upon Practice
Book § 13-4 (f), counsel for the defendant responded: ‘‘Your Honor, if you
will, I don’t think it has been established that it is work product. And, in
fact, I even requested any retainer agreements to ascertain who the contract
was between, whether it was the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel’s firms.
Additionally, Your Honor, in their urgent notice of January 23rd request to
the court, for which no request came prior to that, they say that this man
is going to be used in lieu of the previous planned expert. Additionally, Your
Honor, it says that the appraiser would provide the written report within
seven days. Whether it’s ultimately—that did not occur. And whether it’s
ultimately entered as an exhibit is up to the safeguards of the court. The
discovery phase for which I requested for is left up to my discretion at this
time prior to introducing it, if at all.’’
The foregoing constitutes the entirety of the defendant’s argument before
the trial court in support of her request for the appraisal.
15
Practice Book § 13-4 (f) provides: ‘‘A party may discover facts known
or opinions held by an expert who had been retained or specially employed
by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and
who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial only as provided in
Section 13-11 or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which
it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions
on the same subject by other means.’’
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evidence, the court asked counsel for the defendant to
respond to the argument asserted by counsel for the
plaintiff. Counsel for the defendant argued, inter alia:
‘‘Your Honor, if you will, I don’t think it has been estab-
lished that it is work product. And, in fact, I even
requested any retainer agreements to ascertain who the
contract was between, whether it was the plaintiff or
plaintiff’s counsel’s firms.’’ After hearing argument from
both attorneys, the court ruled: ‘‘I had an opportunity
to take a look at the rules that apply and having listened
to the argument of counsel, I’m persuaded by the plain-
tiff’s position, so I’m not going to order the turnover of
the information. So that request is denied.’’ The plaintiff
proceeded to present the testimony of Hoffman as his
expert witness.16
In its memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’
marriage, the court set forth the following facts per-
taining to the marital residence. ‘‘After their marriage,
the parties purchased 9 Boyd Lane in Greenwich for
$450,000, demolished an existing structure on the prop-
erty and built what became the marital residence. The
parties secured a construction loan and the plaintiff
contributed approximately $350,000 in cash to the proj-
ect, which amount was the total of an inheritance from
his great grandmother and gifts from his parents. At
trial, both parties introduced expert testimony as to the
value of the marital residence, which is the main asset
of the marriage. The plaintiff’s expert, [Hoffman], is a
real estate broker who prepared a market analysis and
testified that the property’s value as of April 11, 2022,
was $1,659,367.50, an increase from the $1,580,350 value
he found on February 15, 2022. Hoffman conceded that
he is not an appraiser and did not perform an appraisal
but based his opinion of value on factors including
16
Tooher prepared two appraisals of the marital residence, which were
admitted into evidence. Hoffman prepared a home valuation report of the
marital residence, which was admitted into evidence.
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relevant sales and his intimate familiarity of the River-
side neighborhood in which the property is located.
The defendant’s expert, [Tooher], has been a licensed
real estate appraiser for thirty-six years and obtained
his [Senior Residential Appraiser] designation in 1994.
Tooher concluded that the value of the property was
$1,160,000 as of June 9, 2021. Tooher further testified
that the real estate market in Greenwich had increased
since that date, but he did not provide an updated opin-
ion of value. The defendant also testified to the below
average condition of the marital residence, including
electrical and mold issues. Based on the credible evi-
dence in the record, the court finds the fair market
value of the marital residence to be $1,400,000, which
is the approximate midpoint between the experts’ opin-
ions of value.17 The property is encumbered by a first
mortgage and a home equity loan with a combined total
outstanding balance of approximately $1,098,000.’’18
(Footnote in original.)

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied her request to obtain a copy of the
appraisal performed by Correll, ‘‘despite the require-
ments of full disclosure in marital dissolution cases.’’
Specifically, the defendant argues that, ‘‘even if the
appraisal could be withheld in a civil action, marital
dissolution cases have unique case law and rules of
procedure that require ‘full and frank disclosure’
17
‘‘Also in the record is the Greenwich Tax Assessor’s card, which assigns
the property a preliminary fair market value of $1,412,200 as of October 1,
2021. While the court assigns this value less weight than either of the experts
who testified at trial, it does provide some indication of value.’’
18
Tooher performed an updated appraisal, which was admitted into evi-
dence and valued the marital residence at $1,265,000 as of February 7, 2022.
We agree with the defendant that the trial court’s finding that Tooher did
not provide an updated opinion of value was erroneous, but because that
value was higher and closer to the value found by the trial court, the defen-
dant was not harmed by this error.
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between the parties. Most notably, Practice Book § 25-
19

3220 makes it mandatory for a husband and a wife in a
dissolution action to exchange ‘any written appraisal
concerning any asset owned by either party,’ and it
imposes a continuing duty of such disclosure through-
out the case.’’21 (Emphasis omitted; footnotes added.)

We first note that the defendant did not assert these
arguments before the trial court in either her request
for production or at trial. She argued only that the
appraisal was not protected as the work product of the
plaintiff’s counsel but neither cited Practice Book § 25-
32 nor argued that she was entitled to ‘‘full and frank
disclosure.’’ See State v. Alvarez, 209 Conn. App. 250,
252 n.2, 267 A.3d 303 (2021) (when party makes different
argument on appeal than at trial, claim is unpreserved),
aff’d, 346 Conn. 530, 292 A.3d 1 (2023).
19
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff represented to the court in
his motion for access to the marital home that he would disclose the appraisal
within seven days and he should not have later been permitted to refuse
to follow through with that representation. Presumably, the plaintiff made
those representations because he was considering introducing into evidence
at trial the appraisal and was seeking to assure the defendant that she would
have access to the appraisal before trial resumed. Because the plaintiff did
not seek to introduce the appraisal or the testimony of the appraiser into
evidence, the defendant’s argument is unavailing.
20
Practice Book § 25-32, which is entitled ‘‘Mandatory Disclosure and
Production,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Unless otherwise ordered by
the judicial authority for good cause shown, upon request by a party involved
in an action for dissolution of marriage or civil union, legal separation,
annulment or support, or a postjudgment motion for modification of alimony
or support, opposing parties shall exchange the following documents within
sixty days of such request: . . .
‘‘(8) any written appraisal concerning any asset owned by either party.
‘‘(b) Such duty to disclose shall continue during the pendency of the
action should a party appear. This section shall not preclude discovery
under any other provisions of these rules.’’
21
The defendant also argues on appeal that the appraisal did not qualify
as work product under Practice Book § 13-3. This argument misses the mark
in that the plaintiff did not object to the disclosure of the appraisal on the
basis of § 13-3, and the court’s denial of the defendant’s request for produc-
tion was not based on § 13-3.
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Moreover, the defendant fails, in her appellate argu-
ments, to address the basis upon which the court denied
her request for production. In objecting to the defen-
dant’s request for production, the plaintiff unambigu-
ously argued that the appraisal was protected from
disclosure under Practice Book § 13-4 (f) because he
had not disclosed Correll as an expert witness, was not
intending to call him to testify as a witness and would
not seek to introduce the appraisal into evidence, and
the court expressly agreed with the plaintiff’s argument.
The defendant did not contest the applicability of Prac-
tice Book § 13-4 (f) before the trial court, nor has she
done so in her brief to this court. Indeed, her brief to
this court is devoid of any mention of Practice Book
§ 13-4 or any analysis as to why Practice Book § 25-32
would trump Practice Book § 13-4, particularly in light
of the express application of Practice Book § 13-4 to
family cases through Practice Book § 25-31.22 In the
absence of a proper challenge to the basis of the court’s
ruling, namely, that the appraisal was protected from
disclosure by Practice Book § 13-4 (f), the defendant
cannot prevail on her claim that the court abused its
discretion in so ruling.23 See OneWest Bank, N.A. v.
22
Practice Book § 25-31 provides in relevant part that ‘‘the provisions of
Sections 13-1 through 13-10 . . . shall apply to family matters as defined
in Section 25-1.’’ We do not reach the issue of whether Practice Book § 25-
32 trumps Practice Book § 13-4 (f) or vice versa because the defendant did
not raise it before the trial court and likewise failed to brief it to this court.
23
Although we need not reach the issue of whether the defendant was
harmed by the court’s denial of her request for the appraisal, we note that
her reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn.
324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007), for the proposition that she need not prove harm
is misplaced. Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘even in the marital
dissolution context, Ramin does not establish a general rule. Over the course
of the proceedings in Ramin, the plaintiff filed five motions for contempt
in response to which the court issued orders to comply, sanctions and
attorney’s fees against the defendant. . . . The defendant’s persistent fail-
ure to produce specifically requested documents prompted this court to
describe his conduct as egregious litigation misconduct . . . . We expressly
recognized that the particular facts of Ramin, because of the defendant’s
egregious misconduct, required a departure from the ordinary rule. Ramin,
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Ceslik, 202 Conn. App. 445, 456–57, 246 A.3d 18 (‘‘[t]he
defendant’s claim is not persuasive because, even if it
has merit, it does not undermine the ground on which
the court based its decision’’), cert. denied, 336 Conn.
936, 249 A.3d 39 (2021).
IV
The defendant finally claims that the court ‘‘erred in
its property orders by inequitably favoring the [plaintiff]
with an excessively high portion of assets, while
assigning [the defendant] minimal assets and unreason-
able amounts of debt and liabilities.’’ We disagree.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the defendant’s claim. ‘‘In dissolution proceedings, the
court must fashion its financial orders in accordance
with the criteria set forth in . . . § 46b-81 (division of
marital property) . . . . Pursuant to § 46b-81 (c), the
court shall consider the length of the marriage, the
causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage
or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, earning capacity, voca-
tional skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities
and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and
income. The court shall also consider the contribution
of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation
or appreciation in value of their respective estates.
. . .
‘‘While the trial court must consider the delineated
statutory criteria . . . no single criterion is preferred
over others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in
therefore, represents a narrow exception to the general rule that the party
claiming error bears the burden to demonstrate harm.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Duart v. Dept. of Correction, 303 Conn.
479, 502, 34 A.3d 343 (2012). Because there was no misconduct by the
plaintiff here, we cannot conclude that this case falls within the narrow
exception carved out in Ramin relieving an appellant from proving harm.
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varying the weight placed upon each item under the
peculiar circumstances of each case. . . . A trial court
. . . need not give each factor equal weight . . . or
recite the statutory criteria that it considered in making
its decision or make express findings as to each statu-
tory factor. . . .
‘‘Importantly, § 46b-81 (a) permits the farthest
reaches from an equal division as is possible, allowing
the court to assign to either the husband or wife all or
any part of the estate of the other. . . . On the basis
of the plain language of § 46b-81, there is no presump-
tion in Connecticut that marital property should be
divided equally prior to applying the statutory criteria.
. . . Additionally, [i]ndividual financial orders in a dis-
solution action are part of the carefully crafted mosaic
that comprises the entire asset reallocation plan. . . .
Under the mosaic doctrine, financial orders should not
be viewed as a collection of single disconnected occur-
rences, but rather as a seamless collection of interde-
pendent elements. . . . [W]e will not disturb a trial
court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the
court has abused its discretion or it is found that it
could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
facts presented.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse
v. Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 129–30, 300 A.3d 1175
(2023).
‘‘[W]hen a trial court states in its memorandum of
decision that it has considered the factors listed in
§ 46b-81 (c) in fashioning an order distributing marital
property, the judge is presumed to have performed [his
or her] duty unless the contrary appears [from the
record].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kammili
v. Kammili, 197 Conn. App. 656, 672, 232 A.3d 102,
cert. denied, 335 Conn. 947, 238 A.3d 18 (2020). Thus,
because the court in this case specified in its memoran-
dum of decision that it considered the criteria set forth
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in § 46b-81 and the evidence before it, it is presumed
at the outset to have properly performed its duty in
distributing the marital estate.
We nevertheless address the defendant’s specific
arguments in support of her claim that the court’s divi-
sion of property was inequitable. The defendant argues
that, ‘‘[m]ost notably, [the plaintiff] was given all of the
parties’ retirement assets’’ and that she ‘‘did not receive
a single dollar of retirement funds.’’ In so arguing, the
defendant ignores the fact that she did, in fact, receive
a large portion of her retirement funds when she unilat-
erally withdrew almost $80,000 from her retirement
accounts, for which she never fully accounted. By order-
ing the defendant to transfer the remaining funds in
her accounts to the plaintiff, the court likely was striving
to offset the defendant’s earlier withdrawal. It was not
improper or inequitable for the court to do so.
The defendant also complains that, although the
court ordered that the proceeds from the sale of the
marital home be split equally, the amount of those pro-
ceeds was unpredictable in that ‘‘[i]t is quite possible
that selling the house could leave nothing for [her],’’
depending on the sale price of the property. To some
extent that unpredictability is unavoidable in that nei-
ther the parties, their expert witnesses, nor the court
can control the actual sale price of the property. The
defendant does not, however, suggest how an alterna-
tive division of the marital residence, short of simply
awarding it to her in its entirety, might alleviate that
unpredictability.
Moreover, as noted herein, the court found that the
plaintiff contributed $350,000 to the purchase of the
marital residence, which he had received as an inheri-
tance from his great grandmother and a gift from his
parents. The court also found that the defendant wilfully
and unilaterally violated the court order that she pay
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the mortgages on the marital residence during the pen-
dency of the action, and, because she did so, ‘‘that
deferral amount [of $87,961.45] must be paid off as a
balloon payment at the end of the mortgage term or
earlier payoff.’’ Despite those findings, which would
tend to favor a split more advantageous to the plaintiff,
the court nevertheless reasonably exercised its discre-
tion in ordering that the proceeds of the sale of the
marital residence be split equally.24 The court’s order
that the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence,
which, on the basis of the record before the trial court,
was the most significant asset of the parties’ marriage,
be split equally belies the defendant’s contention that
the court awarded the ‘‘vast majority’’ or ‘‘virtually all’’
of the parties’ assets to the plaintiff.
Finally, the defendant argues that the court inequita-
bly ordered her to pay the remaining debt on the parties’
two joint credit card accounts, which, pursuant to the
December 16, 2019 pendente lite orders, the plaintiff
had been paying. In making those payments, the plaintiff
reduced the parties’ joint debt by almost $16,000. Mean-
while, the defendant paid off approximately $70,000 of
her sole debt while this action was pending. Considering
its order that the proceeds from the sale of the marital
residence would be shared equally, despite the defen-
dant’s failure to abide by her pendente lite obligations,
24
The court also found that ‘‘[t]he parties also own a Marriott timeshare,
which the plaintiff values at $5000 and to which the defendant ascribes two
different values on her most recent financial affidavit, $45,000 and $20,527.
The parties have tried to sell the timeshare in the past without success.
Given these facts, the court finds the value of the timeshare to be $5000.’’
Although the record does not support the court’s finding that the plaintiff
valued the timeshare at $5000, the defendant testified at trial that the annual
fees for the timeshare were $3000 and that the parties had unsuccessfully
tried to sell it and she was not sure they would get even $20,000 for it when
they did sell it. That was the entirety of the evidence of the value of the
timeshare presented by the parties. On the basis of the scant evidence of
the timeshare’s value presented by the parties, we cannot conclude that the
court’s valuation was erroneous.
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the court again was striving to offset the financial ramifi-
cations of the defendant’s unilateral reductions of the
marital estate. Moreover, we note that the court found
that the defendant has a higher earning capacity and
higher income than the plaintiff, either or both of which
would have justified an order that the defendant pay
alimony to the plaintiff. Despite the plaintiff’s request
for alimony, the court did not issue such an order.
As noted herein, ‘‘[t]here is no set formula the court
is obligated to apply when dividing the parties’ assets
and . . . the court is vested with broad discretion in
fashioning financial orders.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Kent v. DiPaola, 178 Conn. App. 424, 441–42,
175 A.3d 601 (2017); see also Sapper v. Sapper, 109
Conn. App. 99, 107–108, 951 A.2d 5 (2008) (courts are
not bound to use specific formula and are not required
to ritualistically recite statutory criteria considered in
dividing marital assets). The court thoughtfully and
carefully considered the testimony, exhibits and rele-
vant statutory factors in dividing the marital property.
Given the entire mosaic of the court’s judgment, we
are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that
the court’s orders were inequitable. Accordingly, we
disagree with the defendant that the court abused its
discretion with respect to the division of the marital
estate.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.